Could TSR2 have been made to work?

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Now that TSR2 has been the subject of a conference of current experts on the subject, I am asking the BIG question.

Could TSR2 have been made to work? By which I mean could it have been designed and developed in such a way as to let the RAF take delivery of say 50 machines by 1970?

All options are open, provided you come with information and arguments backed up by facts or at least reasonable guesswork.
 
The primary issues with the TSR.2 were not technical, nor even financial. Politics were the big enemy. The program was a political football between Labour and the Conservatives. The lack of other programs ongoing meant the Air Ministry had license to micromanage. There was sniping between the RAF and RN over the Buccaneer. The BAC team was not long enough removed from the mergers to avoid excessive bureaucracy and friction between what had recently been different company, not helped by English Electric and Vickers-Armstrong having to merge separate designs in the process. And in hindsight the cost estimates were recklessly low.

Ultimately, though, the sense I get is that as long as Labour is in power during development the TSR.2 was dead; it was a symbol of everything they hated about the incumbent Tory government.
 
What's the appropriate phrase..."it's a movable feast"

Because it all depends on the dreaded requirements a design is developed for.

So yes, it can....kinda.
Politics aside.

So define how much of the requirements you want it to meet and we can talk options.
 
I have to agree, for my twenty pence worth (Just what is the current terminology now? 20 Mill?).

The aircraft had no more problems than the F14, F111 etc etc et al.
 
Could TSR2 have been made to work? By which I mean could it have been designed and developed in such a way as to let the RAF take delivery of say 50 machines by 1970?
I think it really depends on what you mean by "work"

e.g. an airframe with higher speed and better low level performance than Canberra with which you could visually nav in daylight / good weather a la WW2 Mosquito to drop 2 tactical nukes. This seems achievable.

But you've effectively got a longer range Jaguar, with worse nav system, a far smaller force, at massively increased costs... I've no idea how this is "better" than the hundreds of Jags and Tornadoes with aerial refuelling tankers we got historically
 
ltimately, though, the sense I get is that as long as Labour is in power during development the TSR.2 was dead; it was a symbol of everything they hated about the incumbent Tory government.
Britain had been skint, was skint, would continue to be skint and defence costs were going to be reined in no matter who was in power. Why frame it as political argument?
 
Never read any comments about TSR.2 on Facebook groups - they are not good for your mental sanity.

I've said all my arguments before. The thing was a dead-end. Too big, too heavy, too complicated, flawed tactical thinking, managerial nightmares, incompetency, over-ambition, high-tech obsessiveness.

The clincher is perhaps the admission from a lot of RAF officers who took part in Granby that the RAF had spent 30 years preparing for the wrong war and that supersonic tree-hugging wasn't safe or smart or conducive to accurate strikes with dumb weapons and speed instead of ECM/EW for protection. Sure the RAF did fast low level better than everybody else but it wasn't necessarily the smartest move.
 
The primary issues with the TSR.2 were not technical, nor even financial. Politics were the big enemy. The program was a political football between Labour and the Conservatives. The lack of other programs ongoing meant the Air Ministry had license to micromanage. There was sniping between the RAF and RN over the Buccaneer. The BAC team was not long enough removed from the mergers to avoid excessive bureaucracy and friction between what had recently been different company, not helped by English Electric and Vickers-Armstrong having to merge separate designs in the process. And in hindsight the cost estimates were recklessly low.

Ultimately, though, the sense I get is that as long as Labour is in power during development the TSR.2 was dead; it was a symbol of everything they hated about the incumbent Tory government.
I assume you're not the bloke who had the Damascene experience at Cosford on Saturday?

Chris
 
Damascene...

Inspired ? Or folded / spindled ??
 
The TSR.2 as it emerged was misconceived and fundamentally a mistake.

Actual history intervened and the mistake was ended (but really after too much had already been spent).
The RAF was objectively much better off with what they got instead of the TSR.2/ because the TSR.2 got canceled than they would have been with whatever would have emerged (in limited numbers etc.) directly from the TSR.2 program.
 
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Never read any comments about TSR.2 on Facebook groups - they are not good for your mental sanity.

