RN Sea Based Ballistic Missile

CNH said:
According to Roy Dommett, the Polaris missiles eventually needed refurbishing, replacing the existing fuel. The US Navy had long since abandoned Polaris, and so Lockheed rehired retired engineers to work on the job - and charged us a fortune,
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Sounds about right, from what I've been told Polaris took a fair amount of time to work out all the bugs even after its introduction. I have a copy of Graham Spinardi's book From Polaris to Trident around here somewhere that I need to find time to read.
 
CNH said:
According to Roy Dommett, the Polaris missiles eventually needed refurbishing, replacing the existing fuel. The US Navy had long since abandoned Polaris, and so Lockheed rehired retired engineers to work on the job - and charged us a fortune,
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So typical Lockheed... !!
 
Archibald said:
CNH said:
According to Roy Dommett, the Polaris missiles eventually needed refurbishing, replacing the existing fuel. The US Navy had long since abandoned Polaris, and so Lockheed rehired retired engineers to work on the job - and charged us a fortune,
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So typical Lockheed... !!
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If you have a cow, then milk it.
 
Solid fuel rockets, in my experience, have a “use before date”, so the key guys on Chevaline would have been aware long beforehand of the forthcoming mid service recondition (propellant renewal). Good project management requires the securing of a firm costing from Lockheed before committing to the program and factor it into the overall business case. Having seen a few of these programs from the sharp end, generally common sense things happen but often get over taken by an accumulation of unforeseen events such that a party is out of pocket, so the government covers the loss. Then the myths arise about those involved being stupid/ruthless. As I keep saying on here “the devil is always in the detail”.
 
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One of the factors in the Chevaline enhancement of Polaris was the dithering of various governments as to whether to go ahead with the programme. The Treasury was doing its best to delay or cancel the programme. The result of all of this was to delay the programme and escalate the cost.
 
British 54" solid motor discussed here. There is also a brief section about solid propellent from the Roy Dommett tapes:

So immediately it started – oh, before the technical visit, immediately after NASA, we did a study at the RAE, dated the 3rd of January ‘63 which I have a print of, of what could the UK do? You know, what – if the UK had to do it on its own, what could it offer to do? It concluded that to match Polaris as a missile with solid propellant motors, of which I have to say the Americans have been saying to us since 1958, we should just switch to large solid propellants, they are viable, we must do it. They were switching to Minuteman, their Polaris, it worked and therefore they knew it could be done and so on. The UK didn’t have that background, and was loathed to go down that route at that point in time.
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Not massively revealing but interesting nonetheless.
 
And from the same section of the Roy Dommett tapes:

But the preferred solution was to take the Black Knight technology, build a larger vehicle, which would have been more Black Arrow like in size, which you could store propellant for a year in a silo. So we ended up with sort of saying that UK technology with silos, you know, bringing back the old questions that we have about the reason why we didn’t want Blue Streak in the first place, and so on. Particularly when it was always known the submarine at sea was probably the best way to go. But the estimate for a Polaris missile, not the submarine but the Polaris missile, replacement in the UK was over twice the cost of anything else that the UK could do. And that included a UK equivalent of Skybolt, you know, or a large cruise missile and so on. In other words, we looked at these. That’s a paper I suppose I need to make available to people. It’s available at the National Archive, I’m told.
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“study at the RAE, dated the 3rd of January ‘63”

and

“The U.K. didn’t have that background and was loath to go down that route”

And yet just two years later the U.K. fires a 54inch technology demonstrator.

I’m sure the question in government circles would be why are we paying for this twice? Once in the purchase from the US and once from the RAE.
 
Dither. Well Yes, but for cause.

Defence was not flavour of the month in early-59: Suez had been a military as well as political disaster: officers then in BC as target planners had been posted on some Cairo airfield targets until brief months before we invaded, 11/56, yet Canberra and Valiant could not find them because they were not on their nav systems. Hunter 5 trying to get to the Nile from Nicosia called bingo! when (if) they found the Canal. The Election (to be 8/10/59) must be won - CND was rife in Labour, prosperity+fiscal soundness was what Macmillan had to sell ("most of our people have never had it so good").

