AUKUS Treaty NEWS ONLY

Josh_TN said:
I feel the only truly useful deployments would be very long ranged aircraft-strategic bombers, refuelers, recon, and MPA aircraft. The RAAF has an adequate inventory for any kind of local engagement, which would be limited to Y-8/H-6 types and carrier ac for the foreseeable future.
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Not if China manages to gain basing rights in, say, Indonesia. Which would be fully consistent with the way it has deployed the Belt and Roads Initiative to date (Xi Jinping actually proposed the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' element in a speech in the Indonesian Parliament). And over the likely length of the initiative it's certainly a risk. Australia's been here before with Indonesia as a potential Soviet client - which is pretty much why the bare bases are where they are in the first place.

Established US bases in Australia would also provide pre-established forward support bases so that the US can stage through there to support Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Phillipines (And even Vietnam). And those bases become potential targets so need defences, or at least the potential of defences.

Yes, there are obvious roles for long range aircraft, but there's more to it than that, including domestic perception of whether Australia has just become some sort of static CV for the US to use vs China, or whether it actually gains defensively from US deployments against all sorts of threats.

It strikes me that Darwin would make a very interesting spot to base an MPSRON, and while there's currently no immediate threat you would want some sort of air cover in place, because there's definitely more of a potential local threat than there is at Diego Garcia. Meanwhile "appropriate aircraft training and exercises" covers a multitude of possibilities.
 
DWG said:
... Not if China manages to gain basing rights in, say, Indonesia. Which would be fully consistent with the way it has deployed the Belt and Roads Initiative to date (Xi Jinping actually proposed the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' element in a speech in the Indonesian Parliament). And over the likely length of the initiative it's certainly a risk. ...
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Not that I've thought about Indonesia much but it seems unlikely to me that a country its size (~270M people, ~1M in various kinds of armed services, strengthening democracy, decent economy) would see it in their interests to allow any kind of substantial foreign basing in this situation. They've played the nonaligned role during the Cold War so it will be interesting to see what kinds of dynamics come about this time. Not that I mean to confound Malaysia and Indonesia but the region can be "interesting", one example being U.S. Navy's hefty "Fat Leonard" corruption scandal.

I looked cursorily into Indonesia's military equipment and it's bewilderingly diverse, hard to think some streamlining and consolidation isn't in order. While some of their equipment seemed up to date, if thinly spread, of note (to me at least) is their relative lack of air defense radar systems and missiles. Indonesia is apparently engaged in an effort for a "Minimum Essential Force" or MEF to be attained by 2024; I took that to mean that they intend their armed forces to be able to actually believably repel an invasion by that time without just degrading the enemy and then switching to guerrilla tactics.

Not exactly sure how large an investment KFX is to them in relation to all other defense expenditures and investments but quite a lot, in terms of alignment, could hinge on that project succeeding.
 
UpForce said:

Not that I've thought about Indonesia much but it seems unlikely to me that a country its size (~270M people, ~1M in various kinds of armed services, strengthening democracy, decent economy) would see it in their interests to allow any kind of substantial foreign basing in this situation.
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Indonesian politics has completely reversed itself three or four times in the last fifty years - anti-Dutch insurgency to Russian ally to anti-communist military dictatorship to military-focused nationalism with developing kleptocracy to currently a democracy. It's also been militarily expansionist and willing to take on other regional and international powers, cf Konfrontasi. Militarily Indonesia operates a lot of Russian gear and has ongoing cooperation with Russia - such as occasional deployments of Tu-95s on training flights.

It's regional relationships are mostly positive at the moment, but that can change, particularly over a period of decades. It's sitting on one side of perhaps the prime maritime chokepoint - the Straits of Malacca, with unresolved territorial disputes, and all the alternatives run through its waters. So territorial issues are possible as a source of friction, as are internal ethnic and religious disputes - there was rioting against the Indonesian government in West Papua as recently as 2019. The potential for that escalating into repression and international tension can be seen by how poorly Indonesia handled the secessionist movement in Timor Leste, but would be potentially on a much larger scale. And Indonesia-Australian relations have illegal migration as a regular source of friction.

Over the potential timescales we're looking at you have to consider everything from Indonesia imploding as a state - look at the Aceh issue in the historical Sumatran-Javan core of the country in the '90s, to Islamist insurgencies, to secession movements such as in West Papua, to friction with neighbouring states such as PNG, Malaysia or Singapore, to freedom of navigation issues causing tension. If Indonesia finds itself isolated in regional politics, then China, or Russia, would certainly begin to look like a useful partner.