I've said all my arguments before. The thing was a dead-end. Too big, too heavy, too complicated, flawed tactical thinking, managerial nightmares, incompetency, over-ambition, high-tech obsessiveness.

The clincher is perhaps the admission from a lot of RAF officers who took part in Granby that the RAF had spent 30 years preparing for the wrong war and that supersonic tree-hugging wasn't safe or smart or conducive to accurate strikes with dumb weapons and speed instead of ECM/EW for protection. Sure the RAF did fast low level better than everybody else but it wasn't necessarily the smartest move.

I'm not sure how we would quantify "too heavy", its size and weight were the product of a range and payload combination that the RAF has not possessed since the retirement of the Vulcan. It's complexity/ambition were a function of the requirement it was designed against and not particularly out of synch with its rough peers (F-111, Su-24 and their conceptual antecedents) and ultimate successors, conceived (AFVG) and actual (Tornado).

Flawed tactical thinking is worth exploring, both in general and in reference to Granby. Western air forces had figured out in the 1950s that low-level was the most profitable means of penetration, its not clear there was any alternative as the VVS and PVO would have made medium altitude operations lethal without a massive, sustained and very costly air superiority campaign. The Soviets do seem to have struggled to develop a comprehensive defence against low altitude attacks though they got progressively better through the late 1970s and 1980s. EW and low-altitude are not mutually exclusive and would be used in combination. It would not have been easy, losses would still have been heavy, but much less so than meandering in at medium altitude. In theory, penetrating and transiting to the target at low altitude should have made the final attack phase far and away the most dangerous part of the mission.

The Iraqi Air Force, to the extent it did function, did not function in the way that the Soviet Air Forces would have done. The Iraqi air force barely put up a fight which made medium altitude operations viable very quickly, and preferable given that their short-range point defences over air bases worked much closer to the way they should have done. In short, the poor performance/general lack of effort from the Iraqis resulted in a rapid reversal in where the safest operating space was compared to what was likely in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. I'm not sure that was a product of preparing for the wrong war, a different war perhaps but not necessarily the wrong war.

The irony is that due to the altitude performance requirement written into GOR.339 TSR-2 may have been able to perform better in the medium altitude role than Tornado.

With all of that said, a Buccaneer derivative would have been a sensible and much more deliverable alternative.
 
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The irony is that due to the altitude performance requirement written into GOR.339 TSR-2 may have been able to perform better in the medium altitude role than Tornado.
Well, since that requirement played a huge role in the development problems/costs, that's a sword that cuts both ways...
 
The irony is that due to the altitude performance requirement written into GOR.339 TSR-2 may have been able to perform better in the medium altitude role than Tornado.
But TSR2 as built didn't meet those requirements, being lower speed and ceiling than Tornado GR?

The UK didn't ignore ECM in favour of just low level penetration, but I think it's fair to say that more could have been done e.g. dedicated escort jammers, attack of SAMs / AAA etc. sort of carrying on the WW2 100Gp approach. Fewer bombers, but hopefully more get through

And yes, Buccaneer derivative or OR339 with subsonic speed requirement to give very different airframes? Avionics still too stretching
 
I'm not sure how we would quantify "too heavy", its size and weight were the product of a range and payload combination that the RAF has not possessed since the retirement of the Vulcan. It's complexity/ambition were a function of the requirement it was designed against and not particularly out of synch with its rough peers (F-111, Su-24 and their conceptual antecedents) and ultimate successors, conceived (AFVG) and actual (Tornado).
True, but the F-111 had a smaller airframe for roughly similar weights, AVFG and Tornado were large fighter platforms (they look like Micromachines next to the TSR.2!). The TSR.2 is a beast - it's length and empty weight nearly match that of the B-58 Huster and TSR.2's gross weight exceeded the B-58's by 12,000lb (the B-58's MTOW of course is much higher but then it had much longer range, but not much more weapons payload). TSR.2 it was a lot of aeroplane for half a dozen thousand pounders or a couple of 300kT nukes.

