Alternative fighter for Argentine AF & Navy during Falklands war.

MiG-21MF/bis vs Sea Harriers ?

  • Sea Harriers would have complete air superiority.

  • Sea Harriers would have had some losses.

  • Sea Harriers would have been blasted out of the sky.

  • None of the two aircraft would have gained air superiority.

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H_K said:
What kind of radar were they planning to use for target designation?

Yes, which is exactly why I explained earlier in this thread that the choice for Port Stanley had to be for quality over quantity - ie. the best fighter-bomber that could operate from the short runway in limited numbers (6-8 max) and tough conditions.

… a carrier based aircraft being inherently well suited to these constraints.
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What is the inventory of Argentine aircraft on the islands?
 
If, during the Falklands War, the Argentine fleet had gone to sea, led by ARA 25 de Mayo, to meet the British fleet, would it have been able to provide effective ASW protection ? Particularly with S-2 Trackers.
 
F.L. said:
If, during the Falklands War, the Argentine fleet had gone to sea, led by ARA 25 de Mayo, to meet the British fleet, would it have been able to provide effective ASW protection ? Particularly with S-2 Trackers.
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Doubtful; the speed and radio silence would probably be the better protection.
 
I always wondered why the Argentines didnt use cannon equipped aircraft to strafe the thinly armoured ships and their fragile sensors. Pucaras and Aermacchis could have done a lot of damage this way.
 
uk 75 said:
I always wondered why the Argentines didnt use cannon equipped aircraft to strafe the thinly armoured ships and their fragile sensors. Pucaras and Aermacchis could have done a lot of damage this way.
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I know at least some Skyhawks did use their cannon as well as bombs.
 
F.L. said:
If, during the Falklands War, the Argentine fleet had gone to sea, led by ARA 25 de Mayo, to meet the British fleet, would it have been able to provide effective ASW protection ? Particularly with S-2 Trackers.
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F.L.
Against SSK, yes probably. Not for SSN.
 
uk 75 said:
I always wondered why the Argentines didnt use cannon equipped aircraft to strafe the thinly armoured ships and their fragile sensors. Pucaras and Aermacchis could have done a lot of damage this way.
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uk 75:
The A-4 and Dagger in her runs before drops her bomb use her 20mm (A-4 Colt - i think-) and 30mm on the Dagger.
The the only attack on ships of the MB339 (Crippa) use UZI rockets an her gun
 
A remote possibility perhaps, but Venezuela comes to mind.. If Argentina had had a Chavez instead of a Peron and moved to the left of the Nonaligned movement, the Soviet Union might have become a generous weapons supplier.
Argentina in 1982 with Tu16 Badgers and ASM together with Mig 23 and 27 tactical fighters might have been more than a handful of Sea Harriers could cope with.
Il38s and Kamov helos could have made life harder for RN SSNs.
 
uk 75 said:
A remote possibility perhaps, but Venezuela comes to mind.. If Argentina had had a Chavez instead of a Peron and moved to the left of the Nonaligned movement, the Soviet Union might have become a generous weapons supplier.
Argentina in 1982 with Tu16 Badgers and ASM together with Mig 23 and 27 tactical fighters might have been more than a handful of Sea Harriers could cope with.
Il38s and Kamov helos could have made life harder for RN SSNs.
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On the other hand, Argentina as a Soviet client would probably find itself severely constrained -- the Soviets would not be enthusiastic about having them in direct conflict with the UK. And conversely, the US would have none of the internal debate above support to the UK. It would be full-throated and much more overt.
 
TomS said:
On the other hand, Argentina as a Soviet client would probably find itself severely constrained -- the Soviets would not be enthusiastic about having them in direct conflict with the UK. And conversely, the US would have none of the internal debate above support to the UK. It would be full-throated and much more overt.
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Likely to the tune of "CVN battlegroup shows up with a pair of MEUs that 'happened' to be in the area."

