US Next Generation Bomber Studies

[Steve Pace]

Four airplanes - From the U.S., the 1903 Wright Flyer, Douglas DC-3, Boeing 707, and the SR-71 qualify as game changers. -SP

 

[marauder2048]

Reading the Stevenson brief, it seems that whatever anyone here may think of his analysis, he reached the same conclusion that Bob Gates did, about three years before Gates: That the F-22's advantages were offset by inflexibility and high cost.

Reading the Stevenson brief, it seems that whatever anyone here may think of his analysis, he reached the same conclusion that Bob Gates did, about three years before Gates: That the F-22's advantages were offset by inflexibility and high cost.

I think Bob Gates arrived at whatever conclusion Gordon England told him to when it came to the F-22. As for "F-22's advantages were offset by inflexibility and high cost." that's pretty much subjective opinion. One the USAF doesn't agree with. The decision to end F-22 production is already being seen for the foolhardy decision it was.

And Gates was spectacularly wrong on just about everything from his predictions regarding the emergence of the PAK-FA and J-20, to New Start, to Bin Laden not being in Abbottabad.

Gates wrote: “nearly every time Moseley and … Wynne came to see me, it was about a new bomber or more F-22s.”

Wynne and Moseley should have punched Gates right in his face; that would have made their unprecedented dismissals at least somewhat justifiable.

 

[marauder2048]

In other (kinda) news:

Looks like the Navy is designing AARGM-ER for internal carriage on the F-35 A and C variants (BRU-68A and LAU-147 launcher compatible) .
New, higher impulse SRM preferred but other propulsion solutions will be considered. Could make for an interesting PenAid/GP strike weapon for the bomber fleet.

Some range estimates (from the Super Bug) for various propulsion stacks

 

[RadicalDisconnect]

The point is that you can certainly make valid criticisms about the F-22, F-35, and other systems, but the POGO's opposition and "reasoning" are so flawed in their technical analysis that even on points where they are somewhat correct on, their reasoning and analysis behind it is just atrocious.

Using performance that has absolutely ZERO relevance to any mission profile is the hallmark of their analysis. Of course you have willing folks out there that are ready to swallow up whatever stuff they put out. Check this gem for example...They don't point out the fact that the Viper in that hot rod performance is nearly out of fuel and has only about 2 missiles and a gun. Yeah, thats a profile the F-22 (or the F-35) is likely to be sent up in...because you know, thats how the F-16's are kitted by the USAF or NATO customers...

To give you an idea of how off their "analysis" is, from an unclassified SAR document, it takes around 50 seconds for the F-22 to go from Mach 0.8 to 1.5 at 30k feet.

Reading the Stevenson brief, it seems that whatever anyone here may think of his analysis, he reached the same conclusion that Bob Gates did, about three years before Gates: That the F-22's advantages were offset by inflexibility and high cost.

Except that brief suggests that the F-22 is at a qualitative disadvantage compared to the F-16. Sorry, but the reasoning behind their conclusion is just as important as the conclusion itself. It doesn't even matter that I happen to agree with POGO on maybe a few points. Their research is so poorly done that their credibility in technical analysis is almost zero for me.

It's annoying because these people (Pierre Sprey, Everest Ricionni, etc) had some pretty valid points back in the day and truly made some important contributions when it comes to fighter development, like lightening pilot workload, quantifying performance with E-M, etc. Its just that they are so dead set on their method of achieving these goals (simplicity trumps all) that they just ignore some genuine and important developments in technology. When technology marched on, they chose to ignore their benefits.

 

[RadicalDisconnect]

Double post, mods please delete.

 

[bobbymike]

Bloomberg is reporting - sorry can't find the link - that LRS-B contract will be R&D plus the first 20 bombers. Does that mean a mature design and that there were maybe prototypes built already?

 

[bring_it_on]

To give you an idea of how off their "analysis" is, from an unclassified SAR document, it takes around 50 seconds for the F-22 to go from Mach 0.8 to 1.5 at 30k feet.

Do you have the particular report that claims that?

