Alternative fighter for Argentine AF & Navy during Falklands war.

[Saturn_I]

One last thought on the IFR Mirage options, when did Peru received their IFR capable Mirage-5P3? Just to make an idea of the timescale.
Also, could the KC-130 not refuel IFR capable Mirage F1 or 5, and if so, why not? Both the Mirage types as well as the american aircraft mentioned above, F-8 and F-100 are probe-equipped.

IIRC, the Mirage III and V couldn't refuel from the C-130 because the formers' speed would have been too low to refuel safely (I could be mistaken though). Even if that wasn't the actual reason, the AF planned to convert a B-707 into a KC-707 instead of using the C-130 for both the Mirages and A-4s. Then of course that never happened.

I don’t think that the Etendard could reach the Islands with the AS-30

The missile use the inner pylon, so 1 missile an 1 drop tank, max

You are correct, the Etendards would need buddy refueling or bigger tanks from Super Etendards (1,100L), A-4s (1,135L) or Mirage IIIs (1,300L). Not completely implausible… in fact bigger tanks (1,500L from memory) were tested during the Etendard IVM’s early catapult trials.

I have some pilots manual info on the Etendard IVM’s fuel consumption and can run the numbers.

The A-4Q also came with buddy packs, so even if the 2 KC-130s weren't available for any reason, there could have been an A-4 ready to support the Etendards on their mission.

The Argentinians didn't need better/different planes, they needed more/better weapons, give them the original order of 30 Exocet and working bombs and its a whole new ball game.

That would have made the biggest difference. In the late 60s, a secret military directive specified the responsibilities of each Armed Force. Among other things, it forbade the Air Force from engaging in anti-ship warfare, as that was the responsibility of the Navy. As a result, in April 1982 the AF was completely unprepared to fight at sea, either in terms of equipment or training (though they learned very fast).
Without that directive, I'm sure the AF would have bought a proper plane for anti-ship missions (maybe the F-1 with Exocets, who knows), or at least equipped its aircraft with a good nav system and appropriate bombs.

 

[alejandrogrossi]

I don’t think that the Etendard could reach the Islands with the AS-30

The missile use the inner pylon, so 1 missile an 1 drop tank, max

You are correct, the Etendards would need buddy refueling or bigger tanks from Super Etendards (1,100L), A-4s (1,135L) or Mirage IIIs (1,300L). Not completely implausible… in fact bigger tanks (1,500L from memory) were tested during the Etendard IVM’s early catapult trials.

I have some pilots manual info on the Etendard IVM’s fuel consumption and can run the numbers.

Would be interesting to know. And if you find ant photos of the IVM with bigger tank...more great

 

[alejandrogrossi]

One last thought on the IFR Mirage options, when did Peru received their IFR capable Mirage-5P3? Just to make an idea of the timescale.
Also, could the KC-130 not refuel IFR capable Mirage F1 or 5, and if so, why not? Both the Mirage types as well as the american aircraft mentioned above, F-8 and F-100 are probe-equipped.

IIRC, the Mirage III and V couldn't refuel from the C-130 because the formers' speed would have been too low to refuel safely (I could be mistaken though). Even if that wasn't the actual reason, the AF planned to convert a B-707 into a KC-707 instead of using the C-130 for both the Mirages and A-4s. Then of course that never happened.

I don’t think that the Etendard could reach the Islands with the AS-30

The missile use the inner pylon, so 1 missile an 1 drop tank, max

You are correct, the Etendards would need buddy refueling or bigger tanks from Super Etendards (1,100L), A-4s (1,135L) or Mirage IIIs (1,300L). Not completely implausible… in fact bigger tanks (1,500L from memory) were tested during the Etendard IVM’s early catapult trials.

I have some pilots manual info on the Etendard IVM’s fuel consumption and can run the numbers.

The A-4Q also came with buddy packs, so even if the 2 KC-130s weren't available for any reason, there could have been an A-4 ready to support the Etendards on their mission.

The Argentinians didn't need better/different planes, they needed more/better weapons, give them the original order of 30 Exocet and working bombs and its a whole new ball game.

That would have made the biggest difference. In the late 60s, a secret military directive specified the responsibilities of each Armed Force. Among other things, it forbade the Air Force from engaging in anti-ship warfare, as that was the responsibility of the Navy. As a result, in April 1982 the AF was completely unprepared to fight at sea, either in terms of equipment or training (though they learned very fast).
Without that directive, I'm sure the AF would have bought a proper plane for anti-ship missions (maybe the F-1 with Exocets, who knows), or at least equipped its aircraft with a good nav system and appropriate bombs.

