Avro Arrow killed in the cradle?

[Apophenia]

Probably reminded him about what it'd look like withdrawing from NATO...



Okay, that does make sense, but in all honesty all three nations should have been flying A-7s for CAS, not trying to make a 3rd World AF armed trainer a ground attack plane.

Yep. I suspect that Trudeau thought that ASW in the North Atlantic was sufficient to meet NATO requirements. Then, likely, someone reminded PET of the cost of the 4 x DDG 280 class just ordered and the cost of replacing all the other DDH/DDEs. Suddenly, air and land forces looked like a bargain.

F-5: Agreed. The Freedom Fighters were not going to fare well if things turned hot in Europe.

Its important to remember that it was the US DOD which selected the Northrop trainer/fighter for MAP funding back in 1962. Doubtless the Pentagon had those "3rd World AF"s in mind. But Canadair was also happy to follow its pre-established Starfighter pattern. Not sure if that joy continued on through the first of Northrop's traditional sue-yer-customer lawsuits.

 

[uk 75]

The UK would have supplied Harriers and Jaguars to support Royal Marines in Norway. Sadly neither plane found any NATO customers (Italy and Spain bought US AV16s).
US Marines would have brought F4s and AV8 later F18 and AV16.

 

[uk 75]

In defence of the F5 buy I suppose the plane needed less infrastructure and pilot training. It was a more agile dogfighter than F4 or A7 at a time when two Sidewinders would go up against Mig 21s and close air support weapons were pretty basic.
The replacement F16s and F18s would not get Amraams for many years.

 

[uk 75]

Canadian ASW should have got long range Nimrods and Merlins or at least more P3s.and SH60s to replace older types.

 

[BlackBat242]

The UK would have supplied Harriers and Jaguars to support Royal Marines in Norway. Sadly neither plane found any NATO customers (Italy and Spain bought US AV16s).
US Marines would have brought F4s and AV8 later F18 and AV16.

The AV-16 was a proposed supersonic Harrier that was never built.

The USMC, Spain, and Italy (along with the RAF) bought AV-8B Harrier IIs (the RAF called them GR.5/7/9s).

 

[riggerrob]

In defence of the F5 buy I suppose the plane needed less infrastructure and pilot training. …. and close air support weapons were pretty basic.
…..

“ … less … pilot training …” in the end, the RCAF mainly used CF-5 as a lead-in trainer for more complex supersonic fighters: CF-101 Voodoo, CF-104 Starfighter and CF-18 Hornet.

“close air support weapons were pretty basic” as in almost non-existent.
One wag complained about the CF-5 having such a small payload that it could barely carry a full bomb-load to the end of its own runway! Hah!

 

[uk 75]

The AV-16 was a proposed supersonic Harrier that was never built.

The USMC, Spain, and Italy (along with the RAF) bought AV-8B Harrier IIs (the RAF called them GR.5/7/9s).

oops old brain gone again

 

[Apophenia]

Canadian ASW should have got long range Nimrods and Merlins or at least more P3s.and SH60s to replace older types.

We're a fair way from Arrows and alternatives here but, yeah, a more rational approach to airborne ASW platforms would certainly have helped. There were two major procurement programmes at issue here.

1) Long-Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) contest to replace the CP-107 Argus; and

2) Sea King Replacement (SKR) programme to replace the CH-124 fleet

LRPA ran from 1971 to 1976. The 'primes' were Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, and Hawker Siddeley. In March 1973, the 'primes' submitted proposals - Boeing 720-ASW (LRPA 'CP-137'); Lockheed Orion; McDonnell Douglas DC-10 LRPA; and HSA Nimrod. Canadair would act as local partner regardless of which submission won the LRPA contest.

Boeing and Lockheed were short-listed with MDC's proposal seen as immature and HSA's as offering insufficient industrial benefits to Canada. The Nimrod bid was hardly helped by HSA's history with the GoC. And the DHC acquisition negotiations with HSA were also fresh on Cabinet's mind. HSA probably saw Ottawa as being overly demanding, the GoC definitely regarded Hawker Siddeley management as arrogant and self-serving.