 

[RadicalDisconnect]

To give you an idea of how off their "analysis" is, from an unclassified SAR document, it takes around 50 seconds for the F-22 to go from Mach 0.8 to 1.5 at 30k feet.

Do you have the particular report that claims that?

Google "F-22 SAR 2010". It seems like the original PDF file was taken down though so here's my cached link.

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eABrkdHMP9EJ:www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/SARs/DEC_2010_SAR/F-22-SAR-25_DEC_2010.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

 

[bring_it_on]

Thanks !

 

[marauder2048]

To give you an idea of how off their "analysis" is, from an unclassified SAR document, it takes around 50 seconds for the F-22 to go from Mach 0.8 to 1.5 at 30k feet.

Do you have the particular report that claims that?

Google "F-22 SAR 2010". It seems like the original PDF file was taken down though so here's my cached link.

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eABrkdHMP9EJ:www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/SARs/DEC_2010_SAR/F-22-SAR-25_DEC_2010.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

 

[Flyaway]

Bloomberg is reporting - sorry can't find the link - that LRS-B contract will be R&D plus the first 20 bombers. Does that mean a mature design and that there were maybe prototypes built already?

Bingo!

 

[sferrin]

Bloomberg is reporting - sorry can't find the link - that LRS-B contract will be R&D plus the first 20 bombers. Does that mean a mature design and that there were maybe prototypes built already?

Bingo!

Would be fascinating if those seen over Texas turned out to be prototypes flying. Have they ever been positively identified?

 

[quellish]

Bloomberg is reporting - sorry can't find the link - that LRS-B contract will be R&D plus the first 20 bombers. Does that mean a mature design and that there were maybe prototypes built already?

No.

 

[marauder2048]

Bloomberg is reporting - sorry can't find the link - that LRS-B contract will be R&D plus the first 20 bombers. Does that mean a mature design and that there were maybe prototypes built already?

No.

Are you ruling out sub-scale demonstrators?

 

[flateric]

They are hidden in plain sight.

 

[sferrin]

They are hidden in plain sight.

Elaborate please.

 

[quellish]

Are you ruling out sub-scale demonstrators?

Demonstrating what, exactly? How to build a large bomber (but smaller!)?


LM alone has flown at least 3 new-start risk reduction platforms specifically in support of this program. Each of these 3 has been discussed in public. DARPA, USAF, and other organizations have also conducted extensive R&D over the course of the LRS-B/NGB programs, including flight test.


None of these were "sub-scale demonstrators" or prototypes.

Elaborate please.

See above.

 

[Sundog]

I was thinking the X-55 is one of them; i.e. construction techniques. I was also thinking of the X-56, but Quellish said it wasn't subscale so that wouldn't be one. That's all I have for L-M. For Northrop, I would think the X-47A and X-47B.

 

[marauder2048]

Are you ruling out sub-scale demonstrators?

Demonstrating what, exactly? How to build a large bomber (but smaller!)?

Yes, given that the last production effort stumbled (in part) on materials, fabrication and assembly.

 

[sferrin]

Are you ruling out sub-scale demonstrators?

Demonstrating what, exactly? How to build a large bomber (but smaller!)?

Yes, given that the last production effort stumbled (in part) on materials, fabrication and assembly.

The B-2 was the first large, mostly composite, aircraft. It's no surprise that they encountered hiccups. There have been a few more built since then so that should be practically a non-issue.

 

[Flyaway]

I was thinking the X-55 is one of them; i.e. construction techniques. I was also thinking of the X-56, but Quellish said it wasn't subscale so that wouldn't be one. That's all I have for L-M. For Northrop, I would think the X-47A and X-47B.

Agree for the X-47A & X-47B for NG. But have no clue what LM could have been using.

I assume that the finished article for NG will be bigger than the X-47B.

 

[sferrin]

I was thinking the X-55 is one of them; i.e. construction techniques. I was also thinking of the X-56, but Quellish said it wasn't subscale so that wouldn't be one. That's all I have for L-M. For Northrop, I would think the X-47A and X-47B.

Agree for the X-47A & X-47B for NG. But have no clue what LM could have been using.

I assume that the finished article for NG will be bigger than the X-47B.

