The F-35 Discussion Topic (No Holds Barred II)

[bring_it_on]

Even the early European F-16 deliveries had seen the not-to-exceed price of the aircraft climb up to beyond 11 million. To expect an F-35 in the 90's to cost $20 (or even 28) Million is and was wishful thinking. It was obviously not something that was ever put in as a program requirement or anything (to the best of my knowledge) unlike the Viper's not to exceed cost which itself was exceeded by a considerable margin

The "affordable goal" flyaway cost numbers were printed in the Report for Congress: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues Updated April 8, 2004.

As SPW has also said, that was wishful thinking at a very very early stage of the program even before some of the prototypes had taken flight. They were not a part of the requirement, or required to be contractually guaranteed. The bomber for example apparently has this as a part of the actual RFP and a fly-away cost will be used in a form for comparison. As quoted above, even an F-16 in the mid 1980's was going for something like $18 Million dollars...An $18 million dollar F-16 from the mid-1980's would cost something like $24.7 Million in the mid 1990's..One can simply compare the size, weight and complexity of the F-35A to that of an F-16 from the mid 80's to see how much this particular goal was wishful thinking vs something based on hard data..As the program matured both the PO and independent authorities did adjust the fly-away cost estimate and as is generally the case with a maturing product the estimates do tend to get more accurate with time.

The $28 Million in 1994 comes to $45 Million in Today's dollars and probably above $50 Million by 2020 dollars when the F-35 is likely to be at its cheapest fly-away cost due to production volume. As Paul has mentioned, to get the cost to below or at the $50 million dollar would have required a different aircraft altogether..

The JPO's aspirational goal is to get the price of the F-35A in 2018 to around $75 Million in 'today's' (which I assume to be 2013 or 2014, around the first time I heard the JPO head mention this number) dollars...Still a full $30 Million more than the original $28 --> $45 million target but it would be a fairly decent effort given the shape and form the F-35 has taken. Also, I am not sure I remember from the report (The 2004 report) but didn't it at the time claim that the original projection was based on something like 2900-3000 figther's for the US services?


http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/

 

[sferrin]

Actually, I disagree. It was perfectly feasible to design a fighter to meet that goal ($28 Million in 1994 dollars is $45 Million in 2015). Textron's Scorpion is expected to come in below $20 Million in today's money. I imagine something like a new Gripen, based on an off-the-shelf F414 engine, with off-the-shelf avionics, controlled RCS but not true stealth, would come in at $45 million or below when built in numbers. This could have been a decent replacement for all those F-16s, A-10s etc. It wouldn't necessarily have been dramatically more capable but it would be new build and lower maintenance with a good lifespan ahead. With the F-22 to deal with advanced threats, this would have made sense to me at least.

Except that such an aircraft would be virtually useless against a near peer. And if you have to task an F-22 to each one just so it can survive how is that CHEAPER? You have to add in the cost of the F-22 and it's pilot to the cost of the low end aircraft. Sure, the low end aircraft is cheaper but not when you factor in what you'd need to add in just to be able to use it.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/07/22/the_last_of_the_gunfighters_108267.html

And that's best/worst case. Make 1980 the cutoff date and see what the numbers tell us.

I always found the designation "last of the gunfighters" funny given that the F-105 had 20+ confirmed gun kills and the F-8 had maybe 4.
In any event, looking to the "dogfights" of Vietnam for insight into modern air combat is about as useful as trying to glean insight into
modern land warfare from the tank vs. tank combat of Vietnam.

And what was the lesson they learned in Vietnam? That cheaper, smaller, lower tech fighter aircraft could shoot their hi-tech aircraft down at close range, hence the need for the ability to dogfight if necessary.

That lesson was appreciated no later than WWII when GCI vectored P-47s or P-51s would successfully bounce Me-262s (or the Hurricane CGI on Me-109 or many other examples). The most agile fighter of all time would have been no avail against the typical MiG-21 encounters in Vietnam; a CGI vectored attack from 6 o'clock low. Unless you have other assets (AWACS, CGI) or omnidirectional organic sensors at your disposal (which Blue really didn't have in Vietnam) the MiG-21 is within his WEZ and then out of yours in extremely short order. Given Red's positional, kinetic and situational advantage its unlikely that any amount of Blue's dogfighting prowess will compensate.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

And how many times has the USAF gone against a "near-peer" threat recently? A handful of MiG-29s perhaps?