But we don't actually need Chinese bases for these to become a threat, tension with Indonesia on its own would demand appropriate changes in the defensive posture of Australian and US bases in the far north.
 
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In contrast, the Beta version

www.economist.com

What is the point of the Quad?

The loose coalition of America, Australia, India and Japan is yet to prove its mettle
www.economist.com www.economist.com

The Quad remains a work in progress. It has not yet really achieved all that much. It has certainly not stopped China from threatening its members. The promise of Asian vaccinations was predicated on supplies from India, which its enormous second wave stymied. The importance of unofficial “Quad-plus” partners has also grown, as shown in the aukus deal (how it will work with the Quad remains to be seen) and growing British and French naval patrols in the Pacific. But the leaders’ meeting this week is a statement of intent and energy. China’s hardening edge in military, diplomatic, economic and technological fields has given the grouping renewed purpose.

www.economist.com

The Quad is finding its purpose, at last

An informal defensive coalition of four democracies has to prove its mettle
www.economist.com www.economist.com

For the Quad’s new purpose has everything to do with China. Four decades of engagement, say some, have not made China a friendlier state nor moderated its behaviour. China’s competitive edge, notes Lisa Curtis, a former American official involved with Indo-Pacific policy and now at the Centre for a New American Security, a think-tank in Washington, “has sharpened across the military, economic, diplomatic and technological domains”.
 

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GTX said:
Other reasons US fighters and the like may wish to be based in Australia - great ranges to train without restrictions:

en.wikipedia.org

Delamere Air Weapons Range - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
en.wikipedia.org

Bradshaw Field Training Area - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

Shoalwater Bay Military Training Area - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
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Don’t forget though there is this long running legal situation where the native peoples of Australia are trying to claim a lot of this ‘empty’ land back on the basis that there were cheated out of it by the Australian government of the time.
 
Grey Havoc said:
Speaking of the Quad:
www.bbc.com

Modi at Quad summit: The China factor in Delhi's Indo-Pacific strategy

The 'Quad' - India, Australia, Japan and the US - are meeting for the first time as a group.
www.bbc.com www.bbc.com
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I realize everything can't be neat and tidy but this positioning seems quite piecemeal; maybe the realities are different and a NATO like block is impossible around Pacific and Indian oceans but these combinations seem somewhat random nonetheless. India, with its apparently burgeoning "hidutva" nationalism fanned by Modi, is not making things any easier; I'm worried that a mechanistic view of balances and counterbalances between nations will prove irrational and risky here. There are many more conflicts today that traverse our societies instead of separating them.
 
An Aljazeera analyst's take:

www.aljazeera.com

Is NATO in crisis?

The security pact between the US, UK and Australia did not cause a rift within NATO, but it is not helping, either.
www.aljazeera.com www.aljazeera.com

Will AUKUS upset NATO, putting the UK and France, the two leading European allies, at odds? According to a recent article in Global Times, the mouthpiece of the Chinese government, and some observers, the North Atlantic Alliance is bound to take a hit. Indeed, the sharp exchange of rhetoric, the withdrawal of French ambassadors from Canberra and Washington, and the cancellation of a UK-French ministerial meeting on missile collaboration could create the impression of a deepening crisis.

But this is likely only a temporary spat. There are several reasons why a more serious rift cannot occur.

...

What of the EU? France has used the crisis to argue the case for a more robust European foreign policy. The submarine debacle “only heightens the need to raise loud and clear the issue of European strategic autonomy”, read a statement by Jean-Yves Le Drian and Florence Parly, the foreign and defence ministers.


The president of the EU Council, Charles Michel, and Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, have rallied behind Macron too, accusing Biden of following in the footsteps of Trump and his America First policies.
 
Rhinocrates said:
An Aljazeera analyst's take
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A lot of projection and conjecture there, verging on wishful thinking. The framing is all wrong, perhaps intentionally so.

There are internecine pressures within NATO but those by and large traverse its member nations rather than separate them; these pressures are vigorously fanned from the outside and some damage has been done. They manifest differently due to various traditions, social structures, economies, legal systems, political institutions and cultures but basically it's all about democracy vs. autocracy, human rights vs. subjugation, rule of law vs. kleptocracy. It's an ongoing matter as to how bad it will get.