Unless they're referring to the Polecat and RQ-170. Sounds much more exciting to be mysterious and say they're "hiding in plain sight" than to just say, "X-47A/B, Polecat, and RQ-170" though. :

 

[sferrin]

LM alone has flown at least 3 new-start risk reduction platforms specifically in support of this program. Each of these 3 has been discussed in public. DARPA, USAF, and other organizations have also conducted extensive R&D over the course of the LRS-B/NGB programs, including flight test.


None of these were "sub-scale demonstrators" or prototypes.

Elaborate please.

See above.

Any chance of specifying the actual program names you have in mind?

 

[Flyaway]

I was thinking the X-55 is one of them; i.e. construction techniques. I was also thinking of the X-56, but Quellish said it wasn't subscale so that wouldn't be one. That's all I have for L-M. For Northrop, I would think the X-47A and X-47B.

Agree for the X-47A & X-47B for NG. But have no clue what LM could have been using.

I assume that the finished article for NG will be bigger than the X-47B.

Unless they're referring to the Polecat and RQ-170. Sounds much more exciting to be mysterious and say they're "hiding in plain sight" than to just say, "X-47A/B, Polecat, and RQ-170" though. :

I wonder if the RQ-180 & NG's LRS-B are all that dissimilar in design to each other & the X-47B. Or are they all much the same design just with variation in details.

Could LM's proposed Sea Ghost give any clues to their design.

http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/products/uclass.html

 

[quellish]

Unless they're referring to the Polecat and RQ-170. Sounds much more exciting to be mysterious and say they're "hiding in plain sight" than to just say, "X-47A/B, Polecat, and RQ-170" though. :

I disagree. I would say that conjecture about "sub scale demonstrators" or "prototypes" is far more exciting and mysterious than reading this thread or any of the many public sources for the names of the programs.


DoD identified a number of technologies that required risk reduction for the LRS-B and NGB efforts. These are in the public record. Risk reduction was funded, flight tests of many of these things happened. These were the bulk of the LRS-B and NGB funding.


Individual contractors identified their own areas of risk and performed risk reduction tasks. Again, these are in the public record. In some cases DoD participated, in some cases not.


As far as I know, all of these are documented in this thread.


Conjecture about flying bomber prototypes or demonstrators is exciting, but there is no information which supports this. In fact, there is considerable information to the contrary. The LRS-B program is not at a stage where flying prototypes would make sense, nor is there any indication that this is part of DoD's process for this program.


If someone wants to spin a cool story point to new scoot-n-hide shelters at your favorite "sekrit" place, call a UAV test stand in a very public place part of a "sekrit" project, or misidentify blurry contrails. Paid for with money that came out of thin air, of course.


The new bomber is an EB-52X Megafortress and Sky Masters won the RFP. It's been flying for years out of the secret base in Utah to bomb the greys at Dulce. You heard it here first.

 

[marauder2048]

Unless they're referring to the Polecat and RQ-170. Sounds much more exciting to be mysterious and say they're "hiding in plain sight" than to just say, "X-47A/B, Polecat, and RQ-170" though. :

I disagree. I would say that conjecture about "sub scale demonstrators" or "prototypes" is far more exciting and mysterious than reading this thread or any of the many public sources for the names of the programs.


DoD identified a number of technologies that required risk reduction for the LRS-B and NGB efforts. These are in the public record. Risk reduction was funded, flight tests of many of these things happened. These were the bulk of the LRS-B and NGB funding.


Individual contractors identified their own areas of risk and performed risk reduction tasks. Again, these are in the public record. In some cases DoD participated, in some cases not.


As far as I know, all of these are documented in this thread.


Conjecture about flying bomber prototypes or demonstrators is exciting, but there is no information which supports this. In fact, there is considerable information to the contrary. The LRS-B program is not at a stage where flying prototypes would make sense, nor is there any indication that this is part of DoD's process for this program.


If someone wants to spin a cool story point to new scoot-n-hide shelters at your favorite "sekrit" place, call a UAV test stand in a very public place part of a "sekrit" project, or misidentify blurry contrails. Paid for with money that came out of thin air, of course.


