British rearmament earlier and more effectively in the 30s

[HoHun]

Hi again,

Well, that was quicker than I expected, though I was right to cast doubt on my memory as I had the tracer/non-tracer positions backwards ... quoting "The Mighty Eigth' War Manual" by Roger Freeman (p. 230):

"Tracer was soon found to be of questionable value as it caused gunners to disregard their sights when using it. Tracer also offered a serious optical illusion, particularly with beam shooting. On the other hand, it had advantages in alerting other gunners in a formation and was also of value as a deterrent to attacking enemy pilots. It became general practice to only use tracer rounds in front and rear turrets where optical illusion was negligible. A brighter tracer round known as 'headlight' was introduced during 1944 and used in these positions in a one tracer to four AP incendiary rounds ratio supply - at this time the combined armour piercing incendiary had replaced the separate AP and incendiary rounds in general usage."

Here's a manual "Flexible Gunnery Training in the AAF", which covers the limitations of tracers starting on p. 126 (by PDF count ... it's p. 54 by scanned page numbers):

https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Studies/1-50/AFD-090602-068.pdf

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I have recently put this quote into a thread on Alternatehistory.com. I've posted it here because I think it's relevant to the topic. I think the last sentences are particularly pertinent.

It is a quote from Page 64 of "Grand Strategy Volume I - Rearmament Policy" by N.H. Gibbs first published in 1976 and is part of the British Official History of the Second World War.

It's the last paragraph of Section 3. "The Ten Year Rule in its Final Form 1928", which was the last part of Chapter II "Locarno: The Operation of the Ten Year Rule, 1920-28", which is one of eight chapters in PART I. "THE DISARMAMENT YEARS".

"The state of the Army was, perhaps worst of all. Field Marshal Sir George Milne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, pointed out in 1931 that ten years earlier the military advisers of the Government had accepted the risk of reductions, even below the modest 1914 standard, in view of the Cabinet decision that a major war was unlikely for ten years. The result of this in 1931 was that the country could mobilise only 2 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry brigades in the first three months of war, compared with 6 infantry divisions and a cavalry division in three weeks in 1914. To make matters worse, stocks and reserves of war material varied considerably and were not properly balanced. 'The Army is pared to the bone', the Chief of the Imperial General Staff declared with some justification. And he added bitterly, 'the only reproach that has ever been levelled at us at Geneva is that we have disarmed too much, and that our army is so small that it is incapable of fulfilling our international obligations'. (86) The seriousness of much of this was mitigated if major war was, in fact, unlikely for ten years. But would any government really get that amount of warning? And when warning was given, would the Government, or the people, be willing to put matters right in the time available? An answer to these questions was to be given soon."

(86) C.I.D. 1046-B

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tony,

Special emphasis needs to be put on the last version of the incendiary round, from about 1944. The old incendiary rounds didn't do any damage when firing at a four-engined bombers because the incendiary charge had already burned out by the time the projectile reached the main tank in the forward part of the wing. The new incendiary round on each subsequent impact generated a new jet of fire. It could pierce about 5 to 7 skins, spars, tanks and such, before the incendiary charge was fully consumed."

I've never heard of that. Sounds amazingly complicated.

The Luftwaffe did use a hydrostatic fuze ( AZ 9501 Flussigkeitszunder) which was designed to function when the round entered a fuel tank, but that's as close as I can get!

I think I found a digitized version of the data sheet for the 1944 incendiary ammunition ... here a direct link to the day tracer variant:

L.Dv. 4000/10; Munition für Fliegerbordwaffen, Teil 10, Handbuch der Munition für Fliegerschußwaffen - Serie H: Munition für MG. 151/20

The German description:

Schon beim Auftreffen auf die Flugzeugaußenhaut spricht die im Zünderkopf eingesetzte Zündladung an, schert den Zünderkopf weg und zündet den Brandsatz im Geschoß. Der Brandsatz sprüht über mindestens 10 m Geschoßweg nach vorn aus.

Im Luftkampf als Träger der Brandwirkung, insbesondere zum Inbrandschießen von Kraftstoffbehältern. Bleibt als unzerlegbarer Körper selbst nach Durchschlagen mehrerer Schotten wirkungsvoll. Soll im Verein mit dem M-Geschoß die Brandsprenggranate ersetzen.