I actually think the reaction in France has been subdued because the putting together and roll out of the treaty was - and forgive me for putting this so bluntly (yet again) - so incredibly haphazard and plain stupid. That, to the French and all other observers, is far more scary than any premeditated malice or one-uppance involved. It is inexplicable, defies analysis and is hard to react to constructively (or defiantly, were that to be in order). France recognizes that the basic premise of AUKUS isn't bad at all (apart from them certainly thinking they should've been involved from the get go) and due to their involvement in Australia and in the Pacific in general had and have a good insight into the evolving environment. Comparing NATO and AUKUS is not only premature, in some very important respects they are "apples and oranges" already and potentially (or ideally) almost entirely complementary.

As to "European strategic autonomy", the main reason it hasn't emerged is that the U.S. has a longstanding tradition of resisting it in deed and not recognizing it in word(-s) (on political, strategic, technological levels) and the EU hasn't been too enthusiastic in defying this somewhat nebulous but persistent policy in practice - even as many EU countries have recognized the growing precariousness of EU's situation in the larger European/global context due to the aforementioned pressures traversing all NATO countries. NATO seems also to be a cognitively interesting construct, as seen from the EU it's a "U.S. thing" and seen from the U.S it's an "European thing". The 2% of GDP defense spending talk from various U.S. administrations/leaders has been something of a school of red herring, usually pushing policies and outcomes idiosyncratic to them and largely unrelated to the direct allocation of said funding and what it's supposed to purchase.

All the while, though, on the professional diplomatic and defense bureaucracy level NATO has been ticking along well enough, though the EU/U.S. dissonances about defense in Europe do contribute to too low a preparedness and overall standing capability (something, that to a degree, is being actively remedied). Some, in recent days, have seen a (gentle but unmistakable) shift in the U.S. allowing EU more leeway in developing capabilities and autonomy. This from Defense One ("Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract", Kevin Baron, September 22, 2021):

... buried inside the joint U.S.-French readout of their call came news of a major policy concession.

“The United States also recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO,” says the joint statement.

That’s big. The part that matters most is the phrase “and is complementary to NATO.”
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It should be noted though that there are many strategic, political and other risks that may well be realized (or pushed to occur by malicious actors) before any sufficiently "European strategic autonomous" capability can be stood up. Even if EU leaders got it together tomorrow to build a truly independent force, it would take the better part of a decade at least. So for better or for worse for the immediate and near future challenges there is no substitute for NATO; at least the professionals within are well aware of that, the occasional blooper aside.
 
Australia would not jack the Attack Class in, unless it had to.

So primary strategic failure here, primary diplomatic failure here is not French, or British or American or Australian.
It is Chinese.

China is driving the increases in military spending.
China is the reason new alliance are being constructed.
China has made itself the threat and blundered around so much that the entire region is as one on the definition of the threat.

So misdirection to blaming others serves no useful purpose.
 
UpForce makes some good points above.

Whatever France may feel about its geopolitical exclusion you have to ask what it could realistically bring to the table.

They were building diesel subs on a purely defence procurement basis - Naval Group (and indirectly the French gov't) would make lots of cash on the order and the RAN would get shiny new submarines, a compromise but the RAN had backed itself into a corner in wanting a bespoke conventional submarine but not wanting to foot the bill for a clean sheet design.

Now the RAN is wanting SSNs, probably from the UK but that could change, and in return for US agreement to part with nuclear secrets wanted increased basing rights and even local basing, throwing in missile technology as a further sweetener. The UK also wants something in return, they might get a local naval presence too and a chance to export AI/cyber technologies. Its not immediately obvious what the UK and US gets back from the technical exchange from Australia, Boeing Australia or BAE Systems Australia are subsidiaries in any case but presumably cyber will be a useful exchange area and they have been tight buddies in intel since 1942.

Would they have offered French nuclear secrets to Australia? Well given the spat between the FCAS/SCAF partners regarding IP issues it doesn't seem likely that Paris would have offered the same kind of technology transfer deal London and Washington have where almost every modern military technology is on the table. Even if MBDA wanted to give cruise missile technology, there would still need to be UK agreement.