The new bomber is an EB-52X Megafortress and Sky Masters won the RFP. It's been flying for years out of the secret base in Utah to bomb the greys at Dulce. You heard it here first.

LRS-B is in fact code-named "Truncheon"

Your above point about sub-scale demonstrators makes complete sense now; there's no need as the B-2 would be your scale (or even super-scale) demonstrator for some if not most
of the new materials you might consider using. Example: the use of AFR-PE-4 to re-skin the hot trailing edge sections on the B-2. I understand the same material has been flight
tested on F-35.

As usual, thanks for the insights.

 

[Flyaway]

The B-2 never had any protypes, it was just rolled out of hanger and into flight testing.

 

[bring_it_on]

New DOD Report Shows Decline In Estimated Bomber Spending

The Defense Department estimates in a new report that Air Force spending on its long-range strike inventory will decline to just above $7 billion annually by 2025 after peaking at $9 billion in 2022, a marked drop compared to the Pentagon's 2013 forecast that implies cost estimates to develop and procure a new bomber -- a classified program -- are being revised downward.
DOD disclosed the figures in a previously unreported annual report on its long-term aircraft plan delivered to lawmakers April 22. The congressionally mandated 38-page report summarizes plans to acquire and sustain a fleet that will decline from 13,907 to 12,945 -- a reduction of nearly 7 percent -- between fiscal years 2016 and 2025.
"The plan is affordable within the [future years defense plan, from FY-16 to FY-20] and represents the department's commitment to provide a balanced force able to meet the needs of current conflicts, as well respond to a broad spectrum of future challenges, in a challenging fiscal environment," Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work wrote in a cover letter accompanying the report.
The Pentagon's 2013 report to Congress estimated funding to procure and sustain the Air Force bomber fleet -- including the B-1, B-2, B-52 and the new Long-Range Strike Bomber -- would propel annual Air Force spending on its long-range strike inventory to a sustained level of $10 billion within a decade, a three-fold increase compared to the 2012 plan.
The annual estimate reflects total research and development spending, procurement, operation and maintenance, personnel and military construction resources to achieve the planned inventory as well as to operate, maintain, sustain and support the fleet.
Before the launch of the LRS-B program, the Air Force projected annual spending for 10 years to support the bomber force at between $2.5 billion and $3 billion. With the exception of limited budget information, most details behind the new bomber program are classified.
The new report, dated April 2015, provides -- albeit indirectly -- the only forecast of Air Force budget plans for the classified program beyond the service's five-year budget plan which currently extends to FY-20. The Air Force is seeking $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2016 to develop the new bomber as part of a five-year plan that would allocate $13.8 billion on the research and development effort through FY-20, according to the service' budget request.
The new report states total long-range strike spending would climb from $7 billion in FY-21 to a $9 billion peak in FY-22 before declining back to $7 billion in FY-25.
The new report reiterates Air Force plans to field a new nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber in the mid-2020s but does not explicitly discuss planned inventory. Air Force officials have previously stated a goal of buying between 80 to 100 new bombers.
The Air Force launched the LRSB program with its fiscal year 2011 budget request. The effort was subsequently identified as a key modernization thrust of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which called for the military to "rebalance" toward the Asia-Pacific region following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
With the exception of limited budget information, most details behind the new bomber program are classified. The new report reiterates Air Force plans to field a new nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber in the mid-2020s but does not explicitly discuss planned inventory.
"The strategy to develop and field the LRSB includes minimizing new development and reducing risk through use of mature technologies and existing systems, as well as making informed trades to meet the unit cost target," the new report states.
When describing the projected cost of the new bomber, Air Force officials rely on an FY-10 figure -- $550 million per aircraft -- that does not account for research and development costs and assumes an average cost-after-a-complete-production run that analysts project would extend for more than decade.
Todd Harrison, a defense budget expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, estimates the development effort -- accounting for the impacts of inflation -- could cost $24 billion. In addition, simply factoring inflation into the Air Force's FY-10 cost figure and assuming a 100-aircraft production run through the mid-2030s would translate to $66 billion once inflation is accounted for. That would assume a $90 billion program without any cost growth.
The $550 million cost target "has informed the design effort and helps ensure sufficient production and a sustainable inventory over the long term," according to the report.
Further, the "Air Force and DOD have streamlined requirements and acquisition oversight to ensure timely decisions are made in the fielding of this critically important new weapon system," the report adds.
The Air Force is currently reviewing new bomber designs proposed by Northrop Grumman and a Boeing-Lockheed Martin team, and plans to select a winner -- in what is expected to be one of the most important aerospace military contracts since the competition to build the Joint Strike Fighter -- this summer. -- Jason Sherman