Agree with teme of M-III and V.
And the sentence of the better weapons 8the areas of responsability of the Naval aviation and Air Force.
Disagree
A the time of the conflic the Naval Aviation have 8-4Q and 5 SUE
Forget the SUE to do the AAR with Buddy pack.
Respect the A-4Q, to small number of aircraft, to spare 1 or 2 in AAR roles., and small fuel capacity for to be effective
Again, the needs of 1 or 2 KC130 more emerge.
I try to find a IVM wit a bomb loads, but i can´t find it
I think with 2drops tanks , you have the external pylon to put 2 bombs
I find this

I ansewer myselft
2 drops tank and 2 bomb of 500Lbs

 

[alejandrogrossi]

Wonder is USMC Phantoms ever refueled from KC-130s ?

 

[alejandrogrossi]

The Argentinians didn't need better/different planes, they needed more/better weapons, give them the original order of 30 Exocet and working bombs and its a whole new ball game.

Agree. That said, as this discussion shows some F-8 Crusaders or Mirage F1s (especially IFR capable ones) could have made a meaningful difference in their ability to gain air superiority and cut their losses to Sea Harriers.

+ Buddy refueling capability to make up for the tanker shortfall

+ Ideally a low-altitude interceptor / strike aircraft with short runway capability that could operate from Port Stanley airfield (the F-8 being ideally suited for this. Alternatively some Etendard IVMs as a better-than-nothing option)

The Navy asked for 16 Skyraiders and 16 Etendard, this happened in 1967. They had always wanted the Skyraider, but the US Navy never approved the sale. The story only ended in 1972 when the Navy got the A-4Q.

I don’t think Etendard IVMs would have worked for operations off 25 de Mayo (the Etendard IVB with Avon engine & blown flaps was required for operations off Colossus class carriers - offered to both the RAN and Indian Navy for HMAS Melbourne and INS Vikrant but ultimately did not come to fruition).

That said a very interesting what-if is if the COAN had bought those 16 Etendard IVMs in 1967 followed by A-4Qs in 1972… the Etendards would have been perfect for land-based anti-ship strikes from the mainland with AS-30 missiles as well as a fighter detachment at Port Stanley.

Etendart IVM, before the arrival of F-8 doing Air to air role for the French Navy

So one possible combination for the CV air wing could be
6 IVM (main air to air role and tanker) 6 A-4Q (strike role) / 4 S-2E and 2SK

 

[H_K]

And if you find ant photos of the IVM with bigger tank...more great

Couldn’t find an exact pic, but posted more info here. They were modified 1,300L Mirage III tanks.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/dassault-etendard-prototypes-and-projects.11138/post-605032

 

[H_K]

So one possible combination for the CV air wing could be
6 IVM (main air to air role and tanker) 6 A-4Q (strike role) / 4 S-2E and 2SK

No, unfortunately like I said the Etendard IVM could not operate from the Colossus class carriers due to the short catapults and high landing speed. The whole point of the Etendard IVB design with blown flaps and more powerful Avon engine was to make the Etendard compatible with the Colossus class.

The Super Etendard later « solved » for this with a more powerful engine and improved lift devices, but was still marginal for those small carriers.

 

[Pirate Pete]

- What type of fighters could have been acquired ?

What about Scimitars bought in the 60s/70s ? To operate on the 25 de Mayo ?
In the role of fighter and ground attack ?
View attachment 702053

Leaving to one side the Scimitars dreadful attrition rate - it was something of a ‘challenge’ for experienced pilots.
It would only be any use in clear air space as it was not fitted with/for search radar.

 

[F.L.]

it was big and heavy.

To compare, the A-4 had a gross weight of 7.355kg and the Scimitar 15.513kg. That's twice as much, clearly too heavy.

"MDD A-4Q&A-4E Shkyhawk" bokk from Jorge f. Nuñez. serie aeronaval 24 (only in spanish)

It said : In 1968 the naval aviation study the possibility of the Sea Vixen FAW.1 and the Harrier Gr.1. the in May 1970 we recive the offer of 16 A-4B call "Q" by the Navy.

On the other hand, the gross weight of the Sea Vixen is considerably heavier : 18,858 kg.
An Argentinian Navy Sea Vixen FAW.1 would have been really nice.
The FAW.1 was quite beautiful, compared to the FAW.2 which was really ugly.

 

[F.L.]

Vulcans ? How? When ? Why ? There isn't much online except a short aticle about negotiations happening in 1981 for 12 Vulcans, which was eventually turned down by the british.

 

[alejandrogrossi]

Vulcans ? How? When ? Why ? There isn't much online except a short aticle about negotiations happening in 1981 for 12 Vulcans, which was eventually turned down by the british.

View attachment 702290

I like the Vulcan , always

 

[alejandrogrossi]

Vulcans ? How? When ? Why ? There isn't much online except a short aticle about negotiations happening in 1981 for 12 Vulcans, which was eventually turned down by the british.

