The F-35 Discussion Topic (No Holds Barred II)

[sferrin]

Actually, nobody's suggesting that the F-35A and B are inferior to what the USAF and USMC currently possess, because most of the USAF fighter force and the entire USMC force comprises aircraft that are obsolescent and falling to bits.

Are you suggesting that if the F-15/-16/Harrier forces weren't "falling to bits" that they'd be superior to the F-35 A/C?

 

[LowObservable]

No. I did say "obsolescent" because there have been no significant upgrades for so long.

 

[sferrin]

No. I did say "obsolescent" because there have been no significant upgrades for so long.

So you'd agree, they do need to be replaced, preferably with superior aircraft, that are going to stay that way for sometime? (Throwing an AESA, CFTs, and a -132 on an F-16 isn't going to buy you much time. And I'd go so far as to suggest it will be just as vulnerable to modern air defenses as your average Block 50.)

 

[Triton]

Published on Aug 17, 2015

Video of the F-35 Academic Training Center at Luke Air Force Base showing how the future F-35 pilots train on advanced simulator before taking flight with real Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II.

https://youtu.be/OWusWStb-yc

 

[Triton]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/f-16-vs-f-35-in-a-dogfight-jpo-air-force-weigh-in-on-whos-best/

I thought that this part of the article was particularly interesting:

I spoke to another pilot who has closely watched the F-35s development and has extensive combat experience, Dave Deptula, who now heads the Air Force Associations’s Mitchell Institute. He’s also a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors. Deptula flew the F-15 and twice led joint task forces, in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

His bottom line about what the test pilot said: It’s “interesting, but not relevant to the issue of campaign level utility of the other very significant advantages the F-35 possesses in the areas of low observability, sensor capability, and information integration that provide the F-35 an enormous advantage relative to legacy aircraft. If one can target and kill your adversaries prior to the merge, what they can do at the merge really doesn’t matter now, does it?”

He believes “the anti-F-35 crowd are so focused on how we fought in the last century with old equipment that they can’t conceive of, or understand the information edge advantage aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 provide.”

He even disdains the term “fighter” for the F-35 and F-22. “I’ve said for years and will continue to do so until the defense troglodytes finally get it (and some are slowly coming around)—5th generation aircraft are not ‘fighters’—they are ‘sensor-shooters’ optimized for different threat regimes, and can perform the roles of “F,” “B,” “A,” “RC,” “E,”EA,” and AWACS aircraft of the past.”

Deptula says that one F-35 “can create effects that require dozens of legacy aircraft, and in some cases dozens of legacy aircraft simply cannot accomplish with one or two ‘F’-22s or ‘F’-35s can accomplish.” Dogfighting isn’t the sine qua non of air combat, he argues. Killing the enemy before he knows you’re there is. “Bottom line—it’s about the information, stupid.”

Should we start calling the F-22 and F-35 sensor-shooter aircraft rather than fighter aircraft?

 

[SpudmanWP]

I'm sure the Israelis would just love buying an aircraft called the "SS-35" ???

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/f-16-vs-f-35-in-a-dogfight-jpo-air-force-weigh-in-on-whos-best/

I thought that this part of the article was particularly interesting:

I spoke to another pilot who has closely watched the F-35s development and has extensive combat experience, Dave Deptula, who now heads the Air Force Associations’s Mitchell Institute. He’s also a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors. Deptula flew the F-15 and twice led joint task forces, in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

His bottom line about what the test pilot said: It’s “interesting, but not relevant to the issue of campaign level utility of the other very significant advantages the F-35 possesses in the areas of low observability, sensor capability, and information integration that provide the F-35 an enormous advantage relative to legacy aircraft. If one can target and kill your adversaries prior to the merge, what they can do at the merge really doesn’t matter now, does it?”

He believes “the anti-F-35 crowd are so focused on how we fought in the last century with old equipment that they can’t conceive of, or understand the information edge advantage aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 provide.”

He even disdains the term “fighter” for the F-35 and F-22. “I’ve said for years and will continue to do so until the defense troglodytes finally get it (and some are slowly coming around)—5th generation aircraft are not ‘fighters’—they are ‘sensor-shooters’ optimized for different threat regimes, and can perform the roles of “F,” “B,” “A,” “RC,” “E,”EA,” and AWACS aircraft of the past.”

