US NAVY ATA (Advanced Tactical Aircraft) program: A-12 Avenger II & its rivals

[Sundog]

That's funny, I thought there was a State Secrets Privilege that trumps all else. Obviously only applies to people being tortured in Moroccan shipping containers and not shareholders or the Federal Government...

Edited:I misunderstood what you were saying when I first read it. F-14D clarified it for me.

 

[F-14D]

Two previous posts are particularly relevant for this:
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1169.msg34689.html#msg34689 &
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,1169.msg34736.html#msg34736

What is especially interesting is how the real world interfaces the bureaucratic world interfaces the legal world. The issue before the Supreme Court is basically the contractors are saying they couldn't perform because the government withheld data on stealth technology necessary to build the plane and that GD-MDC had identified availability of that data as one of the cornerstones of their proposal. Gov't is not denying, agreeing with or even addressing that key issue. They're simply saying that the contractors shouldn't be allowed to raise that argument, in the interests of national security. Of course without that argument, a great portion of the contractors' case collapses.

The question seems to revolve around how much has to be disclosed in court. If all the contractors have to show is that whenever they went to USAF for the data they were told they didn't have the right clearances without having to actually disclose the data they couldn't get, then the security argument may go away. On the other hand, if some of the data has to be disclosed in order to asses the validity of the contractors' claims, then the gov't has a case. Of course, the Supreme Court could still say that that must be disclosed in order for the contractors to have their day in court, but require it be be under sealed testimony before a court whose officials are cleared.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

What were the reasons behind the Navy's choice for specifying a subsonic attack aircraft in the ATA program? Range and payload? Contractors may have been given more room to "do their own thing" with the later A-X program, but what convinced the Navy to consider more "fighter-like" supersonic designs for that program?

I imagine the lack of speed have killed any chance of the USAF adopting the A-12 as Congress hoped they would do.

 

[F-14D]

What were the reasons behind the Navy's choice for specifying a subsonic attack aircraft in the ATA program? Range and payload? Contractors may have been given more room to "do their own thing" with the later A-X program, but what convinced the Navy to consider more "fighter-like" supersonic designs for that program?

I imagine the lack of speed have killed any chance of the USAF adopting the A-12 as Congress hoped they would do.

Supersonic speed offered no advantage for the Navy attack mission, and a lot of penalties. What ATA was supposed to be was a long range stealthy strike aircraft. It would have AIM-120 and AIM-9 capability, but that was for self defense. Fighter missions would have been handled by the NATF or an evolved F-14. ATA was very much a East Coast/Beltway envisioned aircraft. AX, on the other hand, had more input from the operating forces in the fleet. It evolved into A/FX when, with NATF and the F-14 firmly out of the picture, it was realized that more fighter capability was going to be needed. But even then fighter was a secondary mission.

Lack of speed was not what killed any chance of USAF adopting A-12. After all, B-52, B-2, B-1 most of the time, F-15E when loaded with significant external ordnance are subsonic. The fact that it was a plane they didn't develop insured they wouldn't want it, and they could and did work against the plane (again, not the only reason it failed) to insure they never had to field it.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Yes but wouldn't the A-12 been adopted as a replacement as the F-111 by the USAF? A low altitude, high speed penetrator?

 

[F-14D]

Yes but wouldn't the A-12 been adopted as a replacement as the F-111 by the USAF? A low altitude, high speed penetration?

The original replacement for the F-111 was the B-1A. Carter's cancellation of that was the impetus that eventually resulted in the F-15E. One of the rationales for the A-12 was, as you state, fulfilling the F-111 role for USAF. While AF in public was on board with that, when push came to shove they would advocate, "Can't we spend that money on more B-2s, please"?

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

Yes but wouldn't the A-12 been adopted as a replacement as the F-111 by the USAF? A low altitude, high speed penetration?

As originally implemented in 1986 in accordance with Congressional pressure and DoD acquiescence, the ATA was to replace both the A-6 and the F-111. The ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighter) program, which was to provide a replacement for both the F-14 and F-15, was implemented at the same time. The eventual result was the F-22 and the F-18E/F.

 

[Sundog]

Yes but wouldn't the A-12 been adopted as a replacement as the F-111 by the USAF? A low altitude, high speed penetration?

