US Next Generation Bomber Studies

[bobbymike]

With my respect, since 6 years there is not a real single picture about the new bomber, just concept and illustrated drawing and a mix between ancient long range strike projects but no concrete picture about the LRS-B.

yep, they really got out of hand lately anf didn't report to forum about state of classified programs running...

Yes that really bugs me to, can't they send us some classified pictures we'll keep them secret, hey its called 'Secret' Projects

 

[RyanC]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

 

[sferrin]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

You can thank the politicians for that.

 

[quellish]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

I am not sure how you are making that connection between cost controls and special access programs.

 

[donnage99]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

Lol reality tells us differently. Classified programs are the ones that are most prone to cost overrun. No oversight, those few in charge can just keep adding on more or changing requirements, boosting up costs. This has been the history of this nation's classified programs

 

[FighterJock]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

Lol reality tells us differently. Classified programs are the ones that are most prone to cost overrun. No oversight, those few in charge can just keep adding on more or changing requirements, boosting up costs. This has been the history of this nation's classified programs

I agree, but classified programs are less likely to be canceled if they overrun, the A-12 was a classic example of a good aircraft that got canceled due to cost overruns but that was not classified.

 

[sferrin]

It's pretty sad that in order to keep costs under control, DoD has to run a program at a high level of classification.

Lol reality tells us differently. Classified programs are the ones that are most prone to cost overrun. No oversight, those few in charge can just keep adding on more or changing requirements, boosting up costs. This has been the history of this nation's classified programs

I agree, but classified programs are less likely to be canceled if they overrun, the A-12 was a classic example of a good aircraft that got canceled due to cost overruns but that was not classified.

There are a whole boatload of reasons the A-12 got cancelled. Blaming it on overruns, when it's actually a rare thing for a project to come in under budget these days, is dubious at best.

 

[flateric]

but what the hell is in the middle?

The thing in the middle...

 

[quellish]

Lol reality tells us differently. Classified programs are the ones that are most prone to cost overrun. No oversight, those few in charge can just keep adding on more or changing requirements, boosting up costs. This has been the history of this nation's classified programs

Special access programs have oversight.
Some go over budget, some do not. I have not seen anything that would lead me to believe that a special access program is more likely to go over budget than a program that does not have the same security restrictions.

 

[dark sidius]

6th gen for what ? a fighter or something else, this concept look very strange. ???

 

[LowObservable]

The first time I saw that thing I nearly did a spit-take in the middle of a press conference.


It's the sort of thing that you'd get your art department to gin up if you wanted to imply that there would be no replacement for your existing products for at least a million years.

 

[flateric]

yes, LM usually shows it next slide next to to 'concurrent's proposal' (which is represented by X-47B) )))

 

[dark sidius]

The Air Force’s top acquisition official defended the secrecy surrounding the Long-Range Strike Bomber during a recent House Armed Services Committee’s seapower and power projection forces panel. Responding to a query from Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) on both the classification level and technology maturation of the program, USAF’s acquisition head William LaPlante said he is convinced the secrecy that surrounds the program is critical to safeguarding key technology. USAF is going for a “Block A” approach, where 80 percent of the requirements in the aircraft are rolled out in the first version while maintaining the target $550 million baseline, he said in the April 2 hearing. This is why it is not front-loading requirements on early versions. “We’re holding firm to that,” LaPlante said. As time goes by USAF wants to “hook into either an open architecture with new sensors, hardened spots on the wings,” and other parts of the aircraft with more up-to-date developments. “We don’t know what technology is going to be there, but we have to build it [so we] … have the technology ramp… that can inject these technologies.” LaPlante noted one of the issues he has been examining is whether USAF has a “sufficient technology ramp” to feed next generation versions of the bomber. “In some areas we do, and some areas we don’t,” he said. “And we can’t talk about it more here.”

 

[fightingirish]

Here an artist’s concept by Erik Simonsen, showing a future unmanned bomber, as it muscles into position under a tanker.
This concept is published in Air Force Magazine, April 2014, page 32.

 

[flateric]

beheaded X-44A Manta I see

 

[bobbymike]

More Bombers for the Navy Decade?

Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower and projection forces panel, said the Air Force’s plan to buy 80-100 bombers is inadequate. Speaking with defense reporters in Washington, D.C., Tuesday, Forbes said he doesn’t have a specific number in mind, but he thinks it’s possible the bomber budget won’t be enough to get the numbers USAF needs. The Air Force has been “the good child ... most of (its program) goes along pretty smooth” and the service has done “a pretty good job with the overall budgets they have had,” Forbes said, but he’s worried about USAF modernization and preserving air dominance. In another plug for aircraft carriers, Navy fighters, and jammers, he said, “It’s not just where the bombers will go, but can we give them the amount of protection and overall air dominance that we think those bombers need?” That said, Forbes argued the next decade—or two or three—“is going to be a decade of seapower.” He said it no longer makes “military sense” to divide the defense budget up into thirds (one for each service), and the Navy should get a bigger share. “Every major country in the Pacific is building their Navy up,” he said, adding, “We’re the only one that’s reducing.” However, he thinks the defense debate in Congress is trending toward bigger budgets, and more bombers may be in the cards. Stay tuned.

—John A. Tirpak
--------------------------------------------------
About 300 or so would be nice

 

[flateric]

back in 2007

 

[Ian33]

Boeing Bird of Prey has always puzzled me - especially as I once saw a huge bomber sized aircraft (drawing) of one (scaled up, same weird kinked wings, same intake, the lot).
Always wondered why it was so special.

 

[flateric]

Always wondered why it was so special.

it's clearly described in any BoP backgrounder

 

[sublight_]

Boeing Bird of Prey has always puzzled me - especially as I once saw a huge bomber sized aircraft (drawing) of one (scaled up, same weird kinked wings, same intake, the lot).
Always wondered why it was so special.

According to Janes, the "special" was its active camouflage, which is not on the platform hanging in National Museum of the United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson. Inviso anyone?

 

[Sundog]

According to Janes, the "special" was its active camouflage, which is not on the platform hanging in National Museum of the United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson. Inviso anyone?

Which were probably conformal, light weight, "light" panels, to illuminate the the airframe such that it matched the background/scattered light in the sky. Sort of a modern version of Yehudi lights.

 

[sublight_]

According to Janes, the "special" was its active camouflage, which is not on the platform hanging in National Museum of the United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson. Inviso anyone?

Which were probably conformal, light weight, "light" panels, to illuminate the the airframe such that it matched the background/scattered light in the sky. Sort of a modern version of Yehudi lights.

Which means there were two of those built and the OTHER one has the light panels, or the active camouflage story is baloney. Any active lighting would have been baked into the airframe design and not just easily pulled off....

 

[quellish]

According to Janes, the "special" was its active camouflage, which is not on the platform hanging in National Museum of the United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson. Inviso anyone?

From [/size]http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=348

In its 38 flights, the Bird of Prey tested ways to make aircraft less observable to the eye and to radar. It also validated new ways to design and build aircraft using large single-piece composite structures, "virtual reality" computerized design and assembly, and disposable tooling.

The aircraft demonstrates advanced stealth concepts, notably its "gapless" control surfaces that blend smoothly into the wings to reduce radar visibility, and an engine intake completely shielded from the front.

You can read about the history of the program here:
http://www.dreamlandresort.com/black_projects/bird_of_prey.html


There was no "active stealth". The construction and design techniques used allowed for a very extreme level of radar signature reduction. Because of this, the signature in other spectrums became dominant. BoP tested methods of reducing those signatures as well. All of these things are visible on the aircraft as it is on display at the USAF museam.

 

[sublight_]

There was no "active stealth". The construction and design techniques used allowed for a very extreme level of radar signature reduction. Because of this, the signature in other spectrums became dominant. BoP tested methods of reducing those signatures as well. All of these things are visible on the aircraft as it is on display at the USAF museam.

I would sure like to see the gapless control surfaced, one piece bodied, ELO platform, evolution of this technology that is probably sitting at TTR today.....

 

[quellish]

I would sure like to see the gapless control surfaced, one piece bodied, ELO platform, evolution of this technology that is probably sitting at TTR today.....

TTR is visible from public land. You can look to your heart's desire.
X-32 and X-45 were evolutions of this technology.