View attachment 702290

I kown thta is a fantasy profile, but thta colour is not the right for our bombers
Here we have 1 of our Canberra

I yhink that her camo is smililar to the RAF Vulcan

 

[F.L.]

https://www.artstation.com/artwork/18GBbX

 

[carvalho2008]

I am not kidding. Probably the MB-326 Xavante airmacchi was the best plane for the Argentine air force!!!

surprisingly, the MB-326 reversed all reason and common sense at first glance.

Brazil, for example, had 126 EMB-326 (of its own manufacture), 40 F-5E and 16 M-III EBR at the time.
In fact, the MB-326 was far inferior to the A-4, but it was error-proof and flexible. Even admitting that Argentines would never improve the runways on the islands, the MB-326 would operate from there without restriction. About 36 to 40 of them there on the islands, as incredible as it seems, would force the British aircraft carriers to maintain a greater distance. This would be terrible for the Harriers who already suffered from little autonomy and would make the CAPs of Harriers dedicated to the air interdiction of the continental face of the islands unfeasible, allowing the Argentine air flow of ammunition and parts between the islands and the mainland.

It stands to reason that all clashes between Harrier and MB-326 would have the same fate as they did with Daggers and A-4s. But the point is that a small trainer fighter operating from the islands would be able to replicate the same exact attack profiles that the A-4s carried out when they came crawling from the mainland. However, they would have more range and pose a much greater danger to the Nae. They would have to get further out and stay that way until the MB-326s were eliminated.


Many may claim that the Argentines used the MB-339 on the islands, but they were so limited in number that they did not even present an actual service sheet. The choice of few units implied a ridiculous and inefficient maintenance team and in an environment where the airspace was already controlled. But the control of the airspace is not done only by air-to-air combat, but also by projecting an attack against the enemy air base....in practice, this made the British no-fly zone unfeasible. Unlike the Pucaras, which were not even worth replacing the lost units, the MB-326 would greatly justify and time ran against the British....

 

[carvalho2008]

 

[H_K]

a small trainer fighter operating from the islands would be able to replicate the same exact attack profiles that the A-4s carried out when they came crawling from the mainland. However, they would have more range and pose a much greater danger to the Nae.

No. A Maachi would be a sitting duck in the anti-shipping role. Much too slow… about 350 knots at sea level loaded with 4x 500lb bombs. (See flight manual here: https://www.docdroid.com/hPy9TpV/aermacchi-mb326gb-flight-manual-pdf#page=265)

By comparison an A-4C Skyhawk could fly 520-540 knots loaded at sea level. An Etendard IVM would be even better for operations from Port Stanley, capable of flying at ~590 knots at sea level with the same load of 4x 500lb bombs… which would be enough to outrun a Sea Harrier which maxed out at ~560 knots!

 

[F.L.]

Nice picture !
I find what you're saying very interesting, but I think that in the absence of effective air cover, the losses from the EMB-326s would have been too significant.

 

[carvalho2008]

a small trainer fighter operating from the islands would be able to replicate the same exact attack profiles that the A-4s carried out when they came crawling from the mainland. However, they would have more range and pose a much greater danger to the Nae.

No. A Maachi would be a sitting duck in the anti-shipping role. Much too slow… about 350 knots at sea level loaded with 4x 500lb bombs. (See flight manual here: https://www.docdroid.com/hPy9TpV/aermacchi-mb326gb-flight-manual-pdf#page=265)

By comparison an A-4C Skyhawk could fly 520-540 knots loaded at sea level. An Etendard IVM would be even better for operations from Port Stanley, capable of flying at ~590 knots at sea level with the same load of 4x 500lb bombs… which would be enough to outrun a Sea Harrier which maxed out at ~560 knots!

Master, if we take the most difficult and classic mission, which would be the narrative of the attack in the open ocean on the HMS Invincible, we see that from the formation of the Super Etandard and A-4, after the firing of the Exocet, the A-4 took more than 1 minute of arrival after the missile. So, see that the exocet is nominally 620 knots...if you do the math you will see that the A-4s were very heavy at the operational limit of no more than 420 knots...here's the reason for the logic I presented...the MB-326 mass operated from the islands, would manage to perform the exact and same flight envelope of the A-4 that had to come crowded from the mainland, with the advantage that the belt and radius of action would be greater.... what seems....

 

[carvalho2008]

Nice picture !
I find what you're saying very interesting, but I think that in the absence of effective air cover, the losses from the EMB-326s would have been too significant.

They would be knocked down as much as the A-4s and Daggers were in each encounter. But the dilemma is that there is a possibility that the Harriers will be operated in a more limited way until the MB-326s are eliminated from Port Stanley. The Harrier already suffered a lot with autonomy and mission time. If the aircraft carriers had to stay a little further away, the mainland side of the islands would remain open to Argentine logistics. This changes the picture a lot, not to mention the eventual hypothesis of successes of the MB-326 in the fleet. Remembering that in the first Kills, it was Ten Crippa hitting the shot director system, I think it was from Argonout, which was softened and defenseless for a second deadly attack with daggers...