Also, IIRC, the USAF wasn't that interested in low alt high speed penetration at the time. The reason was, they had experience with the F-117 and with the advent of stealth, they knew they could attack from 20k ft and up relatively safely. That's why the USAF version of the A-12 was to have the exhaust nozzles above the wing. I believe they even told this to the Navy, but the Navy lacking the USAF's stealth experience still believed they would have to fly on the deck to attack, which is why they had their exhaust nozzles on the bottom of the airframe.

But the Navy was kind of stupid on this, as the book reference by F-14D points out. Especially when a company like Northrop, the company that had just built the B-2, told them they couldn't do it for the price they wanted and had the better design, IMHO.

However, for a subsonic attack aircraft, the A-12 was going to be quite maneuverable. Well, theoretically anyway.

 

[GeorgeA]

Well, John Lehman originally envisioned the ATA as a scaled-down B-2 using B-2 stealth technology, and contemporary accounts say Pete Aldridge did agree to terminate a competing fighter development and accept the ATA as the USAF replacement for its then-current generation of strike fighters.

I guess we can disagree on how sincere Aldridge or the Air Force was, but there was a (perhaps coincidental) termination of a large unnamed program in that period that resulted in thousands of layoffs (this was reported in AW&ST at the time). Certainly Stevenson and other authors have taken a shot at reconstructing the history here and are probably the authoritative sources on this episode.

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

From Advanced Tactical Fighter to F-22 Raptor...

 

[F-14D]

Well, John Lehman originally envisioned the ATA as a scaled-down B-2 using B-2 stealth technology, and contemporary accounts say Pete Aldridge did agree to terminate a competing fighter development and accept the ATA as the USAF replacement for its then-current generation of strike fighters.

I guess we can disagree on how sincere Aldridge or the Air Force was, but there was a (perhaps coincidental) termination of a large unnamed program in that period that resulted in thousands of layoffs (this was reported in AW&ST at the time). Certainly Stevenson and other authors have taken a shot at reconstructing the history here and are probably the authoritative sources on this episode.

Tailspin's post emphasizes a good point: The two services agreed to "evaluate", not necessarily adopt, the plane on which the other had the lead. I base my comments on AF's pretty much consistent opposition to adopting aircraft (except helicopters) and large systems that they themselves didn't develop, and opposition to other services' having too much capability in an arena it considers its purview, even if it has no intention of performing the mission itself. This continues to this day (can you say "Joint Cargo Aircraft"?). Examples abound, but are outside the scope of this topic.

In the case of ATA, if you'll look back you'll find AF going, "We fully support this excellent example for jointness, and by the way, this is really kind of a waste and the money would far better be spent on more B-2s". What Stevenson and others (including court records) show was that (remember, I don't think GD/MD would have been able to pull it off anyway on time and budget) was that the A-12 team's whole proposal required access to information on already developed stealth technologies. They didn't get it. As I recall, the story for many years was that because of corporate proprietary reasons, it couldn't be shared, which actually doesn't make sense on further inspection which many people, including me, didn't do. What the court records show was that AF controlled access to said technology. Makes sense, since they developed all the stealth aircraft up to that date. By an Amazing Coincidence, whenever the A-12 team needed access to that technological data., it seemed that whomever they submitted didn't quite seem to be able to get the required clearances and access in a timely manner, so the team ended up having to try and invent the technologies again on their own. This, by the way is the foundation of the issue being appealed to the Supreme Court. One might wonder what would have happened if the Grumman-Northrop team had won, since they obviously already had that data.

 

[Sundog]

Tailspin's post emphasizes a good point: The two services agreed to "evaluate", not necessarily adopt, the plane on which the other had the lead. I base my comments on AF's pretty much consistent opposition to adopting aircraft (except helicopters) and large systems that they themselves didn't develop, and opposition to other services' having too much capability in an arena it considers its purview, even if it has no intention of performing the mission itself. This continues to this day (can you say "Joint Cargo Aircraft"?). Examples abound, but are outside the scope of this topic.