Deptula says that one F-35 “can create effects that require dozens of legacy aircraft, and in some cases dozens of legacy aircraft simply cannot accomplish with one or two ‘F’-22s or ‘F’-35s can accomplish.” Dogfighting isn’t the sine qua non of air combat, he argues. Killing the enemy before he knows you’re there is. “Bottom line—it’s about the information, stupid.”

Should we start calling the F-22 and F-35 sensor-shooter aircraft rather than fighter aircraft?

F-35-S2? Easier than F/A/B/E//EA/RC-35? or the F-35 Fabeearc pronounced FA-BEERK

 

[SpudmanWP]

FEAR-35

 

[Triton]

FEAR-35

B)

 

[Triton]

"You Say The F-35 Can’t Dogfight? I Say Good."
by Daniel Gouré, Ph.D.
June 30, 2015

Source:
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/you-say-the-f-35-cant-dogfight-i-say-good/

A report is making the rounds of defense blogs of a test of the F-35A’s close-in dogfighting capability. According to this report, the F-35A was significantly less maneuverable than the opposing aircraft, an F-16C, and was at a distinct disadvantage when it came to a duel involving cannons. The bevy of committee critics of the Joint Strike Fighter have jumped on this report as further evidence that the aircraft is inferior to those it is intended to replace and the program is a failure.

Care to guess when was the last time a U.S. fighter fired its cannon in a dogfight with a hostile aircraft? It was more than 40 years ago, during the Vietnam War. In the most recent air campaign, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. and its coalition allies shot down 36 Iraqi aircraft, all with missiles. A number of these engagements were within visual range but involved the use of air-to-air missiles. It is true that during this conflict an A-10 used its cannon to shoot down an Iraqi helicopter, but that was it.

The U.S. experience mirrors that of air combat generally. According to the best study on the subject of air-to-air combat, by CSBA’s John Stillion, the use of guns in air combat has declined from a high of more than 60 percent of all engagements in the 1960s to around 5 percent for the last 25 years. Around 90 percent of air losses since 1990 have been inflicted by missiles. The reasons for this are simple. First, continuing improvements in sensors and missiles. Second, the growing connectivity of aircraft. Third, new tactics that exploit the first two sets of advances.

While it would be nice to have a fighter that can do everything equally well (and all of them better than any adversary) it is not clear that this is necessary. The Flying Tigers were able to beat the Japanese with a fighter, the P-40, which was inferior in dogfighting to several of those flown by their adversary. This was as a result of the innovative tactics developed by the unit’s leader, Claire Chennault, which capitalized on the strength of the P-40. Put simply, the solution was don’t dogfight. Instead, the Tigers were trained to get above their opponents and conduct diving passes.

Do I really need to point out that the Israeli Air Force, which wrote the book on air-to-air combat, is acquiring the F-35? What is it about the aircraft that they don’t know but the bloggers do?

The important conclusion to draw from the above discussion is not that the F-35 is a bad aircraft, but that the existing fleets of fourth-generation fighters are increasingly obsolete. Stillion’s data shows that victory in future air-to-air combat will go to the side that can see first and shoot first. This is the point made by the F-35 test pilot whose report is the centerpiece of the above referenced blogs: “ if you’re flying a JSF, there’s no point in trying to get into a sustained, close turning battle with another fighter. ‘There were not compelling reasons to fight in this region.’” If one accepts the standard set by the anti-F-35 blogs, the aircraft that must be eliminated from the force isn’t the F-35, it is the A-10, which definitely cannot dogfight.

The limited data provided by a single test engagement is not sufficient to draw fundamental conclusions about the ability of the F-35 to dogfight. Yes, pilots will make mistakes and there is a chance of surprise close encounters with hostile aircraft. The Flying Tigers lost pilots who forgot Chennault’s fundamental rule of no dogfighting. But even if it turns out that the JSF is inferior to some other aircraft in close, turning air battles, the evidence of the past 25 years of air-to-air suggests that this will be a rare occurrence. It makes no sense to prefer fourth-generation aircraft, which will be inferior to the F-35 in 90-plus percent of future engagements, over the one that will dominate in that domain but may be less capable in, at most, 5 percent of combat situations.

 

[LowObservable]

Which is all well and good, but in actual fact (yes, one of those pesky things) no F-22 or F-35 can do any form of recon or surveillance worth a hoot until it has a way to share data with the rest of the force, rapidly, securely and preferably covertly.