IIRC, the debate over assisting the UK was over Monroe Doctrine points, that the US considered North and South America "our" turf, and would stomp any part of Europe trying to interfere. But with a USSR-backed Argentina, the UK could easily make a NATO Article 5 call.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Likely to the tune of "CVN battlegroup shows up with a pair of MEUs that 'happened' to be in the area."
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I suspect at that point the UK might ask the US to calm down a bit. Appearing to take a minor role in a US task force to recover UK territory wouldn't be the kind of image the UK would want to project.

An MEU in place of the Guards and more intense US logistic support would certainly be appreciated. I'm not sure what additional bases might be available, but bigger, longer-ranged aircraft would probably help. The carrier battle group (at that point in time, probably not a CVN!) would probably be desirable, especially if the Soviet-backed Argentine forces present a stronger air threat, though I expect ROE would prevent attacks on the Argentine mainland.

Although at that point, the Dutch Marines are likely to come along for the ride too. Supposedly in OTL they had started recalling leave in preparation war, and had to be stood down.

I'd guess you then slot the USMC into 3 Commando Brigade alongside the Korps Mariniers, and land five battalions of Marines. 5 Infantry Brigade is then the Paras and Gurkhas as normal. The Guards stay at home and practice formation walking.
 
F.L. said:
If, during the Falklands War, the Argentine fleet had gone to sea, led by ARA 25 de Mayo, to meet the British fleet, would it have been able to provide effective ASW protection ? Particularly with S-2 Trackers.
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My friend,

The Argentines launched into the sea with two task forces:

The first to the north with its aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo and the second at the same time and in a pincer movement to the South of the Islands with the Cruiser General Belgrano.

The Argentine aircraft carrier managed to reach the launch distance of its planes. He also had the advantage of having first located the British task force to the northwest with his S2T Tracker. Woodward was informed that his escorts had identified that they were illuminated by a Tracker and that therefore the enemy aircraft carrier was in the vicinity... he was also being informed by the submarine HMS Conqueror, which was following the Belgrano to the south, and realized the danger of the movement in pinca, which is why he went ahead and authorized the attack on Belgrano regardless of London's authorization. He realizes that the Argentinian Aircraft Carrier set sail, approached and just didn't launch because its propulsion was compromised and it couldn't make the original 23 knots and suddenly, the sea was calm. This resulted in the ship not being able to generate enough wind at that time to launch the A4 with 4 bombs....at most, with a single bomb and the statistical analysis demonstrated that it would be unfeasible....they gave up and returned to the port, even, as news arrived that the Belgrano was hit to the south....Woodward also ordered a harrier to go to the probable location of the Argentine task for clarification and returned confirming that it was illuminated by a radar that checked the characteristics, by one of the escorts of the Argentinian Aircraft Carrier....but then, the skirmish was already dismantled and the battle did not occur. However, it is extremely important to note that this did not occur due to the obsolescence of the Argentine aircraft carrier that arrived so close, was the first to locate, had the advantage of the first attack and initiative, but was unable to launch the planes.
 
carvalho2008 said:
However, it is extremely important to note that this did not occur due to the obsolescence of the Argentine aircraft carrier that arrived so close, was the first to locate, had the advantage of the first attack and initiative, but was unable to launch the planes.
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Very interesting, mate ! :cool:
What is your source(s) ?
 
F.L. said:
Very interesting, mate ! :cool:
What is your source(s) ?
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The story of the 25th De Mayo and Argentinian AS operations in the Falklands War was published in this book in 2019 that drew on both British and Argentinian sources, including the aircrew involved.


It includes details of the Argentinian Tracker & Sea King ASW operations. These included both sides being aware of a sub from a third unidentified nation.

This book is part of the “Latin America at War” series and is one of a number covering aspects of the Falklands War.