In the case of ATA, if you'll look back you'll find AF going, "We fully support this excellent example for jointness, and by the way, this is really kind of a waste and the money would far better be spent on more B-2s". What Stevenson and others (including court records) show was that (remember, I don't think GD/MD would have been able to pull it off anyway on time and budget) was that the A-12 team's whole proposal required access to information on already developed stealth technologies. They didn't get it. As I recall, the story for many years was that because of corporate proprietary reasons, it couldn't be shared, which actually doesn't make sense on further inspection which many people, including me, didn't do. What the court records show was that AF controlled access to said technology. Makes sense, since they developed all the stealth aircraft up to that date. By an Amazing Coincidence, whenever the A-12 team needed access to that technological data., it seemed that whomever they submitted didn't quite seem to be able to get the required clearances and access in a timely manner, so the team ended up having to try and invent the technologies again on their own. This, by the way is the foundation of the issue being appealed to the Supreme Court. One might wonder what would have happened if the Grumman-Northrop team had won, since they obviously already had that data.

I do remember reading that they would be given the relevant stealth tech info when they needed it as well. I can understand them not being given actual data from Northrop, as the manufacturers usually guard their hard won data as it pertains to real world flight tests and actual aircraft. However, I can also see where all of the research and results for stealth tech that the Air Force funded should have been available to GD/MD as it was taxpayer funded research and, therefore, should have been available to any manufacturer.

Of course, I still recall that exchange between Ben Rich and the GD design chief about the exhaust deck/nozzle problem after they shut the engines down and why they didn't listen to Ben Rich is beyond me. I also wonder if the A-12 wouldn't have had the spike straight ahead problem due to the straight trailing edge that Raymer talks about in his book.

I do think it would have turned out different had Northrop won the contract. But, partly, that's because the U.S. navy would have had to provide more funding to keep Northrop from walking away.

 

[F-14D]

I do remember reading that they would be given the relevant stealth tech info when they needed it as well. I can understand them not being given actual data from Northrop, as the manufacturers usually guard their hard won data as it pertains to real world flight tests and actual aircraft. However, I can also see where all of the research and results for stealth tech that the Air Force funded should have been available to GD/MD as it was taxpayer funded research and, therefore, should have been available to any manufacturer.

Of course, I still recall that exchange between Ben Rich and the GD design chief about the exhaust deck/nozzle problem after they shut the engines down and why they didn't listen to Ben Rich is beyond me. I also wonder if the A-12 wouldn't have had the spike straight ahead problem due to the straight trailing edge that Raymer talks about in his book.

I do think it would have turned out different had Northrop won the contract. But, partly, that's because the U.S. navy would have had to provide more funding to keep Northrop from walking away.

Couple of thoughts here in no particular order. Keep in mind in some ways we're using hindsight. First off, they wouldn't have to give the data to Northrop, they already had it from their work on the B-2. That's why Grumman didn't protest too much when they were directed to team with Northrop. The only other company that already had that kind of information had run away from the ATA project as fast as they could. As far as giving the data to GD-MDC, remember that one of the team's biggest arguments in their claim that the cancellation was for the convenience of the government and not default was that they were not given access to the data, and they couldn't develop their plane for the price they proposed without it. For a long time the public thought was that this was because the other manufacturers were guarding their hard won data, as you say. In retrospect, though, this clearly couldn't be the case. You see, Northrop and Lockheed didn't own the data, the US Government did because the US Government funded the development of the technology. GD-MDC wouldn't go directly to Northrop or Lockheed for the data anyway, they'd go to the Government. Apparently,reading between the lines, the A-12 team was never actually told that they couldn't have the data, it was just that by an Amazing Coincidence no one on the team who asked for it seemed to have just the right clearances to see it.

That's one of the big things in the court case. It's also worthy of note that in what's going before the Supreme Court is not a denial by the Government that the necessary data wasn't provided, but rather the protesters should not be allowed to raise that issue.

For the record, my personal opinion was that the cancellation was the right decision for the wrong reasons, while conversely the (with hindsight) the cancellation of the A-6F was the wrong decision for the right reasons.

Also if I remember correctly, it was Grumman who made the decision to walk away and Northrop agreed with them. It was one of those cases where in light of all the money they'd already put in, the only thing worse than losing the competition would be winning it.

 

[DSE]

In retrospect, though, this clearly couldn't be the case. You see, Northrop and Lockheed didn't own the data, the US Government did because the US Government funded the development of the technology.

This is not a given. It would depend entirely on the data rights clauses of the contract(s).