 

[sublight_]

I would sure like to see the gapless control surfaced, one piece bodied, ELO platform, evolution of this technology that is probably sitting at TTR today.....

TTR is visible from public land. You can look to your heart's desire.

A good thermal imaging system for night observation is way out of my budget....

 

[quellish]

A good thermal imaging system for night observation is way out of my budget....

You don't need it to observe TTR.
This is veering off topic.

 

[Sundog]

One of my old structure professors worked on gapless and flexible control surface technology. My understanding is that it was successful and the way they went about it is still classified. IIRC, based on what was released, they used shape memory alloys/flexible plastic and the way they actuated the trailing edge to change shape was the part of the break through technology they (He and his grad students) developed.

 

[bobbymike]

U.S. Air Force Expects Huge Uptick in Spending on Bombers

May 7, 2014
The Air Force expects spending on bombers to double, come fiscal 2020, as a new aircraft is in the works and older ones get upgrades. Citing a Pentagon document provided to lawmakers, Bloomberg reports that the budget for those types of aircraft would reach roughly $9.5 billion in another half-decade, up from less than $5 billion envisioned for fiscal 2015, which begins on Oct. 1. Spending would remain above the $9 billion level for the ensuing few years, and drop back to $8 billion in fiscal 2024, according to the news service. The substantial uptick is the result of a confluence of events: Military officials want to buy a new long-range stealth bomber with initial capability in the mid-2020s, and existing planes -- some decades old -- need upgrades to keep functioning until a successor is fully available. The Air Force plans to buy up to 100 of the yet-to-be-developed bombers at a total cost of $55 billion or more, according to Bloomberg.

Notably, the news service reports, the Pentagon's projections do not account for automatic spending cuts known as sequestration. The cuts are set to kick in again in fiscal 2016. They were conceived by Congress as a means to force government spending reductions. The new budget revelations come as lawmakers debate how best to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent at the least cost. Some members of Congress see land-based missiles as a cost-effective option compared to other nuclear delivery platforms, namely long-range bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

 

[bobbymike]

Bomber Budget to Peak at $9.5 Billion

Funding for development and production of the Air Force’s Long-Range Strike Bomber, now funded at about $5 billion annually, will climb gradually to about $7 billion in fiscal year ’19, then jump up to between $9 billion and $10 billion between Fiscal 2020 and Fiscal 2022, before beginning to ramp down again, according to a chart released by the Pentagon. The chart was included in the “Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan, Fiscal Years 2015-2044,” which has been required by Congress as a supplement to the Pentagon’s budget request for the last several years. “The current goal is to achieve an initial capability in the mid-2020s, and to hold down the unit cost to ensure sufficient production (80-to-100 aircraft) and a sustainable bomber inventory over the far term,” according to the document. The chart shows USAF holding the legacy bomber fleet inventory (B-52, B-1B, and B-2) steady at about 160 aircraft until Fiscal ’21, then declining by about five airframes per year thereafter. During the next 10 years, USAF intends to continue modernizing its current bombers, updating the B-52 with “machine-to-machine retargeting” capability, improve sustainability of the B-1B, and increase the survivability of the B-2, according to the report. ​
—John A. Tirpak
5/19/2014

 

[bobbymike]

New Bomber Engines

The Air Force’s new bomber project doesn’t depend on getting Congress to fund the new advanced engine program proposed in the Fiscal 2015 defense budget, service acquisition executive William LaPlante told Air Force Magazine Wednesday. LaPlante said the new engine project isn’t specifically keyed to the new bomber or a new fighter, but is meant to explore advanced technologies with an eye toward efficiency and advancing the state of the art. “Once we decide to invest in advanced technology—the next generation of something—we should have in mind” the platforms it could support, LaPlante acknowledged. However, he also said, “We can’t build programs around” the success of a particular technology initiative. The engine initiative calls for $1 billion over the next five years, but the Pentagon has said it’s one of the things that will be cut if sequester continues in Fiscal 2016. LaPlante also said it’s “still too early to tell” if the contractor picked to build the airplane will select an engine for it or if the government will choose the powerplant. James Kenyon, general manager of next generation fighter programs for Pratt & Whitney, said Monday that his company is “prepared to work with the airframers to provide what they need” for the LRS-B, but declined to be specific about any particular engine Pratt is proposing for the project.​
—John A. Tirpak
5/22/2014

