Stealth specs of USN A-12 and NATF.

[Bruno Anthony]

The contemporary of the A-12 & NATF, the F-22 has an RCS supposedly of -40db. Were the A-12 and NATF to have similar requirements? Maybe not so much the NATF, since the USN pretty much said they would sacrifice some stealth for other characteristics.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

The Lockheed NATF would have swing-wings (DAILY, Aug. 31, 1990) and there is a radar cross-section penalty for that choice, Blackwell conceded. But it will allow longer loiter time, improve carrier landing and takeoff performance, and the wings can be swept for a stealthier configuration in combat, he said.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

May 7, 1991 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"Admiral Dunleavy. I will answer that for the record later on because I do not have it off the top of my head.
[The information follows:]
The NATF's internal payload was 4AAAM/AMRAAM, 2 AIM-9, AND 500 RDS 20MM. No external load was mandated, but provision for external carriage of weapons was desired.
[Deleted.]"

 

[quellish]

The contemporary of the A-12 & NATF, the F-22 has an RCS supposedly of -40db. Were the A-12 and NATF to have similar requirements?

No.
RCS requirements are more complex than a single dBsm value. The A-12 was intended to be a low level penetrator, and the RF signature requirements were not in line with the state of the art for the day. It was also intended to carry a stealthy standoff weapon.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

RCS requirements are more complex than a single dBsm value. The A-12 was intended to be a low level penetrator, and the RF signature requirements were not in line with the state of the art for the day. It was also intended to carry a stealthy standoff weapon.

So A-12 RF stealth requirements were less than the F-22? I am a little confused by your statement that "RF...requirements were not in line with the state of the art for the day."

 

[quellish]

So A-12 RF stealth requirements were less than the F-22? I am a little confused by your statement that "RF...requirements were not in line with the state of the art for the day."

The A-12 requirements were written without knowledge of the degree of signature reduction achieved in other programs that had advanced the state of the art.


Comparing the A-12 to the F-22 does not make sense. The A-12 was intended to penetrate at low level, while the F-22 flies as high as it can. The A-12 was also intended to be survivable against a different set of RF threats.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

The A-12 requirements were written without knowledge of the degree of signature reduction achieved in other programs that had advanced the state of the art.

Comparing the A-12 to the F-22 does not make sense. The A-12 was intended to penetrate at low level, while the F-22 flies as high as it can. The A-12 was also intended to be survivable against a different set of RF threats.

This is great stuff. Can you elaborate on what the A-12 requirements were supposed to survive against as defined by the USN?

Did GD's design meet the Navy requirements?
Did NorthGrum know what the Navy wanted/needed better than the Navy did and consequently would their's have done better?

 

[quellish]

This is great stuff. Can you elaborate on what the A-12 requirements were supposed to survive against as defined by the USN?

The specifics have never been made public. The ATA was intended to penetrate at low level to strike at defended land and sea targets. Soviet land and sea RF threats used different bands, polarization, etc. Because the ATA was to penetrate at low level, Soviet look down fighter radars were considered a priority (though SuAWACS was apparently not considered a priority by USN, strangely).

Did GD's design meet the Navy requirements?

No.

Did NorthGrum know what the Navy wanted/needed better than the Navy did and consequently would their's have done better?

That is the general consensus, and more importantly Northrop knew better than USN what was *possible* (and feasible) because of their experience with recent DARPA and USAF programs.


All of these questions, and more, are covered in several books and papers, such as Stevenson's "The 5 billion dollar misunderstanding".

 

[Bruno Anthony]

The $5 Billion... Book is expensive and further was Stevenson in "the P-51 is the answer" mode? Was he in hard core Military Reformer mode like Pentagon Paradox?

 

[quellish]

The $5 Billion... Book is expensive and further was Stevenson in "the P-51 is the answer" mode? Was he in hard core Military Reformer mode like Pentagon Paradox?

Stevenson is/was part of the fighter mafia crowd, and that is reflected in most of his work. In the A-12 book, it's very easy to separate those opinions from the facts.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Stevenson is/was part of the fighter mafia crowd, and that is reflected in most of his work. In the A-12 book, it's very easy to separate those opinions from the facts.

Thank you. At least I won't throw it against the wall if I get it.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

The specifics have never been made public. The ATA was intended to penetrate at low level to strike at defended land and sea targets. Soviet land and sea RF threats used different bands, polarization, etc. Because the ATA was to penetrate at low level, Soviet look down fighter radars were considered a priority (though SuAWACS was apparently not considered a priority by USN, strangely
[/font]

Ok this makes sense now, the A-12 would face different radars than F-22. Maybe the USN thought the SuAWACS would fly more inland tracks to track SAC bombers or cruise missiles that had already penetrated as opposed to flying tracks right at the border? Or the USN blew it on the SuAWACS threat?

Would the NATF be given any A-12 escort mission?

Oh, I just remembered, would the ATA version for the USAF have had different stealth requirements compared to A-12? It would have presumably the same overland mission as F-22.

Thanks for your patience.

 

[donnage99]

if you can find the flight global article about a/f-x, it does shed a little insight on how lockheed modify the f-22 frame to better meet the USN's requirement for RCS.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Thanks for the tip donnage99 but I have that article somewhere, just have to dig it up.

 

[quellish]

Or the USN blew it on the SuAWACS threat?

USAF probably overblew it, while the Navy did the opposite.

Oh, I just remembered, would the ATA version for the USAF have had different stealth requirements compared to A-12? It would have presumably the same overland mission as F-22.

I would have to find the source material, but essentially the ATA was pushed on USAF. At that point the specifications were pretty much already set. USAF monitored the progress of ATA, and at more than one point raised the red flag on the RCS spec (or rather, that they did not think GD would meet it). Again, without the source material in front of me this is from memory, but before USAF lost interest I recall that they were talking about changes to the A-12 for the USAF mission, and this would include changes to the shaping to alter RCS, and at one point making substantial changes including relocating the inlets. USAF was not enthusiastic about low level penetration.

 

[In_A_Dream]

I would have to find the source material, but essentially the ATA was pushed on USAF. At that point the specifications were pretty much already set. USAF monitored the progress of ATA, and at more than one point raised the red flag on the RCS spec (or rather, that they did not think GD would meet it). Again, without the source material in front of me this is from memory, but before USAF lost interest I recall that they were talking about changes to the A-12 for the USAF mission, and this would include changes to the shaping to alter RCS, and at one point making substantial changes including relocating the inlets. USAF was not enthusiastic about low level penetration.

From the bottom to the top of the aircraft?

 

[Sundog]

IIRC, I think AvWeek at one point also mentioned the exhaust nozzle being moved above the wing as well, which as we know now, makes sense. But that straight trailing edge wasn't going to cut it, so hopefully the USAF made them change that as well. By the time they were done, it probably would have looked like the Northrop submission for the ATA.

 

[LEG]

Ok this makes sense now, the A-12 would face different radars than F-22. Maybe the USN thought the SuAWACS would fly more inland tracks to track SAC bombers or cruise missiles that had already penetrated as opposed to flying tracks right at the border? Or the USN blew it on the SuAWACS threat?

Would the NATF be given any A-12 escort mission?

Oh, I just remembered, would the ATA version for the USAF have had different stealth requirements compared to A-12? It would have presumably the same overland mission as F-22.

Thanks for your patience.

The devil is in the detail configuration you believe the A-12 was designed/built to and WHO actually ordered it. My personal belief is that, from the separate factory out in the boonies instead of the primary GDFW line; to the number of pictures we have of separate components (too many for component checks and tuning of prototype assembly tools); and the astonishing number of full scale jigs in a prototype line which Stevenson describes as 'chalk outlines on the ground'; the airframe was past being an EMD prototype and being assembled, carefully, on integrated production tools that could handle the layup of massive composite parts, in a fashion similar to how the Japanese did for the F-2 and are now working on, even more extensively, for FX-3. All at once with stacked, glued, components and half the production scrap losses. Because everything locks together, like a puzzle.

Not surprising now, but in 1983-91, it would have been extraordinary. And yet highly logical for an airframe you didn't expect to have to inspect/repair for stress fracture or battle damage, related to a carrier borne strike aircraft. More on this in a minute.

I believe that the actual design led to a specific number of jets built, much like the F-117s were, as boutique airframes, which were highly specialized and probably lost most if not all of their 'navalization features', if they ever had any.

If you look at some of the available drawings online, they are handed and one side was without wingfolds or LEF for instance.

Additionally, we have multiple photos of A-12 shaped aircraft flying over Texas and Kansas as recently as 2014 I think it was and no, they are not B-2s, B-21s or RQ-180s (size is 60-70ft wingspan) but they are at altitudes where the airframe is drawing cons.