 

[F-14D]

In retrospect, though, this clearly couldn't be the case. You see, Northrop and Lockheed didn't own the data, the US Government did because the US Government funded the development of the technology.

This is not a given. It would depend entirely on the data rights clauses of the contract(s).

I can think of no case where the Government would give up rights to something major for which it paid for the development, especially something as sensitive as stealth technology. Proprietary manufacturing techniques maybe, but the actual basic technology and data--can't see it. Now, I can see the government saying that it was OK to use technologies elsewhere in the company's business (this is the basis of Aribus' case against Boeing), or could say that a company could restrict access to certain technologies from its rivals in commercial business, but I would find it hard to believe that the Government would set itself up in such a way that it couldn't use technology and data it paid for on another Government project, even if it was with a rival company. Example? Government compelling GE to provide F404 data to Pratt & Whitney when the Navy thought it was going to second source that engine. Another example was the required sharing of data between yards on the Virgina class submarine.

In any case, GD-MDD went to the Air Force, not Northrop/Lockheed for data on stealth and related technologies and that's wherein apparently the problem lay. Not that the Government said they wouldn't provide the data, but supposedly that the team couldn't get clearance to see the data.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

My recollection from Stevenson and Skurla's autobio was that Northrop leadership took the position of providing a non compliant bid costed and structured on what was needed to actually deliver the A-12. And this position came from no less an authority as Tom V. Jones.

 

[F-14D]

My recollection from Stevenson and Skurla's autobio was that Northrop leadership took the position of providing a non compliant bid costed and structured on what was needed to actually deliver the A-12. And this position came from no less an authority as Tom V. Jones.

It wasn't that it was non-compliant, as I recall. If it had been non-compliant, the Gov't would have simply rejected it and as long as GD-MDD was compliant, the competition would have been over and the Navy would have awarded to them. What I believe happened was that the Northrop-Grumman team really knew how to build the plane and really knew what it would cost. Note who the two members of that team were.

In negotiations, the Navy tried to get them to lower their price by at least $500 million. Grumman said to Northrop, "Let me tell you what happened to us on the original F-14 contract; we really don't want to do this". Northrop absolutely agreed and told the Navy so. The Navy said , "You'll need to lower your price or else". Northrop and Grumman replied, "OK. Else!", and essentially walked away. The Navy then went back to GD-MDD and continued negotiating the price down, implying that they (the Navy) were getting pricing cooperation from the other team when in fact that team was out of the picture

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The Northrop/Grumman/LTV bid was non compliant (or "unresponsive) because they did not submit a fixed price tender. Apart from bidding $1.7 billion more than the ceiling Northrop only bid for a liability of $400m creating a "quasi-cost-reimbursement contract" (Stevenson). Also Northrop did not meet the RFP material spec and refused to provide the reliability guarantees. As quoted in Stevenson Tom V. Jones (Northrop CEO) said:

"I looked at the fiscal aspects of this contract proposal request and decided that the net worth of neither team was large enough to absorb the loss that a fixed-price type development was likely to create. I felt it would be irresponsible to accept a fixed price on this development contract as we had an obligation to our shareholders and customers to remain financially viable..."

Skurla in "Inside the Iron Works" says that Grumman's Tom Kane had learnt from their Navy friends that their negative assessments of the N/G/LTV bid was that the Navy didn't understand the inlet, the bomb bay was a mess because it used different hanging fixtures for each possible weapon (up to 24) and they weren't happy with terms and conditions (see above). And that the Navy was going to ask for a resubmit with these three items fixed. Kane went and explained all this to Northrop but there was no change on the terms and conditions.

Skurla’s opinion was that Grumman should have primmed on the ATA because they had more people available to handle the bid and better Navy understanding. Northrop at the time was building the ATB (B-2) and bidding for the ATF (F-23). He also takes a swipe at Jones who was in trouble over ROKAF F-20 bribery allegations which I think is a bit unfair because Grumman had the luxury of never really having to soil its hands with work in the third world.