“Handbrake!” On Super Etendard operations

“Skyhawks over the South Atlantic”

Skyhawks over the South Atlantic: The Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas/Falklands War 1982 (Latin America@War): Amazon.co.uk: Rivas, Santiago: 9781912866397: Books

Buy Skyhawks over the South Atlantic: The Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas/Falklands War 1982 (Latin America@War) by Rivas, Santiago (ISBN: 9781912866397) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.
www.amazon.co.uk

“All for one, one for all”

An Island Too Far: Argentine Navy... by Boveda, Jorge

Buy An Island Too Far: Argentine Navy Operations during the Falklands/Malvinas War (Latin America@War) by Boveda, Jorge (ISBN: 9781914059193) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.
www.amazon.co.uk

“Go find him and bring me back his hat” RN ASW operations
 
carvalho2008 said:
He realizes that the Argentinian Aircraft Carrier set sail, approached and just didn't launch because its propulsion was compromised and it couldn't make the original 23 knots and suddenly, the sea was calm.
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Does this photo was taken at this moment ?
Argentine Navy A-4Q (3-A-305) on 25 de Mayo (1982).jpg
 
And there was another British nuclear sub closely following the 25 de Mayo. Almost got in position to sink it a couple of times (from memory).
 
This topic will always fall back on the MB 326 or 339 as the most viable option and with reasonable combat capacity, whether in the land or anti-ship environment. All other options involve alternatives that would need to change the Argentine reality at that time.

If I had the money and budget I would have better planes and missiles than the A4. She didn't have it.

Other alternative suppliers also did not work, as it was a dictatorship that fought against communist insurrections.

In other words, so many changes that would require being another nation with other relationships...
 
Yellow Palace said:
I suspect at that point the UK might ask the US to calm down a bit. Appearing to take a minor role in a US task force to recover UK territory wouldn't be the kind of image the UK would want to project.
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True enough. Probably just one MEU and a carrier group, if we're talking about a Soviet-backed Argentinian government.

Yellow Palace said:
An MEU in place of the Guards and more intense US logistic support would certainly be appreciated. I'm not sure what additional bases might be available, but bigger, longer-ranged aircraft would probably help. The carrier battle group (at that point in time, probably not a CVN!) would probably be desirable, especially if the Soviet-backed Argentine forces present a stronger air threat, though I expect ROE would prevent attacks on the Argentine mainland.

Although at that point, the Dutch Marines are likely to come along for the ride too. Supposedly in OTL they had started recalling leave in preparation war, and had to be stood down.

I'd guess you then slot the USMC into 3 Commando Brigade alongside the Korps Mariniers, and land five battalions of Marines. 5 Infantry Brigade is then the Paras and Gurkhas as normal. The Guards stay at home and practice formation walking.
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I was assuming a CVN group (with nuclear escorts) would be able to redeploy faster, though any carrier group would be going around the Horn instead of through the Panama Canal. The MEU would be whoever was doing a UNITAS tour around South America with the Brazilians etc.
 
Argentina could become a non aligned nation like India and be able to buy Soviet ships and aircraft.
The Non Aligned Movement were very anti colonial in the 60s. I can imagine Washington seeing the Malvinas as another Suez crisis.
 
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carvalho2008 said:
This topic will always fall back on the MB 326 or 339 as the most viable option and with reasonable combat capacity, whether in the land or anti-ship environment.
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For me, the best realistic solution is more Super Étendards and many more exocets !
 
F.L. said:
For me, the best realistic solution is more Super Étendards and many more exocets !
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Without a doubt the Super Etendard is much better... and exocets would be magnificent... but the alternative story falls into this... why wasn't there the number and quantity? because they didn't have a budget....if they barely got what little they had...how could they have more? This is why I insist on the MB-326... it was something applicable within regional supplier alliances and within the budget... at the same time, despite being less capable, it is so flexible that it allows operating in terrible conditions, precisely the problem of small economies and not so well organized structures...
 
The contracts signed by Argentina on 10 Sept 1979 provided for the French to supply:-
14 Super Etendard aircraft
10 AM-39 air launched Exocet ASM
84 R550 Magic AAM
A flight simulator
Spares for 4,000 flying hours, tools & testbeds
Tech assistance to operate the aircraft and weapons.
Training package with Marine Nationale

The intention was to have 7 aircraft deployed on the carrier (2 flights of 3 plus a spare) with the other 7 in maintenance or preserved. (In 1982 the 25th De Mayo was only operating about 6 A-4 Skyhawks IIRC).