We had Blue Steel Mk.1 and Blue Streak in protracted R&D: the ASM: BC/CiC,AM Sir K.Cross, 3/63: “so many basic faults...doubtful they can be overcome” R.Moore, Nuc. Illusion,P213.; the MRBM: “RR share the view with everybody else that DH can be extremely difficult and unsatisfactory” MoS,’58, CN.Hill {here, CNH},A Vertical Empire,P107. Rocketman Minister Sandys asked 11/4/58 “asked whether (DH) could be replaced”, then (25/9/58) contemplated a UK warhead on (to be purchased) Thor, or a new (non-DH) solid-fuel MRBM. M.Jones,Official History,UK Strategic Nuc. Deterrent/1,Pp.125/130/132.

Speculation of UK-solo ASMs, MRBMs is exactly that: wiffery. There could never have been a consensus to squander taxpayers' hard-earned on feeble, doomed attempts to duplicate in sculpted scale what US (with pain and cost) was doing at production scale. What Ministers could do, and spectacularly did, was secure, firstly Bomb, then Skybolt, then SSBN+SLBM on hugely favourable terms, which we continue to enjoy today. Well played those men!


Try this whif. Some have criticised 1st. CDS Mountbatten for confining UK involvement with SSBN/SLBM to observer status in USN's Project Office through the demise of Blue Streak/rise of Skybolt, early 1960. This is the worst hindsight/ahistory.
If.. he had secured funds additional to a credible surface Fleet, say, to co-habit the Holy Loch when we agreed to host USN there, so that RN might have a couple of (presumably US-built) Polaris A1-boats soon after USN arrived there 6/3/61, or waited awhile for A2, then...
How many Mk.2 Victor/Vulcan might we have deployed - none?
Delete VC10 when BOAC wanted to (it was imposed on them solely to secure an option ALBM platform after Vs became bedridden).
Forget any UK Big Bangs, confining AWRE/ROF to small squibs awhile until Ministers decided to stay in-NATO-Area, so became solely porters of US Bombs.

Like Skybolt, Mountbatten was a celestial body.
 
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History of Blue Streak belongs in Blue Streak thread in appropriate section Rockets, Missiles and Guns.

Whiffery is the very essence of this section.
Reference here is comparison.

AH Thread decision '55-'56 implementation '57 beyond. EoS potentially dies.
By '59 behind US but not too far. Whilr SSBN ahead of OTL as resources moved over from '57. Carriers of secondary consideration. Fading in face of needs.
Mountbatten still happy as RN is taking Deterrent.
Army happy if Tactical benefits.

Primary surface focus remains ASW, reinforced post '63 obselecence of Ark Royal.

= liquid rocket abandoned late 50's.
= no late V-Bomber run
= no F4
= no CVA-01
= possible chop Cruisers
= Blue Water goes ahead.
 
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JFC Fuller said:
And from the same section of the Roy Dommett tapes:

But the preferred solution was to take the Black Knight technology, build a larger vehicle, which would have been more Black Arrow like in size, which you could store propellant for a year in a silo. So we ended up with sort of saying that UK technology with silos, you know, bringing back the old questions that we have about the reason why we didn’t want Blue Streak in the first place, and so on. Particularly when it was always known the submarine at sea was probably the best way to go. But the estimate for a Polaris missile, not the submarine but the Polaris missile, replacement in the UK was over twice the cost of anything else that the UK could do. And that included a UK equivalent of Skybolt, you know, or a large cruise missile and so on. In other words, we looked at these. That’s a paper I suppose I need to make available to people. It’s available at the National Archive, I’m told.
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YEEEESSSS !!! I knew it ! Black Arrow tech (kerosene / peroxide) used for ICBM / IRBM. As I said elsewhere, kerosene / peroxide is "acceptable" for second-generation ballistic missiles (think Titan II) as both propellants are liquid at room temperature.

They are not HYPERGOLIC (that is, no spontaneous combustion when in contact like N2O4 / N2H4) but they are STORABLE.

What combinations for ballistic missiles ?

- a) kerosene / LOX : R-7, Atlas-F, Titan I
- b) N2O4 / N2H4: storable, hypergolic (Titan II, Soviet missiles: R-36 and others)
- c) solid fuel (Minuteman, Polaris)

Kerosene / H2O2 is half between a) and b)

Main problem with 85% H2O2 was
a) it had an atrocious reputation in both USA and GB - see John Clark ingintion, written in 1971
b) that reputation come from the many impurities in H2O2 back then that made it, indeed, unstable and explosive.

One should note however that, since then production of 85% H2O2 has been vastly improved. The substance has much better purity and accordingly, is vastly safer.

Problem is that too many people remained fixed on John Clark Ignition reference book surely... in 1972. 48 years ago.
 