But one thing is for sure apart from the stealth experience the Northrop ATA was a much nicer airplane. The design is so good it is basically reused in the X-47B and in the Northrop LRB proposals. If they had been selected perhaps as part of a Grumman prime with Northrop designing the aircraft then the A-12 “Mini Spirit” most likely would have flown and still be in production today. It would be an ideal aircraft for contemporary eight hour complex CAS/strike missions and provide the USN and any AF operator a heck of a lot of reach and capability. So good that you would want to bend the RN into building their CVFs to fly them and work towards building the entire USN air wing around this aircraft.

 

[F-14D]

The Northrop/Grumman/LTV bid was non compliant (or "unresponsive) because they did not submit a fixed price tender. Apart from bidding $1.7 billion more than the ceiling Northrop only bid for a liability of $400m creating a "quasi-cost-reimbursement contract" (Stevenson). Also Northrop did not meet the RFP material spec and refused to provide the reliability guarantees. As quoted in Stevenson Tom V. Jones (Northrop CEO) said:

"I looked at the fiscal aspects of this contract proposal request and decided that the net worth of neither team was large enough to absorb the loss that a fixed-price type development was likely to create. I felt it would be irresponsible to accept a fixed price on this development contract as we had an obligation to our shareholders and customers to remain financially viable..."

Skurla in "Inside the Iron Works" says that Grumman's Tom Kane had learnt from their Navy friends that their negative assessments of the N/G/LTV bid was that the Navy didn't understand the inlet, the bomb bay was a mess because it used different hanging fixtures for each possible weapon (up to 24) and they weren't happy with terms and conditions (see above). And that the Navy was going to ask for a resubmit with these three items fixed. Kane went and explained all this to Northrop but there was no change on the terms and conditions.

Skurla’s opinion was that Grumman should have primmed on the ATA because they had more people available to handle the bid and better Navy understanding. Northrop at the time was building the ATB (B-2) and bidding for the ATF (F-23). He also takes a swipe at Jones who was in trouble over ROKAF F-20 bribery allegations which I think is a bit unfair because Grumman had the luxury of never really having to soil its hands with work in the third world.

But one thing is for sure apart from the stealth experience the Northrop ATA was a much nicer airplane. The design is so good it is basically reused in the X-47B and in the Northrop LRB proposals. If they had been selected perhaps as part of a Grumman prime with Northrop designing the aircraft then the A-12 “Mini Spirit” most likely would have flown and still be in production today. It would be an ideal aircraft for contemporary eight hour complex CAS/strike missions and provide the USN and any AF operator a heck of a lot of reach and capability. So good that you would want to bend the RN into building their CVFs to fly them and work towards building the entire USN air wing around this aircraft.

Since my copy of Stevenson's superb book is away in storage and hasn't been cracked in a few years (but now I'm going to go and dig it back up) and the rest of my statements come from recollection or personal conversations (including with Stevenson years and years ago), I defer to your more recently accessed data. Still, it is clear that the Northrop Grumman team did walk away from the ATA, whether by explicitly saying thanks, but no thanks, or by making themselves unselectable by being non-responsive, which is the contracting term the Gov't uses. Smart move.

 

[InvisibleDefender]

I've been told that the A-12 mockup is now in the "storage area" at the north end of the plant here in Fort Worth.

It was certainly there when the pics for MS Virtual Earth were taken

I went out to the North end in Jan 2004 looking for the A-12 mock up. Nobody had any idea where the mock-up had gone. Not even the museum guys that supposedly owned the mock-up knew where it was. They told me that if I found it, to let them know where it was! Anyway, after driving around, I found the outboard wing sections. They were carelessly discarded as they had just been dumped on the ground. Also in the area were sections of a restored B-36 and an F-16 demonstrator. I drove around a bit longer and didn't see the centerbody of the A-12 mock-up anywhere. I see that it has been dumped there as well. No idea if the stuff is still there or not.

 

[flateric]

A-12
Four wind-tunnel tests were performed using a dynamically
scaled aeroelastic model of the A-12 configuration between
July 1989 and August 1990 as part of the flutter clearance program.
The objective of the program was to verify that the airplane would
have the required flutter margin of safety throughout its flight envelope.
Initial testing was conducted using an overly stiff model to
determinestability of the configuration on the two-cable-mount system.
In addition, model configurations that were considered most
likely to utter were first tested on a sting mount to establish their
flutter characteristics prior to testing on the cable mount. In all, 41
model configurations were tested in the TDT. Some configurations
were tested to determine the influence on flutter of free-play effects
and flexibility in the wing fold joints and wing control surfaces. In
addition, fuel-mass effects on flutter were also studied. All configurations
tested were shown to have the required flutter margins of
safety throughout the vehicle flight envelope.