Speaking of which, the A-12 did a lot of things right for a low level intruder, including the use of a large bypass duct which would have masked the heat bleed for a large (too large for an F404) engine from the top. If someone was looking for that with an advanced IRST (today we know better, the Soviets were barely doing cooled lead sulphide and early testing on indium antimonide, but back then we thought they were doing things they weren't and TAC Brawler modeled that, showing the thermal signatures were a key vulnerability, so the ATA got it...).

But then again, if you look at the details more, you see a large tank labeled 'contrail suppressant' and you're like whuh?

If you look more, you get a 'CFF' or Combined Function FLIR. But the optically flat panel actually looks like it could handle one of the big bore, digital backplane, LOROP cameras we were developing. And then, in addition to this (and integraed apertures for 'MLDS' Missile Launch Detection System and a 'LADS' or Laser Air Data Sensor) you also see an AAS-43 IRST, in the chin of the airframe. And you're like, say hunh? Because that is the same sensor as forms part of the Tiger Eye system today. And it's entirely in the wrong place for a passive look up detection system of a lolo interdictor.

APQ-183 is... Ka? That's going to have the range of a flashlight. And it's going to be costly to own and operate. But what if it's a dual spectrum sensor, X/Ka? The Navy at one time said they were interested in using ATA as missileer with AAAM with F-14s hanging back with AESA modded APG-71 and the guidance pod to allow for sniping.

Which frankly makes more sense for a 5.5" missile than dual stage/dual pulse motors.

The problem with this is that you've got large cutouts in the wing LE which is going to require electronic fenestration and and E-scan. Yet APQ-183 was not an AESA. The room behind the LE is presumably filled with deep RAS, but because the frontal spar is RIGHT THERE. So...what if this aperture is not active at all but some kind of pre-stripline ELS sampler? It saves on duplication of the TWT and DA converter and DSP installations, right there in the wing (noise, not DTRM = no on-antenna preprocessing).

We know that the jet had major performance problems one guy who flew the simulator said it was the most behind-the-power-curve airframe he ever flew. The Stevenson book mentions several shortcomings in controlled sink rate and SEROC.

And yet, if you read the Wiki article, there is mention that it had a better (clean) ITR than any other jet in the business, including the F/A-18, for about 3-4 seconds. And that it had a better STR than any jet in the navy, including the Hornet, out of burner.

Would you want to TFR with a sluggish airframe?

Again, the Stevenson book says 'something, something, fat wing', and suddenly SEROC became acceptable, ceiling went back over 30,000ft and radius drifted towards 1,000nm from <800 while top speed moved from 500 to 540 knots.

A fat wing gives you more gas (and more weight) but it also gives you deeper centerline and more frontal drag. To overcome this, maybe a PW7000 engine with more than the 12-13,000lbf of thrust on the F412 engine. The former was the baseline powerplant for the AFX, as a sought, smaller, replacement for the thirsty F119, mooted for the NATF-22.

Signature issues. The intakes have awkward sidewall geometries. From certain aspects, they 'flash' and the internal vane devices (like on the B-1B) act as resonant dipoles, generating a return wave out of the intake rather than blocking the path to the engine with a pseudo serpentine.

Yet, if you listen to Ben Rich (talking about the pole model): 'It came in a 3 and left a 9' after the Skunk Works tuned it on RATSCAT (or roughly that spread, it's been awhile...).

Would this include a residual hotspot in frontal 40`? I think not.

And if you dig back into the appendices, talking about the judicial decisions and the bean counter who said, effectively, 'nothing was done about the signature issues' there is a quote in the Stevenson book which...interesting.

Because what they describe sounds an awful lot like what you see on the sides of the F-35 forward fuselage, around the inlets, today. And it LOOKS like what you see on drawings and coat cuffs of period A/X (technology recovery effort to save what was good on the A-12 in a followon, simplified, design). Namely a cranked arrow wing with entirely different sweep lines and altered intakes.

We know they altered the geometry of the intakes at least a little bit because the extending/drooping mass flow enhance lips, like those on the Typhoon go away in later designs.

All this, from an emergency Tiger Team working group, which included the USAF, using their digital models, to design 'a bra' for the airframe.

If there was nothing worth recovering (as testified by multiple admirals in Congressional testimony, visible on Youtube) then why all that endgame effort? Why the followon A/X reboot?

If the RAM is old fashioned, F-117 era, 'linoleum sheet' instead of structural appliques like you see on the F-22 and F-35, which one is Ben Rich talking about? Which one is the Admiral testifying to, before Congress?

Again, going from the drawings, the A-12 is in dire straits when it comes to carry through. Longitudinally, the wing is cut by structural hollows for the engines, for the main weapons bays, for the landing gear bays and for the auxiliary/self defense bays.

The book mentions that the skin had structural elements integrated within it, like an exoskeleton and the main structure was glued/bolted onto it, in reversal of standard aircraft design.

This means there is little or nothing, _spanwise_ to take the enormous loads of boarding. And even less sign of sufficient volume for integral tanks. IMO, the A-12 could not have a W shaped aft end because the only things holding the structural box together with were integral stringers, built into the wing skins and acting like a Wellington's geodetic structure to permanently flex the wing to stiffness between the forward and aft spars on which they road as cantilevered structures.

They lied, a lot, about the A-12. I don't know why, by timelines don't add up. Descriptions of signature management don't match up. Handling qualities issues were never dealt with via a separate (Cold Pigeon?) flight test article and carrier suitability testing program.

But what if... The principle prevarication is that the Avenger is a naval strike bomber A-6 replacement at all?

What if it's actually a gatherer?

Now you can put fuel in the weapons bays. Now, as a high altitude platform, you can strip the huge bypass plenum volumes and put saddle/feeder tanks over the engine bays. Now you can remove the thin bulkheads between the MLG and Outboard weapons bays and put proper endcaps on the spars because there is no wingfold. If you need to, you can make the tips wet. If you need to, you can configure the jet for covert transport on a C-5 by pulling the entire wing tip OFF.

The straight trailing edge signature issue can be dealt with by not penetrating but flying standoff race tracks that continually place the bowtie of the wingtip on the objective air defenses.

Now you have a tail (TRD) and a WSO and an ICMS to deal with threats. Now you have 1,308sqft of wing are compared to 900sqft for the YF-23 and 840sqft for the F-22, both of which are FL500-600 airframes. Now you have, not just a P&D but likely a boom receptacle. Now you have a reason why they USAF undertook a colossal endgame save of the program to get signature management back under control and why the DOD budget people were not cleared into that compartment, because they couldn't be, lest it become blatantly clear that the A-12 in fact succeeded. And the Navy demanded their money back for convenience, not default.

All this means you aren't driving a short chord, high aspect ratio, turbulence chasing, bedsheet in a hurricane of low altitude air at all. Never mind recovering it onto a moving postage stamp. Because it is a persistent U-2 replacement.

I think the A-12 made it into service. I think it exists, today, as a very small inventory IMINT/SIGINT/Targeting (Tier 3/TR-3) airframe. I think we have the recent photos to prove it.

LINKS-
U.S. Naval Institute, 2014, Straight Trailing Edge Airframe, Twin Centerline Exhaust Contrails, Hint Of LE Ventral Inlets...

https://news.usni.org/2014/04/23/analysis-mystery-plane-seen-kansas-likely-u-s-military-aircraft

And Texas...

http://www.kens5.com/news/Flying-Dorito-in-West-Texas-skies--258819431.html

 

[Hydroman]

In Stevenson's book, the Navy would not listen to Northrop regarding medium to high altitude penetration for an LO platform, the Navy insisted flying the A-6 low altitude mission. I had stated before, subsonic flying wings do not belong on the deck, same goes for the B-2. In regards to the images of the triangular aircraft, probably another program in flight testing maybe to test the validity of the A-12-type configuration and could have possibly been built by NG or LM. Remember, NG did recreate the Horton IX for RCS testing with the results being classified and the US is known for quite a few and various classified programs testing platforms and certain technologies. The Navy must have known about Have Blue and Tacit Blue and why they were so successful at their designed penetrating altitude points and with Tacit Blue having to penetrate then loiter as well and not be detected. The Navy just could not get past their arrogance.