Whatever the EU might think about the geopolitical situation what could it offer?
Sure the French have SSNs and MBDA has cruise missile technology to offer. AI/cyber is more unknown, and in any case 'Five Eyes' doesn't let outsiders see its intel - even NATO commanders aren't cleared for 'Five Eyes' material.
The EU might think about local basing but what could France bring? A handful of Rafales at Tindall would be useless for posturing. I don't know if French SSNs operate East of Suez, I suspect they do but like the RN they have a small fleet which makes local basing attractive to some extent. France has one aircraft carrier, that is the EU's sole naval airpower projection asset. Again a local base might be useful but the sole CdG can't stay out east forever.

As the cruise of HMS Queen Elizabeth has shown, NATO allies are involved in providing escort ships. In effect NATO is already doing what an 'EU Navy' could. If the EU wants to do any strongarm geopolitics then its up to its member nations to either do it alone with their national forces or by convincing nations to act under the NATO umbrella. And let's face it, France pulled out of NATO's command structure in 1966, it rejoined in 2009 but it hardly has a history of endorsing that organisation's aims and objectives. The EU integrated military "EU Army" concept always has a whiff of fantasies of creating a French-led NATO replacement.
If the EU wants input as a bloc it has to bring something to the table, diplomacy by trade deals can only take it so far. Either it has to rely on NATO (as it does today) or they need to bring a real military force other than flogging bits of kit to local operators. The Pacific nations can't just rely on popping down to the Supermarché and picking up stuff from the Dassault/Naval Group bargain bin.
AUKUS has given the Australians all the tech access they could have wished for plus the additional security blanket of US/UK ships and aircraft and manpower on its shores.
 
Interestingly it mentions in this article that the Australians will have to pay to exit their contract with Naval Group.
However Australia's defence department on Thursday said the letter, which it said was sent the day before the announcement, included no new commitment.

"This correspondence did not refer to or authorise commencement of the next phase of the programme, which remained subject to the announcement of decisions by the Australian Government," a Department of Defence spokesperson said in a statement to Reuters.

The letter, dated September 15, advised French defence contractor Naval Group that it had formally exited a review begun in January, the spokesperson said. The contract between Australia and Naval Group included off-ramps in which Australia could pay to exit the project.
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www.reuters.com

Australia disputes French version of submarine letter

Australia denied on Thursday an assertion by France that Canberra had re-committed to a $60 billion contract to buy French submarines in a letter sent just before it announced it was buying subs from the United States and Britain instead.
www.reuters.com www.reuters.com
 
Would they have offered French nuclear secrets to Australia? Well given the spat between the FCAS/SCAF partners regarding IP issues it doesn't seem likely that Paris would have offered the same kind of technology transfer deal London and Washington have where almost every modern military technology is on the table. Even if MBDA wanted to give cruise missile technology, there would still need to be UK agreement.
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France passed nuclear stuff to Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and a bunch of others - civilian for sure, but everybody and his dog knows how to go from civilian nuke to military nuke. Israel lost no time (Dimona, cough), Pakistan took a little longer only because India stopped dead in its tracks in 74' for two decades. Iran and Iraq... better not to discuss those ones.
...then again, it was the Cold War.
Counterpoint: Australia is a much more friendly and reasonable country that the aforementioned ones (Saddam O-Chirac... pardon, I meant Osirak - I did not ivented that LAME joke ! nuclear reactor ... cough... Eurodif, Iran, George Besse and the 1986 terrorist attacks plus Action Directe... now that was ugly !)

In comparison with such ugly people, you Australians are teletubbies.
 
Archibald bringing in the Teletubbies may be worse than Macron

Sue Howard and Susan Roberts: Teletubbies downunder: The Australian experience

IZI - Internationales Zentralinstitut - ein Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum für das Kinder-, Jugend- und Bildungsfernsehen beim Bayerischen Rundfunk. A clearing house and information centre for children's television, television for young people and educational broadcasting
www.br-online.de
 
UpForce said:
Rhinocrates said:
This from Defense One ("Biden Just Gave France Something More Valuable than a Submarine Contract", Kevin Baron, September 22, 2021):
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... buried inside the joint U.S.-French readout of their call came news of a major policy concession.

“The United States also recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO,” says the joint statement.

That’s big. The part that matters most is the phrase “and is complementary to NATO.”
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Indeed.