JOURNAL OF AIRCRAFT
Vol. 40, No. 5, September–October 2003
Transonic Dynamics Tunnel Aeroelastic Testing
in Support of Aircraft Development
Stanley R. Cole, Thomas E. Noll, and Boyd Perry, III
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199

http://aeroelasticity.larc.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/JNL_ACFT_v40_n5_aircraft_testing.pdf

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Summary of the tests performed...

 

[F-14D]

From the lawyers' point of view this contract is the "gift that keeps on giving".

The US Supreme Court today ruled on this case. It overturned the previous lower court ruling, which overturned previous rulings in even lower courts, which had said that Boeing and GD had to repay the Government money spent on this failed project. In an unanimous ruling, the Supremes said that if the Government was going to continue with its strategy of using the State Secrets privilege, normally used for terrorism or national security issues to deny the companies the information they say is crucial to their case, then the Government can not prove it is entitled to the damages it claims are owed it.

The Supreme Court then sent the case back to the lower courts for further litigation. Like Tailspin said, from the lawyers' point of view this contract truly is the "gift that keeps on giving".

 

[InvisibleDefender]

Wall Street Journal
May 24, 2011
Pg. B2

Boeing, General Dynamics Snag Win

Justices, Citing State Secrets, Toss Ruling That Could Have Cost Firms $3 Billion

By Brent Kendall

WASHINGTON—The Supreme Court on Monday threw out a ruling that could have forced Boeing Co. and General Dynamics Corp. to repay $3 billion to the federal government in a two-decade-old contract battle.

The court, in a unanimous ruling written by Justice Antonin Scalia, said a key issue in the case couldn't be litigated because it involved state secrets that can't be aired in court.

The companies and the Pentagon have been fighting since 1991, when the government cancelled a $4.8 billion contract to build a Navy stealth-fighter jet. The government had demanded that the companies repay roughly $1.35 billion they had already received at the time of the cancellation, plus interest, for a total of about $3 billion. It argued that the companies defaulted on the contract for the A-12 Avenger stealth aircraft.

In response, Boeing and General Dynamics argued the government had superior knowledge of the stealth technology needed to build the fighter jet but refused to share it with them. But the companies weren't allowed to make this claim in court because the government invoked its "state secrets" privilege to protect against the disclosure of sensitive military information.

The companies argued that it wasn't fair for the government to assert a multibillion-dollar claim against them while also refusing to disclose information that they said was central to their defense.

The high court agreed. Justice Scalia wrote that when litigation would lead to the disclosure of state secrets, "neither party can obtain judicial relief." His opinion overturned a 2009 lower-court ruling that found the government was justified in terminating the contract because the companies had failed to meet milestones.

Monday's ruling wasn't a total win for the companies. The justices rejected their claim against the government for $1.2 billion, plus interest, for their costs not reimbursed on the project, again saying the matter couldn't be judicially determined.

"Neither side will be entirely happy with the resolution we reach today," Justice Scalia said.

Monday's ruling doesn't end the case, which will now return to lower courts. The government has said it has other legal arguments that support its determination that the companies defaulted on the contract. In court papers, Justice Department lawyers said the government was never obligated by the contract to share highly classified information with the companies.

The Supreme Court declined to rule on that question, leaving open the possibility that the issue could be litigated without endangering state secrets.

Boeing said it was pleased with the ruling. "It has always been our view that the default termination was improper," said the company's general counsel, J. Michael Luttig. General Dynamics had no immediate comment, and a Justice Department spokesman declined to comment.

The original contract was made with General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas Corp., which merged with Boeing in 1997. The first jet was to be delivered to the Navy in June 1990.

The contractors had problems from the start and couldn't meet the proposed schedule. They also said the cost of finishing the project would substantially exceed the price of the contract. In 1991, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cancelled the contract.

No planes were ever delivered.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Official McDD model:



Source: https://web.archive.org/web/2013072...ine/2011/06/inside-boeings-defence-headqua-1/

 

[InvisibleDefender]

My 'official' model and coffee cup. Notice the early side-by-side seating layout.