 

[LEG]

In Stevenson's book, the Navy would not listen to Northrop regarding medium to high altitude penetration for an LO platform, the Navy insisted flying the A-6 low altitude mission. I had stated before, subsonic flying wings do not belong on the deck, same goes for the B-2. In regards to the images of the triangular aircraft, probably another program in flight testing maybe to test the validity of the A-12-type configuration and could have possibly been built by NG or LM. Remember, NG did recreate the Horton IX for RCS testing with the results being classified and the US is known for quite a few and various classified programs testing platforms and certain technologies. The Navy must have known about Have Blue and Tacit Blue and why they were so successful at their designed penetrating altitude points and with Tacit Blue having to penetrate then loiter as well and not be detected. The Navy just could not get past their arrogance.

Do you see the images? I hope you see them. Copyright nonsense...

Left And Right Wing Structures, Completely Different

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/16/83/9a/16839ae11cbdf26c47e986265cc571b9.jpg

Left And Right Wing Structures, Completely Different

https://forum.il2sturmovik.com/uploads/monthly_09_2014/post-12904-0-53560300-1410228630.jpg

Look how thick that LEF is! (Who designs a LEF on a wing that thick? It's NOT a Slat...)

https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage5.magcloud.com/image/preview/4471f16961d27844a966cb9ac5edfaf4.jpg

Contrail Suppression Tank And Large BP Duct As Mixing Plenum Exhaust

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/attachments/a-12-2-jpg.101351/

Chin Mounted IRST, Utterly Useless For A LoLoLo'ing Aircraft (can't see up)

https://chairagainstthewall.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/sv5356d754.jpg

YB-49 Crash

View: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/JQa73db2ea0


Some things to be aware of...

Full gross weight, X16 Mk.82, X2 AIM-9 and 25,000lbs of fuel, the A-12 was pushing it's 80,000lbs MTOGW. The cats back then were only rated for about 70,000lbs.

Flying wings have notorious super stall and pitchup characteristics resulting from accelerative onset conditions. Meaning, despite having a generous wing loading, (60,000lbs/1,308sqft wing area = 45psf) if you try high speed maneuvering with them, you can easily end up at 90` AOA and irrecoverably stalled as the jet snaps it's outer panels off.

Low sweep, high span, very unforgiving transonics behavior.

Similarly, due to float (large lift, minimal drag) the wing tends to say: "Oh, you wanna fly some more? Fine! Let's go fly..." in ways that makes it certain to be...unpleasant behind a boat.

Aside from Cold Pigeon and Sneaky Pete both of which were likely testing configurations for ATB and/or ATF (remember, high altitude, min signature, 'Missileer' was a configurational option for the latter, along with Bushwhacker, Battlecruiser and SC&M), where is the flying qualities handling program for that specific control configuration? Are you saying that Northrop handed out data on the B-2 FLCS but not it's signature?

Everyone knows this (Gutless, Skyray) is weird and still the Navy chose a flying wing configuration. While the Cold Pigeon never really came out of the shadows, as a testbed, like the Northrop Have Blue, Tacit Blue and several other VLO testbeds eventually did. And it was a Lockheed program so you can't really say 'they had no experience with wings and/or VLO'. They bid on the ATB, of course they had experience.

And even if you do, the USN certainly knew better. They are not stupid when it comes to building carrier suitable jets.

That female lawyer, Peg Olsen, who ended up getting herself a prison sentence and disbarred (one of the few who did, genuinely, suffer, amongst a laundry list of Fraud In Inducement, Deficiency Act, Misprision and other Article 124 related charges that CAPTAIN Elberfeld and Admiral Calvert walked away from.

The point here being: Who puts a no defense acquisition school //captain// in charge of a multibillion-dollar development project with no oversight or rotation of the duty as his time came up to change station? Who at Building 512 listens TO A LAWYER about matters of aeronautical engineering as a function of 'Don't worry, we can use it to bend the Primes over a barrel on product support, later...' If you are 2,300lbs over spec, going into Concept Development, on a FLYING WING you are seriously deluded about how that wing is going to behave, around the boat.

And the folks at Navair are not stupid. This is the 1980s, before the DEI crash of competencies when the best engineers were still one generation out from German Genius trained from Paperclip. Dolly Parton may be singing '9-to-5' but nobody is listening to a female lawyer talking about engineering problems, completely outside their wheelhouse. Nor are they scape-goating her for their own mistakes. Guys didn't do that back then.

And nobody explains how the jet, which just moved from Skinny Wing to Fat Wing suddenly got faster, higher ceilinged, with better singe engine rate of climb, without a nominal increase in power. You do understand that 24,000lbf/70,000lbs is a thrust to weight ratio of .34, right?

I mean, an A-6 with 27 EEW +15 Fuel +10 Ordnance = 50,000lb gross weight, has a wing area of 529 square feet thus a wing loading of 94psf and a thrust to weight ratio of .4.

You don't need a gust response area of 1,308 square feet to do low level interdiction unless you just like pain. But you do need a minimum .4 thrust to weight ratio to work around the boat.

That aircraft was not optimized for lolo attack, off a carrier. Not unless it was also doing anti-gravity testing.

Finally, stealth. The F-22 has circular air data ports and a big, L-shaped pitot. On a nominally .0001m2 airframe. Really. But it doesn't have an optical air data sensor (OADS) which literally scans the airflow, molecule by molecule, going by the sensor window with a laser. That's advanced, even by today's standards.

And the A-12 had such a deep classification level working group VLO rectification effort going on, correcting the inherent problems of a 'certified by Ben Rich' (3-to-9) baseline, that it's mere mention could not be given into the litigative record because it would, apparently, compromise secret data.

This is pure Sioux: Whataeh?

At that point, any federal district court should have basically told DOJ/JAG: "I don't care who you work for, you can either provide the data or you drop the case because the lack of progress in signatures AND weight (the original agreement was only weight, with the USN providing GD/MDD secure compartmented data on the VLO from 'other sources', asking the companies to do both is largely why they were behind schedule and over budget _and yet_ the existence of the compartmented program means were 'making progress' which, if known by Navy management, meant that GD/MDD could not be held accountable for failure to produce...).

This latter is what really pours champagne in the litter box. Because you cannot claim that there is nothing which the USN can recover from the A-12 program on VLO, at the same time you state that there is secret data that cannot be revealed, even in sealed records, because it relates to VLO.

And even if every level of intermediate district court was so corrupt as to fail to see this: 'provide the defendant adequate means of defense or drop the charges', the *SCOTUS* sure as hell would.

Please Note: This 20 year long insanity cost America it's two best fighter design houses and left us with the walking-talking RICO fraud zombie of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman whose last (successful) fighter was the F-5E which had it's first flight in, what, 1972? These are boutique houses.

Similarly, the A-12 of 1991 was supposedly nowhere near production ready. And yet, by 2014, it's not only (still) flying but flying AS THE ORIGINAL MODEL LOOKED. Not as the modified A/X-

A/X Attack Experimental, Technology Recovery/Restart on the A-12

https://aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/jsf/afx_gd_mdd_northrop_01.jpg

Complete with 'Stealth Bra'.

Believe me, I've studied this for a long time. And while I can no longer afford the cost of the Stevenson book to point out, line by line, just how many places he is a gulled fool at best, I do know what I am talking about when I say there is something here which doesn't make sense UNLESS they are still in coverup mode on whatever the A-12 actually was/is.

And 20 odd years on, that, in and of itself, ('flying testbed' my ass) for something which was so worthless there was nothing there worth VLO saving, is really whackadoodle.

Watch these two programs-

A-12 Secret Stealth Attacker, Pt.1

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5SQ-iyY6Fw


A-12 Secret Stealth Attacker, Pt.2

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZKnXKJLvZA&


And listen to Stevenson talk. His eyes are very bright and yet he's so wooden that it's obvious he's being 'suggestive but not specific', on purpose. Especially on the LEGAL SIDE which was always the strength of his book.

Like he's talking to a script.

Two decades later. Who does that? Someone who is pushing a false narrative as a cover story. That's who. I swear, the A-12 is the JFK of the aerospace world. So many lies within lies.

_The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding_ is one of the most popular NIP works ever published, yet has never had a reprint. Never a digital release. Average cost is between 180-220 dollars.

And I just wrecked 90% of its core assumptions within 30 minutes. Using data which is stated in the text, in the available line drawings and from the supporting personalities as development and legal timelines.

Now, I ain't the brightest lightbulb in a family of geniuses. Momma always said she never should have dropped me on my head that second time without taking me to the drowning tub immediately after.

But this is a story that needs a better teller. Hans Christian Andersen just isn't doing it, for me.

There is a technology subtext here, beneath the obvious moral shock and dismay (yawn) of 'Oh my guteness, the government wastes money!'

 

[Hydroman]

Do you see the images? I hope you see them. Copyright nonsense...