http://insidedefense.com/node/169041

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/04/27/house-cuts-460m-from-air-forces-next-generation-stealth-bomber/

Cuts due to late contract award apparently.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/04/27/house-cuts-460m-from-air-forces-next-generation-stealth-bomber/

Cuts due to late contract award apparently.

LRS-B's survivability against GAO protest being a KPP

 

[flateric]

That famous weirdo from the cover of New World Vistas. Hardly a bomber as I see now.
As it was discussed briefly in this topic, let ot be here.

 

[bobbymike]

Battling opinion pieces sorry subscription required

1) Advantage Northrop

http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-stealth-and-integration-experience-point-northrop-grumman-lrs-b-advantage?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150430_AW-19_555&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_5&utm_rid=CPEN1000000230026&utm_campaign=2376&utm_medium=email

2) Advantage Boeing-Lockheed

http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-boeing-lockheed-team-most-qualified?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150430_AW-19_555&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_6&utm_rid=CPEN1000000230026&utm_campaign=2376&utm_medium=email

 

[bring_it_on]

I think both did a rather mediocre job of really driving home why their "team" should win. Their regular staff could have done a much better job

 

[fightingirish]

Both opinon pieces are now opened without required subscription anymore by Aviation Week.

Battling opinion pieces sorry subscription required

1) Advantage Northrop

http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-stealth-and-integration-experience-point-northrop-grumman-lrs-b-advantage?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150430_AW-19_555&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_5&utm_rid=CPEN1000000230026&utm_campaign=2376&utm_medium=email

2) Advantage Boeing-Lockheed

http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-boeing-lockheed-team-most-qualified?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150430_AW-19_555&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_6&utm_rid=CPEN1000000230026&utm_campaign=2376&utm_medium=email

The U.S. Air Force will select a prime contractor this year to develop and build its stealthy Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). Boeing and Lockheed Martin have teamed up to compete against B-2 prime contractor Northrop Grumman, but who will win?


This week, Aviation Week & Space Technology publishes two differing viewpoints on the forthcoming selection. Loren Thomson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, argues that Boeing and Lockheed Martin together have been lead integrators for 95% of the the Air Force’s bomber and strike aircraft, making the teammates the most qualified. Countering that argument, Robert Haffa, former director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, says a deeper dive into Air Force requirements and the competing teams’ capabilities establishes Northrop Grumman as an overwhelming favorite to produce the LRS-B.[/size]

Source: Rupa Haria | AviationWeek.com - Differing Views On Who Will Build The Long-Range Strike Bomber

 

[Triton]

More speculation that Boeing will purchase the aviation business of Northrop Grumman.


"Battle joined
Three of the world’s biggest defence companies are locked in a contest that could reshape the industry"
May 2nd 2015 | From the print edition

Source:
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650144-three-worlds-biggest-defence-companies-are-locked-contest-could-reshape?fsrc=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/battlejoined

WITHIN the next few months, the biggest defence contract for what will probably be many years to come will be awarded by the US Air Force, to build a new long-range strike bomber. The B-3, as it is likely to be named, will be a nuclear-capable aircraft designed to penetrate the most sophisticated air defences. The contract itself will be worth $50 billion-plus in revenues to the successful bidder, and there will be many billions of dollars more for work on design, support and upgrades. The plan is to build at least 80-100 of the planes at a cost of more than $550m each.