 

[Doggzilla]

Not sure why the feel compelled to produce every design as if its the only weapon we will ever need. In reality, older aircraft almost always carry the burden of the mission, since they are the most common at any given time. What we need is a small elite prototype force, and for that technology to be produced in an entirely new aircraft that learned from those mistakes. We didnt see B-29s in 1937, we saw them after B-17s and B-24s had proven them. It would have been insanely expensive to go directly to the B-29, and an incredible amount of experience would have had to be gained. This is why it costs so much to produce and aircraft today. Nearly no intermediate aircraft, and each aircraft has to be tested as if its been through ever war scenario ever. It costs more than actually going to war. Its insane.

For instance, it cost less to operate aircraft over Iraq than it did to train them. Because every training mission is flown like a combat engagement, while real war is mostly flying around on patrol... the training wears the aircraft out far more than war does.

What we need is to produce an intermediate design, to test out all the new tech alongside any acceptable existing components, then produce a new design when the old design is mature.

 

[Jemiba]

I think, the role you call "Intermediate aircraft" is fulfilled today by modified and upgraded aircraft,
instead of completely new types. Or by aircraft taking over roles, they weren't intended for during
the design phase. Contrary to the WW II era, that's possible today, because there are relatively few
requirements, that need completely new structures, I think. Modifying the B-17 or B-24 into a full
pressurized bomber with range and ceiling of the B-29, actually would have been a new aircraft,
but adding capability for the use of precision guided weapons to, say the B-52 or B-1 needed
relatively few changes. And the overall capabilities principally still are sufficient, so the cost-benefit
calculation still is positive, at least better, than building a completely new, intermediate aircraft.
And one day,both mentioned types will have to be replaced, no aircraft will fly forever. But with
them soldiering on, there still is no need for an intermediate type ... economically !

 

[bobbymike]

The Bomber Countdown Has Started

The Air Force is within weeks of issuing a final request for proposals for the new Long-Range Strike Bomber and expects to choose a single contractor to build the airplane “nominally in about a year,” service acquisition executive William LaPlante told Air Force Magazine in an interview. A draft RFP has been out for some time, and while there are “still some iterations going on” between USAF and its contractors over what the final RFP will say, “hopefully that will wrap up soon,” LaPlante said. The downselect in Spring of 2015 will narrow the field of competitors to just one contractor or team, he said. The competition phase has not been limited to “paper studies,” he allowed, but includes flying demonstrators or better. “We will have variants of technical articles … if you want to call them ‘prototypes,’” he said, and this fact, though previously undisclosed, should be no surprise because the program is “relying on relatively mature technologies,” LaPlante explained. Some of these flying demonstrators are the product of “internal resources that industry has already; some of it is stuff that we have funded through various programs over the years.” The product will therefore be “a combination of government (and) … internal investment” from the contractors. A team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin has said it is pursuing the LRS-B contract, and Northrop Grumman is also expected to be in the running.​
—John A. Tirpak
5/29/2014
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Interesting comments in bold. Does this mean there are flying demonstrators out there?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bomber Variants

There will be a number of “variants” of the new Long-Range Strike Bomber, Air Force acquisition executive William LaPlante told Air Force Magazine in an interview. The design chosen will follow an “adaptable strategy” allowing for changes to the aircraft over time, he said. “The decision was made—and we’ve stuck to it … to go with relatively mature technologies” on the first version of the LRS-B, then “build in design points and an adaptable strategy that allows us to do block upgrades to future variants” that can accommodate new threats or technologies. Not all future versions have been mapped out. “We don’t necessarily know exactly what sensor or weapon or capability we’ll put on it, but we do know that we want to build ‘hooks’ in the system” and an open architecture to make it easy to adapt to changing conditions. “One of those for sure is going to be the nuclear … variant,” LaPlante said. He challenged the notion that nuclear hardening must be designed into the aircraft from the start, saying the issue is “not black and white,” but that adequate provision will be made to make it “easier” to make a future nuclear version of the bomber. Why wasn’t the nuclear model first? “From a schedule and a national perspective, [the nuclear model] wasn’t the first version we needed,” he said.
—John A. Tirpak
5/29/2014

 

[flateric]

an official LRS-B program logo

 

[Dragon029]

Would you be able to re-upload that? Image is corrupted or something.