Left And Right Wing Structures, Completely Different

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/16/83/9a/16839ae11cbdf26c47e986265cc571b9.jpg

Left And Right Wing Structures, Completely Different

https://forum.il2sturmovik.com/uploads/monthly_09_2014/post-12904-0-53560300-1410228630.jpg

Look how thick that LEF is! (Who designs a LEF on a wing that thick? It's NOT a Slat...)

https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage5.magcloud.com/image/preview/4471f16961d27844a966cb9ac5edfaf4.jpg

Contrail Suppression Tank And Large BP Duct As Mixing Plenum Exhaust

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/attachments/a-12-2-jpg.101351/

Chin Mounted IRST, Utterly Useless For A LoLoLo'ing Aircraft (can't see up)

https://chairagainstthewall.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/sv5356d754.jpg

YB-49 Crash

View: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/JQa73db2ea0


Some things to be aware of...

Full gross weight, X16 Mk.82, X2 AIM-9 and 25,000lbs of fuel, the A-12 was pushing it's 80,000lbs MTOGW. The cats back then were only rated for about 70,000lbs.

Flying wings have notorious super stall and pitchup characteristics resulting from accelerative onset conditions. Meaning, despite having a generous wing loading, (60,000lbs/1,308sqft wing area = 45psf) if you try high speed maneuvering with them, you can easily end up at 90` AOA and irrecoverably stalled as the jet snaps it's outer panels off.

Low sweep, high span, very unforgiving transonics behavior.

Similarly, due to float (large lift, minimal drag) the wing tends to say: "Oh, you wanna fly some more? Fine! Let's go fly..." in ways that makes it certain to be...unpleasant behind a boat.

Aside from Cold Pigeon and Sneaky Pete both of which were likely testing configurations for ATB and/or ATF (remember, high altitude, min signature, 'Missileer' was a configurational option for the latter, along with Bushwhacker, Battlecruiser and SC&M), where is the flying qualities handling program for that specific control configuration? Are you saying that Northrop handed out data on the B-2 FLCS but not it's signature?

Everyone knows this (Gutless, Skyray) is weird and still the Navy chose a flying wing configuration. While the Cold Pigeon never really came out of the shadows, as a testbed, like the Northrop Have Blue, Tacit Blue and several other VLO testbeds eventually did. And it was a Lockheed program so you can't really say 'they had no experience with wings and/or VLO'. They bid on the ATB, of course they had experience.

And even if you do, the USN certainly knew better. They are not stupid when it comes to building carrier suitable jets.

That female lawyer, Peg Olsen, who ended up getting herself a prison sentence and disbarred (one of the few who did, genuinely, suffer, amongst a laundry list of Fraud In Inducement, Deficiency Act, Misprision and other Article 124 related charges that CAPTAIN Elberfeld and Admiral Calvert walked away from.

The point here being: Who puts a no defense acquisition school //captain// in charge of a multibillion-dollar development project with no oversight or rotation of the duty as his time came up to change station? Who at Building 512 listens TO A LAWYER about matters of aeronautical engineering as a function of 'Don't worry, we can use it to bend the Primes over a barrel on product support, later...' If you are 2,300lbs over spec, going into Concept Development, on a FLYING WING you are seriously deluded about how that wing is going to behave, around the boat.

And the folks at Navair are not stupid. This is the 1980s, before the DEI crash of competencies when the best engineers were still one generation out from German Genius trained from Paperclip. Dolly Parton may be singing '9-to-5' but nobody is listening to a female lawyer talking about engineering problems, completely outside their wheelhouse. Nor are they scape-goating her for their own mistakes. Guys didn't do that back then.

And nobody explains how the jet, which just moved from Skinny Wing to Fat Wing suddenly got faster, higher ceilinged, with better singe engine rate of climb, without a nominal increase in power. You do understand that 24,000lbf/70,000lbs is a thrust to weight ratio of .34, right?

I mean, an A-6 with 27 EEW +15 Fuel +10 Ordnance = 50,000lb gross weight, has a wing area of 529 square feet thus a wing loading of 94psf and a thrust to weight ratio of .4.

You don't need a gust response area of 1,308 square feet to do low level interdiction unless you just like pain. But you do need a minimum .4 thrust to weight ratio to work around the boat.

That aircraft was not optimized for lolo attack, off a carrier. Not unless it was also doing anti-gravity testing.

Finally, stealth. The F-22 has circular air data ports and a big, L-shaped pitot. On a nominally .0001m2 airframe. Really. But it doesn't have an optical air data sensor (OADS) which literally scans the airflow, molecule by molecule, going by the sensor window with a laser. That's advanced, even by today's standards.

And the A-12 had such a deep classification level working group VLO rectification effort going on, correcting the inherent problems of a 'certified by Ben Rich' (3-to-9) baseline, that it's mere mention could not be given into the litigative record because it would, apparently, compromise secret data.

This is pure Sioux: Whataeh?

At that point, any federal district court should have basically told DOJ/JAG: "I don't care who you work for, you can either provide the data or you drop the case because the lack of progress in signatures AND weight (the original agreement was only weight, with the USN providing GD/MDD secure compartmented data on the VLO from 'other sources', asking the companies to do both is largely why they were behind schedule and over budget _and yet_ the existence of the compartmented program means were 'making progress' which, if known by Navy management, meant that GD/MDD could not be held accountable for failure to produce...).

This latter is what really pours champagne in the litter box. Because you cannot claim that there is nothing which the USN can recover from the A-12 program on VLO, at the same time you state that there is secret data that cannot be revealed, even in sealed records, because it relates to VLO.

And even if every level of intermediate district court was so corrupt as to fail to see this: 'provide the defendant adequate means of defense or drop the charges', the *SCOTUS* sure as hell would.

Please Note: This 20 year long insanity cost America it's two best fighter design houses and left us with the walking-talking RICO fraud zombie of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman whose last (successful) fighter was the F-5E which had it's first flight in, what, 1972? These are boutique houses.

Similarly, the A-12 of 1991 was supposedly nowhere near production ready. And yet, by 2014, it's not only (still) flying but flying AS THE ORIGINAL MODEL LOOKED. Not as the modified A/X-

A/X Attack Experimental, Technology Recovery/Restart on the A-12

https://aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/jsf/afx_gd_mdd_northrop_01.jpg

Complete with 'Stealth Bra'.

Believe me, I've studied this for a long time. And while I can no longer afford the cost of the Stevenson book to point out, line by line, just how many places he is a gulled fool at best, I do know what I am talking about when I say there is something here which doesn't make sense UNLESS they are still in coverup mode on whatever the A-12 actually was/is.

And 20 odd years on, that, in and of itself, ('flying testbed' my ass) for something which was so worthless there was nothing there worth VLO saving, is really whackadoodle.

Watch these two programs-

A-12 Secret Stealth Attacker, Pt.1

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5SQ-iyY6Fw


A-12 Secret Stealth Attacker, Pt.2

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZKnXKJLvZA&


And listen to Stevenson talk. His eyes are very bright and yet he's so wooden that it's obvious he's being 'suggestive but not specific', on purpose. Especially on the LEGAL SIDE which was always the strength of his book.

Like he's talking to a script.

Two decades later. Who does that? Someone who is pushing a false narrative as a cover story. That's who. I swear, the A-12 is the JFK of the aerospace world. So many lies within lies.

_The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding_ is one of the most popular NIP works ever published, yet has never had a reprint. Never a digital release. Average cost is between 180-220 dollars.

And I just wrecked 90% of its core assumptions within 30 minutes. Using data which is stated in the text, in the available line drawings and from the supporting personalities as development and legal timelines.

Now, I ain't the brightest lightbulb in a family of geniuses. Momma always said she never should have dropped me on my head that second time without taking me to the drowning tub immediately after.

But this is a story that needs a better teller. Hans Christian Andersen just isn't doing it, for me.

There is a technology subtext here, beneath the obvious moral shock and dismay (yawn) of 'Oh my guteness, the government wastes money!'

Stevenson's book primarily discusses budgets, program and legal aspects and Leg you bring up many good points. When I was at Northrop from 86 to 96, we had taken on individuals from both McAir and GD former A-12 folks onto the B-2 program, Lockheed at the time to my knowledge was trying to help GD and the Navy with their A-12 aft exhaust deck thermal issues. Again from the info I got, GD and McAir were also having issues with the LO and composites for primary structure as well including excessive weight.

However, McAir did a great job regarding avionics and cockpit integration, the flight controls and subsystems were fine for both GD and McAir. The USN also had many spec changes through the process (via the hired on folks comments), going from side by side (like the A-6) to tandem seating and an excessive amount of natural access panels for maintenance.