The sad thing is, had GOR.339 have been just a couple of years later BAC would have put a VG wing on it and a rather different airframe would have materialised. The avonics might have been more compact too. The timing just wasn't right and once the ball was rolling nobody could restart the effort from scratch. What was designed in 1958 was set in stone, BAC was built around marrying the P.17 and 571, nobody could have gone to the MoA to ask for a second attempt at a new design and the RAF was adamant about what it wanted.
 
What was designed in 1958 was set in stone, BAC was built around marrying the P.17 and 571,
And therein lay the problem. If the EE/Vickers merger had been wholly along the lines of "You, Vickers, will help English Electric to build their aeroplane the way they designed it and you, RAF, will stop asking for things beyond what was agreed to when P.17 was given the green light", there might have been a chance. TSR.2 turned out to be so much more than it should have been, and this was its downfall.

What Hood says about the avionics is also true. Those tend to get smaller and better with time, so even though you might have systems integration issues with fitting e.g. an updated digital suite to some hypothetical Mark 2 standard (assuming the Mk1 has a production run), at the very least you are likely not to have to solve space and weight issues in doing so.
 
True, but the F-111 had a smaller airframe for roughly similar weights, AVFG and Tornado were large fighter platforms (they look like Micromachines next to the TSR.2!). The TSR.2 is a beast - it's length and empty weight nearly match that of the B-58 Huster and TSR.2's gross weight exceeded the B-58's by 12,000lb (the B-58's MTOW of course is much higher but then it had much longer range, but not much more weapons payload). TSR.2 it was a lot of aeroplane for half a dozen thousand pounders or a couple of 300kT nukes.

Was the difference really that significant? TSR-2 had a normal AUW of 103,500lb, a maximum overload AUW of 120,970lb and a landing weight of 57,200lb. By contrast the FB-111A had a take-off weight of 110,646lb, a combat weight of 70,380lb and an empty weight of 47,481lbs. Those weights cover different states (and the FB-111 weights varied fractionally over time) so aren't directly comparable but they don't seem that far apart either.

TSR-2 was certainly longer, 89ft including pitot, against 75.5ft for the FB-111, but TSR-2's designers weren't constrained by requirements for side-by-side seating or fitting on a carrier lift. The F-111 ran later than the TSR-2 but the early SOR.183 designs show similar very long fuselages. It would be interesting to know how fuselage volume varied between the TSR-2 and F-111.
 
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Thanks everyone for entering into the spirit of the debate/discussion with lots of "input".

I offer a couple of nuggets of my own.

By the time TSR2s started being built in 1963 there were no Canberras left in the UK allocated to bombing. Their work had been taken over by the three squadrons of Valiants at Marham equipped with US nuclear weapons and assigned to NATO asits main theatre nuclear force.

In 1975 after all the dust had settled and TSR2, F111K and AFVG had been and gone the RAF had 48 Vulcans in the same role as the Valiants but with UK nuclear weapons.

Labour politicians were right to see through the conventional roles toted for TSR2. It was a nuclear strike aircraft plain and simple.

In the meantime after the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crisis had turned the US off the idea of "massive" in favour of "flexible" response the RAF could use Phantoms, Bucs and Jags instead.

Ironically the gap left when the 48 Vulcans left RAF service in 1983 was more than filled by a new wing of US F111s at Lakenheath followed by Cruise Missiles at Greenham.

Had TSR 2 flown in 1962 instead of 1964 it might have been saved to replace those Valiants. Vindicators anyone?
 
We went over this ground already, but a degree of change in requirements could have resulted in a solution more robust in political dialogue and debate.

Arguably the radius of action figure falls between two stalls, at 600nm we're still into the Tactical regime, albeit deep behind any forward thrust and cutting the supplies and supporting infrastructure that sustains the assault.

At 1,500nm to 2,000nm we're into the Strategic regime and hitting the bulk of Soviet European infrastructure and frankly population.

But 1,000nm.....?

Similar the benefits of low supersonic speeds (mach 1.2) at low level impose high cost for little 'additional' increase in survivability over the high transonic (mach 0.9) at low level.....which is more affordable
The savings ideally plowed into enhanced EW and 'stand-off' weapons....which would have utility over a wider range of radii, and scenarios.