My translation:

"Effect: Upon impact on the exterior aircraft skin the charge inserted into the fuze is activated, shears off the fuze head, and ignites the incendiary charge in the projectile. The burning of the incendiary charge is sprays out the charge forward over a projectile path of at least 10 m.

Application: In air combat as carrier of the incendiary effect, in particular for setting fuel tanks on fire. Remains as non-frangible body effective even after several bulkheads have been penetrated. Is meant to replace (in combination with the mine shell) the HE/I shell."

Interestingly, there are also February 1943 data sheets that describes an almost identical shell, with the only real difference being that the fuze is described as activating even upon penetrating 2 mm of cardboard.

The exact same kind of shell also exists for the MG FF/M, for the 15 mm MG 151, and even for the MG 131. However, for the 15 mm and 13 mm version, there is no 1943 data sheet (at least on that site ... as the sheets are numbered, and the 1944 projectile fits in the middle, I wonder if the collection might be missing an earlier version), so it looks a bit as if the shell was developed in 20 mm first.

The site has a lot of other ammunition-related stuff as well, but as it is built on what I think are HTML paradigms from the 1990s, linking is really inconvenient:

Druckschriften und andere Vorschriften

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[uk 75]

The lack of enthusiasm for a "British Expeditionary Force" was in part a reaction to the horrific losses of World War One. But it also reflected the concentration on policing an increasingly troublesome Empire.
The League of Nations was seen (mistakenly) as a means in itself of preventing war. In reality international agreements such as the Locarno Pact required armed forces to come to the aid of a country facing aggression.
Britain found it difficult to shake off this belief in the League.

 

[tomo pauk]

Unfortunately, with Russia out of question as an ally, UK was left with two choices:
- all but abandon France wrt. actual, military help (meaning that France now has to bear the whole brunt of Germany)
- ww1 redux - deploy best part of their forces (both Army ad RAF) in France on the opportune (or inopportune...) moment.

Option 1 also means abandoning Belgium, that in return will see German forces just across the channel.
Neither France, nor Belgium, nor UK were drawing the right moves in the second half of 1930s, unfortunately, allowing Hitler to slowly but steadily gains ever greater power. By late 1930s, the overmatch of German armed forces against anyone in Europe was too big, and Allies (Allies??) were still very much divided on the question how to parry.
Even after September 3rd.

 

[kaiserd]

Unfortunately, with Russia out of question as an ally, UK was left with two choices:
- all but abandon France wrt. actual, military help (meaning that France now has to bear the whole brunt of Germany)
- ww1 redux - deploy best part of their forces (both Army ad RAF) in France on the opportune (or inopportune...) moment.

Option 1 also means abandoning Belgium, that in return will see German forces just across the channel.
Neither France, nor Belgium, nor UK were drawing the right moves in the second half of 1930s, unfortunately, allowing Hitler to slowly but steadily gains ever greater power. By late 1930s, the overmatch of German armed forces against anyone in Europe was too big, and Allies (Allies??) were still very much divided on the question how to parry.
Even after September 3rd.

This “overmatch” idea/ narrative more exists in Nazi German propaganda and as (self) justification for early Allied defeats than in reality.

By any of the major measures of military and economic power France and the UK as an alliance relatively comfortably out-stripped Germany in 1939-1940.
The UK and it’s empire still had many areas of military and economic superiority after the fall of Franch.
And Germany faced major (potentially insurmountable) issues in a theoretical prolonged struggle with France and the UK.
Hence May 1940 shouldn’t be seen as the unavoidable victory of the far more powerful military colossus but as the throw of the dice by a gambler who even surprised themselves how well it all worked out. Even given French structural and leadership problems it is perfectly possible (even likely) that for more than 50 percent of the time this scenario plays out the German attack gets bogged down and weakens France but doesn’t deliver a knockout blow (a WW1-like scenario, but Nazi Germany in an even worse position than the 2nd Reich was re: sustaining a long war).

Perhaps greater earlier interaction, joint planning and cooperation between the French and UK military (especially their armies) - say continuing certain WW1 arrangements would have left both France and the UK in a better negotiating (or intervention) position pre-war and in a better position to survive and wage it once war breaks out. However it is my understanding that UK and French military links were already rather cordial and close so maybe there just isn’t that much scope for improvement in this regard.