And if this is not a fundamentally difficult thing to do, why have multiple ways to do it (Objective Gateway, MADL-for-everyone, all sorts of experiments) been tried over almost a decade, without having a solution identified?

Also: if you can win before the merge, your solution looks more like Stillion's air-to-air NGB and its guarding line of UCAVs than an F-22 or an F-35 (or anything else for that matter). But if you can't guarantee it, you still need to be able to win or at least survive at the merge.

 

[bobbymike]

Have you missed all the F-22 stories and posts with regard to this very thing?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. F-22 Raptor stealth jets provide kinetic situational awareness over Syria

Quote

Although they were not conceived to play this kind of role, F-22 Raptors have emerged as some of the U.S.-led Coalition’s most reliable combat assets in supporting coalition planes during air strikes in Syria and Iraq.

“We are operating regularly in Iraq and Syria. The F-22’s advanced sensors and low-observable characteristics enable us to operate much closer to non-coalition surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft with little risk of detection,” said Lt. Col. J. (name withheld for security reasons) in a recent 380th Air Expeditionary Wing release. “We provide increased situational awareness for other coalition aircraft while simultaneously delivering precision air-to-ground weapons. This allows us to reduce the risk to our forces while mitigating the risk to civilian casualties, one of our highest priorities in this conflict. It is a true multirole aircraft.”

http://theaviationist.com/2015/08/15/f-22-kinetic-situational-awareness/

 

[sferrin]

But if you can't guarantee it, you still need to be able to win or at least survive at the merge.

Is there any objective evidence that the F-35 will be any less survivable WVR than anything else? Those new wing mods they're testing on the Typhoon won't enable it to out turn a 5th gen HOBs missile. It will be interesting to see who (if anybody) even bothers to have them installed on their Typhoon fleets. The thing that amuses me is that those most vocal about the F-35s perceived shortcomings at gunfight range seem to disappear when it's pointed out how disadvantaged those "superior" gunfighters are pretty much everywhere else in the engagement envelope. It's almost as if they think winning a gunfight (something that hasn't happened since the early 80's) is more important than surviving to even see a gunfight. What's your strategy? "Well, see here, we're gonna pray we somehow detect that new-fangled stealth fighter before he sees our flying barn, er, "gunfighter". Then we're gonna creep up on his six without him or his wingman ever seeing us. Then we're gonna plug 'im with our cannon." Brilliant.

 

[bobbymike]

But if you can't guarantee it, you still need to be able to win or at least survive at the merge.

Is there any objective evidence that the F-35 will be any less survivable WVR than anything else? Those new wing mods they're testing on the Typhoon won't enable it to out turn a 5th gen HOBs missile. It will be interesting to see who (if anybody) even bothers to have them installed on their Typhoon fleets. The thing that amuses me is that those most vocal about the F-35s perceived shortcomings at gunfight range seem to disappear when it's pointed out how disadvantaged those "superior" gunfighters are pretty much everywhere else in the engagement envelope. It's almost as if they think winning a gunfight (something that hasn't happened since the early 80's) is more important than even surviving to see a gunfight. What's your strategy? "Well, see here, we're gonna pray we somehow detect that new-fangled stealth fighter before he sees our flying barn, er, "gunfighter". Then we're gonna creep up on his six without him or his wingman ever seeing us. Then we're gonna plug 'im with our cannon." Brilliant.

Just missed one element "All while dodging advanced air to air weapons because they detected me and shot first"

 

[SpudmanWP]

Which is all well and good, but in actual fact (yes, one of those pesky things) no F-22 or F-35 can do any form of recon or surveillance worth a hoot until it has a way to share data with the rest of the force, rapidly, securely and preferably covertly.

The forward F-35s can transmit data either via SATCOM (Block 4) or to another F-35 that is not in the area of AO that can then re-transmit the data via Link-16 (assuming that there is no MADL ground station).

 

[Dragon029]

Any word on MADL upgrades for other platforms? Surely the JSTARS replacement will feature it, but will we see E-3s / E-2s / etc fitted with it any time soon?

 

[SpudmanWP]

Here is a ground system


http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/USMC/2015PEO_LS_ATIP_7.3CAC2S.pdf


They are also researching adding MADL to MIDS:

Continued MIDS Modernization efforts to include Small Business Innovation Research transition opportunities including a Small Form Factor terminal and new waveforms such as Mutli-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL), Common Data Link (CDL), and others into the MIDS JTRS terminal.

http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2016/Navy/0205604N_7_PB_2016.pdf

 

[Dragon029]

[Your second link is a repeat of the first].

