CVA-01 - What was the RN carrier plan 1966-1976

[Archibald]

They should have considered this design. https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/scb-100-class-cvs.42298/

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

They should have considered this design. https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/scb-100-class-cvs.42298/

Same size, would need to be redesigned for British standards and equipment, so wouldn't be any cheaper, not to mention not having the magazine capacity of a strike carrier.

 

[uk 75]

With the benefit of hindsight the demise of the Royal Navy's carrier force came when the US Navy started building its airgroups round the Forrestal.

Even the most optimistic UK economy could not sustain a Forrestal equivalent. We had not even been able to produce an Essex size vessel in any quantity or consistency.

CVA01 attempted to match the capabilities of the combat aircraft of a Forrestal on a smaller platform. It could not, however, be built in any quantity.

The other source of misery for the UK carrier fleet is not the RAF but the nuclear submarine.

Unlike the carrier the nuclear submarine offers the UK a close relationship with the USN and a vessel able to take over the nuclear deterrent while also giving us the ability to sink/contain an enemy fleet anywhere.

The continuing problems with the two new carriers and the accompanying reduction in the size of the rest of the RN is a glimpse of what would have happened if we had tried to build CVA-01.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think you give far more credit to the USNs impact on the RN than it deserves.

Granted the RN looked at the Forestall, but as a 'left of arc' rather than a realistic option, much like they looked at but immediately eliminated small carriers as 'right of arc'. Leaving aside it was too big to be built and sustained in Britain the RN was never going to develop their own versions of the A4, A5, A6, A7, F8, F4, F111B, VFAX, F14, C2, E2, etc that came and went in USN planning and procurement in the time period.

The 55,000t carrier that Britain could build is no slouch, even in a world where Forestalls exist. Nor is a fleet with 2 CVAs and Eagle anything to sneeze at. It's not as if the Soviet will only allocate Tu16s to a TF centred on CVA01 (or even Eagle with Phantoms) or some dictator in the Middle or Far East will not worry because the RN doesn't have a bunch of A7s just offshore.

The problem is Governments with firm but misplaced ideas about Britain's place in the world rather than any technical problem.

 

[kaiserd]

That last paragraph is, potentially not entirely intentionally, quite insightful in respect of this topic.

So much of these conversations and topics about UK carriers and carrier aviation are, at their root, not really about technical aspects about ships or planes, or about rational consideration of opportunity costs and trade-offs against real-world alternatives actually adopted, or about debating what could really be afforded.

They are probably far more about (quoting the post above) “misplaced ideas about Britain’s place in the world”, and of wishing and believing verses actual reality and the actual context. But probably not the same “misplaced ideas” or idea-holders alluded to or intended re: the post above.

However flawed specific UK Governments and their decisions may have been during this period they each, ultimately in the end, ended up having to deal with the hard economic and political realities and conditions of their day. These Governments were certainly more firmly rooted in that regard than much of the related discussions on this topic on this forum. And ultimately overcoming technical challenges, and the development and fielding of sophisticated military kit in general, takes money and time, and realistic decision making unavoidably involves trade-offs (including opportunity costs). Plus “belief” just doesn’t pay the inevitable bills.

And despite what some contributors may think or say my comments above are not political in nature. Instead they are about why much the same arguments come up again and again on this forum in respect of certain topics, including (especially?) this one.

 

[Rule of cool]

The comment was intentional as I've spent time dreaming up ships, planes and tanks that would be cool then wondered why they didn't get built. Now I start at defence/foreign policy, budgets and industrial capacity and see what cool toys can come out of that.

That said the toys do have an impact on defence/foreign policy by providing various options; without block obsolescence with the RN Carrier fleet and almost all the RAF combat fleet relevant Governments might not have taken quite so drastic action.

 

[zen]

So what the carrier is, is the airfield we get to put where we want and when we leave, the 'money' stays with us. While the landbased airfield gets to stay and all that sunk money gets into whoever has boots on the ground.
Because giving other people airfields for free is such a vote winner....for whoever gets them.