The stakes could not be higher for at least two of the three industrial heavyweights that are slugging it out. On one side is a team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin; on the other, Northrop Grumman. The result could lead to a shake-out in the defence industry, with one of the competitors having to give up making combat aircraft for good.

After the B-3 contract is awarded, the next big deal for combat planes—for a sixth-generation “air-dominance fighter” to replace the F-22 and F-18 Super Hornet—will be more than a decade away. So Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group, an aviation-consulting firm, believes it will be hard for the loser to stay in the combat-aircraft business. If Northrop were to miss out, its investors may press for it to be broken up. If Boeing were to lose, Mr Aboulafia thinks it may seek to buy Northrop’s aircraft-building business, to ensure it gets the job after all. The production line in St Louis that makes Boeing’s F-18 (the US Navy’s mainstay fighter until it starts to get the carrier version of the new F-35 in numbers) is due to close in 2017. If Northrop were to depart the field, that could leave Lockheed Martin as the only American company with the ability to design combat planes, and thus the biggest winner of the three.

Usually in a contest of this kind, particularly this close to its end, a clear favourite emerges. Industry-watchers rate this one as still too close to call. That is partly because the degree of secrecy surrounding what is still classified as a “black programme” has remained high. Only the rough outlines of the aircraft’s specification have been revealed. It will be stealthy, subsonic, have a range of around 6,000 miles (9,650km) and be able to carry a big enough payload to destroy many targets during a single sortie. The best clues to what it will look like are from earlier “flying wing” design concepts the aircraft-makers have displayed, and from the shrouded “mystery plane” that Northrop showed in a recent television commercial (pictured). But most of all, picking a winner is hard because both competitors are highly credible—and each has different strengths.

Boeing and Lockheed first joined forces in 2007 to build what was then known as the Next-Generation Bomber—a project cancelled two years later because its excessive technological ambition was causing costs to soar. They decided to team up again in 2013 to prepare for a new request for proposals that the air force quietly released last summer. Boeing is the team leader and will build the aircraft if their bid is successful; Lockheed will take the main responsibility for its design.

That should be a winning combination. Boeing is as good as it gets when it comes to the efficient construction of large aircraft, and has painfully and expensively acquired expertise in carbon-fibre composites as it developed its 787 Dreamliner, a civil airliner. Lockheed can draw on its “skunk works”, an autonomous design team that works on radical new aircraft technologies; and on its experience developing radar-beating stealth technologies for the F-22 and F-35 fighter planes.

Northrop, on the other hand, built the revolutionary B-2 stealth bomber that entered service in the early 1990s. It was conceived as a deep-penetration nuclear bomber at the height of the cold war. But when the Soviet Union dissolved, the need for America to have 132 of the planes went with it. Only 21 were eventually built, leading the programme into a “death spiral” in which declining orders pushed up the unit price of an aircraft to absurd levels. Once its development, engineering and testing costs were added, each B-2 ended up costing more than $2 billion. But it was hardly Northrop’s fault that the cold war ended sooner than expected. The plane it built has since proved its capabilities in numerous conflicts, from Kosovo to Libya.

Updated versions of the once-radical technologies that made the B-2 so expensive (both to buy and to operate) will find their way into the new bomber. Another possible advantage for the air force in choosing Northrop is that it might be better able to focus on the programme. Boeing is not only grappling with its hugely demanding, and rapidly expanding, civil-aviation business; it is also struggling to deliver the K-46 tanker plane by the target date of 2017. (It snatched that big order from a consortium of Northrop and Airbus, after protesting at the air force’s initial decision to award it to its rivals.) Lockheed, for its part, also has its hands full ramping up production of the late and over-budget F-35.

The target for the plane to come into operation is the mid-2020s—if possible, even earlier. In part this is because of fast-emerging new threats and in part because the average age of America’s current bomber fleet, consisting of 76 geriatric B-52s, 63 B-1s and 20 B-2s, is 38 years. Keeping such ancient aircraft flying in the face of metal fatigue and corrosion is a constant struggle: just 120 are deemed mission-ready. None of these, except the B-2s, can penetrate first-rate air defences without carrying cruise missiles—and the missiles are of little use against mobile targets.

