Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

TomcatViP said:
We don't know because there was probably no action done past the dashboard stare.
Just like we can't see trace of those bolts because no tracking action were initiated.

Identical problems...

But dissimilar, or even opposite, press/online media attention.
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The follow-up action is not the responsibility of the pilots. Reporting a problem IS. Apparently they did that. What happens after that is not up to them.
 
Really? I don't think so. Pilots do care of their aircraft like every other responsible professionals care about keeping awareness of their surroundings, especially when they do have, at one time or another, to put their pink flesh and other's at risk.

But that's not the point. The point is that I don't see the intrepid investigative reporters nailing anything in that direction.
 
TomcatViP said:
Really? I don't think so. Pilots do care of their aircraft like every other responsible professionals care about keeping awareness of their surroundings, especially when they do have, at one time or another, to put their pink flesh and other's at risk.
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So WTF are the pilots supposed to do beyond "write it up for maintenance to chase down" once they determine that there is NO IMMEDIATE THREAT to the plane?


TomcatViP said:
But that's not the point. The point is that I don't see the intrepid investigative reporters nailing anything in that direction.
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Because there's no story shock value to "Pilots were told about a noise and following their current FAA mandated training determined that there was no immediate threat to the aircraft, wrote it down for the mechanics to chase down."
 
Oops, somehow missed this (even had it tagged in multiquote). *facepalm*

TomcatViP said:
We don't know because there was probably no action done past the dashboard stare.
Just like we can't see trace of those bolts because no tracking action were initiated.

Identical problems...

But dissimilar, or even opposite, press/online media attention.
Click to expand...
No, very different problems.

"Pilots were alerted to a strange whistling noise. Pilots checked cabin pressurization indicators, saw that the system was still in normal operations, and noted the issue for the mechanics to chase down on the ground or in test flight." There will be an entry in the gripe sheet about this, and NTSB has/should have the gripe sheet. (Pilots have no incentives NOT to write things up in the gripe sheet, other than the sheer time it takes to do so. Most planes get 5-6 gripes per flight.) The fact that there is a comment about the pilots having checked the pressurization system indicates that there was a gripe sheet entry made. The next question should be "what did the mechanics write up in response," but there is NO QUESTION THAT PAPERWORK WAS SUBMITTED.

Now.

The missing bolts. There's only one mark in the paint from a bolt/washer, so there may have only been one bolt installed at Spirit. But that's separate from the issue at Boeing, where there's literally NO PAPERWORK saying either "removed plug for access to internal side of rivets IAW (procedure number)" in a single work order for the rivet rework; or "Work Order #blahblahblah requires removal of door plug for access" followed by "Work Order #blahblahblah requires reinstall of door plug following completion of work" in 3+ work orders for the rivet rework (removal of interference, rivet rework, re-installation of interference). Note that there may be multiple "removal of interference" work orders, depends on how they do the paperwork at Boeing.
 
abcnews.go.com

Boeing says it can't find work records related to door panel that blew out on Alaska Airlines flight

Boeing has acknowledged in a letter to Congress that it cannot find records for work done on a door panel that blew out on an Alaska Airlines flight over Oregon two months ago
abcnews.go.com abcnews.go.com
Boeing has acknowledged in a letter to Congress that it cannot find records for work done on a door panel that blew out on an Alaska Airlines flight over Oregon two months ago.

“We have looked extensively and have not found any such documentation,” Ziad Ojakli, Boeing executive vice president and chief government lobbyist, wrote to Sen. Maria Cantwell on Friday.

The company said its “working hypothesis” was that the records about the panel's removal and reinstallation on the 737 MAX final assembly line in Renton, Washington, were never created,
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At least they've admitted it now. Presumably whichever PR genius came up with "if the door plug removal was undocumented there would be no documentation to share" as a less damaging way to phrase it has been gagged and shoved in a cupboard somewhere.
 