 

[Rule of cool]

In the 1963 study about how to discharge the EoS role the scientists concluded that the available and potential airfields/bases were too far apart to be mutually supporting, that quite a few might become unavailable in a crisis or permanently and if one was lost the whole scheme is likely to fall over as planes couldn't ferry between bases without intermediate stops.

 

[uk 75]

I am reminded of the chaos known as a "cat's cradle" when my mum's knitting went wrong.
I think all the arguments and views in these alt hist threads have at least a grain of truth.
But I like the fact that if you take the time to read the whole thread now and again you will find some good hard info and research.
I try to keep my threads open and good natured and am grateful to all who come in and contribute.

 

[uk 75]

CVA01 and TSR2 are very real for me as they were icons of my childhood. I was not yet a teenager when they were scrapped so I admit to a childish crush on both.
As an old f. I have numerous models of both in my home.
Age has taught me to appreciate why they were not possible (I commend Dominic Sandbrook's series of books about Postwar Britain to get a good picture of what things were like).
Timing is everything. I think both were five years too late.
TSR2 should have been available to take over from the V force and Canberras in 1963 (like the B58 Hustler).
CVA01 and O2 needed to be in service by 1968 in time to operate Phantoms and Buccaneers (or some of Zen's fave projects).
Wilson and Healey were not as severe as Nott in 1981. Valid projects would have survived (We got Nimrod not Atlantiques on their watch).
P1154 and AW681 also have a place on my toy shelves but like a lot of things and people I like they are seriously bonkers.
Found some old pics of my collection of 1/200 scale RAF stuff visiting the What if Modellers stand at Telford in 2004.

 

[Rule of cool]

I agree that the RN had painted itself into a corner by the mid 60s, but its important to put this into perspective. CVA01 was cancelled because it cost ~70 million pounds, and I'd guess CVA02 would cost ~100 million pounds.

In the decade 1965-75 the UK spent ~37 billion on defence, of which the RN's slice was ~20-25%/7.4-9.25 billion and of that about 1/3 was dedicated to new procurement, so ~2.5-3 billion pounds or 250-300 million pounds per year. Over that decade the RN would have spent an average of 17 million of 250-300 million per year to construct the 2 carriers. This is a lot, an SSN cost 5 million a year to construct, but Ark Royals dodgy Phantom refit cost 10 million per year and Tiger's dodgy helicopter rebuild cost 2.5 million pounds per year.

 

[uk 75]

I still think the SSN is the development that kills the carrier in the RN.
They give a range of capabilities that not even France is able to match in the 1970s.
I was lucky enough to get to know some RN officers who had commanded SSNs and they were in no doubt as to how vulnerable carriers were.
To give a specific example the deployment of Dreadnought detered on Falklands War and Conqueror ensured our victory in another

 

[Rule of cool]

SSNs are awesome at what they do, but they do very little: sink ships/subs, covert surveillance, insertion of special forces. None of this would be valuable in Kuwait 61, Tangyanika 64, not very valuable in Indonesia 64-66, or PGW 91. They provided an awesome capability in the Falklands 82, but they couldn't have re-taken the islands as they don't provide air cover.

A balanced fleet in the Cold War required aircraft carriers once it got to a certain size.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I still think the SSN is the development that kills the carrier in the RN.
They give a range of capabilities that not even France is able to match in the 1970s.
I was lucky enough to get to know some RN officers who had commanded SSNs and they were in no doubt as to how vulnerable carriers were.
To give a specific example the deployment of Dreadnought detered on Falklands War and Conqueror ensured our victory in another

What you're forgetting is that subs and carriers do different things.

You send a carrier group someplace, you tell everyone in the area that the carrier's owners are very interested in what's going on there.
You send a sub someplace, and nobody but you knows that you are interested in what's going on there.

 

[FighterJock]

I cannot quite belive that the CVA-01 cost £70 million pounds until cancelation. Highly surprised that the sister carrier CVA-02 would cost more at £100 million pounds.

 

[Yellow Palace]

What you're forgetting is that subs and carriers do different things.

The view held by @uk 75, and arguably that held by the British establishment for much of the last fifty years, is that the UK can only afford to do one of those two things, and that the role of the submarine was (and in some cases, is) more important to the UK than the role of the aircraft carrier. It's usually allied with a view that the British defence industry wasn't capable of delivering the equipment needed by the UK at an economic price, so US and/or European equipment should be purchased instead.