It is not really a case of the absolute lack of equipment or particular deficiencies in equipment that lead to French and UK defeat in May 1940. So the “better” more effective version of rearmament (for both France ad UK) is more about learning how to use these forces and equipment better.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Going back to the Opening Post.

This subject has probably been covered elsewhere but I remain fascinated by it (especially in the light of the Parliamentary vote on Syria).

Could Britain have rearmed earlier and more effectively in the 1930s? If it had done so, could it have either prevented war or defeated Hitler earlier?

Most of the orthodox histories suggest that in the absence of a powerful and effective French army and air force there was little Britain could have done on its own. However as this is the Alternate History thread?

I've come to the conclusion that the answers to the questions in the second sentence of the second paragraph are yes and yes. And that it only needs to be with an earlier start. (Although doing it more effectively would be a bonus.) Simply bringing the deficiency programmes and rearmament programmes of 1934-39 forward one year (with the same weapons and doctrine) would have had a profound effect.

E.g. in the Autumn of 1938 in "This Version of History" the Fighting Services would be at their September 1939 "Real World" strength.

• Fighter Command would have 39 fighter squadrons including 26 of Spitfires & Hurricanes and a better developed radar network while AA Command would be at its Autumn 1939 strength instead of its Autumn 1938 strength.
• Furthermore, the expansion & re-equipment of the Field Army would be at its Autumn 1939 stage instead of its Autumn 1938 stage. E.g. the decisions to introduce conscription and double the Territorial Army would have been made about 6 months before Munich instead of about 6 months after it.

Would Chamberlain have stood up to Hitler at Munich and would Hitler have backed down if he had? Or would the war have started a year earlier? I don't know. However the state of the British Armed Forces in 1938 has been used as a reason for trying to appease Hitler and if British Rearmament had been a year ahead of the "Real World" in the Autumn of 1938 Chamberlain would have had less reason for doing what he did.

In September 1939 the Fighting Services would have been in the position they would have been in September 1940 if war had not broken out.

• The RAF's Scheme L would have been approaching completion and more progress would have been made on Scheme M. E.g. Fighter Command all it's day fighter squadrons would have been equipped with the Spitfire & Hurricane and the Beaufighter would be entering service. The CH and CHL radar networks would have been thicker and development of AI & GCI radars would have been a year ahead of the "Real World".
• The expansion of the Territorial Army from 12 to 24 divisions would be well under way and AA Command would be larger & have a greater proportion of modern guns & fire control equipment. Development of the GL & SLC radars would be a year ahead of the "Real World".

As I understand it an important reason why Hitler went to war when he did was because he thought it was then or never. Germany had a temporary military advantage and he decided to use it before the British & French caught up. If British rearmament had been a year ahead of the "Real World" I think it probable that he would have thought twice about invading Poland and possible that he would have decided it was a bad idea.

In May 1940 the BEF would have had 2 armoured divisions, as many as 24 infantry divisions and as many as 8 army tank brigades instead of 10 infantry divisions, an army tank brigade and 4 "labour" divisions without equipment and more RAF squadrons to support them. That's bound to have an effect on the outcome of the Battle of France.

I'm interpreting doing rearmament more effectively as different doctrine and different weapons. I'm not changing the doctrine or changing the weapons. However, I am starting the development of the "Real World's" weapons a year earlier (in line with the earlier start on rearmament) which I think is possible technologically. E.g. I think the UK had the technology to start the Merlin engine, Hurricane, Spitfire & radar a year earlier and have them in service a year earlier. It also means we get the same tanks but they enter service a year earlier due to the specifications being issued a year earlier. We still get aircraft like the Blackburn Botha & Roc but they enter service a year earlier too.

 

[tomo pauk]

This “overmatch” idea/ narrative more exists in Nazi German propaganda and as (self) justification for early Allied defeats than in reality.

I'd say that proof is in the pudding.

By any of the major measures of military and economic power France and the UK as an alliance relatively comfortably out-stripped Germany in 1939-1940.
The UK and it’s empire still had many areas of military and economic superiority after the fall of Franch.
And Germany faced major (potentially insurmountable) issues in a theoretical prolonged struggle with France and the UK.

This assumes two things:
- simply adding economic capacity to the military capacity means that military capability is doubled (or increased by any arbitrary high %)
- I've said anything about economic capacity

Both assumptions take a truckload of salt to digest.