A missing piece is the failure to fund the TV guided bomb Blue Boar and Anti-ship Missile Green Cheese. Both of which in developments and variants (stand off land attack, scaled down versions etc) could have made Buccaneers or even Vulcans far more viable for far longer.
 
A missing piece is the failure to fund the TV guided bomb Blue Boar and Anti-ship Missile Green Cheese. Both of which in developments and variants (stand off land attack, scaled down versions etc) could have made Buccaneers or even Vulcans far more viable for far longer.

Aye, could have been good, but I think the size of Green Cheese was driven by the warhead. Mind you the guidance system would have been pretty big thanks to the contemporary electronics. Lots of aircraft were to be armed with TV-Martel, but in reality, only Buccaneers sported it and when the Martel ARM was needed, it was found wanting.

Sea Eagle was what Martel should have been. Or if you like, what Green Cheese should have been.

I think that on here we tend to forget the limitations imposed on aircraft and weapons by the technology of the time.

My original rationale for the drawing above was to illustrate how an aircraft the size of a Tornado could do the same job (ie deliver a pair of WE.177C) as a Vulcan or TSR2 but much smaller. I put this down to the size of computers and their increasing power and capability rather than blokes/valves doing the work but Overscan wasn't convinced by this.

Chris
 
But 1,000nm.....?
1,000nm was still out to tactical targets when you draw out on maps. It looks like a convenient round number, but that's just coincidence. But then as built TSR2 was more like 750nm radius.

Agree on the lower speed at low alt plus more EW. I think the UK is almost definitely still in the iron bombs game though rather than GW until the 80s

I think Tornado is helped in the comparison by that large amounts of the fuel, and the weapons are on the outside, which substantially reduces airframe size. Sure you could make the TSR2 airframe ~6ft shorter by using modern computers, but it's still got to wrap around the weapons bay and engines
 
What does “work” mean?

“Work” for who?

I’m absolutely sure TSR2 development would have eventually yielded a system that would have skimmed across the Russian country side at supersonic speed, any weather, while navigating precisely with a few tactical nukes.

However we’ve now given up on tactical nukes as informed understanding is that they’re unnecessary, indeed maybe unworkable. Furthermore the first Gulf war showed low level was not a good place to be, so due to high losses, was rejected after only a few days. So is this a concept that worked?

The low level supersonic tactical penetration was rejected by the RAF shortly after they got the capability in the Tornado;- they disabled the capability by inhibiting (latter removing) the inner workings intake ramp control actuators. So why didn’t they even try to make that aspect work?

Such a niche, small numbers inservice, would have required disproportionate funding. What capability would have been lost to pay for it? There would have been no Vulcan, black bucking the runway at Port Stanley…. Would this have worked for the RAF and the U.K. actual national defence needs ?

A production run of 50 aircraft, maybe 3-4 years wouldn’t have worked for BAC, indeed it may have been a disaster, starving other projects of resources. Additionally probably it’s existence would mean, no 365/1000 aircraft production run Tornado. Damaging your ability to produce a weapon system, is that worth making TSR2 work?
 
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Hanging multiple stores and fuel tanks outside the airframe is a very draggy solution. A compromise frankly to make the aircraft seem smaller and cheaper than it actually is. This to win a compromise with those who wanted a Starfighter successor.....

But as we touch on repeatedly, developments of the Buccaneer will do the job and in fact did the job!

It would have saved a lot of time, money and added to existing production substantially to roll out more Buccaneer variants.
 
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But as we touch on repeatedly, developments of the Buccaneer will do the job and in fact did the job!

It would have saved a lot of time, money and added to existing production substantially to roll put more Buccaneer variants.

Not to mention generate Buccaneer GR1(TFR) export sales and freed up U.K. resources to do a 4th gen fighter entering service in the eighties.
 