In my humble opinion, my following observations:
1. Stupid for the USN to have a fixed-price contract with poor program management for a program with some significant risks.
2. If Northrop or Lockheed would have been a teammate, the USN would have gotten an A-12 airplane.
3. GD/McAir LO and composites were not working (from my sources back then), they did not have the experience.
4. A flying wing would work fine in the carrier environment (our Northrop ATA would have worked well). NG made the unmanned X-47B work and it worked well, so a manned flying wing would have worked back then.
5. Our ATA design had risks but our Northrop/Grumman/LTV team had a hell of a lot of experience and no way were we buying into a fixed-price contract.

You may not agree with my comments but this is from all of the info I disseminated from the the Stevenson book, other sources and former individuals who worked the A-12. I am a aircraft subsystems development and systems engineer by trade but an airplane geek as well.

 

[TomcatViP]

4. A flying wing would work fine in the carrier environment (our Northrop ATA would have worked well). NG made the unmanned X-47B work and it worked well, so a manned flying wing would have worked back then.

This is a very peculiar take on history. The Navy did, again, cancel their Flying Wing Aircraft concept from NG (X-47) and took a significant step back until Boeing came with their MQ-25 tube and wing demonstrators despite all the advance testing that was done.

IMOHO, the X-47 demonstrated that without active airflow management, the flying wing is not suitable for carrier operation with only marginal performance in certain part of the operational regime.

See also LM UCLASS Sea Gosht and MQ-25 competing design, Stingray.

Regarding point 3 in your post, It would be interesting to know more

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Were there any statements made about the X-47B suggesting handling issues relating to carrier operation due to being a flying wing?

 

[Manuducati]

IMOHO, the X-47 demonstrated that without active airflow management, the flying wing is not suitable for carrier operation with only marginal performance in certain part of the operational regime.

Could you point us to any report with such information? As far as I know, X-47B program was particularly successful, including both campaigns at sea, and follow-on flight tests, with a lot of premieres.
The Navy changing his mind about its priorities mid-program is nothing new.

Edit: Colonial-Marine was faster than me.

 

[quellish]

Copyright nonsense...

Tyler Rogoway, is that you?

Contrail Suppression Tank And Large BP Duct As Mixing Plenum Exhaust

Yes, it had a contrail suppression system that injected a fuel additive. This was an early program requirement. I am not sure why you are highlighting this.

Chin Mounted IRST, Utterly Useless For A LoLoLo'ing Aircraft (can't see up)

The A-12 had a FLIR and an IR missile detection system. It did not have an IRST. One FLIR system was for navigation, the other for targeting ground targets. Both were passive. Both are shown on the engineering drawings in your post.

Aside from Cold Pigeon and Sneaky Pete both of which were likely testing configurations for ATB and/or ATF (remember, high altitude, min signature, 'Missileer' was a configurational option for the latter, along with Bushwhacker, Battlecruiser and SC&M), where is the flying qualities handling program for that specific control configuration? Are you saying that Northrop handed out data on the B-2 FLCS but not it's signature?

Everyone knows this (Gutless, Skyray) is weird and still the Navy chose a flying wing configuration. While the Cold Pigeon never really came out of the shadows, as a testbed, like the Northrop Have Blue, Tacit Blue and several other VLO testbeds eventually did. And it was a Lockheed program so you can't really say 'they had no experience with wings and/or VLO'. They bid on the ATB, of course they had experience.

COLD PIGEON/HAVE KEY predates the ATB competition by several years and was a GD program, not Lockheed. Lockheed had nothing to do with it.

Finally, stealth. The F-22 has circular air data ports and a big, L-shaped pitot. On a nominally .0001m2 airframe. Really. But it doesn't have an optical air data sensor (OADS) which literally scans the airflow, molecule by molecule, going by the sensor window with a laser. That's advanced, even by today's standards.

And the A-12 had such a deep classification level working group VLO rectification effort going on, correcting the inherent problems of a 'certified by Ben Rich' (3-to-9) baseline, that it's mere mention could not be given into the litigative record because it would, apparently, compromise secret data.

The core low observable problems of the A-12 can be illustrated easily (again) with this set of polar plots from "Radar Cross Section' by Knott:



The straight trailing edge of the A-12 produced strong frontal returns with different polarizations. This is why you do not see straight trailing edges in other operational VLO aircraft. A 3-spike design is not desirable for a strike/penetration aircraft. Instead, a 4 spike design is about as good as you can get.

Plot (d) shows a 4-spike design. At different polarizations it would still have desirable RCS characteristics. The Northrop design would have had a similar 4-spike plot.

The "Ben Rich 3-9 baseline" you refer to from Stevenson is misleading. This was describing Lockheed's work on the A-12 RCS model, not the design of the aircraft. The GD A-12 RCS model was a disaster:

The navy was in a quandary over what to do with Northrop. It was refusing to conform to the bidding requirements. In the meantime, General Dynamics was getting ready to transport its full-scale radar model for testing. When the A-12 model, with its life-size seventy-foot wing span was first assembled at DEI, the model fit together poorly. McDonnell Douglas deputy program manager Denny Behm was so dis- heartened he wanted to revert to the half-size model. As a portent of things to come, the model was also overweight. The team, emulating the navy's subsequent acquiescent behavior, accepted it in spite of its corpulent condition.

The full-scale model of the General Dynamics-McDonnell Douglas A-12 shown mounted on the model support pylon inside the target support facility at the RAMS test site in New Mexico. The ninety-five-foot pylon extended into an underground silo that cannot be seen in this photograph. The divided roof above the model can be rolled open so the model can be raised on the pylon for testing. Note that the model did not have actual panels or doors; the gaps were radar reflectors.

It's noteworthy that the pole the model was mounted to at RAMS was not a VLO (ogive) pole. It was a cylinder.

And Lockheed worked on the A-12 model for GD:

Before the contract was awarded, Lockheed had provided significant guidance in making the A-12 full-scale model stealthy. As Lockheed Skunk Works president Ben Rich recalled:
...
There were two finalists, but before the final decision [was made] we took their model to the Skunk Works, rebuilt it, tested it at RATSCAT, and raised them from a factor of 2 to a factor of 9... And they had a good design, believe me it was a good design. But it was not stealthy.... So we then got it, and sure as hell they won.

Making RCS models - even full scale models - is difficult. GD made many mistakes with their A-12 model, some of which are described above. GD did have competent RCS engineers, but many of them were young, were hired late in the program after certain decisions had already been made, and in general were not listened to.

After the A-12 cancellation the GD RCS group created an internal design to show they were competent. The design was nothing like the A-12, and actually did perform well (and their model was not a disaster). During the A-12 program they also built their own outdoor RCS range that was capable of measuring VLO aircraft - but they barely used it for the A-12 program.

The A-12 design was so flawed that the GD RCS engineering group completely discarded it.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

The A-12 design was so flawed that the GD RCS engineering group completely discarded it.

Wasn't the GD-led team for A-X offering what was basically a "son of A-12"?

 

[quellish]

And as far as the topic of this thread, the RCS specifications, again from Stevenson:

The GD-McAir team was not able to make the engine inlet stealthy, in spite of a concerted effort. During the demonstration and validation phase there was no radar cross section specification. The team simply attempted to reduce the RCS requirement as much as possible. During the early part of its investigation, the GD-McAir team used a one-half scale model RCS without benefit of other low observable information from the government. When the engine inlet was tested on a full-scale model during the FSD phase, it proved to be deficient. The team changed the inlet to make it more efficient but because the navy did nor have the funds to investigate the low observable aspects of this design, it was not tested.

The GD team was unaware of the RCS levels that Have Blue, Tacit Blue, etc. had demonstrated. They did not know that those levels were even possible until after the A-12 configuration was set in stone.

 

[quellish]

Wasn't the GD-led team for A-X offering what was basically a "son of A-12"?

McDD/GD started with an A-12 like design. Northrop joined them with a different design and, as far as I have been able to find out, the team used the Northrop design. AX had very different requirements than the A-12.

 

[LEG]

Stevenson's book primarily discusses budgets, program and legal aspects and Leg you bring up many good points. When I was at Northrop from 86 to 96, we had taken on individuals from both McAir and GD former A-12 folks onto the B-2 program, Lockheed at the time to my knowledge was trying to help GD and the Navy with their A-12 aft exhaust deck thermal issues. Again from the info I got, GD and McAir were also having issues with the LO and composites for primary structure as well including excessive weight.

However, McAir did a great job regarding avionics and cockpit integration, the flight controls and subsystems were fine for both GD and McAir. The USN also had many spec changes through the process (via the hired on folks comments), going from side by side (like the A-6) to tandem seating and an excessive amount of natural access panels for maintenance.