In the littoral fight then, the MB0326 would be able to repeat even more identically the A-4, as they flew close to the ground and attacked on the coast with the shadow of the islands behind them....equal flight package, however with the advantage of much longer mission time to identify targets....many missions were lost because there was not enough flight time to find and better position to attack targets...it's not just a question of air combat...

 

[carvalho2008]

Foto legal !
Acho o que você está dizendo muito interessante, mas acho que, na ausência de uma cobertura aérea efetiva, as perdas dos EMB-326 teriam sido muito significativas.

Eles seriam derrubados tanto quanto os A-4s e Daggers em cada encontro. Mas o dilema é que existe a possibilidade de os Harriers serem operados de forma mais limitada até que os MB-326s sejam eliminados de Port Stanley. O Harrier já sofreu muito com autonomia e tempo de missão. Se os porta-aviões tivessem que ficar um pouco mais afastados, o lado continental das ilhas continuaria aberto à logística argentina. Isso muda muito o quadro, sem contar a eventual hipótese de sucesso do MB-326 na frota. Lembrando que no primeiro Kills, foi o Ten Crippa acertando o sistema de diretor de tiro, acho que foi do Argonout, que ficou amolecido e indefeso para um segundo ataque mortal com punhais...

Na luta litorânea então, os MB0326 conseguiriam repetir ainda mais identicamente o A-4, pois voavam rente ao solo e atacavam na costa com a sombra das ilhas atrás deles....pacote de voo igual, porém com a vantagem de muito mais tempo de missão para identificar alvos....muitas missões foram perdidas porque não havia tempo de vôo suficiente para encontrar e melhor posição para atacar alvos...não é apenas uma questão de combate aéreo...

Don't think of the MB-326 as a replacement for the Daggers or A-4, but rather as an alternative replacement for the Pucarás....you'll see that the logic of the battle will change completely. The Pucará was intended exclusively for the CAS...the MB-326 would do both missions. As the Pucara did not pose a risk to the fleet, it was able to approach to launch the no-fly zone and the CAPs... this meant that the air bases on the islands did not breathe any projection role. Faced with this scenario, it did not even compensate for the defeat of Pucaras lost in the Islands....because air control passed to the British in the first minute....but air control is not obtained only by air-to-air combat....
Maneuverability and low-altitude flight is exactly the best flight envelope of the MB-326.....as much as the Harrier....

 

[Archibald]

Fact was that Port Stanley's Pucaras were a real nuisance for helicopters - I think one of them shot down a Wasp (crap, was a Scout !) ? only to eat a Blowpipe immediately thereafters. 1-1, score even.
MB-326s (or MB-339s, for that matter) could get the "nuisance" to a higher level. Didn't a MB-339 threw rockets at a British warship at some point ?

 

[carvalho2008]

Fact was that Port Stanley's Pucaras were a real nuisance for helicopters - I think one of them shot down a Wasp (crap, was a Scout !) ? only to eat a Blowpipe immediately thereafters. 1-1, score even.
MB-326s (or MB-339s, for that matter) could get the "nuisance" to a higher level. Didn't a MB-339 threw rockets at a British warship at some point ?

Yes, it was Lieutenant Crippa's MB-339 that made first contact with the landing forces in San Carlos. The MB-339 was configured with eight 122mm Zuni rockets and two 30mm DEFA cannons. TEN Crippa was nervous and on the attack run, he tried to fire twice until he realized that the shots and rockets did not come out because he had forgotten to arm. Towards the end of the race, he managed to hit the weapon button and fire everything he had. But imagine how many shots must have been missed by this first-sight failure. However, it reached the Argonaut frigate's firing radar, which was rendered defenseless. Later, already trying to leave the combat area, the frigate Argonaut was attacked this time by A4 and received two more bombs that did not explode. she was permanently out of commission and saw no further action in the conflict.

 

[Archibald]

The Pucara that had killed the Scout didn't ate a Blowpipe but actually ran into a mountainside...

 

[Archibald]

Fact was that Port Stanley's Pucaras were a real nuisance for helicopters - I think one of them shot down a Wasp (crap, was a Scout !) ? only to eat a Blowpipe immediately thereafters. 1-1, score even.
MB-326s (or MB-339s, for that matter) could get the "nuisance" to a higher level. Didn't a MB-339 threw rockets at a British warship at some point ?

Yes, it was Lieutenant Crippa's MB-339 that made first contact with the landing forces in San Carlos. The MB-339 was configured with eight 122mm Zuni rockets and two 30mm DEFA cannons. TEN Crippa was nervous and on the attack run, he tried to fire twice until he realized that the shots and rockets did not come out because he had forgotten to arm. Towards the end of the race, he managed to hit the weapon button and fire everything he had. But imagine how many shots must have been missed by this first-sight failure. However, it reached the Argonaut frigate's firing radar, which was rendered defenseless. Later, already trying to leave the combat area, the frigate Argonaut was attacked this time by A4 and received two more bombs that did not explode. she was permanently out of commission and saw no further action in the conflict.