The Economist regularly produces briefings to provide wider analysis and update on an issue. The audio is half an hour.

www.economist.com

AUKUS reshapes the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific

A major submarine deal underscores how the new theatre for great-power competition is maritime
www.economist.com www.economist.com

They reiterate exactly that point:

Placating the French will in part be a matter of accommodating those arguments. In a phone call on September 22nd during which Mr Biden and Mr Macron “agreed that the situation would have benefited from open consultations among allies”, America recognised “the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to nato”. France’s ambassador will return to Washington next week, but the lessons it has drawn will linger.

This is really just what Macron wants. Withe the departure of the UK, France is the EU's leading military (and only nuclear) power, and with Angela Merkel retiring, he has an opportunity to assert French influence in the bloc. Should the UK try to rejoin at some time in the medium future, it will probably meet strong French resistance, which the British government probably knows. Hence, I think continuing and probably strengthening direct support by the UK for NATO.

The briefing also provides an overview of how it affects Australia, India and countries bordering the South China Sea.

Bill Hayton, the author of “The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia”, argues that China’s aim is to establish a Sino-centric world in which client or satellite states in an expanding sphere of influence become compliant. But a penchant for the bully’s stick and a sparing approach to the ingratiator’s carrot has undercut its strategy.

...

The Biden administration senses an opening through which it can simultaneously appeal to asean’s members and reshape the role some countries in the group play in regional security.

...

Some members of asean, such as the Philippines and Singapore, openly welcomed the advent of aukus. As one hard-nosed Singaporean strategist puts it, anything that maintains a balance of power in the region is desirable. Vietnam is likely to approve, too, if more quietly.

This goes beyond military-political power.

On tech America can do things. You can imagine America finding ways to encourage Japan and India to work more closely with aukus on ai, quantum computing and other facets of modern security. Add South Korea and Taiwan, and you have an array of tech nations which would be in a powerful position to set open standards for next-generation technologies, offering countries an alternative to Chinese standards and thereby possibly marginalising it. Not so on trade more broadly... [which is] the big hole in American strategy.

That paragraph reminded me of this article in The Grauniad:

www.theguardian.com

Experts say China’s low-level cyberwar is becoming severe threat

Activity more overt and reckless despite US, British and other political efforts to bring it to a halt
www.theguardian.com www.theguardian.com

Industrial espionage efforts from Chinese actors often closely follow goals announced in Beijing’s five-year plans, Collier added, although British and other intelligence agencies said there was a notable and unsurprising shift in focus to targeting vaccine development secrets at the early stage of the pandemic.

The rhetoric continues to step up. Gen Patrick Sanders, Britain’s most senior cyber general, the head of strategic command, last week accused China and Russia of engaging in “the expansion of warfare into the novel domains of space and cyber” in a speech to a UK defence industry conference.

It was, the general argued, part of a wider ideological struggle that amounts to “an approach that seeks to win without fighting”, a long way, in effect, from the rhetoric of internet cooperation espoused six years ago.
 
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Should the UK try to rejoin at some time in the medium future, it will probably meet strong French resistance, which the British government probably knows. Hence, I think continuing and probably strengthening direct support by the UK for NATO.
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GB attitude toward European construction since the 50's has alternated between destructive and constructive.
No to EEC in the 50's
De Gaulle slamming the door twice in the 60's (our fault there)
EEC in 1973, finally
Thatcher attitude in the 80's (no comment)
Euro denial in the 90's
Brexit, finally
That's... a lot of twists and turns. With a half baked brexit as the final, ugly result.

EU has no revolving door : it's either IN or OUT but not "one foot in, one foot out". Too often GB was in that situation...
 
Here are three further perspectives into the issue.

First, an interesting essay, reiterating many of the notions and themes that have come up here but also coming up with new viewpoints, synthesis and conclusions. I do not necessarily agree with everything (e.g. the definition of "atlanticism" is too restrictive, too sociocultural for my tastes; oblivious to the links between the French revolution and the U.S. war of independence, for instance) yet I found these different emphasis with the writer more inspiring than vexing. So wide ranging, thematically and temporally, that choosing a paragraph or two is almost self-defeating, yet here's one quote:

For all the cattiness of Beaune’s phrasing, which casts London’s eager subordination as something closer to an English perversion than a coherent strategic vision, he is not wrong. The Aukus agreement locks both Britain and Australia into an objectively junior role in America’s developing strategic posture in the Pacific, whatever that might turn out to be. Yet by the time the first of the new Australian submarines are actually deployed, in 20 years time, the outcome of the looming contest in the region will likely already have been decided. After all, American planners expect a confrontation over Taiwan to take place within the next six years. By the time Australia’s full complement of 12 submarines is reached, in the mid-2060s, most of the people now furiously discussing their role in a Taiwan conflict will long be dead, and the geopolitical environment will look at least as different as the world of Reagan and Brezhnev does to us now.