In my humble opinion, my following observations:
1. Stupid for the USN to have a fixed-price contract with poor program management for a program with some significant risks.
2. If Northrop or Lockheed would have been a teammate, the USN would have gotten an A-12 airplane.
3. GD/McAir LO and composites were not working (from my sources back then), they did not have the experience.
4. A flying wing would work fine in the carrier environment (our Northrop ATA wo

uld have worked well). NG made the unmanned X-47B work and it worked well, so a manned flying wing would have worked back then.
5. Our ATA design had risks but our Northrop/Grumman/LTV team had a hell of a lot of experience and no way were we buying into a fixed-price contract.

You may not agree with my comments but this is from all of the info I disseminated from the the Stevenson book, other sources and former individuals who worked the A-12. I am a aircraft subsystems development and systems engineer by trade but an airplane geek as well.

Thanks for your response. Always nice to hear from an expert.

I would love to hear any stories from the flight test/structures/systems people you know who can provide some clarity. Public or private.

Ultimately, I can only say again: that USNI photo is an original configuration A-12 'shape' flying at high altitude where the massive area of a flying wing translates to the superior spanwise wing loading of high altitude penetrator. Or standoff gatherer.

For the same reason that the F-15E is not known for its glass smooth transonic low level ride like the F-111 was, you would not take a wing airframe down to low level.

Doing so, with the B-2, completely wrecked the signature management as they had to take a buzz saw to notch the back end as compensation for the added weight/rigidity shortening of longitudinal load flex needed to accommodate the low level penetration.

And I bet the Spirit's low altitude ride quality is still awful.

So, either the USAF were idiots too or the USN was operating to a different theoretical on stealth than is popularly suggested now, possibly involving multi-statics to build trackfiles from composited SPY-1 in classified modes. Possibly with some kind of tropobounce or surface wave radar physics which is not talked about. Maybe even orbital/quantum radar, like the Chinese Luditance system. Who knows.

It is well understood that you can detect targets beyond the theoretical 12nm limit of radar horizon. SPQ-9 does so. So does Podsolnukh.

BY DESIGN, the argument that the A-12 is _only_ a low altitude penetrator and/or the USN did not somehow understand how VLO works is a non-starter. Flying wings achieve optimum range efficiency at-altitude, due to their low loadings. That is also where they are least likely to hit accelerative stall issues inherent to rapid pitchup maneuvers (though, again, the A-12 nominally had better ITR than the F/A-18...).

Better acceleration than a clean A-6 while loaded. Better turn than a Hornet.

Wayback Machine

FWIW, the X-47A did not come aboard, only flew approaches. I would not call it a flying wing but more of a deltoid shape.

The X-47B did accomplish landings and takeoffs and yet is a lifting body with a separate airfoil section on a different sweep angle, outboard, like a cranked arrow design. It too should not be considered a flying wing, IMO.

It is also lightweight and never selected for productionization with combat capable systems.

Likely for reasons similar to why the CCA was not and is not intended to survive competitive downselect with two, 300 million dollar, manned, NGADs at risk. They will find a reason to cancel it, just as they did the J-UCAS.

Even though DARPAs UDS/UOS program would have made its transitional selection date of 2006, and been the better airframe, for cost, in a GWOT, 'we could not afford both the JSF and the J-UCAS' and so the manned JSF was greenlit. Despite needing two separate, Nunn-McCurdy breach justifications.

When it isn't serviced, doesn't have the same aerodynamic configuration and is far different in terms of operational payload/systems weight representation, relating testbed UCAVs to a manned air vehicle is not a suitable comparison.

A flying wing, riding the edge of a stall, underpowered for the sink rates required to control scatter, and with gross weight issues on takeoff and recovery, is not a suitable jet for behind the boat. Is not a suitable jet for low level penetration.

Makes no sense with all that HIGH ALTITUDE hardware, as anything but a conventional VLO platform with full understanding of how stealth works, on the hypotenuse theory.

Conversely, if there were airframes completed from the initial prototype tooling, with straight trailing edges and centerline engines as buried LE intakes as suggested by the in-flight photos and visible evidence of things like multiple canopies seen next to very large, (10ft tall, 30ft wide) gloss blue, jigs then the entire 'nothing built beyond bolts and spar caps, the production line was done in chalk' assertion of Stevenson's book is clearly a lie.

And thus, you have to wonder, was there a third supplier who was involved here? Were these prototypes put together by naval aviation depot working with one of the closed test ranges?

>
Further review of the documentation for Audit Report No. 91-059, "Review of the A-12 Aircraft Program," dated February 28, 1991, as well as the Inspector General letters transmitting the report on March 1, 1991, to Chairman Les Aspin and Representative Andy Ireland, indicates that statements to the effect that the Secretary of ,Defense "decided to terminate the A-12 aircraft contract for default" should have been phrased differently. According to the 1 DoD Press Release ("Navy Terminates A-12 Program", January 7, 1991), the Secretary of Defense decision was that he would not "ask Congress for more money and bail the contractors out." The Press Release also stated: "The U.S. Navy notified General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas today that it has terminated its contract with those companies for the A-12 carrier-based aircraft program. The Navy action, terminating the contract for default, Is based on the inability of the contractors to design, develop, fabricate, assemble and test A-12 aircraft within the cont~act schedule and to deliver an aircraft that meets contract requirements." (Underscoring added).
>

'With /those/ contractors...'

https://media.defense.gov/1991/Feb/28/2001714477/-1/-1/1/91-059.pdf

Again those 'prototype tools' are enormous. They would weigh TONS. How did GD/MDD not know what happened to all of them and all the component parts?

Three Canopies

http://www.notreally.info/transport/planes/avenger_ii/a-12/img//767854_425x275_mb_art_R0.jpg

Wing Tool

http://www.notreally.info/transport/planes/avenger_ii/a-12/img//767852_425x275_mb_art_R0.jpg

Main Fuselage Jig

http://www.notreally.info/transport/planes/avenger_ii/a-12/img//767850_425x275_mb_art_R0.jpg

The ATA was so CSAR (compartmentalized, special access required) top secret that _data_ not used by Lockheed had to be destroyed rather than be securely archived or transferred from Skunkworks to GD ownership. Surely the two companies had to discard their 'prototype' tools via a contractor with classified disposal capacity?

Especially if, as Stevenson now states, there were sufficient components to build an entire airframe.

How did flyable prototypes get built which neither company knew of and which certainly would have: "See these flying airframes? These are not proof of a defaulted contract!" negated the government case?

If the shut down of GD/MDD ATA funding was so immediate in its effects that there was a floodtide of people coming over to the B-2, then HOW did those aircraft get built?

Even if you assume A/X was less a technology base recovery than a testbed completion system, there was no one on the LMTAS/GD/MDD A/X team left to finish the build!

And the lawsuits were such that both government and companies spent BILLIONS on litigation with these two system primes being privately told to divest all their aerospace assets, because they would never build another military airframe?!?!

The A-12 flew. As an airframe, not an ATA prototype. It has/had been maintained from 1991 to 2014, at least. If it's so useless as a stealth platform, what functional role did it serve, as a prototype, to be retained for so long, if 'nothing was recoverable' from the effort?

The A-12 was never intended to be a carrier attack jet. It was intended to be some kind of CIA spook mobile successor to existing SIGINT or IMINT programs. If you pull off all the navalization, the weight and boarding factor issues are non-existent. Take off from a 10,000ft runway.

If you put fuel in the weapons bays (there is literally no place else for it). If you populate the wide by thick (almost too thick for truly high altitude work) LE with various stripline antenna farms and LOROP, the only thing which matters is lateral RCS as you do racetrack orbits. Which also explains the two of everything costs.

If you retain a second seat and full AAR capability to compensate for the chief shortcomings of the U-2R/S, then, maybe, you get a TR-3 Black Manta. If not as a gatherer, then as a targeter, for War Breaker against the SS-20 then.

And via JASSM or MAKO/SIAW, against Iskander today.

Either way, that jet flew. And flew for so long (program dispute settlement in 2020 as exit from service date, hiding program logistics in plain sight?) that it doesn't make sense as a range test mule for other programs.

You would never be able to fund its existence in such a bitter, litigative, environment.

Unless the lawsuit itself is the finger-to-nose vehicle for doing so.

In any case, the very existence of an A-12 configuration airframe is contrary to the entire government case against GD/MDD and it seemingly cost this nation its two best fighter design houses, for nothing.