The JSF as originally envisaged would have shared core F-22 components (F119 engine, avionics, etc) and reduced the cost of both programs through commonality. F-22 would have cost less to buy and to support.

The only "near-peers" for the JSF-lite would be operators of Su-30MKI, Eurocanards, F-22, and J-20, plus late model teen series like Block 60 F-16. That still leaves practically every likely foe as dead meat. If you want to take on India or China, your 300 F-22s will be required, in practically every other peacekeeping/regional war scenario the JSF-lite would be fine.

 

[sferrin]

And how many times has the USAF gone against a "near-peer" threat recently? A handful of MiG-29s perhaps?

And how many times do you want to face a near-peer greatly out-gunned? I would think "zero" would be the answer to that question. And with wars being "come as you are" these days there won't be years to say, "whoops, we guessed wrong, start cranking out better jets".

 

[LowObservable]

The "affordability goals" of the JSF program was a flyaway cost per aircraft in FY 1994 dollars of $28 million for the Air Force CTOL variant, $30-35 million for the Marines STOVL variant, and $31-38 million for the US Navy CTOL variant. $45 million to $61 million in today's dollars.

Sources:
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421473/f-35-defense-waste-danger
http://fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-rl30563.pdf

That was before the X-32/35 selection process was even done and well before any contact was ever signed.


In other words, wishful thinking.

Reminds me of the days when the F-16 was suppose to be the "cheap, lightweight fighter" that ended up costing several times that of the aircraft it most frequently replaced (the F-4). For some reason we don't hear people complaining about that. Curious.

I didn't hear that at the time. Because it was not the case, as far as I know.


See Figs 21 &22.

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19850010645.pdf

 

[LowObservable]

The $28m (CTOL) flyaway was not entirely wishful thinking.

The progress of manufacturing technology - things like high-speed machining, automated tape-laying, design for manufacture and assembly - was very rapid at the time. And there was a (not unreasonable) expectation that COTS would replace a lot of bespoke electronics at all levels.

As PaulMM points out, $28m 1994 is $45m today, and for an aircraft that was not expected to weigh more empty than an F/A-18C (24klb) and a single-seater at that. Today, the URFC for the 31klb Super Hornet is $60m, including two-seaters, and at a fraction of the production rate.

$28m was a hard goal, but demonstrably not ludicrous.

 

[marauder2048]

Actually, I disagree. It was perfectly feasible to design a fighter to meet that goal ($28 Million in 1994 dollars is $45 Million in 2015). Textron's Scorpion is expected to come in below $20 Million in today's money. I imagine something like a new Gripen, based on an off-the-shelf F414 engine, with off-the-shelf avionics, controlled RCS but not true stealth, would come in at $45 million or below when built in numbers. This could have been a decent replacement for all those F-16s, A-10s etc. It wouldn't necessarily have been dramatically more capable but it would be new build and lower maintenance with a good lifespan ahead. With the F-22 to deal with advanced threats, this would have made sense to me at least.


The USAF drove JSF to high cost with their insanely gold-plated requirements, then canned the F-22 early because the cheaper F-35 was now capable enough to not need as many, and now have to buy lots of capable-but-costly machines.


You reap what you sow.

Ahh yes..the oft-invoked myth of "off-the-shelf avionics" for combat jets. Even the Textron Scorpion is a mostly custom avionics job. The target price
they quote is low because the capability is very low-end; if you want to push it towards even AT-6C capability you are looking at a substantial increase.

The Gripen-ish aircraft you propose would have eventually met a late model F/A-18D (a la the Finnish and Swiss evaluations) and like Saab we'd be going right back to the drawing board.

 

[bring_it_on]

Marine Corps Gazette, April 1966, PROGRAMS OR PANIC
[ Maj. JR Cushman]

We have a problem. Not new by any means, but one of growing concern each year. Here's why: Only six years ago the average tab for a maintenance-involved accident was about $154,000. Today that figure has soared to over a half-million dollars. Surprising? Not really if you'll recall that not long ago $400,000 would buy a 2dLt a brand new, shiny jet fighter. Today that same officer (now more senior) sits in the front seat of a Phantom F-4, which carries a tag of $3.9 million. More costly machines; bigger repair bills after they're bashed. It's that simple.