DWG said:
abcnews.go.com

Boeing says it can't find work records related to door panel that blew out on Alaska Airlines flight

Boeing has acknowledged in a letter to Congress that it cannot find records for work done on a door panel that blew out on an Alaska Airlines flight over Oregon two months ago
abcnews.go.com abcnews.go.com


At least they've admitted it now. Presumably whichever PR genius came up with "if the door plug removal was undocumented there would be no documentation to share" as a less damaging way to phrase it has been gagged and shoved in a cupboard somewhere.
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Boeing has also disowned a lobbyist working on their behalf who had emailed Republicans to say that the company was co-operating by providing employee names and claiming the NTSB had only asked for them two days before their testimony, the email went on to throw shade on the NTSB investigation while not addressing the lack of record keeping once. Boeing has claimed the lobbyist email was unsanctioned and admitted it was unprofessional to attack the investigators to try and deflect attention.
 
DWG said:
At least they've admitted it now. Presumably whichever PR genius came up with "if the door plug removal was undocumented there would be no documentation to share" as a less damaging way to phrase it has been gagged and shoved in a cupboard somewhere.
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I'm thinking "made personally responsible for paying the $10k per FAR violation** that their big mouth made Boeing liable for," and then likely fired.

** There's never only one FAR violated, they're horribly recursive like that. If you violate one FAR, you have violated probably 10 others as well.


WatcherZero said:
Boeing has also disowned a lobbyist working on their behalf who had emailed Republicans to say that the company was co-operating by providing employee names and claiming the NTSB had only asked for them two days before their testimony, the email went on to throw shade on the NTSB investigation while not addressing the lack of record keeping once. Boeing has claimed the lobbyist email was unsanctioned and admitted it was unprofessional to attack the investigators to try and deflect attention.
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"Unsanctioned," unprofessional, and likely in violation of the FARs.
 
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WatcherZero said:
Boeing has also disowned a lobbyist working on their behalf who had emailed Republicans to say that the company was co-operating by providing employee names and claiming the NTSB had only asked for them two days before their testimony, the email went on to throw shade on the NTSB investigation while not addressing the lack of record keeping once. Boeing has claimed the lobbyist email was unsanctioned and admitted it was unprofessional to attack the investigators to try and deflect attention.
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www.seattletimes.com

Boeing lobbyist fires off email to discredit federal safety agency's harsh criticism

A Boeing lobbyist sent an email to GOP members of Congress bluntly attempting to discredit NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy's testimony in a U.S. Senate hearing.
www.seattletimes.com www.seattletimes.com

In an email Friday, Kingston wrote “unfortunately, the email inadvertently was sent out by my office
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How the hell do you send an email deliberately smearing the NTSB 'inadvertently'? Is there anyone working for Boeing not currently pointing a gun at their own collective foot and saying "Hold my beer"?
 
Toxic management culture - but that's pretty much par for the course in every facet of management in every kind of industry or organisation these days.
To some extent Boeing probably guesses they can bluff their way out of this. Airlines are still paying for new aircraft - they can't all order Airbuses as they'd have a waiting list 20 years long and no-one else is in the market since its an international duopoly so what can be done? Nobody is ever going to close down Boeing and even if some executives get the chop, they get a nice golden handshake and the money is in the bank, they don't stand to lose personally.
Probably they are more frightened of the shareholders losing money and kicking their arses in return.
 
Hood said:
Toxic management culture - but that's pretty much par for the course in every facet of management in every kind of industry or organisation these days.
To some extent Boeing probably guesses they can bluff their way out of this. Airlines are still paying for new aircraft - they can't all order Airbuses as they'd have a waiting list 20 years long and no-one else is in the market since its an international duopoly so what can be done? Nobody is ever going to close down Boeing and even if some executives get the chop, they get a nice golden handshake and the money is in the bank, they don't stand to lose personally.
Probably they are more frightened of the shareholders losing money and kicking their arses in return.
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Boeing and Airbus futures are safe, whatever blunders they do, as long as they maintain the duopoly over 100 seats+ airliners. On top of that, they have "neutralized" Bombardier and Embraer regional jets atempts at concurrencing them from "below".

Only China could break the duopoly.
 
Voltzz said:
I am sorry if i am misunderstanding this, but are you implying that the MCAS crashes were the pilots fault?
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Yes. In part. The incident did occur with other pilots that landed safely, even completing their flight.