That's a massively backwards choice to make, for one airframe. But that single photo of a flying A-12 configuration in 2014, proves that is what they did. Because you would not create a 'modern stealth' configuration airframe with straight trailing edge. Visible LE inlets and a ventral exhaust.

That. Jet. Flew.

 

[quellish]

The ATA was so CSAR (compartmentalized, special access required) top secret that _data_ not used by Lockheed had to be destroyed rather than be securely archived or transferred from Skunkworks to GD ownership. Surely the two companies had to discard their 'prototype' tools via a contractor with classified disposal capacity?

You seem to be referring to the work Lockheed was contracted to do on the exhaust. GD and Lockheed terminated their relationship during the program. Lockheed was required to dispose of the data they had been given by GD.

How did flyable prototypes get built which neither company knew of and which certainly would have: "See these flying airframes? These are not proof of a defaulted contract!" negated the government case?

There were no flyable prototypes.

The A-12 flew. As an airframe, not an ATA prototype. It has/had been maintained from 1991 to 2014, at least. If it's so useless as a stealth platform, what functional role did it serve, as a prototype, to be retained for so long, if 'nothing was recoverable' from the effort?

It did not fly.
It was not maintained between 1991 and 2014.
There would be no functional role or reason to use it.

The A-12 was never intended to be a carrier attack jet. It was intended to be some kind of CIA spook mobile successor to existing SIGINT or IMINT programs. If you pull off all the navalization, the weight and boarding factor issues are non-existent. Take off from a 10,000ft runway.

Well, if you pull off the navalization it becomes a completely different airplane. The Navy requirements drove the structure and configuration.

If you put fuel in the weapons bays (there is literally no place else for it). If you populate the wide by thick (almost too thick for truly high altitude work) LE with various stripline antenna farms and LOROP, the only thing which matters is lateral RCS as you do racetrack orbits. Which also explains the two of everything costs.

A triangle has terrible broadside RCS as well as frontal. TACIT BLUE is a good example of a VLO surveillance aircraft, as is Darkstar.

In any case, the very existence of an A-12 configuration airframe is contrary to the entire government case against GD/MDD and it seemingly cost this nation its two best fighter design houses, for nothing.

The mockup was not an airframe.

That's a massively backwards choice to make, for one airframe. But that single photo of a flying A-12 configuration in 2014, proves that is what they did. Because you would not create a 'modern stealth' configuration airframe with straight trailing edge. Visible LE inlets and a ventral exhaust.

What photo? The photo of the B-2 over Kansas?

 

[LEG]

"Tyler Rogoway, is that you?"

Look, it's all in the same computer cloud, right? I'm not stealing something Google hasn't already pointed me to, as a public link. Lack of a way to disseminate the data inhibits informed discussion from valid arguments. I am not asking X to host the image, bloating their bandwidth, I am not stealing Y's content, without accreditation.

I am value adding by syncretic tradition, that there is a different perspective inherent to the individual ideas by combining them in a mutually supporting fashion.

But if I can't know for sure that the links will post, as intended, then I have wasted a LOT of effort finding the backing imagery, for nothing. I get this, all the time, on Reddit, less on Quora.

Yes, it had a contrail suppression system that injected a fuel additive. This was an early program requirement. I am not sure why you are highlighting this.



The A-12 had a FLIR and an IR missile detection system. It did not have an IRST. One FLIR system was for navigation, the other for targeting ground targets. Both were passive. Both are shown on the engineering drawings in your post.

But daaaaad! It's a low level intruder because the USN is too retarded to know how RCS works and the Golden Haired Children are too stuck up to explain it! Everyone knows that!

Reality Check: It takes five minutes of time to convey the fundamentals. You ask for the disk and take it to your super computer which verifies their super computer's conclusion. You alter the scope and scale of the design expectations.

If you are mixing to ambient and adding a contrail suppressor, that says you are in the conbands of the FL190-FL400 block. That says you are aware of the issues with IRST performance inherent to MiG-23MLD and MiG-25PD all suddenly mounting them. And the MiG-29/Su-27 taking them to the upper hemisphere.

During TAC Brawler workups, turning the ATF mathematical model sideways to the surveillance radar, sometimes brought a (desired turn-in) response. And sometimes didn't. As the message to the interceptors got lost in the GCI somewhere.

Pushing the jet to burner ALWAYS got a reaction however.

And that was back in the bad ol' cooled Lead Sulphide days.

You are both right and wrong about the naviflir and MWS. Which was the AAS-43. My bad.

However-

>
In the attack configuration, the A-12 was to have a two-man crew (as did the A-6 Intruder), and for “other missions”—presumably electronic warfare variants—the A-12 would have a three-man crew. The basic aircraft would have a dual-function radar/infrared search and tracking system, with the radar having both air-to-air and air-to-ground modes. (Antiship, close air support, and tanker missions also were envisioned for the basic aircraft.)
>

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2018/february/avenger-couldnt-avenge

As I'm sure you know, the AAS-42 on the F-14D could be used as a line up aid, behind the boat. Its slow raster (you can literally see the update line proceed down the screen) meant it was not suitable as a primary flight sensor. By the time we get to PIRATE, that has changed. The imager is now FPA quick enough that you can literally fly with it.

F-14D IRST, 'The Silent Stalker'

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HztwvYwPtrM


PIRATE IRST Visionics Display

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWxSsp7Ogyk


The NavFlir on the A-12 is the IRST. That's why it is labeled as such in the cutaway.

The A-12 has a high altitude, passive, look down, air to air sensor which, in the AAS-42 on the F-14D was said to be 'Sensitive enough for Phoenix envelope shots against the F-117'.

According to this book-

https://www.amazon.com/F-14-Tomcat-Osprey-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0850457203

Oh my, a 'stealth feature' recently of AAQ-37 DAS 'look through the airframe' multi-function aperture (SAIRST, MAWS, Visionics) fame.

Which was taken off the F-22 (EOSS) due to costs/packaging reasons yet is standard on the A-12.

But nothing could be recovered from the Avenger II technology base. AAR-56 also has visual resolution level, imaging, sensors btw. Yet does not function as a visionics system or even IRST, only as a MAWS.

AAR-56 Function Test 1

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUj3JTe1nVI


AAR-56 Function Test 2

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVrdQhYQI1M

COLD PIGEON/HAVE KEY predates the ATB competition by several years and was a GD program, not Lockheed. Lockheed had nothing to do with it.



The core low observable problems of the A-12 can be illustrated easily (again) with this set of polar plots from "Radar Cross Section' by Knott:

View attachment 727628

The straight trailing edge of the A-12 produced strong frontal returns with different polarizations. This is why you do not see straight trailing edges in other operational VLO aircraft. A 3-spike design is not desirable for a strike/penetration aircraft. Instead, a 4 spike design is about as good as you can get.

Plot (d) shows a 4-spike design. At different polarizations it would still have desirable RCS characteristics. The Northrop design would have had a similar 4-spike plot.

The "Ben Rich 3-9 baseline" you refer to from Stevenson is misleading. This was describing Lockheed's work on the A-12 RCS model, not the design of the aircraft. The GD A-12 RCS model was a disaster:





It's noteworthy that the pole the model was mounted to at RAMS was not a VLO (ogive) pole. It was a cylinder.

And Lockheed worked on the A-12 model for GD:



Making RCS models - even full scale models - is difficult. GD made many mistakes with their A-12 model, some of which are described above. GD did have competent RCS engineers, but many of them were young, were hired late in the program after certain decisions had already been made, and in general were not listened to.

After the A-12 cancellation the GD RCS group created an internal design to show they were competent. The design was nothing like the A-12, and actually did perform well (and their model was not a disaster). During the A-12 program they also built their own outdoor RCS range that was capable of measuring VLO aircraft - but they barely used it for the A-12 program.

The A-12 design was so flawed that the GD RCS engineering group completely discarded it.

Head over handlebars...I meant to do that.

In any case, Post-Pigeon, GD has experience with a flying wing for handling purposes which _might_ explain why there was no separate flying qualities program.

But it doesn't change the fact that the only reason you would push a lot of effort into making that configuration boardable would be if you were trying to maximize stealth as a core value. The flying wing itself isn't a problem that needs to be solved as far as carrier suitability. It has way too many negative factors, starting with that short coupled pitching moment.

Which means, either the model works or it doesn't. If the latter, Ben Rich should have said so, and he did not, instead stating that his people brought it up to spec. HIS PEOPLE being Lockheed Advanced Development Projects, aka The Skunk Works. The go-to solution source for 1980s tactical stealth.

Did none of those pipe smokers choke on their beer either?