The submarines are not, therefore, the central point of the agreement, which we can interpret as a smaller, tighter auxiliary alliance complementing the role played by Five Eyes in locking the Anglophone defence establishment into the defence of the American-led order, with the wavering Canadians and New Zealanders left to follow their own future paths. As the French defence analyst Mathieu Duchâtel notes, the broader context of the Aukus agreement is one in which, unlike the situation in the 1990s, the US has already lost strategic dominance in the Taiwan Strait and the broader first island chain flanking China, and therefore seeks to establish greater strategic depth through basing options in Australia. Aukus may or may not be a good strategic bet— Australia’s most eminent strategists seem markedly more sceptical of its wisdom than their British equivalents — but either way, it is now seemingly inevitable.
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unherd.com

Now Europe is free of its Anglo problem

Charles de Gaulle would be pleased by the British-American alliance
unherd.com unherd.com

Second, two professors consider current economic and demographic trends in a wide historical context (this is based on a book they're writing) and suggest/propose/posit that in the mid-term China is at least a stagnant if not a declining power. As such it could become less risk averse and push its advantages more readily, risking all kinds of catastrophes. The professors seem somewhat light on how, if the above is knowable, this could yet be avoided (a rapid global phasing out of fossil fuels, sharing scalable solutions for demographic challenges, turning the tables on the rather strict controls the Chinese Communist Party tries to exert on the Chinese diaspora via expat organizations, etc. ?) instead of forging ahead into an unmanageable, comprehensive confrontation. Both professors are, among other academic pursuits, scholars at the AEI which might explain this emphasis on worst possible outcomes but their historic analogies and examples as such, I think, are solid nonetheless.

foreignpolicy.com

China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem

The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the opposite.
foreignpolicy.com foreignpolicy.com

Third, the FP essay is corroborated, in its way in a memoir written by a well connected businessman who is/was used to dealing with the Chinese Communist Party and well acquainted with the rampant official patronage systems and the unofficial corruption and power brokering as well. There's a lot under the efficient and shining hood of "modern" China that remains unobservable to an outsider.

Mr. Shum believes that the majority of the business class is aware of the problems in the system, but few are willing to speak up because the cost is too high.

Many businesspeople have managed to move at least part of their assets abroad, he said. Few make long-term investments because they are too risky and difficult. “Only idiots plan for the long term,” he said.
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www.nytimes.com

An Insider Details the ‘Black Box’ of Money and Power in China

A memoir by a well-connected businessman offers insights into the Communist Party’s thinking as it tightens its grip on the private sector.
www.nytimes.com www.nytimes.com
 
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The former Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull, who oversaw the original deal for new submarines with France, addresses the Press Club in Canberra, Australia, pointing out the political and diplomatic fallout of the Morrison government's decision to cancel the French contract as well as providing some context around Australia's stance on nuclear power and nuclear powered subs more generally.

Sums up the situation very well in my opinion.

Address to the National Press Club - September 2021 | Malcolm Turnbull

<p>With the swirl of media soundbites, the impression has been created that the Australian Government has replaced a diesel electric French designed submarine for a nuclear powered American, or British, one. This is not the case.</p>
www.malcolmturnbull.com.au www.malcolmturnbull.com.au
 
Ok this is political drift.
Australia walked itself into this mess. Yes.
But there were no easy answers to that situation and a choice had to be made.
The process with the Attack Class meant this was the last minute to eject out of program.
And that meant giving it every chance to persuade the Australian Government it was going to deliver.
 
jeffb said:
Sums up the situation very well in my opinion.
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Quite exhaustive indeed and a good read; notable that most of the speech/statement is just running down the (multitude of) facts. Precious little analysis, interpretation or projection needed there.
 
This has echos of the F111 saga in both UK and Australia. A Whitlam style government post Covid slashing of the Defence budget may yet see Australia getting no new submarines.
Equally the RAF may dust off its pre 1967 requirements for long range strike aircraft. B21Ks anyone?
 