Of course, HSA brass weren't the only ones. Washington was putting pressure on (through its ambassador) to skew LRPA toward Lockheed (which was in serious financial distress at the time). This was also a better fit (than HSA) with the US-Canada Defence Production Sharing Arrangement. Although Boeing offered all kinds of deal-sweetners, Lockheed was awarded the LRPA contract ... resulting in the CP-140 Aurora (and, eventually, the CP-140A Arcturus. In a nutshell, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was bailed-out and the Nimrod never stood a chance in the LRPA contest.

SKR ran from 1975 to ... well, see rough timeline in footnote [1].

The SH-60 was considered and rejected. The Canadian requirement was for a shipboard helicopter in which crews could stand fully upright when the aircraft was airborne. The SH-60 couldn't meet that requirement.

The British Merlin variant was submitted but, perhaps for GE continuity, DND was more interested in the Italian T700-powered EH101. If you're looking for Brit content, I'd suggest the Westland Sea King (airframe still in production until 1995, IIRC) With 20/20 hindsight, Canada could have swung a deal with Westlands to assemble Sea King as interim replacements for the CH-124 fleet. DND could then have sat back with comparatively sprightly shipboard helicopters awaiting the chopper of their dreams.

_____________________________________

[1] Sea King Replacement (SKR) Timeline and Name-Changes

- 1975: SKR begun as component of Canadian Patrol Frigate project
- 1978: New ASW helicopters calved off from the larger CPF project
- 1985: SKR rebranded as the New Shipboard Aircraft (NSA) project
-- Note that the SH-60 Maple Hawk was a rejected NSA contender
- 1991: New SAR Helicopter Requirement added to the NSA Project
- 1993: NSA winner EH101 (as CH-148 Petrel & CH-149 Chimo)
- 1993: NSA contract cancelled by new Jean Chrétien government
- 1994: NSA rebranded as the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP)
- 1994: Renewed NSARH (CH-113A replacement programme)
- 1998: NSARH winner = utility EH101 (as CH-149 Cormorant)
- 2004: MHP winner Sikorsky H-92 Superhawk/CH-148 Cyclone
- 2008: November; first flight of the H-92/CH-148 Cyclone
- 2010: Sikorsky-owned H-92 begins shipboard trials aboard CPF
- 2010: Sikorsky's late fees (CAD 89M) for a 'compliant' MHP waived
- 2011: 'Interim Maritime Helicopter Project' (IMHP) announced
- 2015: June; delivery of 6 x Block 1 IMHP CH-148 Cyclones
- 2018: June; IOC for the IMHP CH-148 Cyclones
- 2021: November; final Block 2 (full MHP) CH-148 accepted
- 2023: Project closeout for Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP)?

I'm hoping that this close out date is merely aspirational. It would be so much more fun if SKR/NSA/MHP hung on long enough to reach its 50 year golden anniversary!

 

[EB99]

- I hate to say that but RCAF would probably end with F-106s, because NORAD interceptors. Although F-101B might make more sense, because two seats, two engines... and we are back to OTL. Although Phantom is also a match there.

- IMHO the biggest mistake that sunk the Arrow was to dump the MA-1 & Falcons... after 1956 before returning to them by September 1958. Sparrow II was a pipe dream, no way to get even a downrated AMRAAM in the 1950's. It was a fateful 18 months wild goose chase, unfortunately by the era of the Arrow, radars & missiles had became the most costly developments, ahead of Orenda engines and Avro airframe... which were doing well, cost-wise.

-Maybe another mistake came earlier, when they dumped the Avro C-104 delta wing design... which could have been a Canadian a) F-106 or b) Draken or c) Mirage III. Just one engine and delta-wing, seems to have worked well for ADC, France, Sweden. Maybe that was the one and only right way to go ? Only with one Orenda Iroquois it would still have a crapton of thrust. Perhaps hitting the right spot between a smallish Mirage III and a F-106 larger, pure interceptor. Imagine the versatility of the Mirage III but inflated to F-106 size and thrust: could have been a world beater.

Another, of several, mistakes was to build the Mid-Canada Line. This is often overlooked, but the $225M spent to build the 8 sector stations and 90 unmanned radar sites in 1956-57 (not to mention the operating costs until the line was abandoned in 1964) would have gone a long way towards funding further development and production of the CF-105. Released cabinet documents show that the concern over the threat to Canadian sovereignty posed by the all-American construction and operation of the DEW line in Canada's north was the driving factor behind this totally useless expenditure. The radars could not provide accurate speed estimates, so any aircraft flying in the middle of Canada had to be treated as a bogey. And the wavelength used was particularly affected by migrating flocks of Canada geese.