The MIDS news sounds promising though - I wonder though if it'll only be a MADL-receive function however, as (as far as I'm aware) a large part of MADL's data bandwidth and stealthiness comes from the use of highly directional antennas, which wouldn't be present on those legacy platforms. It wouldn't be that bad, as if you're sending Link 16 transmissions, you're arguably just as likely to have those detected as have your legacy airframe detected on radar (or so I would imagine).

 

[quellish]

...until it has a way to share data with the rest of the force, rapidly, securely and preferably covertly.

Have you missed all the F-22 stories and posts with regard to this very thing?

Without going into details, what the F-22 is doing now is not what LowObservable is describing.

 

[Jeb]

Published on Aug 14, 2015

How would a 4th generation fighter compete against a 5th generation fighter? F-35 test pilot Billie Flynn, a former Canadian Armed Forces aviator who has flown everything from the CF-18 to the F-16 to the F-35, explains his theory.

https://youtu.be/tuz0ob4aGP8

That's the most non-answer answer to that question that he could possibly have given. "We can do anything we want and we will dominate the enemy." ???

 

[Jeb]

...until it has a way to share data with the rest of the force, rapidly, securely and preferably covertly.

Have you missed all the F-22 stories and posts with regard to this very thing?

Without going into details, what the F-22 is doing now is not what LowObservable is describing.

It's not, not in the sense of being a flying data server, but I get the idea at least that the F-22 pilots are becoming much more skilled & sophisticated at battlespace management and directing forces even if it's just through voice & simple data sharing. Like they're pulling off the command & control functions from AWACS & J-STARS, but closer to the actual combat zones and with more automation.


I've always thought that F-22 pilots were going to work in the same fashion & role that special operations sniper teams do, where they're as much about watching the big picture from a concealed high position and giving the Gods-eye view to the rest of the shooters and only directly engaging enemy opposition when it's necessary to clear the path for the team, or otherwise to knock off high-value or high-threat targets.


And if the F-22s are setting that precedent despite having the constraints in data sharing, the F-35s may bring even more capability to the arena...except they don't have the same level of performance and stealth that the F-22s do.

 

[SpudmanWP]

[Your second link is a repeat of the first].

Sorry, fixed with quote.

 

[DrRansom]

Why does every F-35 need to be a: Fighter / Reconnaissance / Electronic Attack / Early Warning / ....? Wouldn't it have been simpler to focus on Fighter / Attack sensors and leave the advanced, expensive kit to specialist planes?

Whenever I hear that statement, it sounds like the Air Force overloaded the F-35 with electronics. Instead of optimizing cost and performance, they went all in on performance and will pay the price in maintenance, reduced flight hours, and limited money for new fighters / fleet upgrades.

 

[SpudmanWP]

What constitutes "overloaded with electronics" that is not core to being a VLO aircraft or a normal part of a multirole fighter?

 

[bobbymike]

What constitutes "overloaded with electronics" that is not core to being a VLO aircraft or a normal part of a multirole fighter?

It seems a more 'we can do these things now' rather than an effort to 'stuff as much into it as possible for no good reason' by USAF/contractor??

 

[DrRansom]

What constitutes "overloaded with electronics" that is not core to being a VLO aircraft or a normal part of a multirole fighter?

Maybe there isn't a spectacular increase in F-35 electronics versus the competition. In either case, that still rankles as adding those additional missions seems, to me, to be a distraction from the need to make the F-35 accomplish its original mission at the best balance of capability and cost.

For example, consider DAS: I get 360 IR warning against SAMs / local detection of aircraft. But was it necessary to add the ability to see through the airplane? That seems to have produced only technological difficulties and no increase in visual acuity. Here, rather cut the television portion of DAS and retain the staring IR warning.

Now, a DAS system for missile launch is a great idea, but that should be considered first for dedicated recon assets, and later added to F-35 via software functionality. Again, focus on primary mission and supporting capabilities.

 

[SpudmanWP]

What do you not understand about a software driven avionics system?


One radio provides ALL the frequencies & waveforms, current and future.


One radar provides all the modes, current & future.


One EODAS provides the raw data that SOFTWARE can use in many different ways. They did not have to add any more hardware to the F-35 to enable the whole "see through the plane" bit... which btw will save lives during landing and enable much better night operations. Sure they had to fine tune it, but in the grand scheme of things it was an overblown drop in the bucket that was mostly the responsibility of the helmet maker and not the F-35 SDD team.