The SE required to be updated with ULISS 80 Inertial Control Unit free of US tech that was then embargoed for Argentina and updated Martin Baker SMB Mk.6T ejection seats.

Technical crew training began in France in Aug 1980 with pilot training starting that Nov. Contractually it was to be carried out on the Argentinian SE the first 5 of which were delivered by 1 April 1981. Those first 5 aircraft, with 5 Exocets, 20 R550, tools and equipment arrived in Argentina by ship on 18 Nov 1981. However at that point work was still required by a team of Aerospatiale technicians to fit the Exocets to the airframes and this was not supposed to happen before 10 April 1982. That work was in fact carried out by Argentinian personnel with the help of 3 French technicians from 9 April and was completed by afternoon on 11 April on 4 aircraft (the 5th was being held back as a hangar queen to supply spares to the others if required).

The French arms embargo on supplies to Argentina put in place in April 1982 was lifted on 6 Aug 1982. Despite British protests via diplomatic channels the remaining 9 aircraft were shipped to Argentina, arriving in Dec 1982. The remaining 5 AM-39 Exocets were flown to Argentina 20/21 Nov 1982.

SE carrier operations began on 18 April 1983
 
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To operat from the Islands, I think the the MB339, was a good options.
For what its call " close air support"
For antiship role, I think -my opinion only- I prefer the A-4. In my case the A-4C version (2 pylons more in the wing).
Few of the C have the Omega system; I believe that is is a navigation system.
I put before, give more A-4 (for the FAA) in equal number of Dagger, and 1/2 KC-130.
More range and with the AAR, the can use different routes to approach the Islands. The M-5 have 1 or 2 routes
Of course, appropriate fuzes for bomb or suitable bomb for anti ship role (Snake Eyes)
Its much, but not much more
Just to remember that the A-4Q has problems with the wing spar, or the other A-4 -in many cases- the ejection seat cartridges were expired.
The SUE is ideal for ASM, but the AM-39 is for open waters. When you have the ships in the the San Carlos strait, you need bombs.
Lets say that all the A-4 use that configuration
1700916531537.png
COAN and FAA

Not that
1700916645493.png
or that
1700916683468.png
 
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Scott Kenny said:
I was assuming a CVN group (with nuclear escorts) would be able to redeploy faster
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I had a look - at that point, the EISENHOWER was in the Med with two nuclear escorts. My guess is that they'd deploy to the South Atlantic. Though this is only a month or two before the FORRESTAL and INDEPENDENCE sailed at short notice for Lebanon. It's possible that either of those could be deployed instead.
 
alejandrogrossi said:
To operat from the Islands, I think the the MB339, was a good options.
For what its call " close air support"
For antiship role, I think -my opinion only- I prefer the A-4. In my case the A-4C version (2 pylons more in the wing).
Few of the C have the Omega system; I believe that is is a navigation system.
I put before, give more A-4 (for the FAA) in equal number of Dagger, and 1/2 KC-130.
More range and with the AAR, the can use different routes to approach the Islands. The M-5 have 1 or 2 routes
Of course, appropriate fuzes for bomb or suitable bomb for anti ship role (Snake Eyes)
Its much, but not much more
Just to remember that the A-4Q has problems with the wing spar, or the other A-4 -in many cases- the ejection seat cartridges were expired.
The SUE is ideal for ASM, but the AM-39 is for open waters. When you have the ships in the the San Carlos strait, you need bombs.
Lets say that all the A-4 use that configuration
View attachment 712482
COAN and FAA

Not that
View attachment 712483
or that
View attachment 712484
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For the A4 to operate from the islands, there is a prerequisite that the runway needs to be lengthened. This is the problem, it has to be an aircraft that dispenses with as many prerequisites as possible. All other models require a series of other measures or accessory weapons, creating an alternative reality that is increasingly distant from the real one. In the MB-326 case, it would be enough for Argentina years before to follow the path of Brazil, South Africa or Australia in this type of basic investment, contrary to the path adopted by the IA63 Pucara. The effectiveness would be absurdly greater.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Likely to the tune of "CVN battlegroup shows up with a pair of MEUs that 'happened' to be in the area."