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Hanging multiple stores and fuel tanks outside the airframe is a very draggy solution. A compromise frankly to make the aircraft seem smaller and cheaper than it actually is. This to win a compromise with those who wanted a Starfighter successor.....
Also, there is in-flight refuelling.
When GOR.339 came out in 1957 the RAF barely had a tanker capability other than a few early Valiant conversions and they were dedicated to supporting the V-Force. By 1966 the tanker fleet becoming dedicated to the fighters (Lightnings and Javelins) and supporting deployments out East. After 1971 the AAR capability stagnated in terms of aircraft using it and pilots proficient in it - again mostly Lightning jockeys. The events of 1982 was a shocker, suddenly everything needed a probe - ironically all the bigger stuff like Herks and Nimrods that didn't have them and Vulcans who hadn't used theirs for 15 years or more.

The TSR.2 had a refueling probe but only really for the ferry range heading to the Far East. And with external tanks and AAR there wasn't anywhere a Tornado or Buccaneer couldn't get to.
 
The TSR.2 had a refueling probe but only really for the ferry range heading to the Far East. And with external tanks and AAR there wasn't anywhere a Tornado or Buccaneer couldn't get to.

To explore that a bit further: Refuelling an aircraft in a zero-threat environment mid-Atlantic is one thing, doing it within range of the VVS, let alone the PVO, is something else entirely. A Tornado operating out of the RAFG bases in West Germany on a mission into Eastern Poland would spend most of its flight in hostile airspace with a vanishingly small window for refuelling. The range extension that could be expected would be minor as it simply wouldn’t have burnt much fuel, because it wouldn’t have covered a very large part of its flight, before that window closed. There may also have been a survivability penalty resulting from hulking around ferry tanks.

In the USAF the F-111 became a treasured resource, in part because of this, especially with the signing of the INF treaty which removed the missiles that could also provide that range. 382 aircraft were therefore planned for an upgrade that would have kept them going into the early 2000s.

To understand the TSR-2 range requirement, draw 1,000NM range circles from Akrotiri, Laarbruch and Conningsby, the target coverage would have been very impressive and beyond anything that a Tornado or AFVG could do.
 
Hanging multiple stores and fuel tanks outside the airframe is a very draggy solution. A compromise frankly to make the aircraft seem smaller and cheaper than it actually is. This to win a compromise with those who wanted a Starfighter successor.....
Also, there is in-flight refuelling.
When GOR.339 came out in 1957 the RAF barely had a tanker capability other than a few early Valiant conversions and they were dedicated to supporting the V-Force. By 1966 the tanker fleet becoming dedicated to the fighters (Lightnings and Javelins) and supporting deployments out East. After 1971 the AAR capability stagnated in terms of aircraft using it and pilots proficient in it - again mostly Lightning jockeys. The events of 1982 was a shocker, suddenly everything needed a probe - ironically all the bigger stuff like Herks and Nimrods that didn't have them and Vulcans who hadn't used theirs for 15 years or more.

The TSR.2 had a refueling probe but only really for the ferry range heading to the Far East. And with external tanks and AAR there wasn't anywhere a Tornado or Buccaneer couldn't get to.
Organising in-flight refuelling is additional cost, complexity and scheduling.
The basis of the OR was rapid adaptability to rapidly chsnging circumstances as Soviet forces moved away from known fixed sites and moved equipment in previously unknown patterns.
The plane was as much to recce temporary logistics hubs and military bridging locations.

And sending tankers over East Germany to get bombs on something East of Mińsk is not something to contemplate.
 
My original rationale for the drawing above was to illustrate how an aircraft the size of a Tornado could do the same job (ie deliver a pair of WE.177C) as a Vulcan or TSR2 but much smaller. I put this down to the size of computers and their increasing power and capability rather than blokes/valves doing the work but Overscan wasn't convinced by this.

Chris

I don't recall having expressed an opinion on this before - but certainly, part of the problem with the size of the TSR2 was the size of the electronics needed. 1960s avionics were tremendously complicated, maintenance-heavy and largely unreliable. However, I think the mission requirements of speed and range were more onerous and bigger factors in the size of the TSR2. As I recall, Sydney Camm said an aircraft would need to weigh 100,000lb to meet the spec.
 