Red a few things about Crippa. That man had huge, huge balls of steel, attacking a fleet like this with an underarmed trainer.

 

[carvalho2008]

Fact was that Port Stanley's Pucaras were a real nuisance for helicopters - I think one of them shot down a Wasp (crap, was a Scout !) ? only to eat a Blowpipe immediately thereafters. 1-1, score even.
MB-326s (or MB-339s, for that matter) could get the "nuisance" to a higher level. Didn't a MB-339 threw rockets at a British warship at some point ?

Yes, it was Lieutenant Crippa's MB-339 that made first contact with the landing forces in San Carlos. The MB-339 was configured with eight 122mm Zuni rockets and two 30mm DEFA cannons. TEN Crippa was nervous and on the attack run, he tried to fire twice until he realized that the shots and rockets did not come out because he had forgotten to arm. Towards the end of the race, he managed to hit the weapon button and fire everything he had. But imagine how many shots must have been missed by this first-sight failure. However, it reached the Argonaut frigate's firing radar, which was rendered defenseless. Later, already trying to leave the combat area, the frigate Argonaut was attacked this time by A4 and received two more bombs that did not explode. she was permanently out of commission and saw no further action in the conflict.

Red a few things about Crippa. That man had huge, huge balls of steel, attacking a fleet like this with an underarmed trainer.

It was a unique battle, where it was demonstrated that the romanticism of the doctrines fall to the ground after the first shot, as well as possible fallacies of the armament industry that cause embarrassment when you need it most.

Imagine if the Argentines had at least tried and successfully adapted the famous Pucaras torpedo planes before the conflict. This first contact revealed how unprepared the British were for coastal warfare. If they were ready before the war, Pucaras armed with torpedoes would enter San Carlos Bay in true Pearl Harbor style and could seriously devastate the fleet there. There was no way for the ships to move and the lack of programming of the firing centers was clear, where they simply silenced so as not to hit each other when the plane was in the middle of them...

 

[H_K]

I've been re-reading John Shield's excellent "Air Power in the Falklands Conflict" and Gordon Smith's equally impressive "Battle Atlas of the Falklands War".

Falklands War 1982 by Land, Sea and Air

Naval Events of World Wars 1 and 2, Warships Lost, and the military background to their losses

www.naval-history.net

Couple of thoughts:

1. Argentine air power failed across the board for the first 20 days of the conflict, from May 1st to May 21st. Out of the first 150+ anti-ship sorties, only 2 ships were put out of action (Sheffield & Ardent - both sunk). This failed to impede the RN invasion plan or even to seriously contest control of the sea.

2) The main failure reasons were (in order): a) Inability to find targets, b) Unsuitable weapons (misses or duds), and c) Interference from Sea Harriers. But reasons a) and b) were the main culprits.

3) The RN was exceptionally weak during this initial period, with only 20 Sea Harriers and very limited low-level air defenses (only 2 Sea Wolf frigates). Furthermore, the RN and RAF failed to properly execute air interdiction, and anyway didn't have the numbers of Sea Harriers available to really shut down Port Stanley airport even if they'd tried. Lastly, the RN took big risks with its ships operating close inshore on multiple occasions to shell the island.

Based on the above, it's fairly astonishing that the RN didn't get mauled during this initial period, which would have prevented its troops from even making it ashore.

In my next post, I'll look at 2 of the key missing ingredients. Basically better weapons (such as the AS-30 missile) and using Port Stanley to forward base fighters, for both anti-ship and air-to-air missions.

 

[EwenS]

A few points to pick up on.

Gunfire support - most of this was carried out at night with the ships withdrawing before dawn. Ardent was hit on the day of the landings while in Falkland Sound when that was no longer possible and before the artillery could be set up ashore. And the Argentinians were not making air attacks at night.

The other incident that comes to mind was that of Glamorgan on 12 June. She had been called in to provide gunfire support overnight 11/12 June. At 0637 on 12 June she was 18 miles offshore with the job complete (her guns only had a range of about 12 miles). She was hit by an Exocet from an improvised launcher and tracking radar system. And it took the Argentinians 3 attempts to get a missile on target.

Sandy Woodward's tactics were designed to minimise the risk to the Task Force. Ships not immediately required were sent to the Towing, Repair and Logistics Area located to the east of the Falklands and outwith the TEZ with a number of escorts for protection. They were then only brought forward into the danger zone when required. The main task force was then kept at arms length from the Falklands themselves (70-100 miles generally to the eastwards). This was a double edged sword. It extended the distance the Argentines had to fly but it also meant that the Sea Harriers could spend less time over the Islands themselves while on CAP.