Hence May 1940 shouldn’t be seen as the unavoidable victory of the far more powerful military colossus but as the throw of the dice by a gambler who even surprised themselves how well it all worked out. Even given French structural and leadership problems it is perfectly possible (even likely) that for more than 50 percent of the time this scenario plays out the German attack gets bogged down and weakens France but doesn’t deliver a knockout blow (a WW1-like scenario, but Nazi Germany in an even worse position than the 2nd Reich was re: sustaining a long war).

Gambler was surprised by weakness of the Western militaries. Netherands and Belgium were side dishes for Hitler, declining to be in any firm alliance with France or UK. French military was in mid-19th century, doctrine-wise - Napoleon was rolling in his grave. French government forbade RAF from bombing the German assets from French soil for crying out loud.
UK decided not to fully comit themselves to the yet another Continentlal war.
Nazi Germany didn't have 2nd front to worry about, the Soviet Union was amicable to them, to say at least.

Perhaps greater earlier interaction, joint planning and cooperation between the French and UK military (especially their armies) - say continuing certain WW1 arrangements would have left both France and the UK in a better negotiating (or intervention) position pre-war and in a better position to survive and wage it once war breaks out. However it is my understanding that UK and French military links were already rather cordial and close so maybe there just isn’t that much scope for improvement in this regard.

An earlier firm stance against Hitler would've helped a lot here. An actual continental commitment - talk British 4-5 brigades and 3-4 squadrons deployed in France by early 1938 might've worked. British not signing the AGNA without French as at least observers, or not at all?

It is not really a case of the absolute lack of equipment or particular deficiencies in equipment that lead to French and UK defeat in May 1940. So the “better” more effective version of rearmament (for both France ad UK) is more about learning how to use these forces and equipment better.

There were faults in the gear available, but indeed these faults were minor when compared with faults in the military commands and governments policies.

 

[uk 75]

Both the British and French General Staffs consistently give politicians gloomy advice on responding to the various crises from Abyssinia through to the Polish Corridor.
In fact the military of both countries are staunch supporters of appeasement. Chamberlain can always count on them to frighten the Cabinet into supporting him.
Churchill had access to more junior officers. I assume he would have rearmed faster along the lines suggested above. But it took the outbreak of war to get him into the Cabinet and the fall of Norway into Downing Street.
There is simply no appetite amongst most of the senior military for even planning a serious war against Germany.
Why? Well most assumed that removing Hitler would simply put the Comnunists in power backed by Stalin. They did not see Hitler as the danger he was.
It would only have taken one senior British or French officer to see the menace as clearly as Churchill and come up with a plan to resist Hitler. But noone did.

 

[EwenS]

........ and a better developed radar network while AA Command would be at its Autumn 1939 strength instead of its Autumn 1938 strength.


In September 1939 the Fighting Services would have been in the position they would have been in September 1940 if war had not broken out.

• ..... The CH and CHL radar networks would have been thicker and development of AI & GCI radars would have been a year ahead of the "Real World".

I'm not sure how you can actually speed up the development of radar for the RAF. Here is the timeline for the development of British radars that I posted up somewhere else a few months back:-

"1934 Watson Watt was asked about the possibilities of detecting aircraft with radio waves.
1935
Jan - Initial funding for the project. Further funding dependent on the success of a practical demonstration.
26 Feb - Successful Daventry experiment with Post Office transmitter and a borrowed Handley Page Heyford.
May - Additional funding allows recruitment of staff for experimental work on radar at Orfordness with Watson Watt.
Aug - Air Staff accept a proposal to develop a chain of stations from the Tyne to Southampton and Treasury funding is agreed by end of the year. Proposal is for 7 stations by Aug 1936 (target missed).
1936
Bawdsey Manor purchased to allow Watson Watt to develop the system further with all experiments transferred from Orfordness.
July - Fighter Command formed
1937
Jan - RDF training school set up at Bawdsey
April - First RDF towers erected at Bawdsey. Trials in exercises produced poor results revealing the need for Filter Rooms.
July / Aug - First Filter Room established at Bawdsey to co-ordinate information from Bawdsey & 2 other stations.
Aug - First trials of the system in exercises.
24 Sept 1937 Bawdsey becomes the first operational radar station in the world.
Nov - production order given to industry for 20 sets.
1938
Aug - more exercises involving Bawdsey & 4 other CH stations then available.