HTP/kerosene is hypergolic in the sense that once the hydrogen peroxide has been decomposed via a catalyst into steam and oxygen, the kerosene can be injected into the resulting gases and will spontaneously ignite. But yes, you are right in the sense that mixing the two liquids (although probably not a good idea) will not immediately result in ignition.

HTP had quite a good reputation in the UK – in the early 1950s, it was decided that any rocket engine to be carried in an manned aircraft should be HTP based. Hence the Sprite, Super Sprite, Spectre, Stentor and Scorpion rocket motors.

But yes, a Black Arrow sized rocket would have made an excellent MRBM for the UK.
 
I see the point... how about "indirectly hypergolic" ? glad to be proven wrong here. I'm fine with indirect hypergolic, really.

HTP had quite a good reputation in the UK – in the early 1950s, it was decided that any rocket engine to be carried in an manned aircraft should be HTP based. Hence the Sprite, Super Sprite, Spectre, Stentor and Scorpion rocket motors.
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Hmmm... HTP had quite a good reputation in the RAF maybe. For the Royal Navy, alas... HTP / H2O2 / peroxide, its reputation was utterly ruined by these coffins. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explorer-class_submarine

At least their nicknames provided British humor as its best. HMS Exploder - ROTFL.
 
I’m not so sure. Consider the following;-

John Clarke called the chapter about Peroxide “Always a Bride’s maid”

The nick name for the RAF’s Peroxide powered Blue Steel was the “Pig”

I’m not sure where the info that it had a good reputation in the RAF, I was told by a chap who had to sign off flight worthy Blue Steels (Pigs) Peroxide was horrifying and untrustworthy. (See post 11)

Then there was the Kursk

Admittedly not Peroxide, the US had seven silo explosions with liquid fuelled rockets, including one with a “storeable liquid”. Had someone accidentally dropped a wrench against the a peroxide tank the outcome may have been the same. The USSR lost an SSBN due to a “storeable Liquid”. Anyone know of silo explosions in the USSR?

To the best of available information not a single solid fuel ICBM/IRBM/SLBM has gone pop while at readiness.

Sure it was great if surrounded by scientists and techi”s all at the top of their game firing a few a year.
 
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Brass....you find it on subs and ships.
It's common, affordable, easy to cast (compared to steel or iron), stronger than straight copper, and generally useful. Good resistance to corrosion.

You find it in fittings to handle water.

Theory is Kursk had a HTP leak from a torpedo onto a brass fitting in the torpedo room. Catalysing on contact with brass it decomposes into the explosive mixtures of oxygen and hydrogen among other things....and it heats up as it does this.
Catalytic reaction being pumped through silver gauze is impressive speed of this process and the temperatures reached. A few inches of pipe after the gauze and it's completely broken down, hot and easy to inject kerosene. Needing little to get the burning going.

And bet your bottom dollar that British submarines have brass too.

Anyway yes a bit of OT drift here.

Central AH is smaller lighter nuclear weapons concieved post '55-'56 and SLBM adopted as RN solution.
Objective is ISD around '65.....
Secondary AH component is funded high ISP solid fuel rocket technology. This would be ICI facility producing tons at peak production.
Interesting knock on effect is possible solid space launcher and low rate production for other missiles.

Third component is large submarines. An engineering feat well within RN and UK capabilities.

Fourth element could be Italian style distribution onto surface assets as well. Actually looked at one point from converted carriers i think.
 
CNH made a comment elsewhere on this forum about Blue Streak getting "trapped" into liquid fuel very early on, that combined with comments from others (e.g. zootycoon) about UK solid work reminded me of some past thoughts. First, what was actually going on with UK solid rocket developments, some observations with regard to the infrastructure required for solid rocket manufacture, with an emphasis on extrusion pressing:

c.1945 the British were limited to being able to press 10", captured German presses were evaluated that could manage 20.6 inches and development work was undertaken on a press of 22.5 inch diameter, one apparently being installed at ROF Bishopton.

Fast forward to December 1956 and the Westcott paper on solid ICBM designs is based on 3ft 6 inch diameter (42 inch) motors of 25ft length as (emphasis mine and courtesy of A Vertical Empire):
These maximum dimensions are considered feasible with radial burning plastic propellant charges… and are within the pressing limits of facilities already planned and requested.
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This tells us that an extrusion press capable of producing solid motors of 42 inch diameter and 25ft length either existed or had been requested by late 1956.