The Argentinians were not completely blind. Their 707 tracked the TF on its way south until warned off through diplomatic channels. The 2 Neptunes, the best maritime recce aircraft the Argentinians had, operated until 8 June, when they were servicable. After that they have been described as almost beyond repair. It was one of these that detected the TF and set up the attack on Sheffield on 4 May. In the early days the Trackers operating from the 25th De Mayo were able to locate the TF from its radar emissions and on their radars. Beginning 13 May the Trackers operated from shore base and were able to reach out to the areas both north and south of the Islands. But the Sea Harrier CAP which they were able to detect at long range prevented them getting too close to the Islands to really identify the location of British ships..

As for the lack of Sea Wolf escorts, it was a relatively new system to the RN. At the time of the Falklands War there were only 3 Type 22 frigates in service (Two went south while the third needed repairs). They were joined on 25th May by the then sole Seawolf Leander conversion.

 

[carvalho2008]

I agree with friends HK and Ewens, and add the following:
The assumption of war by the Argentine side was a bluff, when Thatcher demonstrated he would really fight back, the Argentines barely began to prepare.

a) The islands did not have aviation focused on attack or naval retaliation, only on close air support for the land battle (Pucarás). This is why, as incredible as it may seem, if, instead of having 45 Pucarás, there were 45 MB-326s, and of these, operating between 24 and 36 from there, there would be some capacity to attack the fleet. This would force the carrier to stay a little further away, making the Harriers' operation even more difficult. As well noted by one of the colleagues, dozens of Argentine air missions returned empty-handed, as they did can´t to locate and assign targets with only 5 to 10 minutes of flight over the islands before running out of fuel limits. Probably the MB-326 would be shot down in each encounter with the Harriers as it was, but the risk of attacking the Aircraft Carriers would be much greater. This would compensate for each MB-326 unit shot down being replaced on the islands, which did not happen with the pucaras, which allowed the British to approach fully. As I demonstrated earlier, the A-4 and SE formation that attacked the Invincible, they were so heavy and at their limit that their speed was around 420 knots... Mb-326 could do something close to this with the same load of bombs and at a much greater range....

b) Even with the bomb configuration problem, I was very curious about an alternate reality configuration of the MB-326 with 8 127 mm rockets + two 125 kg bombs....after all, each rocket has a similar explosive war head to the impact of a 76 mm naval gun....the thin skin of those ships would suffer a lot from the ship's shape despite not sinking, being out of combat or defenseless to a new wave, this time heavier, of Daggers or A-4. ...

c) In reality, the RFA won the war...a 10 and excellent service.....besides, it was a horror show in which the war was won by those who made the fewest mistakes....it was a battle marked by bombs that did not explode and hit the targets, the Argentine planes continued to arrive and hit, the Caps de Harriers were insufficient (despite their excellent work), the anti-aircraft missiles did not work, the radars and directors of fire failed to lock the planes with the shadow of the islands behind, there were 4 or five attacks by an Argentine SSK that suffered from blindness at point-blank range and contrary to what was expected in these cases, which would be successful, the optical cable simply left due to a configuration error, the British Task even at point-blank range, exhausted its stocks of anti-submarine torpedoes on the Argentine Mr Magoo SSK and didn't hit any....

it was a show of errors in doctrines and equipment failures of the defense industry....my God!!

 

[Archibald]

The entire war was absurd from day one. Argentina and UK were on the same side of Cold War, for a start - and the USA ended rather baffled before (rightly) siding with the British. As the Special Relationship could not be scuttled, not for a murderous junta. Whatever the Monroe Doctrine thought about the British fighting a south american country.

Argentina and UK had strong trade and passable relationship minus the Faklands, but the issue was fast evolving, somewhat away from a murderous war. And then that war happened.

Adding the absurd to the injury, Great Britain actually sold military gear to Argentina the previous decade, so they ended fighting their own armement - Canberra bombers and Type 42 destroyers, and it could have been worse (Harriers and Vulcans, which is so absurd in the light of the war, it looks like a very bad joke).

Then again, the Argentina junta was bunch of miserable morons, while Thatcher was a stubborn pighead. And so the two idiot governments clashed, and a thousands soldiers died in a brief but brutal war.

But at the end of the war, Thatcher certainly had saved the islands granite rock, sheeps, and awful weather from the naughty invaders. They bravely deprived Argentina of that luxury.

 

[Topi]

The entire war was absurd from day one. Argentina and UK were on the same side of Cold War, for a start - and the USA ended rather baffled before (rightly) siding with the British. As the Special Relationship could not be scuttled, not for a murderous junta. Whatever the Monroe Doctrine thought about the British fighting a south american country.

Argentina and UK had strong trade and passable relationship minus the Faklands, but the issue was fast evolving, somewhat away from a murderous war. And then that war happened.