The contrary view is that the UK was perfectly capable of affording both, and of developing its own equipment, if it spent money more wisely, wrote sensible specifications, and made its mind up about what it actually wanted.

I have sympathies for both points of view, and suspect the truth lies somewhere between the two.

 

[FighterJock]

Quite Yellow Palace, it is rather sad that the CVA-01 and CVA-02 never entered service ultimately.

 

[uk 75]

Yellow Palace is correct about the SSN Vs Carrier argument. I would put it even more forcefully. SSNs are essential Carriers are desirable. Unless you have a growing economy like the US or India this choice is unavoidable.

I do not think foreign purchases are a panacea- the Ajax fiasco shows that. But the UK is very bad at delivering big programmes.
Polaris and Trident showed it can be done. But the current two carriers with their lack of armament, quality issues and feeble airgroup show what would probably have also happened with CVA 01.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yellow Palace is correct about the SSN Vs Carrier argument. I would put it even more forcefully. SSNs are essential Carriers are desirable. Unless you have a growing economy like the US or India this choice is unavoidable.

Not sure I'd say that the US economy is growing right now. I think it's just inflating the costs of goods anymore.

But that's a conversation for a different day.

I do not think foreign purchases are a panacea- the Ajax fiasco shows that. But the UK is very bad at delivering big programmes.
Polaris and Trident showed it can be done. But the current two carriers with their lack of armament, quality issues and feeble airgroup show what would probably have also happened with CVA 01.

I don't think that CVA01 would have as feeble an air group as the QE class. Not least because the CVA01s would have catapults, so they can operate anything the US does in terms of support air group. E1/C1/S2s that the USN just replaced with E2/C2/S3s, for example. Dart turboprop conversions all around to not need to worry about avgas on the carrier. Or even E2/C2/S3s, if there's space for them.

 

[uk 75]

I think if a simpler CVA design not requiring new infrastructure but able to operate Phantoms had been developed by 1960 and under construction in 1964 for delivery by 1968 the UK would have stayed in the carrier business. A second ship could have been in service by 1972 and a third by 1976. Ark Royal, Eagle and Hermes would all leave service by 1977.

In addition to the CVA a simple commercial standard LPH/Commando ship would have allowed Albion and Bulwark to be replaced by 1975.

This force would have still been in service in 1982 though one CV and one LPH would be in reserve.

The SSN fleet would have been smaller and development slower. The C class boats would have been built but the S and T classes would have been less urgent.

At some point in the 1980s the CV successor would have been considered. A joint design with France (DeGaulle with gas turbines?) might work.

The Commando Ships and Fearless/Intrepid would need replacing as well. Some kind of mini Tarawa LHA would allow a two for four replacement. Same size as Ocean but with a well deck?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think if a simpler CVA design not requiring new infrastructure but able to operate Phantoms had been developed by 1960 and under construction in 1964 for delivery by 1968 the UK would have stayed in the carrier business. A second ship could have been in service by 1972 and a third by 1976. Ark Royal, Eagle and Hermes would all leave service by 1977.

In addition to the CVA a simple commercial standard LPH/Commando ship would have allowed Albion and Bulwark to be replaced by 1975.

You really need 3x LPHs in the fleet, plus however many Royal Marines you plan on packing on them. One at sea, one in refit, one getting ready to go to sea. Plus their helicopters, of course.

At some point in the 1980s the CV successor would have been considered. A joint design with France (DeGaulle with gas turbines?) might work.

I don't know that the French would have given up on the nuclear power side of things, so those two designs wouldn't be very closely related. Reactors are very dense chunks of metal and water, while GTs are anything but dense. And GTs would need huge uptakes and exhausts, along with a donkey-boiler for the catapults.

 

[Rule of cool]

I cannot quite belive that the CVA-01 cost £70 million pounds until cancelation. Highly surprised that the sister carrier CVA-02 would cost more at £100 million pounds.