 

[donnage99]

Side by side seats?

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

Side by side seats?

The Navy attack community liked the side-by-side seating arrangement in the A-6 and Lehman reportedly preferred it. Northrop's proposal was side-by-side. There must have been a drag (range) and/or stealth benefit to the tandem that more than offset that. The four-view is from Stevenson's The $5 Billion Misunderstanding. If he mentions the reason(s), I couldn't find it with a quick skim through.

 

[InvisibleDefender]

front view...

 

[Vulcan652]

For anyone interested, here's a June 5th, 2011 article written by James P. Stevenson in the Federal Times:

https://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110605/ADOP06/106050304/

It offers his personal analysis on what the Supreme Court's A-12 decision means for the contractors.

Also, quick question: The 1995 Skunk Works digest mentioned above (I know this thread has been going for a while now) states that the first A-12 prototype was 80% complete. I have no idea if that info is accurate, but assuming it is, what is likely to have happened to the semi-built airframe following cancellation? Would it have been destroyed, or is there a chance that could be hiding away somewhere like Sneaky Pete?

 

[Stargazer]

For anyone interested, here's a June 5th, 2011 article written by James P. Stephenson in the Federal Times: http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110605/ADOP06/106050304/ It offers his personal analysis on what the Supreme Court's A-12 decision means for the contractors.

Also, quick question: The 1995 Skunk Works digest mentioned above (I know this thread has been going for a while now) states that the first A-12 prototype was 80% complete. I have no idea if that info is accurate, but assuming it is, what is likely to have happened to the semi-built airframe following cancellation? Would it have been destroyed, or is there a chance that could be hiding away somewhere like Sneaky Pete?

Aviation Week & Space Technology published a factory photo circa 1992 which clearly showed 4 or 5 airframes being constructed, and I remember two of them seemed pretty much advanced. I suppose that all of these were destroyed after cancellation of the program. Why keep an aircraft that wasn't completed and that hasn't had time to become a significant milestone in a company's history?

 

[OM]

Side by side seats?

...Also known as "YOT" seating in some pilot circles. "YOT" meaning "You Over There" from the Pilot's POV.

 

[Vulcan652]

For anyone interested, here's a June 5th, 2011 article written by James P. Stephenson in the Federal Times: http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110605/ADOP06/106050304/ It offers his personal analysis on what the Supreme Court's A-12 decision means for the contractors.

Also, quick question: The 1995 Skunk Works digest mentioned above (I know this thread has been going for a while now) states that the first A-12 prototype was 80% complete. I have no idea if that info is accurate, but assuming it is, what is likely to have happened to the semi-built airframe following cancellation? Would it have been destroyed, or is there a chance that could be hiding away somewhere like Sneaky Pete?

Aviation Week & Space Technology published a factory photo circa 1992 which clearly showed 4 or 5 airframes being constructed, and I remember two of them seemed pretty much advanced. I suppose that all of these were destroyed after cancellation of the program. Why keep an aircraft that wasn't completed and that hasn't had time to become a significant milestone in a company's history?

Thanks for the info Stargazer2006, I didn't know about the Aviation Week photo but definitely sounds worth a look - I'll see if I can dig it up. I guess you're right that the airframes were probably destroyed following cancellation of the programme. Maybe one day we'll get the details!

 

[InvisibleDefender]

Here's some stuff ... enjoy

 

[flateric]

many thanks!

 

[quellish]

Here's some stuff ... enjoy

If memory serves those are pretty much what was published in the AW story. I think there was a separate story that showed the canopy being used for sled tests, but I could be mistaken.

 

[Stargazer]

If memory serves those are pretty much what was published in the AW story.

We still haven't seen here the one presenting several airframes in preparation.

 

[Vulcan652]

A-12 canopy (believed to be real) appears on eBay - yours for around $620,000!


http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/12/how-an-a-12-avenger-ii-canopy.html


(Sorry if it's been posted already)

 

[BillRo]

Here are some A-12 drawings I got from Gary J. an ex-Navy AD buddy of mine from Fort Worth. I don't know if they have been posted before but someone was looking for a cutaway.

 

[Vulcan652]

Very cool images there BillRo, thanks for posting!