Adding the absurd to the injury, Great Britain actually sold military gear to Argentina the previous decade, so they ended fighting their own armement - Canberra bombers and Type 42 destroyers, and it could have been worse (Harriers and Vulcans, which is so absurd in the light of the war, it looks like a very bad joke).

Then again, the Argentina junta was bunch of miserable morons, while Thatcher was a stubborn pighead. And so the two idiot governments clashed, and a thousands soldiers died in a brief but brutal war.

But at the end of the war, Thatcher certainly had saved the islands granite rock, sheeps, and awful weather from the naughty invaders. They bravely deprived Argentina of that luxury.

Maybe having the Argentines buy E.E. Lightnings and HMS Centaur along with Sea Vixens and Scimitars to operate from it would have made for an even more absurd farce of a Falklands War... Hell, one could have the junta buy HMS Tiger (to replace General Belgrano), Oberon-class submarines, Rapier SAMs, Sea Wolf for Argentine frigates and CVR(T) for the Argentine army to really add insult to the injury.

 

[H_K]

if, instead of having 45 Pucarás, there were 45 MB-326s, and of these, operating between 24 and 36 from there, there would be some capacity to attack the fleet.

b) Even with the bomb configuration problem, I was very curious about an alternate reality configuration of the MB-326 with 8 127 mm rockets + two 125 kg bombs

The problem with the MB-326 scenario (in addition to them being slow sitting ducks) is:

a) parking space at Port Stanley
b) Bomb release

There never were 45 Pucaras operating from Port Stanley, only 12 at the most at any given time, along with 4-5 MB-339s. Most of the Pucaras were sent to Goose Green or Pebble Island; these were short and muddy grass airstrips unsuitable for jet aircraft. So realistically you could fit maybe 12 jet aircraft at Port Stanley…

The bomb release problem is described by Argentine sources as a lack of confidence in the safe use of bombs from the MB-339s, which limited them to guns and rockets only. I don’t have any more details unfortunately…

 

[H_K]

Base

In my next post, I'll look at 2 of the key missing ingredients. Basically better weapons (such as the AS-30 missile) and using Port Stanley to forward base fighters

Ok here are my further thoughts on this.

1) Better weapons: Argentina needed a more accurate and reliable weapon than dumb bombs. The obvious answer was the AS-30, which historically could be launched by Mirage IIIs, 5s, Canberras and Etendards. The AS-30 packed a large 240kg warhead with supersonic impact speed (Mach 1.4) and allowed the shooter to maintain a stand-off distance of at least 3km, ie. outside of gun engagement range and probably problematic even for Sea Wolf.

AS-30 capability could have been bought with the Mirage IIIs or as part of a surplus Etendard IVM sale (with the Super Etendard deal) or even as a crash upgrade to the Daggers (using the Mirage IIIs’ gear). Or more ironically the RAF Canberras’ surplus AS-30s might have made their way to Argentina in the 70s.

Given range limitations, the ideal launch platforms would probably have been Canberras and Daggers from the continent and Etendard IVMs from Port Stanley… which brings me to my next point.

(To be continued)

 

[Pioneer]

The F1s could have at least lobbed Super-530Fs at the SH putting them on the defensive, allowing more attackers to get through, maybe get a few kills too. Presumably the Mirage F1 would have a bigger combat radius allowing it to provide more efficient, closer escort for the strikes?

Well whilst on the topic of range, the Mirage F1 did have a recognised increased internal fuel tankage for 40% greater combat range.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[carvalho2008]

The problem with the MB-326 scenario (in addition to them being slow sitting ducks) is:

a) parking space at Port Stanley
b) Bomb release

There never were 45 Pucaras operating from Port Stanley, only 12 at the most at any given time, along with 4-5 MB-339s. Most of the Pucaras were sent to Goose Green or Pebble Island; these were short and muddy grass airstrips unsuitable for jet aircraft. So realistically you could fit maybe 12 jet aircraft at Port Stanley…

The bomb release problem is described by Argentine sources as a lack of confidence in the safe use of bombs from the MB-339s, which limited them to guns and rockets only. I don’t have any more details unfortunately…

I think just the opposite....an MB-326 can, depending on the configuration, attack between 350 knots and 469 knots....

As I have shown, several A-4 attacks that came very heavy from the continent, carried out the incursion between 420 knots (case Invincible) to 470 knots... one had to come exceeding its limits, another, would operate from the island, much lighter, much less required.

The MB-326 could thus carry a light configuration of two pods with 4 127 mm rockets + 2 bombs of 118 kg.

The reports are that not only was there a problem with the time for the bombs to explode, but also that several 500 kg bombs pierced the targets and were not even deposited on the hulls of the ships. A rocket warhead is almost equal to the payload of a naval projectile of the same caliber.....does enormous damage....and lighter bombs would be better suited to stop inside the hulls of target ships.