Skunk Works had no skin in that game and no need to lie about it. They did need GD to be financially viable to support the ongoing ATF effort. Putting a stick in Northrop's spokes by destroying MDD only works, post ATF downselect, if you are willing to risk the resulting Tacair Trainwreck. By which, the USN got BOTH the F/A-18E/F _and_ the JSF, after failing to clean sheet the A/X or AFX.

Which doesn't make a lick of sense because the USAF needed all the money it could grab, for ATF, C-17 and ATB. Having just begun procuring the hotrod F-16C.50, it did not need JAST and would not have begun looking at CALF/MRF until 2012, so as to allow buildout of the F-22.

And according to the info I have, it was a USAF led working group that was putting together the 'bra' for the A-12. Or at least their analytics RCS data. Which further suggests that the mean girls were no longer hoarding the sweet math for stealth either. Probably because they knew what it meant in terms of the Navy whining about needed a new F-14 AND A-6 replacement.

What it doesn't explain is why a shift from skinny to fat wing would be accompanied by a major INCREASE in performance. Unless that performance involved shedding a navalization penalty, relevant to a different mission set.

USAF operates the gatherer community, be it RC-135, U-2R, MQ-4 or RQ-170. And, according to the drawings, that opposite side wing does not have a folding (symmetrical, top to bottom) LEF. It doesn't even look like it has the mounts for actuator linear drives inherent to a slat.

Who does that? Taking OFF a high lift device on a jet intended to control scatter with variable lift on a short coupled LE:TE moment arm?

Someone who has made a deliberate choice to emphasize VLO over takeoff performance, that's who.

Someone who is pushing the program as a separate sub-variant for a Klingon mission. Which means landbased and Blue Suiter understandings of VLO, likely from the start.

It sounds to me like the goal posts are being slid. First the USN doesn't know how stealth works. And then, with a re/design incorporating high altitude relevant stealth features, they understand but simply don't know how bad the GD/MDD design was, as a baseline. Yet still had the basic self awareness to put Lockheed on the job when Northrop wouldn't budge on a Proprietary or NatSec justification. And of course Lockheed lied out of sheer oneryness.

Contradiction doth not become you oh logicus.

Unless Lockheeds senior Versuchs Werke engineer, which DID understand (Senior Trend/F-117/ATF) stealth, lied to Stevenson and/or GD/MDD about the nature of their airframe evalutions post-fix RCS. Why do that? Why put in all those billable hours on the low RCS exhaust?

Maybe because, if the jet flew, as a standoff gatherer, flying wing-tip on, most of the time. A straight trailing edge is still meeting a swept leading edge at some oblique angle and, during the turn, two sweeps of the leading edge will still not back scatter within a common bearing but rather the sum of the two angles.

Now, you need to explain to me, as you would to a small child or a golden retriever, why a jet with a straight trailing edge and centerline, ventral, twin, exhausts, all apparently anathema to VLO, is flying, in the conband, in 2014.

Yeah, I didn't think so either. But Whoomp, there it is.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Now, you need to explain to me, as you would to a small child or a golden retriever, why a jet with a straight trailing edge and centerline, ventral, twin, exhausts, all apparently anathema to VLO, is flying, in the conband, in 2014.

What are you talking about here?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Now, you need to explain to me, as you would to a small child or a golden retriever, why a jet with a straight trailing edge and centerline, ventral, twin, exhausts, all apparently anathema to VLO, is flying, in the conband, in 2014.

Photos and/or video, por favor.

If you want a VLO plane to fly racetracks, that's the TACIT BLUE airframe. Remember, TACIT BLUE was supposed to fly inside S-300 SAM (SA-10/-12/-20) range and send SAR/GMTI radar data to tactical aircraft for targeting. And apparently worked very well at that task.

Today, we can pretty much do that with a modified JASSM airframe fitted with the SAR pod developed for the MQ9s. Needs more fuel tankage because the jet engine has to spin a big generator as well as make thrust, and carry a parachute to recover the airframe later.

 

[LEG]

You seem to be referring to the work Lockheed was contracted to do on the exhaust. GD and Lockheed terminated their relationship during the program. Lockheed was required to dispose of the data they had been given by GD.

GD came back and said they'd like to have the data they'd purchased. Because Ben Rich's initial response had not been what they were looking for when he said: 'This is the weight of the exhaust with enough recirculative cooling to not cook the RAM to uselessness, after engine shut down, when the nozzle actually gets hotter...'

They were over on weight, supposedly, and so they said 'No way, can't do it.' And walked away from the only company (at the time) known to be flying a hot brick coanda exhaust, operationally. Six months later they admitted he was right and tried to finagle on the off chance he didn't follow SOP. ADP does not do what they do because they break security rules.

Aerodynamic/Material/Design ones. Yes. They will shatter those to come up with new solutions.

But not program security. Not ever.

Ben Rich said: 'I trashed it all, as the CSAR requirements demand. You know I did. For me to recover the data would mean starting all over and I will charge you double for my trouble and wasting my guys' time.'

GD scuttled off, tail between legs, like kicked dogs. Because they were already behind on budget. Supposedly.

There were no flyable prototypes.



It did not fly.
It was not maintained between 1991 and 2014.
There would be no functional role or reason to use it.

I see a pointy wing tip. What do you see?

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Well, if you pull off the navalization it becomes a completely different airplane. The Navy requirements drove the structure and configuration.

IT WAS ALWAYS 'A DIFFERENT AIRPLANE'!!

It was not what the USN said it was: a low altitude penetrator. It has too many systems compromises to be considered so. Including an IRST with look down coverage and a contrail suppression scheme and an exhaust mixing plenum. And, oh yeah, 1,308 square feet of wing area.

It was not 'built for the Navy' because What Maroon designs a flying wing with the same T/Wr as an Airbus and a non-functional wing LEF mechanism that is your sole means of controlling/entraining airflow over the airfoil without entering a dangerous transition in mid->high AOA behaviors which flying wings are notorious for departing from thanks to their short chord and wide span.

Never mind that this thing is gonna rattle your fillings out at low level and .85.

And the rotary flap wing structure to support that ten inch thick moving flap structure is not present.

There is no cutout in the LE RAS. There is no actuator drive to extend a slat.

It's a lie on its face because, without leading edge high lifts, and with a critically low T/Wr, you are not boarding that jet.

So much for operational suitability and carrier compatibility. Which are the two driving preconditions of a naval aircraft, which _have to happen_.

Even beyond stealth.

Which is why you would go with a flying wing to begin with.

Ergo, it was not a naval jet. Not from Day 1. That's the whole point.

A triangle has terrible broadside RCS as well as frontal. TACIT BLUE is a good example of a VLO surveillance aircraft, as is Darkstar.



The mockup was not an airframe.



What photo? The photo of the B-2 over Kansas?

I see a pointy wingtip and a straight trailing edge. I see a leading edge sweep angle which is too great to be a Spirit, even with roll rate forced perspective change.

What do you see?

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSGLBb3k80U


To be honest, just on flutter reasons, a pointy wingtip is not very smart (Dagger, Dart, Eagle) if it is exactly what it looks like.

Never mind RF justifications.

But then again, if the entire outboard wingtip is one cast piece of RAS, who can say 'what it looks like, beneath the skin' as a layered dielectric/absorber/cancellation grid.

The A-12 configuration airframe flew. Because that pointy wingtip, with no cut back, means it's not a B-2.

And the only way GD/MDD 'didn't know about it' doing so was if they were part of the process which covered it all up. I don't see why they did it. It makes far more sense for GD to buy LMTAS/ADP, as a division, than Lockheed Martin to swallow GD's entire F-16 line.

Lockheed is space and missiles. Their last success, before the F-22, was the F-104.

And we all know what a criminal fraud embarrassment that turned out to be.

No big loss for Lockheed and yet, if the Skunk Works goes to GD, they gain an automatic +10 in stealth design.

Meanwhile, the loss of McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics, both together, has all but crippled our ability to build competitive fighter airframes at mass production levels.

And the photo, just like the Miller photo and JFK, is the proof of the lie. Lies within lies.

That. Jet. Flew.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

To be honest that just sounds like a load of conspiracy-minded garbage.

You have a grainy photo of (we aren't entirely sure) made by (no idea), how does that tie into the A-12, cancelled 24 years earlier? A very slight planform similarity?

 

[CiTrus90]

Flateric and OlivierM already demonstrated that the Wichita picture from 2014 shows a B-2.
The straight trailing edge is just a compression artifact.

Lockheed is space and missiles. Their last success, before the F-22, was the F-104.

I guess the U-2, A-12, SR-71, C-141, C-5, F-117 were all flukes...