GTX said:
www.seattletimes.com

Boeing admits it can’t find records on the Alaska Airlines door plug work

Boeing admitted in a letter to Congress that it can't find a documented record of the work done on the Alaska Airlines door plug and said no record may exist.
www.seattletimes.com www.seattletimes.com
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DOJ opened a criminal investigation that will cover the true extend of the problem (we need more DOJ in the industrial sector, a sadly deserted domain by justice departments across the world in the last 30 years - People of good intends can do a lot but when the sentiment of impunity is widespread).

www.forbes.com

FAA Issues New Warning Of Wiring Issue On 737 MAX Wing Spoilers

The FAA has published a new proposed airworthiness directive for Boeing 737 MAX planes following reports of improperly installed spoiler wire bundles.
www.forbes.com www.forbes.com

Bundle shaffing induced spoiler hard jams risks roll issue.
 
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TomcatViP said:
In part. The incident did occur with other pilots that landed safely, even completing their flight.
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So now we are talking about which percentage of blame is to be apportioned to the pilots?

Boeing presented the 737 MAX variants as aircraft that could be flown by pilots of 737 older variants, without extensive re-training of those pilots - thus reducing airlines' costs when putting the 737 MAX into service. Events (346 dead) forced Boeing AND the airlines into accepting extensive re-training of pilots as essential to safely operating 737 MAX aircraft.
The four pilots who perished with their passengers and crew were NEVER re-trained. That puts the blame squarely with Boeing management and the authorities who should have checked on Boeing.
If any part of the blame for those crashes is to be apportioned to the four dead pilots, it is negligible when compared to which part of the blame can be laid at Boeing's feet.
 
The type conversion from NG to MAX consisted of hour long slide presentation the pilots could watch on their laptops. Even then the MCAS system was never mentioned in any MAX pilot documentation provided by Boeing apart from the glossary (despite never appearing in the body of the manuals).
 
TomcatViP said:
Yes. In part. The incident did occur with other pilots that landed safely, even completing their flight.
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I presume you're referring to the Lion Air flights preceding the loss of Flight 610. Note that the AoA sensor issue on Lion Air 610, AoA data mismatch due to an incorrectly repaired AoA vane, was not the same as on Ethiopian Airlines Flight Flight 302 - presumed by NTSB to be complete loss of the AoA vane due to a birdstrike. What this means is all the crews involved, across the Lion Air flights that didn't crash, Lion Air 610, and particularly Ethiopian 302, will have encountered different patterns of MCAS activation depending on the precise set of AoAs experienced by the aircraft in the Lion Air cases and for Ethiopian 302 whatever AoA signals the AoA sensor deemed appropriate for not having a vane attached any more. Because the precise patterns of AoA inputs and MCAS activations will have differed, arguing that the initial Lion Air crews managed to avoid disaster, therefore Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302 should have been able to, strikes me as arguing from shaky foundations, particularly in the case of Ethiopian 302.

According to the NTSB's System Safety and Certification Specialist's Report, the Boeing fault tree analysis for the Max flight controls considered erroneous MCAS activation to be a Major failure in Normal Flight, escalating to Hazardous in Operational Flight, and erroneous AoA data to be a Major failure in Normal Flight, escalating to Catastrophic in Operational Flight. The NTSB notes several errors in the fault tree (AND instead of OR combination of failure conditions) that meant AoA data mismatch was not specifically considered in the fault tree analysis, considered too unlikely/covered by other scenarios. If the onset of MCAS activation due to erroneous AoA input was sufficient to place the aircraft in the Operational Flight envelopes, then we have aircrews being asked to deal with a situation Boeing's own Safety Systems Analysis for the Max considered simultaneously Hazardous and Catastrophic, and having been placed there by a system they had not even been told existed. Asking for a perfect response from all crews in all situations (which effectively Boeing's redundancy planning did), strikes me as unreasonably optimistic.


Normal Flight Envelope : Generally associated with routine operational and/or prescribed conditions, either all engines operating or one engine inoperative.
Operational Flight Envelope : Generally associated with warning onset; outside the normal flight envelope
Limit Flight Envelope : Generally associated with airplane design limits or EFCS protection limits​

AoA is a fundamental parameter in determining whether you're in Normal Flight Envelope, Operational Flight Envelope, or Limit Flight Envelope.