HP examined the requirements and felt a much bigger and heavier than specified aircraft was needed.
Frankly I think they were right.
 
Hmmm.. Maybe wasn't you Paul.

Tankers. Must agree with JFC (where ye been? Inside?) and Zen.

I've been looking into this for my next book. Back in 1953 (I think) Flight Refuelling Ltd proposed tanker kits for Valiant and Vulcan. 'Oh we won't be needing that.' was the Air Staff response.

Same when airlines proposed fitting the kit to their aircraft in the 70s.

May 82 saw probes and pods on anything in the inventory that didn't already have them.

Don'cha love the smugness of hindsight?

Iraq - wasn't the size of Iraqi airfields a factor? Peripheral defences were primed for action as soon as the Tornados crossed the opposite boundary.

The 'no Black Buck' with Tornado scenario was mentioned at the recent TSR2 conference.

If... Big if. .. The Air Staff considered it feasible to put two Buccaneers into Bahia Blanca, could they have, at a later date, put two (probably one) JP233-armed Tornados across Port Stanley field? Recovered to Punta Arenas/eject over Falklands/eject over the sea and pick up by sub...

Bomb Argentine mainland? Same. All quite mad and tanker intensive.

Civvie aviation folk have the BAC311, Naval folk have CV(A)01, tank folk the MBT70/80, car folk have various pet cancelled (or unfulfilled promises such as the RO80) projects and no doubt railway folk have the same.

Do we have an alternative subject to TSR2?

I'll get me coat.

Chris
 
To explore that a bit further: Refuelling an aircraft in a zero-threat environment mid-Atlantic is one thing, doing it within range of the VVS, let alone the PVO, is something else entirely.
And sending tankers over East Germany to get bombs on something East of Mińsk is not something to contemplate.
Eh what??? At what point did I say anything about refuelling over the Eastern Bloc?
Zen was saying that external fuel was a drag (literally) and I was just pointing out that other methods exist to top-off tanks for long-range sorties. I was thinking of other conventional operations other than lobbing WE177s about.

It's worth noting the planned flight profiles - the top two look like ferry profiles, the bottom three combat profiles. Max internal fuel was 5,650 Imp gallons.
1684406558791.png
Compared with:
F-111: I've not seen any definitive internal fuel capacity but one groundcrew source implies a capacity of around 4,180 imp gallons. For the F-111A range with max internal fuel was quoted as over 3,165 miles. Though figures I've seen for the F-111C give a combat range of 1,330 miles and a ferry range of 4,300 miles.
If the F-111A figure is true then the economic cruise would be 400 miles more on 1,400 gallons less fuel.

Buccaneer S.2: internal fuel 1,560 Imp gal, plus 425 gal bomb door fuel tank can be fitted as well as provision for 440 gal bomb bay tank and/or two 250 or 430 gal underwing tanks, typical combat range 2,300 miles.
"Typical" is pretty vague but it seems it could go 300 more miles on a low-level cruise on about 4,625 gallons less fuel.

Tornado: internal fuel 1,461 imp gal (including the fin tank), provision for one or two 330 Imp gal drop-tanks under fuselage plus 300 or 495 gal tanks on the shoulder pylons and inboard wing pylons. Radius of action with heavy weapons load, hi-lo-lo-hi 863 miles, ferry range 2,420 miles.
Tornado can't match TSR.2's sorties. But then its lugging 41% less fuel around.
 
Do we have an alternative subject to TSR2?
Avro 730 supersonic reconasense bomber....
;)
Ah, well, I have to agree. Been looking at the recce role as the bomber aspects have been pretty well covered. In fact only yesterday, SPF member Yellow Aster provided me with a wonderful quote for the book. 'Red Drover was the Rolls-Royce of reconnaissance radars. With the price to match.'