$3.9 Million in the Mid 1960's, inflation adjusted to a mid 1980's cost comes to around $12.9 Million, or around 30% cheaper than what an F-16 cost around that timeframe as per a report from that time-frame cited earlier.

 

[Triton]

The $28m (CTOL) flyaway was not entirely wishful thinking.

The progress of manufacturing technology - things like high-speed machining, automated tape-laying, design for manufacture and assembly - was very rapid at the time. And there was a (not unreasonable) expectation that COTS would replace a lot of bespoke electronics at all levels.

As PaulMM points out, $28m 1994 is $45m today, and for an aircraft that was not expected to weigh more empty than an F/A-18C (24klb) and a single-seater at that. Today, the URFC for the 31klb Super Hornet is $60m, including two-seaters, and at a fraction of the production rate.

$28m was a hard goal, but demonstrably not ludicrous.

Thanks for the additional information, LowObservable.

 

[marauder2048]

The $28m (CTOL) flyaway was not entirely wishful thinking.


The progress of manufacturing technology - things like high-speed machining, automated tape-laying, design for manufacture and assembly - was very rapid at the time. As PaulMM points out, $28m 1994 is $45m today, and for an aircraft that was not expected to weigh more empty than an F/A-18C (24klb) and a single-seater at that. Today, the URFC for the 31klb Super Hornet is $60m, including two-seaters, and at a fraction of the production rate.


$28m was a hard goal, but demonstrably not ludicrous.

And I'm sure there's a parallel universe in which the CPI is somewhat predictive of combat jet (or aerospace in general) inflation. If you can
find the right superstring harmonics we can explore it in further detail. Until then, the RAND view on avionics (nearly) dominating both the upfront
and the long tail remain the gold standard for truthiness.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Interestingly an F-4 at $3.9 million in 1966 equals $28 million in 2015 dollars. One would hope we could built something substantially more capable than an F-4 for the same money, given the increase in technical base.

 

[marauder2048]

Interestingly an F-4 at $3.9 million in 1966 equals $28 million in 2015 dollars. One would hope we could built something substantially more capable than an F-4 for the same money, given the increase in technical base.

Hokey regressions and ancient models are no match for a good hedonic method at your side. CPI is used by politicians to deceive the ignorant.

OMB mandates that DOD use GDP growth as a baseline. NAVAIR uses yet another model and BLS (which generates CPI data) uses a completely different model for commercial aircraft.
All show *much* higher annualized growth rates than CPI but they don't even remotely come close to matching the data for combat aircraft since 1973.
The current best fit model (R^2 = 0.97 and see below for visual confirmation) for that data predicts a $28 million 1994 URF JSF in the $90 million range today.
For some reason, that $90 million figure sounds very familiar...

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

If you could explain the rationale?


It sounds like you advocating calculating the average rate of increase in cost of military aircraft since 1973 and then using that as the predictor for cost inflation of the JSF - all that proves is JSF costs have increased roughly in line with previous programs, and the actual dollar increase seems worse because of the length of the development program. Interestingly even this "adjusted" graph shows F-35 is more costly than an F-14 or F-15 was.


I'd like to see the same graph extended back to say 1945, and I'm not sure what you are proving . Using this metric, if in the last 10 years military aircraft increased in cost by a thousand percent, then we must be happy with another thousand percent increase in the next ten years. Incompetence in the last program means we have to expect the same incompetence in future.

Aluminium hasn't become as costly as gold. Electronic components are cheaper than ever. Manufacturing is more automated. What is the driver for military aircraft cost increases being so much higher than other cost increases? Surely its increasing complexity?

 

[Pioneer]

Interestingly an F-4 at $3.9 million in 1966 equals $28 million in 2015 dollars. One would hope we could built something substantially more capable than an F-4 for the same money, given the increase in technical base.

I agree 100%!!!!!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[gtg947h]

Aluminium hasn't become as costly as gold. Electronic components are cheaper than ever. Manufacturing is more automated. What is the driver for military aircraft cost increases being so much higher than other cost increases? Surely its increasing complexity?

Increasing complexity (more highly integrated systems, complex structure, etc.) is part of it. There's also the much more in-depth and rigorous testing that goes along with any modern aircraft, civil or military, and the pace of that testing is much more restrained and methodical than in the past. This testing is done partly because of said complex systems, but also to help validate the models and calculations used to design the aircraft. They also try to be more thorough with the testing, and it's done in a very restrained and carefully-planned way to minimize risk. Notice that test pilots aren't getting killed all the time like they used to in the 40s, 50s, and 60s? That's because we stopped doing stupid things like incentivizing the XB-70 program to go supersonic early on and including penalties if it's not done by the 5th flight.

Don't forget the ever-increasing costs of compliance (and showing said compliance) with government regulations on everything, from spending to the number of bathrooms.

 

[bring_it_on]

DOD Inflation Handbook...

 

[LowObservable]

Clearly, not everything tracks the CPI.

Costs have gone up in aerospace in general, for sure. Compare an early-model 757 and a 737-900ER (the latter has 85-90 per cent the capability of the former). In 1980 the 757 was yours for $26 million - $75m by the CPI - and the 737 is $102 million today. But that includes higher quality (reflected in dispatch reliability, engine TBOs &c) and more operational bells and whistles. (References below.)

However, it seems to be a circular argument to develop "combat aircraft inflation" trends, including F-22 and F-35, and argue that those trends are why the jets cost as much as they do. It's a bit like the college-fund salesmen of the 1990s, saying that college education was always going to outrun the CPI: it begs the question "why"? And however much you may dismiss the CPI, the JSF goal of $45m (2015) is not out of line with the bigger, lower-rate Super Hornet.


Why does the JSF cost what it costs?

1 - Extra included equipment accounts for part of it: EO-DAS, EOTS, MADL, and a capable passive EW system.

2 - A very complicated integration of secondary power ("more electric") and thermal management, that was supposed to be cheaper/lighter than the alternative of AMAD, hydraulics and turbine starter/APU while addressing specific stealth-related needs.

2a - The engine for some reason costs more than two F414s. P&W says it is because of things like thermal management (see above) baked into the engine.

3 - Direct costs of stealth: specialized coatings, sealants and structural materials. (Offset by not requiring a wideband all-aspect active EW system.)

So there's nothing crazy or incomprehensible about the price; I don't think anyone else could build to that requirement for less money. But it is driven by requirements, not some magic macro-economic inflation factor. That's the symptom, not the cause.

http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1980/1980%20-%202929.PDF

http://www.boeing.com/company/about-bca/

 

[sferrin]

I didn't hear that at the time. Because it was not the case, as far as I know.


See Figs 21 &22.

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19850010645.pdf

F-4 price in 1965 dollars: $2.4 million
F-16 C/D price in 1998 dollars: $18.8 million

2015 dollars F-4: $18.2 million
2015 dollars F-16: $26.4 million (Of course actually buying one today costs much, much more than that.)

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

And my figure for F-4 of $3.9 million in 1966 = $28.8 million in 2015, making the F-16 cheaper (by a little bit). And neither figure supports the contention it was several times the F-4 price.

 

[sferrin]

Aluminium hasn't become as costly as gold. Electronic components are cheaper than ever. Manufacturing is more automated. What is the driver for military aircraft cost increases being so much higher than other cost increases? Surely its increasing complexity?

Composite and titanium parts cost WAY more than the aluminum and steel that made up the majority of older aircraft. Also your base is much smaller than it was back then. Back then we had half a dozen manufacturers turning out fighters. Today? Two. And yes, complexity also drives up cost. How do you propose to avoid complexity AND maintain superiority? One cannot just say, "make a superior AESA but use fewer features (in the physical sense), fewer lines of code, and cheaper materials than the AWG-10" and expect it to happen. Hell, one chip in a modern AESA likely has more physical features (each of which needed to be designed) than an entire AWG-10. And while an F119 might have fewer parts than a J75 each of those parts are far more complex, made of more expensive materials, and have greater NRE costs associated with them than their earlier analogs due to increased R&D required to reach those points. Complexity is almost certainly THE driver behind increased costs but there is no way around it. (And before somebody goes there, "complexity" is far, FAR more than just part count.)

 

[sferrin]

And my figure for F-4 of $3.9 million in 1966 = $28.8 million in 2015, making the F-16 cheaper (by a little bit). And neither figure supports the contention it was several times the F-4 price.

Grabbed my prices off wiki. But even at a one-to-one price it still shoots down the notion that the F-16 was a cheap, affordable replacement. Compared to an F-15? Yes. Compared to the aircraft it was actually replacing? Nope. Nor would one reasonably expect it to be. Since the very beginning that's the way it's been because each succeeding generation takes more time to develop. The why's and wherefore's are obvious. Compare today's Formula 1 car to a race car from 1920. Miles apart in capability, complexity, and cost.

 

[LowObservable]

The Nasa paper from 1985 clearly puts the F-4E and F-16A much closer together than that, in 1981 dollars.


This would hardly be surprising as the F-4 was twin-engine, two-seat and bigger than the F-16. The F100 engine is clearly higher-tech than the (mostly steel) J79.


You'd need access to historical defense budgets to know for sure, but the idea that the F-16 was "several times" the cost of the F-4 is not supported by the facts.

 

[sferrin]

The Nasa paper from 1985 clearly puts the F-4E and F-16A much closer together than that, in 1981 dollars.


This would hardly be surprising as the F-4 was twin-engine, two-seat and bigger than the F-16. The F100 engine is clearly higher-tech than the (mostly steel) J79.


You'd need access to historical defense budgets to know for sure, but the idea that the F-16 was "several times" the cost of the F-4 is not supported by the facts.

Yeah, I was off there, though it was (and is) more expensive than the F-4. Yet, despite the howls of "no BVR, small payload, short range, etc. etc" in the beginning, nobody would trade today. Funny how that works. It's almost as if those buying the aircraft know something those in the bleachers don't.

 

[bring_it_on]

The F-4 price of $2.4 million mentioned by Sfferin for 1965 comes to $5.76 in 1979.

I have also come across a $2 million figure around 1965 for the F-4..which would be around $5.2 Million in 1980 and just over $15 Million today (using a simple inflation calculator)

EDIT - For some reason the source file for the chart above isn't uploading so I put it up on my scribd account ....

https://www.scribd.com/doc/272561720/Congressional-Report

 

[bring_it_on]

I didn't hear that at the time. Because it was not the case, as far as I know.


See Figs 21 &22.

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19850010645.pdf

F-4 price in 1965 dollars: $2.4 million
F-16 C/D price in 1998 dollars: $18.8 million

2015 dollars F-4: $18.2 million
2015 dollars F-16: $26.4 million (Of course actually buying one today costs much, much more than that.)

F-16D price was closer to 20 Million per aircraft in 1991, the C/D price was fairly well in line with the inflation calculator working from 1979's price (see chart in my previous post) vs that of the 1990 defense budget documents..

Interestingly using the F-16 1979 price as a starting point, the 2015 inflated adjusted price comes to $33 Million..Although not relevant for the JSF or pretty much any other western fighter currently in development, it could be a good benchmark for programs like the Indian Light Combat Aircraft, or even the T-X as a reference point for the cost v capability analysis cited here -

 

[LowObservable]

Please produce contemporary sources for complaints, let alone "howls" about short range. Actually, if you dig very far you'll find Fighter Mafia types pointing out that the F-16 had better range than the original F-15.

As for BVR, the most consistent and effective criticism by far came from people selling AIM-7-compatible fighters - Macs (F/A-18A/B) and Northrop (F-18L), engaged in the Canadian and Australian contests. And "the people buying the jet", the F-16, very early on, recognized that it was important. AMRAAM was well under way by 1980, and designed for F-16 tip-rail compatibility. It was supposed to be in production by 1985, so an interim AIM-7 installation was not attractive.

Fortunately, the AIM-9L proved itself, and gave the F-16 very good A2A in its early days, even with AMRAAM's late arrival.

There were two main complaints about the F-16 in 1980-82: One was the absence of BVR and the other was the old joke about the Soviet generals watching the victory parade down the Champs Elysees and saying "It was a pity we lost the air battle."

 

[sferrin]

Please produce contemporary sources for complaints, let alone "howls" about short range.

Yeah, sure, I'll just conjure up magazines from 35 years ago, many of which aren't even in business anymore. : Are you really going to try to pretend there weren't complaints about how the F-16 came up short in many regards compared to the F-4 it was replacing? I can only imagine how it would have played out were the internet what it is today back then. We'd have been hearing how inferior the F-16 was compared to the rejected 5th Gen Viggen with it's BVR and short field capability, and how the F-16 was much slower than the proposed Mirage F-1E. "Has no BVR, can't guide LGBs, useless at night, can't carry as many bombs as the F-4, etc. etc. etc." And yet here we are today with the F-16 pretty much universally recognized as one of the most successful fighters of the last 50 years, with a kill record to match.

Just looking through Lou Drendal's Squadorn Signal publication from 1981. My, my, my it's like deja vu.

"The GAO also questioned the pace of the test program, but the Air Force replied that of
32 milestones to be accomplished before the production decision, only one appeared to
be in any trouble. The GAO also questioned the escalating cost of the F-16. The Air Force
replied that it could justify all increases In the total program cost, which should have been
relatively easy, given the overall tendency of government to spend far In excess of it's
ability to pay. The GAO questioned the impact on costs that European participation in the
program would have. The Air Force replied that the added volume generated by the NATO
buy would more than make up for any increases in costs. The GAO questioned whether or
not the F-16 in fact needed the capability to fire radar guided missiles, as stated in the
Tactical Air Command report on the F-16, and they questioned the survivability of the F-16
in the air-to-ground role, which had been added to the F-16's missions. The GAO report
concluded that the F-16 was highly vulnerable to projectile and missile warhead
fragments from both air-to-air and air-to-ground threats. As a result of this report, USAF
directed General Dynamics to accelerate it's reassessment of F-16 survivability. However,
the Air Force took strong exception to the overall tenor of the GAO report, stating that
most of these perceived problems had either been anticipated and were in the process of
being fixed, or had already been fixed. In spite of this, the GAO issued another critical
report exactly one year later, urging complete DOD review of the F-16 program before the
Air Force went ahead with it's planned buy of an additional 738 F-16s, which would bring
the total USAF buy up to 1,388 aircraft. This report questioned structural integrity, radar
operation, flight stability, anti implementation of the Foreign Military Sales plan. The Air
Force provided point by point rebuttal of the GAO's allegations, and the program continued
apace."

. . .

"In the meantime, a moderate mutiny was brewing among USAFE commanders. They
worried that the F-16 would be too vulnerable to Soviet fighters with beyond-visual-range
(BVR) radars, and were reluctant to accept F·16s if they had to give up their F-4s. (The F·4
was equipped with the BVR Sparrow Missile) The F-16 had demonstrated the ability to fire
the Sparrow during the test program, so the primary diff iculty was with the relatively sim·
pie radar in the F-16. The Air Force promised to look into the possibility of upgrading the
radar,"

Wow, imagine how today's media would blow this up if it were modern commanders not wanting to give up their F-16s for F-35s. The intertubes would melt and the usual suspects would wear the prints from their fingers with the amount of "news" they'd churn out.

"But, by that September, when the F-16 made it's first appearance at the Farnborough
Air Show, the Consortium was voicing concern that they would have to shut down their
production lines if additional third country orders were not forthcoming within the next
few months. (The Dutch were the only members of the Consortium to agree to purchase
additional F-16s, having made the decision to replace their NF-5s.)"


*GASP* Shocking, just. . .shocking.


As for range:

"During Coronet Falcon, the 4th TFS deployed from Hill AFB, Utah to
Flesland Air Station, Bergen, Norway, with a 10 hour, non-stop f light. The F-16s did this
with three refuellings, the last a precautionary move in case bad weather was encountered
at the destination. Lt. Col. Gary Michels, C.O. of the 4th, and a veteran of a
similar F-4 deployment, stated that the F-4 would require 7 or 8 refuellings for the same
mission, and would have used more than five times as much fuel."

It's interesting that the Col. would go out of his way to make the comparison to the F-4. It's almost as if people thought the F-16 would have less range.

And of course this:

"The air-to-air threat was provided by RAF Lightnings and Phantoms, which attempted to
intercept from within five minutes of takeoff, until the F-16s had landed. The F-16s not
only were the most accurate bombers, they also scored 86 kills in air-to-air combat, with
no losses! By contrast, the four other teams suffered 42 losses to the air-to-air threat,
while scoring only one kill in defense. Ground crews averaged a 10.5 minute turn-around
in refuelling and rearming with six MK-82 500 pound bombs and 515 rounds of 20MM
ammunition."

Of course today this would be explained away as a piece of "scripted propaganda".

Yep, it sure is interesting reading through "contemporary accounts".

 

[LowObservable]

Drendel appears to be further confirming that one of the main early issues was lack of BVR - which was already being addressed via MSIP and AMRAAM when the book was published. No argument with that.


Which consortium? Which Farnborough? I guess this refers to the assembly lines in Belgium and the Netherlands and I had forgotten (if I ever heard it) that there was any plan to use them for third-party deliveries. In any event that never happened.


And the fact that a commander praises the F-16's range is taken as confirmation that there was a controversy over its lack of range. As CS Lewis' Professor put it: "Logic! What do they teach them in these schools?"

 

[sferrin]

And the fact that a commander praises the F-16's range is taken as confirmation that there was a controversy over its lack of range. As CS Lewis' Professor put it: "Logic! What do they teach them in these schools?"

"Logic" indeed. Can you show me where I claimed the F-16 was short in the range department? Of course you can't, because I never said it. I said the perception was there. The fact the Col. felt he needed to point out the range difference supports the notion that the perception was there.

edit: Alright, I'll concede that it doesn't prove anything BUT it does indicate what the Col. thought was important to talk about. Of all the things to choose about the F-16 to talk about (excellent maneuverability, great visibility, Star Wars like cockpit and displays, etc.) he chose range. So if range wasn't a hot button why would he single that out?

 

[gTg]

I guess this refers to the assembly lines in Belgium and the Netherlands and I had forgotten (if I ever heard it) that there was any plan to use them for third-party deliveries. In any event that never happened.

If i remember correctly, Danish F-16 were produced by SABCA and Norwegian F-16 by Fokker. It may have been the other way around...

 

[bring_it_on]

Interestingly they did launch a Sparrow from an F-16, and even planned to do a guided launch at a target around the late 80's. Not sure whether the latter occurred however.

Aviation Week & Space Technology -

 

[sferrin]

Interestingly they did launch a Sparrow from an F-16, and even planned to do a guided launch at a target around the late 80's. Not sure whether the latter occurred however.

Aviation Week & Space Technology -

Funny thing is Northrop even tried that from their F-20. The pilot described the AIM-7s as "boat anchors" ;D




Eventually the "Air Defense" variant of the F-16 was fitted with them.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

And the fact that a commander praises the F-16's range is taken as confirmation that there was a controversy over its lack of range. As CS Lewis' Professor put it: "Logic! What do they teach them in these schools?"

"Logic" indeed. Can you show me where I claimed the F-16 was short in the range department? Of course you can't, because I never said it. I said the perception was there. The fact the Col. felt he needed to point out the range difference supports the notion that the perception was there.

edit: Alright, I'll concede that it doesn't prove anything BUT it does indicate what the Col. thought was important to talk about. Of all the things to choose about the F-16 to talk about (excellent maneuverability, great visibility, Star Wars like cockpit and displays, etc.) he chose range. So if range wasn't a hot button why would he single that out?

Range WAS a hot topic with the US fighter pilot community because their near-universal perception was single engine = low range. The F-16 deliberately stuffed in extra fuel to kill this argument stone dead, and in fact was significantly better than the F-4 and the F-15A, so the F-15C resorted to extra internal fuel and FAST packs to get adequate range to catch up with its "little brother".

 

[Triton]

Why does the JSF cost what it costs?

1 - Extra included equipment accounts for part of it: EO-DAS, EOTS, MADL, and a capable passive EW system.

2 - A very complicated integration of secondary power ("more electric") and thermal management, that was supposed to be cheaper/lighter than the alternative of AMAD, hydraulics and turbine starter/APU while addressing specific stealth-related needs.

2a - The engine for some reason costs more than two F414s. P&W says it is because of things like thermal management (see above) baked into the engine.

3 - Direct costs of stealth: specialized coatings, sealants and structural materials. (Offset by not requiring a wideband all-aspect active EW system.)

So there's nothing crazy or incomprehensible about the price; I don't think anyone else could build to that requirement for less money. But it is driven by requirements, not some magic macro-economic inflation factor. That's the symptom, not the cause.

Concurrency and retrofits to production aircraft? Or is the role of concurrency and retrofits in driving F-22 and F-35 costs exaggerated?

 

[bring_it_on]

More than 80% of the projected aircraft will be produced without any concurrency changes (current plan) with the overall cost of the concurrency changes having been reduced over time.

F-35 PEO: Joint Strike Fighter To Escape Concurrency 'Rut' Around 2018
Posted: April 17, 2015

The head of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program expects the $400 billion fighter jet program to lift itself out of the concurrency “rut” by about 2017 or 2018 as the number of aircraft and engine faults discovered during developmental testing continues to decline.
This week, the Government Accountability Office warned that the costs associated with retrofitting already-built Joint Strike Fighters will likely increase as the Defense Department ramps up procurement quantities over the next five years. The services plan to purchase another 339 aircraft through 2019 at a cost of $54 billion, despite 40 percent of the developmental test program remaining.
Speaking at the Norwegian-American Defense Conference in Washington April 17, Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan said the concurrency overlap and the number of new discoveries has come down significantly over the last few years, but conceded that the 130 airplanes already in the field will all need to be retrofitted at some point.
“This program started with an immense amount of concurrency,” the general said. “We are going to find other things wrong with this airplane because we have testing left. Our job is to figure out, how once we find those things, we get it into the production line and stop building airplanes that are not appropriate for what we found -- and then putting a program in place to get all of the other airplanes out in the field upgraded to that new capability or to remove those deficiencies.”
“We feel by about 2017, 2018 we will be out of this rut in which we are building airplanes that now have to be retrofitted because of a new discovery,” he continued.
Bogdan explained that the cost of concurrency, $1.7 billion to date, will not be borne solely by the Untied States, but that international partners will also pay their share depending on an agreed retrofit plan tailored to their needs. His comments come as the first Norwegian F-35, AM-1, makes its way down the assembly line at Fort Worth, TX. The first two Norwegian jets will be delivered in 2015 as the European partner works toward achieving initial operational capability in 2019.
“Ultimately, it will be the partner's decision as to whether they want to modify their airplanes and up to what level,” he said. “We will create a plan that allows every single airplane eventually by 2018 to have the full hardware and full software capability that we promised. We believe all the partners will fund it to that level, but they don't have to. We will keep the airplanes in a configuration they desire, but that's a bill we all end up paying.”
Earlier in his presentation, Bogdan said the F-35 JSF program is big, complicated and sometimes very messy, but “this is not the same program it was five years ago.”
Bogdan described Norway as a “model citizen” on the program and the only partner to bring its procurement profile of 52 fighter jets forward. The country was recently selected to host a heavy engine maintenance depot to service jets in Europe, and Bogdan said there would be many more opportunities for Norway and the wider European defense industry to participate in future sustainment work.
According to the general, European partners can expect to see a suite of new requests for proposals come out in the next two to three years as the program delivers more aircraft and moves closer to its initial operational capability milestones.
“The only two things that we've actually assigned so far are heavy airframe depot and heavy engine depot,” he said. “In the future, over the next two to three years, we'll start discussing with the partnership how we'll set up capabilities to repair all sorts of systems: landing gear, hydraulics, avionics, support equipment, warehousing, and setting up the supply chain. -- James Drew

Concurrency while adds to program cost has no bearing on the per unit cost to produce the F-35 with its systems..LO was listing the reason why the F-35 costs to produce what it does..

 

[RadicalDisconnect]

The USAF drove JSF to high cost with their insanely gold-plated requirements, then canned the F-22 early because the cheaper F-35 was now capable enough to not need as many, and now have to buy lots of capable-but-costly machines.


You reap what you sow.

I was under the impression that some of the gold plating, like EOTS on every JSF, and the tailed instead of canard configuration were driven by the Navy.

 

[LowObservable]

RD - The tailed configuration was Navy-driven on the LockMart design. It was clear that you needed a bigger wing for the Navy version, and if you scaled-up the canard the root chord of the delta (highly tapered) main wing started to consume all the space on the body and nowhere to put the foreplane. The quad-tail had less sweep, and you could also hang the H-stabs on booms.

 

[Triton]

We should probably also add the cost of writing and debugging 24 million lines of software code, including the 9.5 million lines of code on board the plane, to explain the cost of the F-35. I presume that this also includes the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS).

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/ALIS.html

I don't know how many lines of software code are on the F-16.

 

[bobbymike]

We should probably also add the cost of writing and debugging 24 million lines of software code, including 9.5 million on board the plane, to the cost of the F-35.

Software is so incredibly complex. Every time I read about F-35 or other modern weapon systems software requirements it always reminds me of early debates on SDI when opponents estimated the system (entire SDI system that is) would require maybe 5 million lines of code and that would be impossible to write let alone get to work.