See AC 25-7D Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes

we need more DOJ in the industrial sector, a sadly deserted domain by justice departments across the world in the last 30 years
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Historically, there was a deliberate, multi-national move* to exclude law enforcement from air accident investigations because their involvement and investigative techniques, particularly in countries with less enlightened policing practises, caused personnel to lawyer up and refuse to provide evidence due to perceived risks of prosecution. The result was accident investigations that never developed the information needed to reach a conclusion. Similar issues can be seen later with the advantages of CHIRPS vs historic non-confidential incident reporting systems. Going back to the old way of doing things would cause things to go backwards, rather than being an improvement. There is provision for that bar on access to be overriden by the judiciary, but only when “their disclosure or use outweighs the likely adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigation” (Standard 5.12, Annex 13 of the Convention)

There's a comparatively recent case in the UK, the Shoreham Airshow disaster, where the police** sought access to AAIB materials and were specifically excluded from access to AAIB witness statements by the High Court: "In refusing to order the disclosure of witness statements obtained by the AAIB, Singh J, delivering the judgment of the Court, noted the significant chilling effect that the possibility of such disclosure would have on people called upon to provide candid accounts to AAIB investigators, as well as the unfairness involved in disclosing accounts given to the AAIB under their powers of compulsion to the police who, for good and well-established reasons, have no such powers of compulsion." Discussed here.

* Aka the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation

** And then the Crown Prosecution Service, and then the Coroner - police given access to GoPro footage but not AAIB witness statements, CPS allowed to use GoPro footage in the trial, but circumstances specifically noted as unique, Coroner told they couldn't have the AAIB witness statements, specifically because of the danger of setting a precedent and damaging air accident investigations in general.
 

For the portion of the examination focused on Boeing, the F.A.A. conducted 89 product audits, a type of review that looks at aspects of the production process. The plane maker passed 56 of the audits and failed 33 of them, with a total of 97 instances of alleged noncompliance, according to the presentation.
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The F.A.A. also conducted 13 product audits for the part of the inquiry that focused on Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the fuselage, or body, of the 737 Max. Six of those audits resulted in passing grades, and seven resulted in failing ones, the presentation said.

At one point during the examination, the air-safety agency observed mechanics at Spirit using a hotel key card to check a door seal, according to a document that describes some of the findings. That action was “not identified/documented/called-out in the production order,” the document said.

In another instance, the F.A.A. saw Spirit mechanics apply liquid Dawn soap to a door seal “as lubricant in the fit-up process,” according to the document. The door seal was then cleaned with a wet cheesecloth, the document said, noting that instructions were “vague and unclear on what specifications/actions are to be followed or recorded by the mechanic.”

Asked about the appropriateness of using a hotel key card or Dawn soap in those situations, a spokesman for Spirit, Joe Buccino, said the company was “reviewing all identified nonconformities for corrective action.”
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As a QA I can say that using Dawn soap in a process isn't in and of its self wrong so long as the method and result has been validated as resulting in a product of acceptable quality and that once validated as the approved method you then always use the same product that has been validated or validate additional products as acceptable substitutes and that the usage of the products in the process is recorded and documented as it is used.
 
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WatcherZero said:





As a QA I can say that using Dawn soap in a process isn't in and of its self wrong so long as the method and result has been validated as resulting in a product of acceptable quality and that once validated as the approved method you then always use the same product that has been validated or validate additional products as acceptable substitutes and that the usage of the products in the process is recorded and documented as it is used.
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A hotel keycard is pretty uniformly 0.040" thick (not sure about the +-), and unlike brass or steel feeler gauges won't do anything to aluminum.
 
WatcherZero said:
As a QA I can say that using Dawn soap in a process isn't in and of its self wrong so long as the method and result has been validated as resulting in a product of acceptable quality and that once validated as the approved method you then always use the same product that has been validated or validate additional products as acceptable substitutes and that the usage of the products in the process is recorded and documented as it is used.
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Say what you do, do what you say. That's the absolute basics of QA.

My concern over the soap would be whether there's any long term reaction with the material of the seal or door, particularly if it penetrates into the structure. Doubly so as the makers of Dawn soap aren't likely to give it a moment's thought before altering the ingredients, or bother announcing it, while with an aerospace grade product you'll probably be warned (hopefully in advance) if the make-up changes.