By the outbreak of WW2 there were 18 CH stations reporting to the Stanmore Filter Room plus 2 another independent stations. Plus 24 CHL stations on order, the first of which opened in Nov 1939.


The RN radar story begins in Aug 1935 with orders being issued to the RN Signal School. But given that everything had to fit into a ship there was a whole set of different problems to overcome. (No room on a ship for 4 transmitter and 4 receiver masts several hundred feet tall along with all the buildings and telephone lines to make the CH system work). An entirely different wavelength had to be used to achieve this and initially the wrong one was chosen.


Unlike the RAF the main problem was money to retain the necessary scientific officers. It was mid 1938 before that was resolved. That was about the same time that the first Type 79 sets went to sea in Sheffield and Rodney which were still the only 2 ships equipped on 3 Sept 1939 although more were in the pipeline.


Initial ranges for Type 79 were 30-53 nautical miles at 3,000-10,000ft. More powerful valves in early 1939 improved that to 40-70 miles.

Note that the RAF needed working radar before it realised it needed a whole back room operation to exploit it. It was late 1939 before the RN achieved that. And rudimentary fighter direction began on Ark Royal in May 1940. But with so few sets in the fleet the radar was separate from the direction facilities.


So while the RN might have saved some time, I doubt it would have been able to achieve the same time scale as the RAF."

So the RAF went from zero to having a working new technology for air warning inside 3 years and along the way learned that it wasn't just the radar that was required but the back room facilities to make use of the information.

As for GCI that only became possible once CHL became available to the RAF in early 1940. CHL itself was based on a gun laying and coastal defence radar developed for the Army from 1936. And the Plan Position Indicator (PPI the radar screen we all think about today) didn't arrive until June 1940. The PPI made GCI a much simpler proposition. Prior to that range and bearing data had to be taken from the radar screen and manually plotted with all the dlays and inaccuracies that that involved. The necessity for it really arose when the Luftwaffe switched to night bombing in Sept 1940. By Nov 1940 trial equipment was in place. the first system went operational on 1 Jan 1941 with 5 in service by the end of the month. These were all based on CHL sets. The first purpose designed GCI set, Type 7, became available in June 1941.

Sometimes throwing money at something doesn't speed up delivery of the finished product.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth I knew most of those fine details.

All the "stuff" needed to make radar had been around for some time. A workable radar system was suggested before World War One. (I think it was 1908.)

Therefore, all that's needed is for someone in authority to have the "Eureka moment". E.g. someone asks Robert Watson-Watt "Can you make us a death ray?" a year earlier. This is plausible because the earlier start on rearmament probably means that the D.R.C., Reorientation Committee, et al are set up earlier too.

As you've mentioned the RN Signal School they suggested a 50cm radar in 1931. King George V suggested radar around the same time when he attended a lecture about Asdic.

To be honest I thought pushing aero engine development a year ahead of the real world would have been the hardest to justify.

 

[uk 75]

If the British had used more Matilda 2 tanks in their units they would have had one of the best tanks. Replacing the Matilda 1 earlier would have made a bigger difference.
The RAF light bomber force is hard to change. Neither the Battle nor the Blenheim can survive against German air defences.
At the end of the war Typhoons are able to kill German tanks but by then the Allies had air superiority.
Would greater numbers of RAF fighters in France been able to claw control of the air away from the Luftwaffe?

 

[tomo pauk]

Would greater numbers of RAF fighters in France been able to claw control of the air away from the Luftwaffe?

Mass fighters, radar-assisted fighter control, stock up the bases with AAA (1in Vickers, 2pdr HV pom pom - make these in many hundreds; 3in guns + 94mm guns), and Luftwaffe is in for a surprise. Gladiators need to be bombed-up, and used as short-range bombers. Have the Henleys ready to be shipped in France by mid-1939.
Battles and Blenheims need to be operated at shorter ranges, so the effect of the much greater RAF presence is put to the good use.

Granted, we still have the problem of the French AF not lifting their own weight.

 

[Deleted member 4286]

This subject has probably been covered elsewhere but I remain fascinated by it (especially in the light of the Parliamentary vote on Syria).

Could Britain have rearmed earlier and more effectively in the 1930s? If it had done so, could it have either prevented war or defeated Hitler earlier?

Most of the orthodox histories suggest that in the absence of a powerful and effective French army and air force there was little Britain could have done on its own. However as this is the Alternate History thread?

Aviation week April 1940!