 

[Apophenia]

Another, of several, mistakes was to build the Mid-Canada Line. This is often overlooked, but the $225M spent to build the 8 sector stations and 90 unmanned radar sites in 1956-57 (not to mention the operating costs until the line was abandoned in 1964) would have gone a long way towards funding further development and production of the CF-105. Released cabinet documents show that the concern over the threat to Canadian sovereignty posed by the all-American construction and operation of the DEW line in Canada's north was the driving factor behind this totally useless expenditure. The radars could not provide accurate speed estimates, so any aircraft flying in the middle of Canada had to be treated as a bogey. And the wavelength used was particularly affected by migrating flocks of Canada geese.

Yes, that 1956 CAD 224.5 Million ($2.4+ Billion in 2023 CAD) all came out of the RCAF's budget. Mind you, RCAF estimated costs had only been $85 M - everyone involved seemed to under-estimate the infrastructure challenges in building a line at that latitude.

On the other hand, we only know with hindsight that MCL was a "totally useless expenditure". At the time, the low-energy requirement for bistatic radar probably seemed like a good idea for such remote installations.

An unanswered question is why the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Slemon, chose to ignore the Air Defence Command report recommendation to go with doppler instead of bistatic?

 

[EB99]

Yes, that 1956 CAD 224.5 Million ($2.4+ Billion in 2023 CAD) all came out of the RCAF's budget. Mind you, RCAF estimated costs had only been $85 M - everyone involved seemed to under-estimate the infrastructure challenges in building a line at that latitude.

On the other hand, we only know with hindsight that MCL was a "totally useless expenditure". At the time, the low-energy requirement for bistatic radar probably seemed like a good idea for such remote installations.

An unanswered question is why the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Slemon, chose to ignore the Air Defence Command report recommendation to go with doppler instead of bistatic?

I have read that the Pinetree Line used pulse-doppler, and there was dissatisfaction with the inability to track low altitude targets due to ground clutter. Perhaps that influenced the decision, or perhaps it was better suited to unmanned sites.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Another, of several, mistakes was to build the Mid-Canada Line. This is often overlooked, but the $225M spent to build the 8 sector stations and 90 unmanned radar sites in 1956-57 (not to mention the operating costs until the line was abandoned in 1964) would have gone a long way towards funding further development and production of the CF-105. Released cabinet documents show that the concern over the threat to Canadian sovereignty posed by the all-American construction and operation of the DEW line in Canada's north was the driving factor behind this totally useless expenditure. The radars could not provide accurate speed estimates, so any aircraft flying in the middle of Canada had to be treated as a bogey. And the wavelength used was particularly affected by migrating flocks of Canada geese.

I disagree with that. The Mid-Canada line needed to be done as far as radar coverage goes. The DEW line gives you advanced warning, the MCL would give location after the interceptors launched.

Problem was execution, not existence.

Again. alternatively, you're building airbases up there instead of unmanned radar stations...

 

[Apophenia]

IAgain. alternatively, you're building airbases up there instead of unmanned radar stations...

Yup. And when you see the infrastructure (or lack thereof) related cost overruns on the MCL, imagine what happens to the budget once more RCAF Stations (including their manned radar stations) need to be built instead.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yup. And when you see the infrastructure (or lack thereof) related cost overruns on the MCL, imagine what happens to the budget once more RCAF Stations (including their manned radar stations) need to be built instead.

And since one of our discussed options for allowing shorter ranged interceptors instead of the Arrow is to build airbases Up North...

 

[EB99]

I disagree with that. The Mid-Canada line needed to be done as far as radar coverage goes. The DEW line gives you advanced warning, the MCL would give location after the interceptors launched.

Problem was execution, not existence.

Again. alternatively, you're building airbases up there instead of unmanned radar stations...

The fact that the Mid-Canada line was retired in less than a decade seems to indicate that it provided little value, particularly as it was retired just as the Voodoo was coming into service.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The fact that the Mid-Canada line was retired in less than a decade seems to indicate that it provided little value, particularly as it was retired just as the Voodoo was coming into service.

Again, problem of execution.