In the kind of one-sided wars that America and its allies fought in the years after the September 11th 2001 attacks, such deficiencies were not a problem. But during that period China, in particular, has invested heavily in “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities. These include thousands of precision-guided missiles of increasing range that could threaten America’s bases in the Western Pacific, and any carriers sailing close enough to shore to launch their short-range tactical aircraft. Critics of the huge F-35 programme (the Pentagon is planning to buy 2,457 aircraft at a cost of around $100m each) argue that its limited range was a growing problem even before it entered service. A new long-range bomber that can penetrate the most advanced air defences is thus seen as vital in preserving America’s unique ability to project power anywhere in the world.

If getting the new bomber into service fast is a priority, so too is keeping the price low enough to be able to build it in sensible numbers, and thus keep it safe from political ambush. Budget caps imposed by Congress in 2013 have ushered in a decade of defence-spending austerity, and the B-3 will be the first major weapons system to be designed and produced in this new era.

To stay on budget and avoid the risk of having its orders cut, the programme will have to rely on technologies adapted from earlier projects; and any temptation to “gold-plate” its specification with showy but not strictly necessary features will have to be resisted. The B-3 will be a bit smaller than the B-2, and be able to use the same engines as the F-35. The option of being able to fly the bomber pilotlessly, by remote control, seems to have been dropped, as have some highly sophisticated surveillance sensors that were proposed earlier.

The risk of this cautious approach is that the new bomber might quickly lose its technical edge if faced with new threats or relentlessly improving air-defence systems (thanks to ever faster processors and sensors). But this danger is being seen off in two ways. The first is by designing the planes with what the Pentagon’s acquisitions chief, Frank Kendall, describes as an “open architecture and modular approach”, in which companies will compete to provide future upgrades that can be easily plugged in as and when needed. The other is that, despite its stealthiness, the B-3 will be fully connected to a range of “off-board capabilities”, such as electronic countermeasures and the collection of targeting data, provided by other aircraft and orbital reconnaissance satellites, instead of having to carry everything on board.

In keeping with the secrecy surrounding the plane, neither of the two competing teams is prepared to discuss their bids or why they should prevail in any detail. Such reticence may not survive the awarding of the contract. Although the air force is striving to make its decision as protest-proof as possible, neither Boeing nor Northrop is likely to take defeat quietly. Northrop is still smarting from Boeing’s lobbying triumph over the K-46 tanker programme, in which a plane that many military analysts considered superior ended up losing.

The Pentagon likes to share work around so as to ensure there is continued competition for contracts to provide military gear, especially complex ones such as this. In the case of the B-3 it has explicitly ruled out taking such concerns into account when choosing between the two contenders. That may be because it realises that whichever it selects, it will deal a devastating blow to the other. The days when America had a choice of combat-plane suppliers are coming to an end

 

[Triton]

"This Obscure Skunk Works Jet May Help Team Win New Stealth Bomber Bid "
by Tyler Rogoway
4/11/15 4:25pm

Source:
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this-obscure-skunk-works-jet-may-help-team-win-new-stea-1697207263

 

[marauder2048]

So if I understand Aboulafia's position(s):

NG wins -> sells fighter line to Boeing
NG loses -> sells fighter line to Boeing

I defy him to make any less sense.

 

[Sundog]

So if I understand Aboulafia's position(s):

NG wins -> sells fighter line to Boeing
NG loses -> sells fighter line to Boeing

I defy him to make any less sense.

It's not about making sense, it's about telegraphing what Wall Street wants.

 

[marauder2048]

So if I understand Aboulafia's position(s):

NG wins -> sells fighter line to Boeing
NG loses -> sells fighter line to Boeing

I defy him to make any less sense.

It's not about making sense, it's about telegraphing what Wall Street wants.

There's very little to no evidence to suggest that:

a. the street wants or would want NG broken up
b. NG would be willing/able to sell
c. Boeing would be willing/able to buy

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/what-the-b-3-bomber-should-be/?hootPostID=d801a1f7f1c3ffe456dc74ab11c5dd0e

More opinion piece but interesting nonetheless IMHO.