 

[mz]

The downselect in Spring of 2015 will narrow the field of competitors to just one contractor or team, he said. The competition phase has not been limited to “paper studies,” he allowed, but includes flying demonstrators or better.

This doesn't make sense, prototypes flying before a selection of the contractor in the spring of 2015? That means they should be flying already?

Or do they select one contractor in the spring of 2015, then that contractor builds a prototype?

 

[TomS]

This doesn't make sense, prototypes flying before a selection of the contractor in the spring of 2015? That means they should be flying already?

Or do they select one contractor in the spring of 2015, then that contractor builds a prototype?

Sounds to me as though they have demonstrators flying already. I would not be surprised if these are mostly subscale models or modifications of existing aircraft to test specific concepts or technology, rather than full-scale bomber prototypes.

 

[bring_it_on]

Yeah tech demonstrators would have been flying to validate the designs, materials, processes etc. Materials would be as important as shaping here as even though they say that the aircraft will use

mature technologies

we do not know exactly what has

matured

nicely in the black world.

 

[bobbymike]

No Time or Speed Limits

​The Air Force will buy the 80-100 Long-Range Strike Bombers at whatever rate makes the most sense, service acquisition chief William LaPlante said in an interview with Air Force Magazine. Acknowledging that USAF will have a lot on its plate in the 2020s—the LRS-B, the F-35, an F-22 successor, the T-X trainer, KC-46 tanker, and other programs—LaPlante said the bomber doesn’t have to be crammed into a certain timeframe to preserve the overall funding scheme. The aircraft is “foundational” to the Air Force mission for the next 40 years, he said, and the service will trade other programs to keep it, if necessary. The rate of production, he said, will have to be fast enough to obtain learning curve efficiencies, but not so fast that the program suffers from “concurrency issues” like the F-35 experienced. As for the buy range of 80-100 airplanes, LaPlante said the figures recognize “we have never bought anything” in the numbers planned and a range is more “credible” than a specific number. However, because the $550 million average production unit cost is a key program requirement, the 80-100 was set “because you have to have … something to shoot for” to derive a unit cost estimate.

—John A. Tirpak

Feel Free to Do Better

Contractors proposing concepts for the Air Force’s Long-Range Strike Bomber can offer better than the Air Force’s minimum requirements and get paid for them if the price is right, service acquisition head William LaPlante told Air Force Magazine. Although USAF has shown laudable “discipline” on not changing the LRS-B requirements, which he said have remained fixed since 2010 and can only be altered by the Chief of Staff, the service is trying to structure the request for proposals such that contractors can offer “more than the lowest-acceptable technology” solution. However, there are relatively strict limits on weight and volume in the airplane, and any capability over and above the threshold “has to earn its way on” to the aircraft. The strategy is in keeping with the Pentagon’s “Better Buying Power” guidelines, which allow rewarding contractors who offer substantially more capability for only marginally higher cost.
—John A. Tirpak


The 80 Percent Solution

The first version of the Long-Range Strike Bomber is “very deliberately” not the final version, Air Force acquisition chief William LaPlante said in an interview. LaPlante said the first version could be described as the “80 percent solution” to USAF’s ultimate requirement. In previous programs, he explained, the acquisition community would get nervous that “there would be no second version” of a given program because of cost or funding uncertainty, and tended to load up the initial model with more capabilities than were really needed at the start. That made them more complex, added changes and requirements, and “that’s how you get 15-year development” timelines, LaPlante said. With the LRS-B, the “Block” approach—starting with a well-defined capability that is less than the ultimate requirement and then improving it in stages—is being pursued because there’s “historical evidence” that it works better, he asserted. The F-16, he noted, looks largely the same today as it did when first introduced in the 1970s, but “if you open it up … on the inside” the aircraft is virtually unrecognizable from early models, due to improvements and increased capabilities.
—John A. Tirpak