 

[H_K]

A rocket warhead is almost equal to the payload of a naval projectile of the same caliber.....does enormous damage

If rocket warheads half the size of an AS-12 or Sea Skua were effective against large ships that would be known by now.

 

[carvalho2008]

If rocket warheads half the size of an AS-12 or Sea Skua were effective against large ships that would be known by now.

who has or had As-12 or Sea Skua, would not need to use rockets....

Rockets were not an option for the A-4 due to the high drag, either on the way out or back....there was no fuel or refuelers necessary to maintain this profile...

Beaufighters cry about being forgotten...

 

[_Del_]

If rocket warheads half the size of an AS-12 or Sea Skua were effective against large ships that would be known by now.

Probably wouldn't sink a large combat ship, but a salvo of unguided rockets probably makes a mess of all the soft bits like radars, antennae masts, funnels, helicopters/hangar facilities, small arms stations, the bridge, fires, etc. And given that armoured ships have not been and are not en vogue, it's not impossible you may get penetrating rounds from the salvo as well.

Sheffield was lost to fire, not the size of the hole in her side above the water line.

 

[F.L.]

I wonder why the Argentine navy decided to buy the Karel Doorman (future 25 de Mayo) rather than modernise the Independencia (former Warrior) ? Both were early Colossus-class aircraft carriers, commissioned in 1945 and 1946 respectively. Modernising Independencia would have been more expensive than buying the Karel Doorman ?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I wonder why the Argentine navy decided to buy the Karel Doorman (future 25 de Mayo) rather than modernise the Independencia (former Warrior) ? Both were early Colossus-class aircraft carriers, commissioned in 1945 and 1946 respectively. Modernising Independencia would have been more expensive than buying the Karel Doorman ?
View attachment 703435View attachment 703434

IAI Independencia was run aground by a drunken captain. I understand when grounding go badly they can write the ship off, even if it’s successfully refloated.

 

[H_K]

In my next post, I'll look at 2 of the key missing ingredients. Basically better weapons (such as the AS-30 missile) and using Port Stanley to forward base fighters, for both anti-ship and air-to-air missions.

(Continued)

2) Forward basing fighters
- As we’ve discussed, Port Stanley airport had 2 major constraints: the 1,200m long runway and limited parking space + exposed weather conditions.

- My estimate is a maximum of 12 combat aircraft could be parked using the grass areas and leaving the main apron space (80x45m) free for resupply flights and other aircraft.

- Another dozen Pucaras could be operated from the secondary airfields at Goose Green and Pebble Island… historically though they didn’t achieve anything so I’ll ignore them

- With such a limited space available it makes sense to operate the most effective combat aircraft possible from there. I don’t buy that lightly-armed, slow MB-326s were the solution… I’d want a real fighter bomber

- The main missions would be both CAP/interception to challenge Sea Harriers in the air and also anti-shipping to force the RN task force to stand-off from the islands

- Deltas like the Mirage IIIs and Daggers are out of the question due to their high takeoff and landing speeds

- A naval aircraft by design should be suitable for short runways and also the very wet weather… that leaves Skyhawks and Etendards.

- Argentine Skyhawks had a take-off run of ~800-900m lightly loaded (18,500lbs TO weight with 2,000lb external fuel/stores). So take-off should not be a problem. Their approach speed was also low (122 knots), however they didn’t have a brake parachute (unlike some other foreign Skyhawks) so landing distance would be too great. If a chute could be fitted they could operate from Port Stanley, but their effectiveness would still be limited by the lack of radar and an anti-ship missile

- Etendards/Super Etendards had a take-off run of ~900-1,000m depending on the load configuration (the Super Etendard had more power and more lift than the Etd IVM but this was offset by being 400kg heavier and the heavier Exocet payload). The COAN assessed that take-offs were possible with no safety margins. Approach speeds were a little higher than the Skyhawk (125-130kts), but both had a brake chute which reduced the runway length requirement to 900m (from threshold to full stop). The COAN assessed that landings would be possible in dry conditions, but were worried about bringing back a heavy Exocet in wet conditions… ultimately the Super Etendard was too precious to risk.

- This brings me to the surplus Etendard IVM option. They would have been able to operate from Port Stanley with 1 or 2 AS-30 missiles (or 2 Magics/Sidewinders in air-to-air mode), and land lightly loaded even in wet conditions (unlike an Exocet-carrying Super Etendard). Ideally 15-18 Etd IVMs would have been transferred to Argentina around 1979-81. Even with high expected losses they should have achieved some success against Sea Harriers and RN escorts, drawing out the conflict or delaying the landings by weeks (especially if combined with land-based AS-30 strikes from Canberras or Daggers)

- Alternatively one might look at operating Mirage F1s or Jaguars from Port Stanley but not sure Argentina had the money to buy yet another type?