You have to wonder whether Spirit's work on other programmes is any better. Potentially so for non-Boeing projects if customer QA is better at auditing their processes, probably not for other Boeing projects on the assumption 737 practices are typical.
 
Suicide...via Ray Donovan?

www.nextbigfuture.com

Dead Boeing Whistleblower Said if Something Happens It Was Not Suicide | NextBigFuture.com

John Barnett, 62, from Louisiana was found dead in his vehicle outside a Charleston hotel on Saturday morning. Barnett, who worked for Boeing for 32 years,
www.nextbigfuture.com www.nextbigfuture.com

www.nextbigfuture.com

Boeing Whistleblower is Dead and Video Evidence Destroyed | NextBigFuture.com

Boeing whistleblower was found dead of a gunshot wound to the head and separately video evidence has been destroyed.
www.nextbigfuture.com www.nextbigfuture.com
 
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Apparently, self inflicted gunshot wound in his truck parked in front of his hotel, while going through days of hearings for whistleblower protection.

Here is a specialized news report from 2 days ago:

www.corporatecrimereporter.com

Boeing Whistleblower Found Dead in Charleston After Break in Depositions - Corporate Crime Reporter

Boeing whistleblower John Barnett was found dead in his truck at a hotel in Charleston, South Carolina after a break in depositions in a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. That’s according to Barnett’s lawyer Brian Knowles. In an email to Corporate Crime Reporter, Knowles wrote that Barnett “was...
www.corporatecrimereporter.com www.corporatecrimereporter.com
 
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"We were already anticipating if [Max 10 certification] came in ‘25, it'd be late in the year," [Delta CEO Ed] Bastian told Bloomberg in an interview Sunday. "My guess is it will be another year or two beyond that."
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www.flightglobal.com

United considering A321neo order as 737 Max 10 certification stalls

United Airlines chief executive Scott Kirby acknowledges that the US carrier is considering a potential order of Airbus A321neos to replace the Boeing 737 Max 10 aircraft it no longer expects to be delivered.
www.flightglobal.com www.flightglobal.com

United’s deals with Boeing call for 80 737 Max 10 deliveries this year, 71 in 2025 and 126 in the following years through 2033. But with certification of the largest variant of Boeing’s next-generation narrowbodies likely pushed into 2025, United recently removed those jets from its fleet plan.

“We’ve asked Boeing to stop building Max 10s for us and build Max 9s,” [United CEO Scott] Kirby says. “If and when the Max 10 gets certified, we’ll convert them back to Max 10s.”
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If?!

During the JP Morgan Industrials Conference on 12 March, Kirby said shifting to A321neos is possible – but only if “we get a deal where the economics work”.
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Comments like these will only increase pressure on the Boeing board from institutional shareholders. The FAA may have given them 90 days to respond, I'm not sure the market will be so generous.
 
Word is Airbus has had a ring round of customers asking if anyone wanted to delay taking their delivery and have managed to free up a sizeable number of slots during the next couple of years that they can tempt United with.
 
Huh. Boeing should be worried, then.
 
Boeing will probably offer some deep discount that will keep them onboard like they did for the huge Ryanair order (allegedly a full 50% off list price selling the planes at below cost) even if they order a few more Airbus in the short term.

After the 29% fall in Boeing share price since Christmas (including a big fall this week) and with Airbus having risen 13% over the same period, for the first time since Airbus became a publicly traded company in 2000 it has substantially overtaken Boeing in Market Capitalization, something it didn't even achieve 2/3 years ago during the MAX grounding when they both had a market cap of just under $100bn and it overtook Boeing in revenue. As of today Boeing has a market cap of $112.4bn while Airbus has a market cap of $136.17bn

www.bloomberg.com

Boeing’s Calamities Push Stock to Its Widest Gap With Airbus Ever

As the troubles faced by Boeing Co. deepen and reverberate through the airline industry, the planemaker is falling even further behind its biggest competitor, Airbus SE.
www.bloomberg.com www.bloomberg.com
 
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One wonders how related is the recent spate of 737 engine problems.

And why the news never mentions the manufacturer of those engines.
 
1635yankee said:
One wonders how related is the recent spate of 737 engine problems.

And why the news never mentions the manufacturer of those engines.
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A conspiracy, perhaps? Involving all media of course.
 