What you advocated removing was just a software feature, no hardware changes would have been done and lives would have definitely been lost due to the reduced capability.


Sure there will be upgrades to the systems, but they will not be singular in purpose.


Being a software driven plane means a relatively long SDD phase but it will lead to greater, cheaper, end faster Post SDD upgrades.

 

[Dragon029]

Why does every F-35 need to be a: Fighter / Reconnaissance / Electronic Attack / Early Warning / ....? Wouldn't it have been simpler to focus on Fighter / Attack sensors and leave the advanced, expensive kit to specialist planes?

For one thing; the advanced, expensive kit is a large part of what makes a fighter potent.

But in the bigger picture, the point is for every F-35 to be a force multiplier; how many of each specialist type do you need to fight a competent enemy? How many fighters do you need to protect a tactical bomber? How many jammer platforms? What do you do if your strike package, or AEW, or jammers, or fighters are shot down?

At least with multiroles you can provide generic capabilities to each, and then dominate through quantity and concentration of force.

If the enemy has 1000 jets, of which 500 are air-to-air only fighters and 500 are bombers, and you have 1000 jets, which are multiroles 70% as good as a dedicated fighter or bomber, then you can defeat their fighter fleet (and clean up their bombs later) while still conducting air-to-ground operations. All you have to do is fit every fighter with A2G and A2A armament, or land jets and swap loadouts. The enemy on the other hand has to produce more fighters.

You also have the ability to benefit from economy of scale. Pretty much the only reason we're looking at a (TY) $85 million F-35A at the beginning of FRP is because the expected purchase size and rapid production rate has resulted in large investment in production facilities and logistics. With those savings, you can then put more of those technologies that make modern fighters effective and make those 70%-as-good fighters 80% as good, 90% as good, etc.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Why does every F-35 need to be a: Fighter / Reconnaissance / Electronic Attack / Early Warning / ....? Wouldn't it have been simpler to focus on Fighter / Attack sensors and leave the advanced, expensive kit to specialist planes?

Lets take a typical detachment of F-35Bs on an LHD
Assuming 6 planes that can do any job at any time.


What if they had to specialize?
1 for Recon
1 for CAS
1 for EA
1 for Early Warning
2 for Fighters


Assuming a %75 readiness rate you would have at least 4 F-35Bs ready to do any job. If you went the specialized route, always be out two of those capabilities.


"Sorry, no recon for a week while we wait for a part"


"Incoming attack... Sorry, no fighters to defend"


"Help, we need CAS... Sorry, not till Tuesday"


"We're going DownTown today and need that EA escort... bummer that it can't fly today"

 

[Triton]

"Navy To Test F-35C off Eisenhower in October"
By Lara Seligman 3:20 p.m. EDT August 20, 2015

Source:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/naval-aviation/2015/08/20/us-navy-plans--sea-testing-f-35c-october/32048197/

WASHINGTON — The US Navy is planning at-sea testing of the carrier variant joint strike fighter in the first few weeks of October aboard the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower, according to several sources.

The upcoming sea trials will mark the second phase of developmental testing for the Lockheed Martin-made F-35C. During the test period, the team will evaluate the aircraft’s ability to launch and recover from the carrier, and its performance in suboptimal conditions and during night operations.

The Navy conducted initial sea trials with the fighter jet aboard the carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) off the coast of Southern California in November. During the testing period, the Navy completed 124 catapult launches and arrested landings with zero missed arrestments, service spokeswoman Sylvia Pierson said Thursday. Because the aircraft performed so well, the test team decided to conduct night operations, an unprecedented feat during the first at-sea period of any naval aircraft since the F-4 era, Pierson said.

Pierson characterized the November trials as “history-making,” adding that the team completed all test goals ahead of schedule.

“Testers also accelerated the F-35C program test and evaluation objectives by six months as they completed all 2014 carrier-based threshold test goals ahead of schedule, developed a large amount of the initial aircraft launch and recovery bulletins, and paved the way for F-35 fifth generation fighters to deliver an unprecedented stealth-at-sea capability to the carrier air wing,” she said.

The initial tests also qualified the four test pilots to fly the aircraft in at-sea test events, Pierson noted.