The French Foreign Minister still says they were lied to and in light of the comments by Turnbull its hard not to feel some sympathy, obviously trust had completely broken down. Perhaps it was just as well the deal foundered now rather than in a couple of years time.
If France want answers, they are going to have to wait 18 months like the rest of us until Australia decides what it actually wants.
https://www.theguardian.com/austral...lia-of-submarine-betrayal-in-latest-broadside
 
breakingdefense.com

What AUKUS Means For Australia: More Than Nuclear Subs - Breaking Defense

When the United States, United Kingdom and Australia announced their new AUKUS agreement, the major focus was on the path for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the first time. But that headline aside, there is much more to the agreement, which could represent a major shift in...
breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com
 
Hood said:
The French Foreign Minister still says they were lied to and in light of the comments by Turnbull its hard not to feel some sympathy, obviously trust had completely broken down. Perhaps it was just as well the deal foundered now rather than in a couple of years time.
If France want answers, they are going to have to wait 18 months like the rest of us until Australia decides what it actually wants.
https://www.theguardian.com/austral...lia-of-submarine-betrayal-in-latest-broadside
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The trust break down appears to be all on the Australian side, their own department of defence didn't know what was coming and was approving and officially moving the project forward --on the day it was cancelled--!

Turnbull makes some good points too about what it means to lack the industrial base to maintain the nuclear power technology you've installed in your subs and how dependent that must make you on the suppliers of that technology.

To summarize AUKUS:
  1. Australia has now moved much, much closer to the US both diplomatically and militarily. It has trashed it's reputation with the EU (a major trading partner), with China (its largest trading partner), insulted a European ally that has territory and 2 million citizens in the South Pacific and put a large question mark over it's own head with regards to the rest of it's nearest neighbors.
  2. It now has no plans for a Collins class replacement beyond a vague (and technologically fraught) intent to consider a nuclear powered option in the future.
  3. It has agreed to base US strategic military aircraft and provide support and resupply facilities for US and UK naval assets on its territory (effective immediately).

I'd argue that it's actually the Australian equivalent of Brexit, a process that has done a similar job on the UK, but that's a discussion for another time.
 
However tactless or insensitive the Australian government may have been in handling this issue the facts remain:

China is building a large naval and air presence with a proven track record of using it to bully regional powers.

The SSN is the most effective counter to such activity. The US and UK have a much deeper capability in this area than France.

The European countries have displayed little appetite for spending money or people to defend countries outside their geographical area. The US remains the only power able to counter Chinese military ambitions.
 
To summarize AUKUS:

  1. Australia has now moved much, much closer to the US both diplomatically and militarily. It has trashed it's reputation with the EU (a major trading partner), with China (its largest trading partner), insulted a European ally that has territory and 2 million citizens in the South Pacific and put a large question mark over it's own head with regards to the rest of it's nearest neighbors.
  2. It now has no plans for a Collins class replacement beyond a vague (and technologically fraught) intent to consider a nuclear powered option in the future.
  3. It has agreed to base US strategic military aircraft and provide support and resupply facilities for US and UK naval assets on its territory (effective immediately).
Click to expand...

Harsh, but true - I would say in the near-term. Long term, Australia will probably benefit from it. There is a certain logic behind moving closer from the USA when China becomes a major threat in the Pacific.

I would say that, while France has 2 million citizens on scattered islands across the South Pacific as bases for the French Navy;
- the USA have 330 million inhabitants and a 2000 km long Pacific coast, plus Hawaii, plus Guam, where they can base their enormous fleet. Plus Japan and South Korea allies. French Navy is peanuts, compared to that. That's probably Scott Morrison cynical but "realpolitik" calculations when going from Barracudas to AUKUS.
Although a case can be make he probably botched the job like a pig, and it will cost him in the next few years.

As for Turnbull... if he is the PM who negociated the Barracuda deals back in 2014-2016; and if he is from the political opposition to Morrison (excuse my absolute ignorance of Australian politics)
- then no surprise he feels angered by the deal going into the wall the way it did.
It is a bit of his legacy that is going down the drain now.
I would be cautious about Turnbull feelings if only because of the two points above.
He was the deal maker back then, and he lost to Morrison: two good reasons to be a little angry.
 