The RN hadn't spent 70 million on CVA01, although long lead items had been ordered, rather the Treasury believed it would cost that (I think) and the MoD thought (hoped?) it would cost 56 million IIUC. Assuming that the British do things right and lay CVA02 down immediately after 01 is launched it should be cheaper than 01 but of course that will be destroyed by the 70s inflation.

 

[orlovsky]

Yellow Palace is correct about the SSN Vs Carrier argument. I would put it even more forcefully. SSNs are essential Carriers are desirable. Unless you have a growing economy like the US or India this choice is unavoidable.

Just that the UK spent a lot of money on carr... through deck cruisers.

If you leave the SSNs alone, and just look at two major surface combatants in late 1960s money:

14 Type 42 @ 20 million = 280 million L
3 Invincibles @ 40 million = 120 million L

12 Type 42 and 2 medium catobar carriers should easily fit into the 400 million.

Aircraft: F-4 and Buccaneer of the FAA + the money for Sea Harriers

Crew: probably the biggest problems. Ship alone, 3xInvincibles+2Type42 ~2500. If the Invincibles are not fully crewed some sort of compromise there, too. (How the RN thought it would get the crews for 3 CVA-01 is a mystery.)

So it's a matter of moderate political will. Which was not there, after the RN had burned the medium carrier option in the cva-01 battle and the new focus was on ASW.

 

[orlovsky]

I don't know that the French would have given up on the nuclear power side of things, so those two designs wouldn't be very closely related. Reactors are very dense chunks of metal and water, while GTs are anything but dense. And GTs would need huge uptakes and exhausts, along with a donkey-boiler for the catapults.

I have read that late in the design stage of CdG, DCAN considered a reversion to conventional propulsion due to problems with other systems (electricity? catapults? not sure). Also thought that's not very plausible as the redesign would be huge. Anyone know anything about this?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I have read that late in the design stage of CdG, DCAN considered a reversion to conventional propulsion due to problems with other systems (electricity? catapults? not sure). Also thought that's not very plausible as the redesign would be huge. Anyone know anything about this?

Frack, that'd be just this side of starting over on the design...

 

[FighterJock]

Without the Invincible class carriers (through deck cruisers) or the Harriers we would have lost the Falklands ultimately, so they became a vital component of that entire war.

 

[Archibald]

Note that very early in CdG carrier pre-history (when PA75 was PH75) PH75 was not to be nuclear but borrow propulsion from F67 / F70 frigates. That was circa 1972-73. PH75 shifted to nuclear power because of the crisis / hospital ship mission. Similar to Agadir 1960 murderous earthquake, when French carriers were send to help. Having a nuclear reactor onboard the ship would provided plenty of electrical power.

1960 Agadir earthquake - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Rule of cool]

A word on Britain's ability to deliver big programmes, at least until the 70s.

As has been stated when something is considered vital and supported with the full weight of government, like Polaris SSBNs, British industry gets on with the job and delivers. In contrast everything else in the 60s was up for debate and vulnerable to changes to Government whim or if politically 'safe' always under pressure to get things done cheaply; not value for money but plain and simple cheap. This makes me believe that something as intangible as 'confidence' had a major impact on what Britain could and couldn't do during the transition from an unlimited global power to something more modest. Industry and unions aren't going to get behind something like CVA01 & 02 if it is likely to be cancelled or even if it is ordered cut back, delayed, overtime bans and all that.

 

[Rule of cool]

Without the Invincible class carriers (through deck cruisers) or the Harriers we would have lost the Falklands ultimately, so they became a vital component of that entire war.

Yet the feebleness of the FAA was the key vulnerability for the RN in the Falklands, CVA01 would have saved lives if it was available.

 

[uk 75]

We got a lot of help from the US with all aspects of the Polaris programme helped by decisive leadership in the USN and RN.
The V force had been also supported by the US. Blue Steel and Rascal are very similar. US bombs were made available.

The US were keen to help with the carrier programme and as the RAF history I posted showed Essex carriers were discussed.