Then things take a pause, to CNH's point about Blue Streak getting trapped as a liquid design. The Black Rock motor, a double chamber 24 inch unit, surely fits in here somewhere though it may have been cast as the 24 inch Phoenix motor, from 1960-62 for Blue Water was. Though it seems to have had its problems the 24 inch Phoenix seems to have been an advanced motor, details are scant though, one assumes it would have had the same 205 ISP of the 17 inch Saluki test motors?

And then finally, 11th June 1965, the 54 inch plastic propellent experimental motor is fired at Westcott that implies manufacturing capability (cast?) existed for that diameter. I would love to know the length though.
 
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To understand the manufacturing infrastructure required for large composite propellant motors such as Minuteman and Polaris (?) take a look at this;-
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=2t9ET7GP-iU

It shows the basic propellant production process, but not the motor casting(called “Case bonding”). This was done on the site and consist of a pour and cure cycle.

Double Base propellant powered casing is quite different and extrusion for large motors is obsolete by about 1960, although it continued for small motors in volume production for some time.
 
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And then finally, 11th June 1965, the 54 inch plastic propellent experimental motor is fired at Westcott that implies manufacturing capability (cast?) existed for that diameter.

There’s a considerable difference in the manufacturing capability needed to make a lab supervised one off and that for the serial production of dozens of motors to a consistent standard.

To answer CHN original question about ISP limits, HMG decided not to invest in the type of plant in the above documentary. Apart from Polaris, supplied off the peg, there was no domestic demand.

Also the information I have is that Saluki was a 24inch diameter motor with a hybrid propellant.
 
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Zootycoon said:
There’s a considerable difference in the manufacturing capability needed to make a lab supervised one off and that for the serial production of dozens of motors to a consistent standard.
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Absolutely, and that is why it would be good to understand the capacity of the infrastructure built in the UK in the 1950s through to the mid-1960s. The report quoted above shows that it was felt by late 1956 that the ability to manufacture 42 inch by 25ft solid motors using the extrusion technique had either been achieved or would be soon. What is less clear is how the casting capability developed. For instance, what size motors could be accommodated in the casting shed and curing house constructed at RO Summerfield?

Of course, investments were made when demand existed, and they were abandoned when that demand went away. As an example, apparently a propellent mixing house was built at Waltham Abbey to support the Blue Water programme.
 
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Had facilities been built for such scale propellant, casting for 24, 42 and 54 inch diameter rockets would be the outcome?
Once the infrastructure is built and staffed, not using it is only a recipe for dismantling it.
 
JFC
True, was the Waltham Abbey facility for composite or double base propellant because they’re quite different/bespoke/non interchangeable?

Somerfield’s main capacity was DB with a mInor capacity for composite. I don’t know about Waltham and Banwell but suspect it was the same.
 
just musing, was there ever any proposals for UK. surface vessels to carry Polaris (or equivalent IRBM./ICBM.) in similar vein to the Italian cruisers ?

cheers, Joe
 
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Zootycoon said:
Also the information I have is that Saluki was a 24inch diameter motor with a hybrid propellant.
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Interesting, I always had Saluki as a 17 inch test motor for the 24 inch Phoenix. Blue Water seems to have gone through a few evolutions in its life so its possible things have become confused over the years. There are a couple of files related to Phoenix at Kew, alongside a mass of Blue Water files, but even arranging a visit there at the moment is a miserable experience.
 
42 inches diameter.....

Pershing is 40....

Could this 42" 25ft long missile be comparable with Pershing?
 
The Blue Water 17inch/24inch confusion comes from a 70% scale test vehicle called Jinker fired during the early project work up. I understand it’s motor was called Aspin although some sources attribute it as Saluki. I have a photo of a Saluki;- it’s 24inch.
 
I’m not sure (please correct if anyone has access to definitive info) but Blue Water needed a dual thrust motor, short duration at high thrust for boost and sustained lower thrust for cruise. I think Phoenix accomplished this by one means (VG nozzle?) and Saluki by another (a hybrid propellant grain).
Good old fashioned risk mitigation.
 
How about clustering the solids you can do?

'A Vertical Empire' has a picture of a missile with seven clustered solid boosters as the first stage and one solid fuelled booster as the second stage.
 
The problem, as with so many Brit fantasy prpjects here, it cannot match the real world solution. Polaris was perhaps the most succcessful programme that either the USN or the RN ran in the Cold War. Replacing it with aome relic from the " Quatermass" era of British rocketry is nearly as daft as my failed attempt to have an alt world with propeller driven bohemoths
 
Uk75;- is that the beer talking?