Archibald said:
As for Turnbull... if he is the PM who negociated the Barracuda deals back in 2014-2016; and if he is from the political opposition to Morrison (excuse my absolute ignorance of Australian politics)
Click to expand...
Actually, Turnbull was Morrison’s boss, and has good reason to believe that he was stabbed in the back by Morrison in a party coup… so yes a lot of bad blood there.

www.abc.net.au

Turnbull says 'political operator' Morrison likely working behind scenes in leadership spill

Malcolm Turnbull says Scott Morrison likely played a double game during the Liberal Party leadership turmoil that saw Mr Turnbull ousted as prime minister.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
 
I agree with the above assessment. There didn’t seem to be any reason to be so deceptive. Simply state your concerns and pull out if necessary. But I also agree that long term it probably won’t significantly ding Australia and that a closer US relationship is in Australia’s interest.
 
As as I can remember, last time France blew such tantrum related to failed military contracts was when then-unfortunate Rafale endured a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of late-generation F-16s, first; then the F-35s itself.
That was before Egypt broke the deadlock early 2015: in the 2002-2012 era.
- Netherlands 2002: ugly.
- Marocco taking F-16s in 2007 was not very pretty either.
- India 126 Rafales deal that went nowhere: very ugly, partially salvaged since then.
Wikipedia must have a list somewhere (of course they have one !)
en.wikipedia.org

Dassault Rafale - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

Note that the 2006-2011 failures were found to be lack of communication and backing by the French government toward Dassault.

Naval Group (unlike Dassault) is largely owned by the French government (2-3rd or more) but failed in Australia as badly as the Rafale did in its dark days in the late 2000's.
As far as "big and juicy military contracts" are concerned, these two setbacks are comparable in size, losses, and damage.

Submarines and combat aircraft are elite technological areas that also cost an arm and a leg to keep alive and up-to-date - public money and private money altogether.

Bottom line: France resources are limited. Staying at the vanguard of so many advanced tech areas, civilians and military, is damn expensive.
(EPR, is that thou ? TGV ? )

Had the Rafale failed to sell outside France, it would have either sunk Dassault... (no, bizjets are not enough: not with the 2008 and 2020 monster crisis, nearly back to back) - or the French Government military budget; as the AdA and Aéronavale would have had to bore the brunt of Rafale cost all alone.

I suppose that non-nuclear Barracudas to Australia were seen as a rather inesperate way of slightly reducing the huge cost burden of the French Navy Barracudas; sharing it with someone else, for once - something the Rubis failed to do with Canada 30 years ago.

Combat aircraft are hard to sell, but nuclear subs...
 
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Archibald said:
As as I can remember, last time France blew such tantrum related to failed military contracts was when then-unfortunate Rafale endured a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of late-generation F-16s, first; then the F-35s itself.
That was before Egypt broke the deadlock early 2015: in the 2002-2012 era.
- Netherlands 2002: ugly.
- Marocco taking F-16s in 2007 was not very pretty either.
- India 126 Rafales deal that went nowhere: very ugly, partially salvaged since then.
Wikipedia must have a list somewhere (of course they have one !)
en.wikipedia.org

Dassault Rafale - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org

Note that the 2006-2011 failures were found to be lack of communication and backing by the French government toward Dassault.

Naval Group (unlike Dassault) is largely owned by the French government (2-3rd or more) but failed in Australia as badly as the Rafale did in its dark days in the late 2000's.
As far as "big and juicy military contracts" are concerned, these two setbacks are comparable in size, losses, and damage.

Submarines and combat aircraft are elite technological areas that also cost an arm and a leg to keep alive and up-to-date - public money and private money altogether.

Bottom line: France resources are limited. Staying at the vanguard of so many advanced tech areas, civilians and military, is damn expensive.
(EPR, is that thou ? TGV ? )

Had the Rafale failed to sell outside France, it would have either sunk Dassault... (no, bizjets are not enough: not with the 2008 and 2020 monster crisis, nearly back to back) - or the French Government military budget; as the AdA and Aéronavale would have had to bore the brunt of Rafale cost all alone.

I suppose that non-nuclear Barracudas to Australia were seen as a rather inesperate way of slightly reducing the huge cost burden of the French Navy Barracudas; sharing it with someone else, for once - something the Rubis failed to do with Canada 30 years ago.

Combat aircraft are hard to sell, but nuclear subs...
Click to expand...
You wouldn't want to be on commission, that's for sure!
 

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