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www.flightglobal.com

Boeing steps up quality inspections as part of initial response to two concerning safety audits

The chief executive of Boeing Commercial Airplanes has laid out initial steps the company is taking to address quality and safety concerns raised by two recent investigations into its 737 Max assembly site in Renton.
www.flightglobal.com www.flightglobal.com

“The vast majority of our audit non-compliances involved not following our approved processes and procedures,” he adds.

Boeing has responded by “working with each employee noted with a non-compliance during the audit, to ensure they fully understand the work instructions and procedures”.
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This does not fill me with confidence. Don't get me wrong, it needs to happen, but it points towards Boeing still treating it as a set of individual problems, not a systemic problem manifesting in the work of multiple employees. At the very least that "working with" needs to extend to anyone working in tandem with the relevant employees, their supervisors (possibly following several steps up the supervisory chain) and relative quality control/quality assurance personnel*. There also needs to be a quality audit spreading out from each of those non-conformances to check whether the issue is 1) systemic across the work team or several work teams, 2) determining whether the issue is work practises not reflecting documented processes or documented processes not reflecting physical reality.

It has also now set aside “time in each shift for mechanics to complete compliance and [foreign object debris] sweeps”.
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In other words personnel were being scheduled so tightly there wasn't time for necessary QA and safety checks. A FOD sweep after reinstalling the door plug might have seen someone asking "Why are there four bolts lying here?", and compliance checks would have demanded they be accounted for.

The report found that “our procedures are too complicated, we change them too much and we can do more to connect metrics to the safety outcomes we want”, Deal says.
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Moving targets are always more difficult to hit, but I suspect it's the metrics that are the core issue. I'll bet they, and senior management's pay and bonuses, are absolutely locked around number of aircraft completed.

“This week, we will deploy our safety management system to conduct new reviews of travelled work within our four walls,”
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This one makes me really wonder how much of a clue they have. Their "safety management system" isn't a few QA guys who can be deployed to look at a problem area, it's everyone in the company, from the shop floor guys in Renton to the C-suite in Arlington, VA.

* I'm drawing a QC/QA distinction because QC is checking processes are followed, while QA is watch trends and modifying processes if need be.
 
BROF said:
A conspiration, perhaps? Involving all media of course.
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Only insofar as the engine maker is a major advertiser, and was once a major media company -- it owned NBC from 1987 to 2013.
 
1635yankee said:
Only insofar as the engine maker is a major advertiser, and was once a major media company -- it owned NBC from 1987 to 2013.
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CFMI is a major advertiser and owned NBC 12 years ago? And hence has control over all media in 2024? Such conspiracy theory should have no place in this forum. On top if what is refered to is the intake de-icing system issue, it has nothing to do with the engine. 737 MAX nacelles are made by Spirit Aerospace.
 
DWG said:
This does not fill me with confidence. Don't get me wrong, it needs to happen, but it points towards Boeing still treating it as a set of individual problems, not a systemic problem manifesting in the work of multiple employees. At the very least that "working with" needs to extend to anyone working in tandem with the relevant employees, their supervisors (possibly following several steps up the supervisory chain) and relative quality control/quality assurance personnel*. There also needs to be a quality audit spreading out from each of those non-conformances to check whether the issue is 1) systemic across the work team or several work teams, 2) determining whether the issue is work practises not reflecting documented processes or documented processes not reflecting physical reality.
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I'll bet the first round at any face-to-face meetup that the documented processes do not reflect physical reality.

The door seals on the 727s were a (expletives deleted) to install. WITH the use of lube.


DWG said:
Moving targets are always more difficult to hit, but I suspect it's the metrics that are the core issue. I'll bet they, and senior management's pay and bonuses, are absolutely locked around number of aircraft completed.
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Absolutely no bet, boss. No way, no how. Not even at a billion to one.



DWG said:
This one makes me really wonder how much of a clue they have. Their "safety management system" isn't a few QA guys who can be deployed to look at a problem area, it's everyone in the company, from the shop floor guys in Renton to the C-suite in Arlington, VA.

* I'm drawing a QC/QA distinction because QC is checking processes are followed, while QA is watch trends and modifying processes if need be.
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Based on stuff I heard over 25 years ago, Boeing had not grokked that concept then.
 
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