IIRC, the debate over assisting the UK was over Monroe Doctrine points, that the US considered North and South America "our" turf, and would stomp any part of Europe trying to interfere. But with a USSR-backed Argentina, the UK could easily make a NATO Article 5 call.
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Possibly, but it was likely more that Argentina's military dictatorship was an active ally in anti-communist efforts in Latin America. If I recall, Kirkpatrick was livid that the US gave any support to the UK.
 
carvalho2008 said:
For the A4 to operate from the islands, there is a prerequisite that the runway needs to be lengthened. This is the problem, it has to be an aircraft that dispenses with as many prerequisites as possible. All other models require a series of other measures or accessory weapons, creating an alternative reality that is increasingly distant from the real one. In the MB-326 case, it would be enough for Argentina years before to follow the path of Brazil, South Africa or Australia in this type of basic investment, contrary to the path adopted by the IA63 Pucara. The effectiveness would be absurdly greater.
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So, Argentina's best option may be to buy Harriers?
 
1635yankee said:
So, Argentina's best option may be to buy Harriers?
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If it didn't have a budget that would allow it to operate top-notch fighters better than daggers and A4s, do you think it was feasible to buy and operate Harriers in Argentina?
 
1635yankee said:
Possibly, but it was likely more that Argentina's military dictatorship was an active ally in anti-communist efforts in Latin America. If I recall, Kirkpatrick was livid that the US gave any support to the UK.
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Agreed that a Soviet-backed Argentinian government is highly unlikely.

And as is I'm wondering why the UK didn't make it an Article 5 issue for more overt US help.
 
carvalho2008 said:
For the A4 to operate from the islands, there is a prerequisite that the runway needs to be lengthened. This is the problem, it has to be an aircraft that dispenses with as many prerequisites as possible. All other models require a series of other measures or accessory weapons, creating an alternative reality that is increasingly distant from the real one. In the MB-326 case, it would be enough for Argentina years before to follow the path of Brazil, South Africa or Australia in this type of basic investment, contrary to the path adopted by the IA63 Pucara. The effectiveness would be absurdly greater.
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A-4 I want it to operate from mainland.
The MB339 to operate from the Islands
 
carvalho2008 said:
yes...but...They were only able to operate with the A4 and with serious operational maintenance problems
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You ask if was feasible for Argentina to buy Harrier. I was test on a CV but never buy it.
If the Spain Navy have this
1700951854407.png
Let image that in the 25 de Mayo
1700951928951.png have this
1700952144279.png
But my choise is for the A-4 (not the Q ex B)
I prefer the C version
 
carvalho2008 said:
For the A4 to operate from the islands, there is a prerequisite that the runway needs to be lengthened.
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No, a brake parachute would have been sufficient for the A-4 to operate from Port Stanley.

Some A-4 operators had a chute added to their aircraft but not Argentina… again an example of poor planning for the war.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Agreed that a Soviet-backed Argentinian government is highly unlikely.

And as is I'm wondering why the UK didn't make it an Article 5 issue for more overt US help.
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Because NATO's remit did not -- and does not -- extend that far; the Falklands were far outside of the region where Article 5 was applicable. I don't know what its exact limits were, but it also likely would exclude British Honduras (Belize since independence), Diego Garcia, and the Marianas Islands. The NATO treaty tended to exclude colonial possessions, and I'm not sure it would apply to overseas metropolitan territories of France, such as Martinique. It was certainly not held applicable during the Algerian (then under French control, and, by French law, part of metropolitan France) war for independence.
 

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