The French managed it with style, so did the North Koreans and the Italians got a long way along the road.
 
Yes they did, because they were not offered the relationship we have had on Polaris and Trident.
To uninvent Polaris would be as much of a fantasy as uninventing the jet engine. Yes, Britain could have built its own SLBM in the 60s just as it could have built its own Space Shuttle in the 1980s. But the circumstances that would have allowed this to happen are as fantastic as Sir Alf Ramsey becoming Prime Minister, which as a British Citizen he could do in an alt history fantasy.
 

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Yes, the saying “Necessity is the mother of invention” holds true here.

I thought the alternative history being discussed was based around a hypothetical situation of there being a declared a necessity but no “off the peg” Polaris or Trident solution. What was the necessary technology step (Composite Propellant, GRP case) and what was its impediment (no business case to support the investment in the infrastructure). Was the composite propellant /GRP case technology beyond the U.K. ability- No so the impediment is why it didn’t happen. Hence I see no disagreement with yourself, just a different presentation.

I’m always blown away by the first achievers, Even when others are forced to go down the same path with no understanding how it was originally done, knowing it can be done puts a completely different mindset into the team. While justly creditable, it’s often mistaken for innovation which it isn’t.
 
Let me try and express my reservation..
When I suggested an alternate history thread based on no jet engine only rockets and props being available I was told that this was "fantasy" as it could not have happened.
For the same reason, I argue this thread is fantasy. Univenting a US developed SLBM is as improbable as univenting the jet engine.
Alternate history has to be based on a plausible change to real world events.
 
I accept that the US might have decided in 1962 not to offer Britain Polaris but the scenario here has been about Britain developing a national SLBM programme.
There are only two plausible candidates for a government in London in 1962. The Labour Party was generally in favour of relinquishing the nuclear deterrent. The Conservatives, Macmillan was PM but any likely alternatives (Butler, Macleod, Hailsham, Powell) supported economic prosperity and although they wanted a nuclear deterrent they were not willing to increase the Defence Budget markedly.
The Cabinet looked at alternatives to Polaris and rejected them.
The deterrent was only possible because of the close relationship between Whitehall and the Pentagon. Neither Nixon nor Kennedy nor any rstional US President (this is 1962 not 2020) could have persuaded the US military to throw this away.
 
A national SLBM programme would start from 1956-'57, following realisation of lightweight physics package from 1955-'56.
By 1962 the programme would be well along, likely physical infrastructure already in place or near completion, having begun by 1958-'59.
By start 1965, national SLBM effort would trump other military programmes.
 
Furthermore.
Polaris's progress would only emphasise that the UK effort was on track. By 1962 elements of Polaris might be sought for guidance system if UK effort is behind. As might assistance on physics package.
But rocket, structure, RV and related IRBM and TBM efforts would all be coming into fruition.
 
uk 75 said:
I accept that the US might have decided in 1962 not to offer Britain Polaris but the scenario here has been about Britain developing a national SLBM programme.
There are only two plausible candidates for a government in London in 1962. The Labour Party was generally in favour of relinquishing the nuclear deterrent. The Conservatives, Macmillan was PM but any likely alternatives (Butler, Macleod, Hailsham, Powell) supported economic prosperity and although they wanted a nuclear deterrent they were not willing to increase the Defence Budget markedly.
The Cabinet looked at alternatives to Polaris and rejected them.
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While I accept your assessment of U.K. domestic politics, at global level you’re missing the the Cuban missile crisis. Following this an independent deterrent was seen in a different light.

(Apologies for what may appear like a bit of a tag team.)
 
Unfortunately in this case the UK domestic situation trumps everything else. The Conservatives were soon to be mired in political and economic crises.. A new leader took over from Macmillan in 1963 and then lost to Labour in an election in which Labour fought on the need to reduce defence spending. In 1964 this government begins canceling major projects and had promised to get rid of Polaris. It manages to limit this to canceling the fifth boat (largely because the PM and Defence Secretary realised the importance of the relationship with the US). A bloated UK only programme would have been an easy target. We also know now that had the Conservatives won, the state of the economy would have forced them to find defence cuts.
France by contrast was enjoying a good period under De Gaulle and believed in strong governmental support for industry.
The poor state of the UK economy and industry is structural and an alternative history would have to be drastic to the point of fantasy.
As for the Cuban Missile Crisis public opinion in the UK simply breathed a sigh of relief it was over.
 

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