The Falklands was a political not military failure. The UK took its eye off the region and paid a high price. Timely deployment of an SSN could have detered as it had done in the 70s. CVA01 on its own (like Ark Royal up to 1979) might have been able to protect the task group but equally she was only one ship and might have been unavailable.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Falklands was a political not military failure. The UK took its eye off the region and paid a high price. Timely deployment of an SSN could have detered as it had done in the 70s. CVA01 on its own (like Ark Royal up to 1979) might have been able to protect the task group but equally she was only one ship and might have been unavailable.

I don't think CVA01 would have been on it's own, I use it as shorthand for a carrier fleet that at worst will have CVA01 and Eagle until the early-mid 80s, but more likely there would have been 2 CVAs built.

Even in my mind where the British do a lot right for their military (CVA01/02, TSR2 etc)the Falklands would still be invaded. The Foreign Office kept negotiating with the Argentines without taking sovereignty off the table and Operation Journeyman ended with whimper by not ejecting the Argentines from South Thule. The result was when General Galtieri approached Admiral Anya in late 1981 for support for his coup, Anya agreed on the proviso the Navy could invade the Falklands. They were so confident that the British wouldn't react that Anya specifically prohibited any planning to be undertaken to defend the islands. I doubt better ships and planes would impact this thinking very much.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Note that very early in CdG carrier pre-history (when PA75 was PH75) PH75 was not to be nuclear but borrow propulsion from F67 / F70 frigates. That was circa 1972-73. PH75 shifted to nuclear power because of the crisis / hospital ship mission. Similar to Agadir 1960 murderous earthquake, when French carriers were send to help. Having a nuclear reactor onboard the ship would provided plenty of electrical power.

1960 Agadir earthquake - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Maybe if running a turboelectric drive, not turbines directly connected to the prop shafts. There's not a lot of spare generating capacity on a ship with mechanical drive.

 

[Archibald]

I just thought about a CVA-01 with Resolution-class boomers nuclear reactors.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution-class_submarine

 

[zen]

Need five reactor and steam plant systems of 27,000shp each to deliver 135,000shp.

 

[Archibald]

CdG is proof that adapting boomers reactors to carriers ain't exactly optimal. But I couldn't help wondering about the British doing a similar move for CVA-01.

 

[FighterJock]

We can only dream Archibald sadly.

 

[Rule of cool]

I believe the British did look at nuclear propulsion for CVA01, although I don't know what type, and rejected it on grounds of cost. By the early 60s the A2W was producing 35,000hp and the A3W was producing 70,000hp.

The Global Security article on the A3W says the JFK would cost $440m with nuclear power and $280m without and with the Nimitiz with a cheaper 2 reactor setup nuclear propulsion represented half the cost of the ships whereas an oil plant is about a quarter of the cost of the ship IIUC.

I've never looked directly into the cost of nuclear propulsion, but Wow that's a lot of upfront cost!

 

[orlovsky]

CdG is proof that adapting boomers reactors to carriers ain't exactly optimal. But I couldn't help wondering about the British doing a similar move for CVA-01.

Well, the ship works as intended after some initial problems. In the PA2 debate, they were considered for up to 60k tons /26 kts or so. They have some excess power that the propulsion system of CdG cannot use, no idea why. The screw problem alone seems too minor?

 

[zen]

RN did examine nuclear plant options.
The most intriguing being a reactor and plant concept for 75,000shp.
This would allow single units for large nuclear powered Destroyers....ideal for NIGS on might note.
Two sets for Cruisers.
Three or four for Carriers.

One should bear in mind that the upfront cost is offset by not costing in fuel for many years.

 

[Rule of cool]

RN did examine nuclear plant options.
The most intriguing being a reactor and plant concept for 75,000shp.
This would allow single units for large nuclear powered Destroyers....ideal for NIGS on might note.
Two sets for Cruisers.
Three or four for Carriers.

One should bear in mind that the upfront cost is offset by not costing in fuel for many years.

What were they looking to do, develop their own surface ship reactors? Or didn't it get that far?

From the Global Security article on the A3W.

.......a conventional carrier could fight for 3 1/2 days with its onboard provisions of munitions; Enterprise could fight for a week.....

..........Navy’s analysis showed that the total life-cycle cost of a nuclear carrier with its air wing over a 25-30 year lifespan is only 3 percent more than a conventional carrier.