Chris
 
True, but the F-111 had a smaller airframe for roughly similar weights, AVFG and Tornado were large fighter platforms (they look like Micromachines next to the TSR.2!). The TSR.2 is a beast - it's length and empty weight nearly match that of the B-58 Huster and TSR.2's gross weight exceeded the B-58's by 12,000lb (the B-58's MTOW of course is much higher but then it had much longer range, but not much more weapons payload). TSR.2 it was a lot of aeroplane for half a dozen thousand pounders or a couple of 300kT nukes.
IMO, the F-111s size has more to do with the USNs carrier requirements in combination with VG and Turbofans ensuring a smaller airframe.

I do wonder how much cheaper a 600nm radius twin-seat twin-engined all-weather interdictor is compared to a 1000nm radius twin-seat twin-engined all-weather interdictor. Same number of engines, same number of crew, trained to meet the same standards, with the same (or similar) avionics.

I believe Medium-altitude operations against a peer-opponent are probably impossible without Stealth, especially against Soviet Air Defences as they existed in the 1960s and 70s.
 

I do wonder how much cheaper a 600nm radius twin-seat twin-engined all-weather interdictor is compared to a 1000nm radius twin-seat twin-engined all-weather interdictor. Same number of engines, same number of crew, trained to meet the same standards, with the same (or similar) avionics.
Oh, you mean the P.17? Why didn't you say?

Chris
 
Oh, you mean the P.17? Why didn't you say?

Chris
P.17 was supposed to meet the same requirement 1000nm combat radius with 200nm of supersonic dash.

As for F-111 strike radii, Illusions of Choice says the original requirement for the F-111 was 800nm with 400nm of supersonic dash, with dash later reduced to 210nm. The F-111A as built did have a combat radius of 800nm, but only with a supersonic dash of 30nm. Increasing the supersonic dash to 200nm reduced combat radius to 540nm.
 
So, Q: how did UK move from: unaffordability: 50xTSR.2, 4/65; 50xF-111K, 1/68; to deployment of 228xIDS Tornado, 1/7/84-14/3/19?

MoA Mulley, HoC, 10/3/66: at canx. assumed >£475Mn.R&D+50 TSR.2, cf. £125Mn.{+£25Mn.interest}: 50xF-111K; 10 yrs. TSR.2 operation as >£300Mn. >F-111K. UK proceeded with MRCA (prodn. contract 7/76) at a Panavia not-to-exceed Unit price of £3.07Mn. (money as at 5/70). Defence GDP share was 5.5%, 1965/66; 4.7%, 1976/77. RAF's share did not drastically change. All knew better than to surmise cost-of ownership. (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmdfence/494/49404.htm, 20/4/16. Do recognise the non-comparability of scope of all these numbers {gun, ejection seat, inventoried kit, in? no?}, so just take them as rough-order-of-maybe).

A: I don't know. But maybe...: FRG had been in DoD 1964-68 trying to do AVS, so learning some Project Management magic, which they imposed on the collaboration. So: Reliability and Maintainability Panel, Specifying such virtues in-upfront design - novel in UK, who had difficulty staffing such berths. (Fans need reminding that TSR.2 avionics reliability guess was that System MTBF might be measured in minutes” (RAFHS,Jrnl.17B,P170): i.e. no second sortie same day; so AW only; so no need for iron precision, so failure to meet the O.R.).

Other McNamara PERT-fairy-dust included Configuration Control - No Change, Why Change?, deflecting flavour-of-the-month fashion.
But more than all that...people woke up to the Purpose of the Product: one avionic box (we still had black boxes then), Elliott's Stores Management System, was there to put ordnance where it was wanted. Everything else was to support just that.

The Product, in the culture of all on TSR.2, was the Magnificent Flying Machine. Somehow, and I know not quite how, more Tornados could be generated more rapidly by fewer people than would ever have been possible on TSR.2, so we, the User, got more bang for the buck.
 
The nub of the TSR2 problem for me is that it was not a Canberra replacement.

As Labour politicians and other critics noticed, the RAF had got themselves a fourth V bomber.

This, rather than hostility to the Navy, was why the Buccaneer would not do. And indeed it did not. The TSR2 replacement was the Vulcan B2 minus Blue Steel.

It is typically British that no politician had the courage to call the RAF out on this until it was too late.

Just noticed Alertken's useful point about Tornado above.
 
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