The news of the upcoming testing comes amid indications budget pressures and competing priorities could drive the Navy to purchase fewer of the planes per year in the 2020s. The current plan is to purchase around 20 F-35Cs annually during that decade, but one top service official suggested that number could fall.

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Joe Dunford suggested earlier this year that the Pentagon is weighing whether to stick to its plan to buy 2,443 F-35s overall.

"Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number," Dunford wrote in response to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The F-35C is expected to become operational by 2018, when the Navy will stand up an operational squadron with 10 F-35Cs and trained pilots.

The carrier variant of the joint strike fighter will be the last model to become operational: The Marine Corps declared initial operational capability on its vertical takeoff and landing F-35B earlier this summer, and the Air Force plans to declare its conventional takeoff and landing F-35A ready to go in the fall of 2016.

 

[sferrin]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJhTDzeMYkI

 

[jeffb]

Why does every F-35 need to be a: Fighter / Reconnaissance / Electronic Attack / Early Warning / ....? Wouldn't it have been simpler to focus on Fighter / Attack sensors and leave the advanced, expensive kit to specialist planes?

Lets take a typical detachment of F-35Bs on an LHD
Assuming 6 planes that can do any job at any time.


What if they had to specialize?
1 for Recon
1 for CAS
1 for EA
1 for Early Warning
2 for Fighters


Assuming a %75 readiness rate you would have at least 4 F-35Bs ready to do any job. If you went the specialized route, always be out two of those capabilities.


"Sorry, no recon for a week while we wait for a part"


"Incoming attack... Sorry, no fighters to defend"


"Help, we need CAS... Sorry, not till Tuesday"

"We're going DownTown today and need that EA escort... bummer that it can't fly today"

This is a bit of a furphy isn't it Spudman? With existing aircraft you'd just move the stores/pods to another available aircraft and move on.

Repairs can be made to pods while the aircraft is out on a different mission too. With F35 the aircraft has to be sitting there in the bay with the techs. If it affects a capability all aircraft need, you may need to cycle each aircraft out of action while it's addressed.

"Help, we need CAS... Sorry, not till Tuesday, we're waiting on a critical software patch".

 

[sferrin]

This is a bit of a furphy isn't it Spudman? With existing aircraft you'd just move the stores/pods to another available aircraft and move on.

And fly right to the site of the soon to be CSAR mission. Brilliant.

[/quote]

 

[SpudmanWP]

This is a bit of a furphy isn't it Spudman? With existing aircraft you'd just move the stores/pods to another available aircraft and move on.

DrRansom was talking about "specialist planes" and specifially NOT multi-role fighters.




You can't strap a pod on a plane and make it a CAS, EW, RECON, Maritime strike aircraft, etc.... especially in upcoming denied environments.




btw, Most of the hardware on the F-35 is "podded" internally and can be replaced as single unit.

 

[jeffb]

DrRansom was talking about "specialist planes" and specifially NOT multi-role fighters.

Yes he was but your counterpoint went straight to the scenario of an LHD which only has room for 6 aircraft total. So the likelihood of putting one example each of an EW, CAS, RECON, etc and a couple of fighters is extremely unlikely precisely for the reasons you outline. That doesn't mean that specialized aircraft are a bad idea generally, just that equipping an LHD with them is.

You can't strap a pod on a plane and make it a CAS, EW, RECON, Maritime strike aircraft, etc.

Yes you can. And without the size, shape, power and heat generation restrictions that apply to a unit which has to fit into a F35 bay you can build cheaper, quicker, easier and respond more rapidly to changes in tactics and technology.

... especially in upcoming denied environments.

I think this is debatable, especially as they've been 'upcoming' for about as long as the F35 has. It also assumes that that the F35 won't be 'denied' as well. See above re: 'technology changes'.

btw, Most of the hardware on the F-35 is "podded" internally and can be replaced as single unit.

Doesn't that introduce a significant stores issue aboard your hypothetical LHD? Don't they need to carry at least one spare of each 'podded' piece of hardware for each aircraft? With normal pods you might need to carry a copy for each aircraft but in many cases you won't. You'd think that would be a smaller logistical footprint.

And fly right to the site of the soon to be CSAR mission. Brilliant.

Thanks Sferrin. So only send specialized CAS aircraft on CAS missions - check. The A-10 folks will be delighted to know you've finally come around Sferrin! ;D

 

[SpudmanWP]

t's not just a LHD problem.


Countries the world over are building Multi-role fighters because having specialized ones is too expensive.


Except for very few exceptions, having "specialized planes" is a bad idea. Only the largest militarizes still employ "small" amounts of specialized planes and are in most cases reducing their numbers (EA-6, A-10, Harrier, etc).


No podded solution can be integrated as tightly as an internal one. Take EOTS for example, because it's internal it is a more stable platform and has a higher-speed link to the avionics.


btw, if you carry limited number of "pods" then you are exposing yourself to not being able to execute the mission due to lack of equipment. This is the main driver to the F-35 carrying everything, day one. Large purchases drives down costs.

 

[lastdingo]

This
The historical problem of carrier-borne reconnaissance
applies to specialised planes in general, particularly when in warfare with allies or for several carriers cooperating.


I disagree that links to podded equipment are slower. The internal datalinks (can) follow the same protocols and standards, (can) have the same cables and are integrated with the same Mil Std hardware (1553 and 1760 usually IIRC).

Pods tend to be less stiff and less reliably aligned with the fuselage, though (a problem shared with anything on the flexing wings).
This requires a lot of calibration and is a problem with applications such as gun pods. It's not that much an issue with reconnaissance or fire control (~LANTIRN etc.) equipment since their perfect alignment with the fuselage isn't critical.

 

[sferrin]

Thanks Sferrin. So only send specialized CAS aircraft on CAS missions - check. The A-10 folks will be delighted to know you've finally come around Sferrin! ;D

Clearly what I said sailed over your head like an SR-71 as your A-10 pilot would be the next guy in need of rescue.

 

[LowObservable]

Also, internal integration usually imposes limits on the field of regard - and given the speed at which data can flow through a USB, I can't imagine that a pod-to-airplane fit imposes any significant limit on transfer speeds.

Spud inadvertently makes a point with the example of six aircraft on an LHD - with four available at any one time, they physically can't do all the things that an F-35 is advertised as doing, even if the F/R/A/E/EA rhetoric was not running ahead of reality. (AWACS? Srsly? How many sorties do you need? How well does any fighter radar search even its 120 deg sector?)

The UK's ops analysis said that you needed 24-30 aircraft, plus AEW&C and ASW, for the carrier to be more than a self-licking ice-cream cone (that is, not wholly occupied with its own defense) against expected adversaries. That basically meant sustaining CAP while performing A2G and escort if necessary.

And of course all AFs have "specialized planes" if you include recce, transport, training. There are many that have a single combat type, using a modular approach, and more that are gravitating that way - but on the other hand, there is a counter-trend involving armed UAVs or counter-insurgency platforms. It's not a hard-and-fast rule - it's an economic calculation that weighs the benefits of commonality against the advantages of using less expensive platforms against some threats, or even specialized vehicles (UCAVs) against the most demanding ones.


For instance - if your targets on the ground are dismounts, or modified civilian utility vehicles, and their most effective air defense is MANPADS, would you rather have one RF stealth platform, or >1 non-stealthy aircraft with DIRCM, magazine depth and persistence?

 

[sferrin]

Also, internal integration usually imposes limits on the field of regard - and given the speed at which data can flow through a USB, I can't imagine that a pod-to-airplane fit imposes any significant limit on transfer speeds.

However they DO impose an RCS penalty. (And drag, extra weight, etc.)

Spud inadvertently makes a point with the example of six aircraft on an LHD - with four available at any one time, they physically can't do all the things that an F-35 is advertised as doing, even if the F/R/A/E/EA rhetoric was not running ahead of reality. (AWACS? Srsly? How many sorties do you need? How well does any fighter radar search even its 120 deg sector?)

The UK's ops analysis said that you needed 24-30 aircraft, plus AEW&C and ASW, for the carrier to be more than a self-licking ice-cream cone (that is, not wholly occupied with its own defense) against expected adversaries. That basically meant sustaining CAP while performing A2G and escort if necessary.

You sound like you're saying LHA/Ds would be more survivable without integral counter-air capability. As for "AWACS", the F-35B has more sensors available to it than just the active mode of the APG-81. And six with only four available? (Six might be the "standard" Harrier compliment but it bounces all over.) Unless you've got documentation that says otherwise, I see no reason it wouldn't be a one-for-one swap Harriers for F-35Bs. Yes, yes, we all know the F-35 is bigger than a Harrier but it's footprint isn't THAT much different. There are certainly more than four Harriers on these flight decks: