1935-1940: alternative Luftwaffe?

Hi Tomo,

(since I'm not allowed to send you the PM)

Sorry for the inconvenience! I don't normally disable forum PMs, but unfortunately, I had reason to do so on this one.

I've started a conversation on another forum about the Fw 190 being mooted with extra supercharger sets, of two different types, in an installation much better streamlined than it was the case with the Kangaroo, the V18. Unfortunately, it seems that really good data is lacking. Perhaps you have a better insight on this?

That's a very interesting find! I'm not quite sure what to think of it ... in Hermann's "Der Weg zum Höhenjäger", there is a German version of the diagram Calum published, in lower quality but with the original legend, and the belly-mounted supercharger is in fact called "Doppellader" ('double supercharger') there.

I'm not quite sure what to make of this since I'm not familiar with the physical shapes of the German superchargers. From the legend alone, I would think that this is actually a three-stage supercharger setup, since the 'double supercharger' should have two stages in itself.

Unfortunately, at least in my edition of Hermann's book, there seems to be something missing between page 99, where the text just breaks off, and page 100, where a new chapter starts. The last sentence fragment in my print is "Bereits am 25.9.1943 reichte FW die 1. Kurz-", breaking off in mid-word. If you happen to have a newer edition, that might have been fixed ...

(The other diagram seems to show a turbo-supercharged version, as there appears to be an exhaust pipe running to the belly supercharger as in the Känguru aircraft.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Sorry for the inconvenience! I don't normally disable forum PMs, but unfortunately, I had reason to do so on this one.

Okay, thanks for the clarification :)

That's a very interesting find! I'm not quite sure what to think of it ... in Hermann's "Der Weg zum Höhenjäger", there is a German version of the diagram Calum published, in lower quality but with the original legend, and the belly-mounted supercharger is in fact called "Doppellader" ('double supercharger') there.

I'm not quite sure what to make of this since I'm not familiar with the physical shapes of the German superchargers. From the legend alone, I would think that this is actually a three-stage supercharger setup, since the 'double supercharger' should have two stages in itself.

Excellent, we're on the same page here thus far.

Unfortunately, at least in my edition of Hermann's book, there seems to be something missing between page 99, where the text just breaks off, and page 100, where a new chapter starts. The last sentence fragment in my print is "Bereits am 25.9.1943 reichte FW die 1. Kurz-", breaking off in mid-word. If you happen to have a newer edition, that might have been fixed ...
No such luck, my book has the same issue.

(The other diagram seems to show a turbo-supercharged version, as there appears to be an exhaust pipe running to the belly supercharger as in the Känguru aircraft.)

Again - agreed.

BTW - do you know if there is a way to contact Mr. Hermann, so he could provide some clarification and, hopefully, a backstory?
 
Hi Tomo,

BTW - do you know if there is a way to contact Mr. Hermann, so he could provide some clarification and, hopefully, a backstory?

I believe Mike Williams has corresponded with Dietmar Hermann in the past, so possibly he could help you to establish contact.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
If Britain and France had not encouraged Poland to resist Hitler's demands for the transfer to Germany of the corridor between the Reich and East Prussia Hitler's thirst for war might have again been thwarted.
The Luftwaffe succeeded to overaweing Germany's opponents right up until 1939.
If Britain had been able to send larger numbers of Hurticanes and even better, Spitfires, to fight in France in 1940 the Luftwaffe might have faced its first real test before the Battle of Britain.
 
Indeed, but Hitler was said to have been furious that Appeasement deprived him of attacking Czechoslovakia. He would have been even angrier not to have been able to attack Poland.
Delaying the outbreak of war for another couple of years when Britain and France had modernised their air forces would have made the Luftwaffe less effective against them.
 
Hi Tomo,

I've started a conversation on another forum about the Fw 190 being mooted with extra supercharger sets, of two different types, in an installation much better streamlined than it was the case with the Kangaroo, the V18.

Coincedentally, this very recent thread has a link to some US intelligence documents that include "T-2 F-TS-552-RE Comparison Between the Gear-Driven Supercharger and the Exhaust-Driven Turbine in a High-Altitude Fighter", which might be directly relevant to DB 603 developments:


( It appears to be part of a collection assembled by David Lednicer, judging from the user name in the online archive.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Indeed, but Hitler was said to have been furious that Appeasement deprived him of attacking Czechoslovakia. He would have been even angrier not to have been able to attack Poland.
Delaying the outbreak of war for another couple of years when Britain and France had modernised their air forces would have made the Luftwaffe less effective against them.

Lebensraum was just to the East from Breslau. Hitler was not interested in breadcrumbs, he wanted the whole cake.
 
@HoHun - would you be so kind to comment on what is written in this post : link
If I'm reading that right, a mixture comprising of up to 80% alcohol, up to 20% of water and 0.08% of TEL added to the 68 oct fuel ups the octane rating to almost 100 octane, depending on the percentage added. Graph goes to 30% of the mixture addition to the fuel.
 
Hi Tomo,

@HoHun - would you be so kind to comment on what is written in this post : link
If I'm reading that right, a mixture comprising of up to 80% alcohol, up to 20% of water and 0.08% of TEL added to the 68 oct fuel ups the octane rating to almost 100 octane, depending on the percentage added. Graph goes to 30% of the mixture addition to the fuel.

Spot on!

Note that the effect of alcohol is greater than that of an equivalent amount water, indicating that it was not only used "to prevent freezing", as popularly stated on the internet.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Note that the effect of alcohol is greater than that of an equivalent amount water, indicating that it was not only used "to prevent freezing", as popularly stated on the internet.

The 68 oct fuel base is what caught my attention - apparently, just by addition of the specified mixture to the very low-octane fuel, not only the whole procedure required to get the 95-100 oct fuel can be avoided, but even there was a cheaper way to obtain the 87 oct fuel from the low-octane stock?

At any rate, seems like that I've just scratched the surface wrt. alcohol-based additives for fuel, and the alcohol-fuel itself.
 
French autoclub and government were experimenting with the fuel mixture that was 80% gasoline, 10% tap water, with rest being oleic acid + alcohol (~6% of total), and up to 1% amonnia. Noted was the high octane rating of the mixture.
However, the oil industry was against this, and soon (1939!) the experiments were forbidden. Germans were reporting in 1943 and 1944 about use of that mixture in France.

(source: Waffen Revue #46)
 
French autoclub and government were experimenting with the fuel mixture that was 80% gasoline, 10% tap water, with rest being oleic acid + alcohol (~6% of total), and up to 1% ammonia.
Noting of course that gasoline itself already is a complex mixture, with several approaches depending on economics and technical characteristics of the available crude and the refinery.

Also: any motor fuel containing that much water, plus acid and base constituents, potentially will be very corrosive to metals.
 
I actually did look into some of this -- assembling a lot of information to be used to analyze the 1940 BOB.

The Luftwaffe's "Z-Plan"

Source:
German Aircraft Industry and Production: 1933-1945 by Ferec Vajda and Peter Dancey

On 26 October 1938, the RLM presented it's first ideas for the Luftwaffe version of the Kreigsmarine's "Z-Plan":

45,700 aircraft were to be built by 1 April 1942 at a total cost of 60 billion reichsmarks...which not coincidentally was the entire military budget of Germany from 1933 to 1939!

The Luftwaffe by Spring 1942 was to have 10,300 operational aircraft and 8,200 in reserve.

By 7 November 1938, there were further details on the 1942 Luftwaffe OBAT:

16 x Fighter Geschwaders (Bf-109)
16 x Zerstorer Geschwaders (50% Bf-110 and 50% Me-210)
8 x Stuka Geschwaders (converting from Ju-87 to Me 210 as it became available)
4 x Heavy Bomber Geschwaders (He-177s)
54 x Medium Bomber Geschwaders (Ju-88s)

By 15 November, the RLM had done it's computations on the number of aircraft needed:

4,331 x Bf 109
3,320 x Bf 110 and Me 210
2,002 x Ju 87
2,000 x He 111
900 x Do 17
7,327 x Ju 88
703 x He 177

The older planes (He-111 and Do-17) were intended to act as "bridges" between existing production and the long delayed Ju-88 and He-177 programs.
 
First, let's look at the evolution of the Luftwaffe bomber force before looking at where it stood in the Summer of 1940.

Background to German Re-Armament

While Hitler denounced Versailles in the Reichstag on 17 May 1933, it took until 26 February 1935 for the existence of the Luftwaffe to be acknowledged, followed by the blatant violation (and death) of Versailles on 16 March 1935 when German conscription was announced.

Until March 1935, almost all German military work had to be done in secret. Where it couldn't be hidden (airplanes) a weak, semi-plausible civilian rationale (civilian airliner or experimental racer) was used to keep the Big Two (France and Britain) off of Germany's back.

First Generation Bombers - The Secret Ones -- these planes were designed and entered service when the Luftwaffe didn't officially exist.

Junkers 52 Series

Ju 52/3mg3e: 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 310 mile (500 km) radius

The Ju-52 was designed beginning in 1930, and following several years of production for civilian airlines, a secret militarized variant, the Ju 52/3mg3e was developed and ordered pending arrival in quantity of a "purpose" built bomber in the Dornier 11 series. Despite this, the Ju-52 ended up equipping the majority of the early Luftwaffe bomber units.

Dornier 11 Series (Do-11/Do-13/Do-23)

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Do-11 (1932-?): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 298 mile (479.5 km) radius
Do-23 (1934-1936): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 420 mile (675.9 km) radius

These aircraft were developed from the earlier Do P (1930) and Do Y (1931) prototypes; with the Do F (Do-11) prototype being built in Switzerland. About 141 Do-11 and 273 Do-23 were delivered (the few Do-13 built being converted to Do-23s).

The first bomber unit was the Behelfsbombergeschwader (BehBG) or "Auxiliary Bomber Group"; and to maintain cover, officially it was in public sources, the Verkehrsinspektion der DLH (Traffic Inspectorate of Deutsche Lufthansa).

Later in November 1933, the Deutsche Reichsbahn (German State Railway) replaced two of its night trains with air freight service flown by Lufthansa. In reality, these were flown on Do-11s crewed by Behelfsbombergeschwader pilots, gaining experience in night flying.

Second Generation Bombers - The "Mail" Planes -- the second generation, while still needing a "cover" as a fast passenger/mail plane, could be more blatant in how they skirted the line between civilian and military purposes.

Dornier 17 Series

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Do-17E-1 (?): 750 kg (1,650 lbs) to 310 mile (498.8 km) radius
Do-17M-1 (?-1941): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 310 mile (498.8 km) radius
Do-17Z-2: (1940-?): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 210 mile (337.9 km) radius

The Do-17 was designed to meet a 1933 six-passenger mail plane specification by Lufthansa -- after three prototypes were evaluated by Lufthansa in 1935, they were returned to Dornier as being insufficient for the airline's needs. The next year however, the first bomber version, the Do-17E-1 was delivered in late 1936.

There were three major bomber versions, the -E, -M, and Z; and in each, they were cramped for the crew -- the type was simply just too small to be a realistic medium bomber.

When they redesigned the Do-17 to have a slightly larger nose with extra guns for the bombardier, the added weight reduced bombload on the Do-17Z-1 to 500 kg. Adding more powerful engines (+100 more HP each) restored the bombload to 1,000 kg on the production Do-17Z-2, but reduced the combat radius to 210 miles.

In a final postscript, production limitations forced a shift from BMW inline engines on the E to radial engines in the M and Z variants -- the Reichluftministry (RLM) needed all the inline engines for the fighter force (Bf-109/110).

The Ju-86 Series

Ordered to the same 1934 specification - high speed twin engined 10 passenger aircraft - as the He-111, the Ju-86 was generally inferior to the He-111 in Spanish Civil War experience. Despite a single gruppe (III KG 1) participating in the invasion of Poland, the Ju-86 was retired from active service shortly afterwards, going to training schools.

Some were converted to Ju-86P high altitude high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and bombers in 1941-1942.

The Early He-111 Series

He-111P/H (1940): 500 kg (1,102 lbs) to 400 mile (645 km) radius
He-111P/H (1940): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 300 mile (483 km) radius

Heinkel took the earlier single-engine He-70's wing and tail assembly and scaled it up to a larger twin-engine design, which first flew in May 1935, followed by civilian passenger service with Lufthansa (He-111C in 1936) and military service (He-111B in late 1936).

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The He-70 and He-111 lineage is clear in this image

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Civilian He-111 Cutaway

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Civilian He-111 Interior, looking forward, you can see the four seat "smoking" compartment (aka bomb bay).

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Civilian He-111 Interior, looking rear

Because of the need to masquerade as a civilian aircraft until 1935, the He-111 was forced to make compromises to avoid being blatantly a bomber, the same as the Dornier 17.

In the case of the He-111, they had to make the fuselage narrow instead of wide; which forced an odd internal bomb bay arrangement in order to fit the maximum number of bombs inside.

This was the ESAC 250 cell (Elektrische-Senkrecht-Aufhängung für Cylinderbomben), which translates as Electrical Vertical Suspension for Cylinder Bombs. In the ESAC 250 cell, bombs were stored nose up, which led to inaccuracy issues; but it couldn't be helped.

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ESAC on early (stepped nose) He-111

Like the Dornier 17, the He-111 had it's development altered by the need for engines for fighters.

In late 1939, the He-111 was in production under two variants -- the -111P with the DB 601 engine, and the -111H with the Jumo 211 engine. Other than the engines, they were effectively the same. In 1940, the RLM killed the He-111P in favor of the He-111H because they needed the DB-601s for Bf-109 and Bf-110 production.

The late He-111 Series - or why the He-111 stayed in production for so long.

He-111H-16 (1942): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 640 mile (1029.98 km) radius.

From the He-111H-4 onwards, external bomb racks were fitted. These racks blocked the bomb bay, so most aircraft with the external bomb racks had the bomb bay space filled with a 835 liter (221 US gallon) fuel tank; giving it nearly 200 more miles of combat radius and making the He-111 competitive with the Ju-88; and the He-111 could more easily carry a wider load of external bombs than the Ju-88.

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Diagram showing the location of the major fuel tanks and the bomb bay tank.

He-111 bomb rack approved configurations were:

4 x 250 kg + 1 x 500 kg (1,500 kg total)
or
5 x 250 kg (1,250 kg total)
or
3 x 1000 kg (3,000 kg total)
or
3 x 500 kg (1,500 kg total)
or
2 x 1800 kg (3,600 kg total)
or
1 x 2500 kg
or
2 x 45cm (17.7") F5b Torpedoes (812 kg each, 1,624 kg total)

Third Generation Bombers -- The Wünderplane and the Ural Bomber

The Ural Bomber(s)


In 1935, the Luftwaffe issued a specification for a Langstrecken-Grossbomber (Long-Range Heavy Bomber) to Dornier and Junkers.

The specification was for 1,100 kg (2,425 lb) of bombs to 2,500 km (1,553 miles); later revised to 1600 kg (3,527 lb) for 2,000 km (1,242 miles); which would give it a combat radius of about 435 miles (700 km).

Both corporations produced prototypes (Do-19 and Ju-89) with flight testing in October-December 1936; before the RLM cancelled the Uralbomber program on 29 April 1937.

The reason for cancellation was that following the June 1936 death of Walther Wever in a plane crash, his replacement - Albert Kesserling - argued that Germany couldn't spend twice the engines, double the fuel consumption, and 2.5 times the amount of alumium to get a bomber that could carry the same bombload as a smaller medium bomber -- and the smaller medium bomber could cover about 70% of the targets that the Uralbomber could.

This was very important given Germany's strategic considerations at the time -- they had to rapidly build up a force of combat aircraft capable of deterring the Big Two (France & Germany); while facing an increasing amount of resource constraints.

Ernst Udet himself told Ernst Heinkel this in 1938:

"In [the] future, there will be no multi-engined bombers that cannot attack in a dive. The He 111 is the last horizontal bomber. Thanks to its accuracy on target, a medium-sized, twin-engined aircraft that delivers its 1,000 kg bomb-load on target in a dive has the same effect as a four-engined giant bird that carries 3,000-4,000 kg of bombs in horizontal flight but can only drop them inaccurately."

"We do not need the expensive machines that gobble up so much more material than a twin-engined dive-bomber. Junkers has the first twin-engined dive-bomber ready, the Ju 88. We can build two or three of this type with the same amount of material required for a four-engined job, and still achieve the same bombing effect. Jeschonnek too is fully enthusiastic. By building these large-size Stukas which cost less in materials, we can produce the number of bombers demanded by the Führer!"


We can however extrapolate what might have been for the Uralbomber if it had been given full development from the examples of the He-111 and B-17:

He-111P/H (1939): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 300 mile (483 km) radius
He-111H-16 (1942): 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 640 mile (1029.98 km) radius.
2.1x combat radius increase

B-17B (1939): 1,088.6 kg (2,400 lbs) to 448 mile radius.
B-17G (1945): 1,814.3 (4,000 lbs) to 700 mile radius.
1.5625x combat radius increase

Lets average it to a 1.831x radius increase; and we end up with a fully developed Uralbomber radius of 800~ miles.

The Ju-88

The Ju-88 design began in August 1935 with a Schnellbomber specification that called for a three-seat, twin engined bomber with 800 to 1000 kg bombload, a maximum speed of 500 km/hr and with no more than 30,000 man hours required to build each aircraft.

There were five competitors for this specification -- Bf-162, Hs-127, Ju-85 (essentially a twin-tailed Ju-88), Ju-88, He-119 -- and all except the Ju-85 received prototypes.

The Bf-162 was killed early on in order to let Messerschmitt to concentrate on Bf-108/109/110 production; while the others were killed due to engines. The Ju-88 used Jumo 211s; while the others used variants of Daimler-Benz engines, which were needed for Bf-109/110 production.

Despite gaining a lot from being the first Luftwaffe bomber that could be designed in the open; a lot of time was lost thanks to various RLM inconsistencies, which changed it from a three-man lightly armed fast bomber into a four-man heavily armed dive bomber.

The design pushed the strate of the art of stressed skin construction forcing a lot of "don't do this" reminders in the early Ju-88 manuals. One also wonders whether the fact that one of it's chief designers -- Alfred Gassner -- was an American citizen who returned to the US after the first prototype was completed had anything to do with this.

I've run across differing states for combat radius for the Ju-88.

The German Air Force, 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure by Matthew Cooper states:

Ju-88A-1: 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 550 mile (885.1 km) radius
Ju-88A-1: 1,500 kg (3,380 lbs) to 250 mile (402.3 km) radius

while this German Briefing Slide (IMAGE A/IMAGE B) claims different ranges (convert to combat radius by multiplying from a range of 0.305 to 0.40).

I believe that this is due to Ju-88 units in the Battle of Britain being limited to Rüstzustand A (1,680L Wing Fuel Only), while the chart by Junkers shows best possible ranges with the most optimal configurations for future Ju-88 development, including:

Rüstzustand B (1,680L Wing Fuel + 1,222L forward bomb bay aux tank)

Rüstzustand C (1,680L Wing Fuel + 1,222L fwd b.bay aux tk + 680L aft b.bay aux tk)

Rüstzustand C+ (1,680L Wing Fuel + 1,222L fwd b.bay aux tk + 680L aft b.bay aux tk + two 900L wing drop tanks)

Using the Junkers chart and a 0.35x multiplier, we get for late-war Ju-88 units capable of utilizing all possible combinations of Rüstzustand with beefed up landing gear and larger tires:

Ju-88A-4: 500 kg (1,102 lbs) to 800 mile (1286 km) radius
Ju-88A-4: 1,000 kg (2,205 lbs) to 630 mile (1014 km) radius
Ju-88A-4: 1,500 kg (3,307 lbs) to 508 mile (818 km) radius
Ju-88A-4: 2,400 kg (5,291 lbs) to 273 mile (439 km) radius

These numbers line up with claims that the Ju-88 could carry a "one ton bomb load to a radius of 600 miles" on the Eastern Front.

Fourth Generation Bomber -- Bomber A

On the very same day that Walter Wever died (3 June 1936), the RLM instructed Blohm & Voss, Heinkel, Henschel and Junkers to start developing a heavy bomber (with dive bombing capability); with studies due August 1936.

Bomber A specifications were for a 500 km/hr top speed, 5,000 km range and a three man crew (Pilot + Co-Pilot/Gunner + Radio Operator/Gunner), utilizing remote controlled 13mm MG131 turrets.

Heinkel's P.1041 proposal for Bomber A (500 kg payload to 2500 km range) was accepted and following mockup inspections; the official RLM designation of He-177 was assigned in late 1937 to the program, and three operational ranges were set (Nahbomber, Mittelbomber, and Fernbomber).

In early 1938, the RLM changed the specifications to 1,000 kg payload to 6,700 km (4,163 miles) and a crew of four, and no delivery of prototypes took place, because no DB606 engines were available -- only two prototype DB606 engines were available for the privately developed He-119 high speed aircraft venture, with no serial production engines available.

Heinkel proposed to the Luftwaffe General Staff that two of the six contracted He-177 prototypes be fittede with four separate Jumo 211 engines -- this was rejected on the grounds that this would eliminate the dive bomber capability; before it was accepted on 17 November 1938 that the He-177 V3 and V4 would have four engines due to the powerplant situation.

The long delay in DB606s showing up continued into 1939, to the point that Heinkel began actively searching for alternative powerplants, and getting Udet's approval for the following prototype schedule:

He-177 with DB-606: By end of August 1939
He-177 with Jumo 212 (two Jumo 211's coupled): By end of January 1940
He-177 with BMW 802 radials (two BMW 801s coupled): By mid-April 1940

When Udet visited Heinkel in April 1939, the staff once again raised discussion with him about the four-engined He-177 concept; but apparently this was turned down as well.

To make things short, there were endless delays, due to lack of engines, then constant problems with the engines and other technical issues:

He-177 V1 Prototype First Flight: 9 November 1939 - 1.4 years delay

He-177A-0 Pre-Production Delivery: 19 May 1941 - 2.6 years delay

The specifications at the time for the A-0 series were:

Rüstzustand A (Nahbomber / Short Range Bomber) (8800L fuel)
2000 km (1243 miles) range - 7,000 kg bombs (435 mile radius est.)

Rüstzustand B (Mittelbomber / Medium Range Bomber) (10,730L fuel)
3000 km (1864 miles) range - 4,000 kg bombs (652 mile radius est.)

Rüstzustand C (Fernbomber / Long Range Bomber) (12,660L fuel)
5000 km (3107 miles) range - 1,000 kg bombs (1,087.45 mile radius est.)

Amusingly enough, to switch from Rüstzustand to Rüstzustand required special parts kits and install time; it wasn't just enough to put in auxiliary fuel tanks or drop tanks. In any case this was the best the He-177 could offer -- every successive version lost range, whether through added weight or fuel loss from more defensive armament and strengthening the wing.

Operationally, the He 177 never really quite got there -- there was a deployment of them in Stalingrad with I/FKG 50 in January 1943 as cargo aircraft for the Stalingrad Airlift, as well as maritime patrol aircraft with guided weapons, but their first real operational debut as a bomber was with KG 1 in Summer 1944.

KG 1 was deployed to Prowehren (54.766667, 20.396667) and Seerappen (54.7494, 20.2906), both in East Prussia -- now part of Kaliningrad Oblast.

From those bases, the He-177s executed high altitude daylight attacks against Soviet rail hubs; among them being:

20 July 1944: All 87 of KG 1's operational bombers flew against the Velikiye Luki railroad station, some 400~ miles distant. They apparently flew so high that Russian fighters couldn't easily intercept and they caused a serious amount of damage to the station and town for no losses. Another strike was also apparently made on the Kalinkovichi rail yards, also some 400 miles distant.

22 July 1944: Brest-Litovsk some 220 miles distant was bombed with "up to 20 aircraft"; destroying the HQ of the Russian 80th Rifle Corps, killing Major General I.L. Ragulia.

23 July 1944: Molodechno was bombed, some 270~ miles distant; large fires and explosions were reported.

Their last mission against Russian troop columns was made on 25 July, after which KG 1's war was effectively over.

Further He-177 Development

On 15 September 1942, Goering finally removed the dive bombing requirement, allowing development of the four-engined He-177 to seriously start, some four years late.

5WfsVDx.jpg

One of the few photographs of a He-177B prototype in existence.

Range for the various proposed four engined versions averaged about 4,400 km (2,734 miles); some 400 km less than the twin engined He-177A-5's 4,800 km; giving it a maximum radius of action of 1,540 km (957 miles).

By late summer 1943, the four-engine He-177B-5's development schedule was estimated as:

First Prototype Aircraft: 1 April 1944
First Production Aircraft: March 1945

As you can see... it's too little, too late.

The most amusing thing about the whole He-177 mess is if you know anything about the Avro Model 679 Manchester, you'll see a lot of similarities.

The Manchester was to be a twin engined medium bomber that could make shallow dive-bombing attacks; and it was powered by two Rolls Royce Vulture engines, which were two Peregrine engines joined with a new crankshaft, forming a X-24 engine with 2600 cubic inches displacement and 1,780 hp.

Unlike Germany, the British didn't waste any time in shifting over to a four engined version (Lancaster) with conventional powerplants -- the Manchester flew operationally on 24 February 1941; with the Lancaster's debut a little bit more than a year later (372 days) on 3 March 1942.

Fifth Generation Bombers - Bomber B

The Bomber B Specification was issued by RLM on July 1939 to Arado, Dornier, Focke Wulf and Junkers for a twin engine high altitude pressurized medium bomber to replace the Ju-88 and He-111.

It was to have a top speed of 600 km/hr and carry a 4,000 kg (8,420 lb) bombload to any part of Britain from French or Norwegian bases, implying a combat radius of about 700 miles and a range of 2000 miles (3,218 km).

Junkers' and Focke-Wulf's designs were selected for development, but Bomber B was cancelled in June 1943 due to both a lack of resources and the inability of German industry to deliver powerplants capable of reaching the 2,466 hp power levels needed to make the "Bomber B" spec work.

Sixth Generation Bombers - Dirty Paper!

In early 1942, the Germans did a survey on what their aviation industry had with the capability to strike at the US from bases in the Azores; with the completed plan being given to Goering on 12 May 1942.

At that point, it was all pretty much dirty paper and a few prototypes; with no realistic chance of them actually entering service.

LOOKING AT AIRFIELDS

With all that out of the way; let's look at realistic basing options for a strategic bombardment campaign against England -- GOTT STRAFE ENGLUND!

Cuxhaven, Germany (53.8586, 8.7025) offers the best position for a bombing campaign against the British Isles, because it enables a near direct flight path to Britain over the North Sea, without having to violate Dutch or Belgian neutrality by overflying them.

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This map aligns well with statements I have seen in various books that state that when WWII began in September 1939, German bombers (i.e. the most modern He-111 in service) could only reach London with 500 kilogram (1,100~ lb) bombloads.

It also makes it clear why the Luftwaffe wanted to wait for the Ju-88 to enter service in large numbers, and as a "dream", wanted to wait until 1942 and a force of four Kampfgeschwader of He-177 (about 400~) were in service at a minimum alongside about maybe ten Kampfgeschwader of Ju-88s (about 1,000~).

On 1 September 1939, the Luftwaffe's bomber force first line inventory was:

400 x He-111H
349 x He-111P
38 x He-111E
257 x Do-17E
212 x Do-17Z
40 x Do-17M
18 x Ju-88

Out of this, only the 749 x He-111s are capable of reaching England; and even then you might not be able to fit all of them into the Bremen-Cuxhaven area in Northern Germany due to airfield limitations. Plus, due to the increasing obsolescence of the Dornier 17 force (about half are older E models, versus the newer Z); you'll need to use your He-111s to backstop them.

So you've only got about maybe 300 x He-111s capable of striking England. Assume a 85% dispatch rate; and that's 255 planes going out every day; figure about 200~ or less actually hit the target.

At 500 kilos of bombs per plane, that's only 100 metric tons of high explosive you're dropping on either London or eastern England.

If you wait until you get 300 x Ju-88s in service, you can reach most of England with twice the bombload; or 200 metric tons per raid.

If you get really lucky and Hitler doesn't go crazy until 1942; you'll have a force of probably about 200 He-177 and 1,000 Ju-88s; letting you drop 1,198 metric tons in each raid; of which 532 metric tons will come from the He-177 "überbombers".

If we alter things to June 1940 and the fall of France with Montdidier, France (49.6486, 2.5708) as our airfield area we've got this strategic layout:

INHvUBw.png


Suddenly, lots of things are in our favor.

Our shorter ranged Dorniers can actually reach targets of importance, effectively doubling our bomber force, and we can carry heavier payloads to targets like London.

References:
The German Air Force, 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure by Matthew Cooper
Battle of Britain 1940: The Luftwaffe’s ‘Eagle Attack’ by Douglas C. Dildy
Dornier Do 17 Units of World War 2 by Chris Goss
Ju 52/3m Bomber and Transport Units 1936-41 by Robert Forsyth
German Aircraft Industry and Production: 1933-1945 by Ferec Vajda and Peter Dancey
Heinkel He-177, 277, 274 by Manfred Griel and Joachim Dressel
The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume Six: Men and Planes
 
If you reverse the combat radius (400 miles) of a He-111H with 500 kg bombload in 1940 by dividing by 0.35; you get a range of 1142 miles.

Multiplying that by 0.40 gets us a maximum distance of 456 miles for a more sedate maritime patrol aircraft profile. I think we could push it to 500 miles if the crews fly only 500 feet or so at optimum cruise settings.

That gets us this map, where the red lines represent 500 mile flight paths:

nWSSEg4.png


Can you see why Raeder and the Kriegsmarine were feeling this:

u6svOZC.png


in August 1939?

At that point, capturing Norway and France is a fever dream; hence Raeder's statement that the Kriegsmarine could "do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction."

Here's another map:

elOdjUk.png


Purple: Convoy or Direct Great Circle Route for ships going to the UK

Red: He-111H range with 500 kg (1,100 lbs) of weapons.

Yellow: He-177 Range with 1000 kg (2,200 lbs) of weapons.

I'm starting to see why the Kriegsmarine kept pestering the Luftwaffe over production of the He-177 as a maritime patrol aircraft, when the RLM started to cool on the He-177; because even from 1939 Germany's borders, it was capable of flying long enough to attack the major convoy routes.
 
References:
Ju-87 Stuka by Peter C. Smith
Hitler's Stuka Squadrons by John Ward
Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, Part 2 by Manfred Griehl

Stukas

In August 1935, the RLM released a specification for a heavy dive bomber, and there were four designs which took place in the Rechlin dive bomber "fly-off":

64VOU3j.jpg

Arado Ar 81 (Eliminated in Round One)

xcbVPS4.jpg

Blohm and Voss Ha 137 (Eliminated in Round One)


The remaining designs were:

8fKJmaN.jpg

Junkers Ju 87 V2

mMKuzLD.jpg

Heinkel He 118


Ironically, it may be because of Charles Lindbergh that we got the Ju-87.

On 27 July 1936, Udet decided to fly the He-118 again to further compare it with the Junkers product. Ernst Heinkel at the time was entertaining Lindbergh, and couldn't attend at Rechlin. He did telephone Udet and warned him to pay attention to the prop pitch and fly carefully.

Udet in his best Howard Hughes impersonation, ignored Heinkel and put it into a dive from 13,000 feet. As he dove, the propellor feeathered itself, causing the reduction gear to destroy itself, resulting in massive vibrations which caused the He-118's fuselage to fail. Udet barely escaped with his life, parachuting out safely; but he was recovered in an unconscious state and taken to the hospital.

So; let's look at how Stukageschwader were tactically organized.

Geschwader - ninety-three aircraft at full strength including the three-plane Stab (staff) unit.
Gruppe - thirty aircraft
Staffel - nine aircraft
Kette - three aircraft in V formation

When used against warships up to light cruisers, Staffels (9 aircraft) were the standard attack unit. If the target was a heavy cruiser (or larger), the full Gruppe of 30 aircraft was used.

Bombing attacks would be typically carried out from 15,000 feet and a cruising speed of 150 MPH; with the dive being 80 degrees and bomb release at 3,000 feet.

Bomb weights by 1940 were typically 500 kg for concrete forts and armored warships, with 250 kg being the preferred weight for ground attack and merchantmen (usually with 4 x 50 kg on the wings).

In Poland, Stukas flew 6000~ sorties for 31 losses, a loss rate of 0.52% per sortie (or one loss every 193.5 sorties).

I haven't been able to find precise figures for France, but I can guesstimate. During that period, Stukas at one point were flying four to six sorties a day during the heaviest fighting; and they started out with about 300 serviceable Ju-87s on 10 May 1940.

With a average estimate of 600 sorties per day for the Stuka force and 46 days (10 May 1940 to 25 June 1940), we get about 27,000 sorties from the Stuka force. Groelher gave Stuka losses as 164 to all causes; which gives us a loss rate of 0.61% per sortie (or one loss every 164.6 sorties).

Peter C. Smith pointed out that when VIII. Fliegerkorps was reassigned to Luftflotte 2 in late August 1940; it effectively moved a specialized unit which had:

200+ Ju-87 (Sturzkampfgeschwaders 1, 2 and 77)
30~ Bf-110 fighter-bombers (V./Lehrgeschwader 1)
18~ reconnaissance aircraft (Do-17/Ju-88) = 2./Staffel from Aufklärungsgruppe 11 and 123

From the Cherbourg area to the Calais area; and effectively halted further operational attrition of the Ju-87; preserving the type for future operations, which makes sense when you look at the record for the Channel Battles and the Early Battle of Britain.

FF401uj.png


From July to August 1940, 59 Stukas were lost for:

1 x Anti-Aircraft Ship (HMS Foylebank) sunk
1 x Destroyer (HMS Brazen) sunk
5 x Destroyers (HMS Beagle, Boadicea, Bulldog, Boreas, Brilliant) damaged
4 x Corvettes/Frigates/Sloops/Yachts sunk (Warrior II, Kingston Galena, Roding, Gulzar)

14 x Merchantmen Sunk (Aeneas, Dallas City, Alacrity, Tascalusa, Island Queen, Pulborough I, Corhaven, Polgrange, Leo, Henry Moon, Portslade, Grönland, Coquetdale, Empire Crusader)

29 x Merchantmen Damaged (Flimston, Antonio, Eastmoor, Argos Hill, Briarwood, Lifland, East Wales, William Wilberforce, City of Melbourne, Corundum, Kenneth Hawksfield, Polgrange, Empire Daffodil, Tamworth, Newminster, Summity, Kylemount, Peru, Eleanor Brooke, Mons, Westown, Hodder, Scheldt, Balmaha, John M., Kirnwood, Oiltrader, Ermine, Kemevfal, River Ythan)

Channel convoys halted due to one out of three ships at the time ending up being sunk or damaged, and Dover based Destroyers were withdrawn from the area.

A few months later in January 1941, Stukas in the Mediteranean pretty much trashed a good portion of the Mediterranean Fleet (Carrier Illustrious, Cruisers Suffolk, Gloucester, Perth, and Southampton) with their long range Ju-87Rs. This was followed up another trashing off Crete in May 1941.

For all their faults, Stukas were very, very good anti-shipping units in the early war period, until British AAA gunfire directors caught up to them; forcing the Germans to shift to long range guided missiles from medium bombers for the mid-war to late-war period.

STUKA Technical Specifications and Notes:

Ju-87A Series
: 372 mile (600 km) radius with 250 kg bomb

Note: A 500 kg bomb could be carried if the rear gunner was left behind.

Ju-87B-1: 186.4 mile (300 km) radius with 500 kg bomb

Note: The huge drop in range was due to the B-1 having a 1,000+ hp engine (versus the A's 600 hp), but the fuel capacity remained the same -- 440L in two 220L wing tanks. Both crew could now be carried along with a 500 kg bomb.

Ju-87B-2: 130~ mile (209 km) radius, 370 mile (590 km) range with 500 kg bomb.

Note: Yet another engine change, to 1200+ hp. This enabled carriage of a 1,000 kg bomb if the back seater was left behind. Range dropped again since fuel capacity was still 440L.

Ju-87R-1: 300 mile (482 km) radius, 875 mile (1400 km) range with 250 kg bomb.
Ju-87R-2: 272 mile (437 km) radius, 779 mile (1250 km) range with 250 kg bomb.

Note: The R-1 Reichweiteriausführung (Long Range Version) finally got around to fixing the range issue. Two 150L fuel tanks were added to each of the outer wing panels, and the wing was plumbed for two 300L drop tanks. The R-2 version was a B-2 with only the drop tanks added, so range was less than the R-1.

Ju-87D: 217 mile (350 km) radius, 620 mile (1,000 km) range @ 12,600 lb weight. (assuming 250 kg bomb)

8waKBqi.png

This drawing shows the fuel tank arrangement for the Ju-87D series

Note
: The D was a significantly revised design which began in the spring of 1940 and continued as lessons learned in operations against fortifications and warships showed that a much heavier bomb would be needed to realistically damage them; along with more defensive armament. A more powerful engine (1,400 hp) was fitted; along with slightly enlarged internal fuel tanks (780L total) and now-standard drop tanks (2 x 300L)
 
This may well be so, however I would gently point out that the P-51 did not make any real contribution to the European air war until almost four years after it was designed. So, as Lusser points out, one can rush things, but ultimately, despite what one might wish, four years is how long it will REALLY take to mature the concept until its actually operationally useful.

Let's look at it from the POV of the USAAF in 1940-1941...

The 1940 fighter program's covered by Curtiss with their P-40 (July 1940 onwards).

The 1941 fighter program's covered by Lockheed with their P-38 (July 1941 onwards) and Bell with their P-39 (June 1941 onwards).

For the 1942 fighter program, we've got the wunderplane P-47, capable of flying at extremely high altitudes and fast speeds coming sometime in mid-1942 (with the P-43 being built in 1941 even though it's obsolete to keep Republic in business); and maybe the P-63 as a backup for late 1942, early 1943.

For 1943+ onwards, we've got the R-40C program (whatever may come of it).

So, how do we slot the Mustang into the AAF production program?

The answer is...we can't.

Not when North American is working on:

AT-6 Texan (we kind of need this to train the thousands of pilots for the thousands of planes FDR wants)

B-25 Mitchell (to equip the 1940-41 medium bomber program)

B-28 (to equip the 1942-1943 high altitude medium bomber program).

More to the point (and this is REALLY important) was that the Mustang had not been built to AAF specifications -- it was basically built "out of the system", to British/Commercial specifications, so there was a strong institutional distrust of the Mustang as it was not invented here (NIH).

[Back then, there was always a problem of "cranks" claiming that their idea was a world beater, if only the HIDEBOUND CONSERVATIVES WOULD SEE IT.]

It took time for the AAF's "next generation" fighter programs to fail as miserably as everyone else's (Look at Germany's Me 109/209/309 and Me 210/410) before people started remembering the spectacular range and performance of the Allison engined Mustangs in flight test.

The P-51A with 2 x 75 gallon drop tanks had a combat radius of about 600 miles due to it's extremely low drag versus other fighters.

So if the Allison Mustang could fly to Berlin and back, why the switch to the Merlin, imposing about half a years' delay?

Because by the time people had finally circled back to the Mustang as the solution to the AAF's problem(s), the threat had advanced -- no longer was the likely threat B-17 type aircraft...but now B-29 type aircraft.

Additionally, theoretical enemy fighter capabilities had increased -- in order to be capable of intercepting a B-29 class target.

Only the Merlin had a working two-stage supercharger -- the Allison two-stage supercharger was too immature for production.
 
Ju-87A Series: 372 mile (600 km) radius with 250 kg bomb
Note: A 500 kg bomb could be carried if the rear gunner was left behind.
Ju-87B-1: 186.4 mile (300 km) radius with 500 kg bomb
Note: The huge drop in range was due to the B-1 having a 1,000+ hp engine (versus the A's 600 hp), but the fuel capacity remained the same -- 440L in two 220L wing tanks. Both crew could now be carried along with a 500 kg bomb.
Ju-87B-2: 130~ mile (209 km) radius, 370 mile (590 km) range with 500 kg bomb.
Note: Yet another engine change, to 1200+ hp. This enabled carriage of a 1,000 kg bomb if the back seater was left behind. Range dropped again since fuel capacity was still 440L.
Thank you for the very detailed posts.
Some remarks:
Note that range of the 87B-1 is with a 500 kg bomb, while that of the 87A is with 250 kg bomb - doubling the bomb load will have very detrimental effect on range, while the more powerful engine can be in many cases throttled back in order to use less fuel.
Is there any German-language source that stipulates the reduction of flight crew in order for bigger bomb load to be carried?
See here for Ju 87B-2: 1000 kg bomb + full ammo and crew + full internal fuel:

87b2.jpg

Ju-87R-1: 300 mile (482 km) radius, 875 mile (1400 km) range with 250 kg bomb.
Ju-87R-2: 272 mile (437 km) radius, 779 mile (1250 km) range with 250 kg bomb.

Note: The R-1 Reichweiteriausführung (Long Range Version) finally got around to fixing the range issue. Two 150L fuel tanks were added to each of the outer wing panels, and the wing was plumbed for two 300L drop tanks. The R-2 version was a B-2 with only the drop tanks added, so range was less than the R-1.

Both the R-1 and R-2 have had the same internal fuel load as the B-1 and B-2. See here for same 370 kg of internal fuel + 444 kg of fuel in drop tanks, as well as 1000 kg bomb, full ammo + crew of two:

87R.jpg
 
Let's look at it from the POV of the USAAF in 1940-1941...

The 1940 fighter program's covered by Curtiss with their P-40 (July 1940 onwards).

The 1941 fighter program's covered by Lockheed with their P-38 (July 1941 onwards) and Bell with their P-39 (June 1941 onwards).

For the 1942 fighter program, we've got the wunderplane P-47, capable of flying at extremely high altitudes and fast speeds coming sometime in mid-1942 (with the P-43 being built in 1941 even though it's obsolete to keep Republic in business); and maybe the P-63 as a backup for late 1942, early 1943.
More comments below, but the XP-46 contract granted 9/39 was Materiel Command great aspiration to dramatically improve performance over P-40. Earlier start, later first flight - dismal performance to promised expectations.

XP-47B with R-2800 nipped the P-44 which was modified to accept R-2800, as a better solution and was the final transformation from Seversky to Republic.

Even as early as 1939, the general assessment of the P-40 and -39 by AAF-Hq was that they were both substandard to Euro Spitfire and Bf 109. Hence XP-46.

By late 1941, The AAF Fighter Board as well as the Hq Planning and Hq Close Ar Support directorate were changing from fast attack bomber/dive bomber concept derived from LW success - to fast attack bomber/fast muti role Pursuit capable of CAS, REcon and battlefield air superiority. NAA marketing intelligence a the Pentagon were aware of both funding FY42 for dive bombing, that the XA-32 was a hog, powerful, but a hog. They invested internal funding for the Low Level Pursuit variation of the Mustang I (NA-83) and had that ready for Arnold visit.

I have internal NAA correspondence for most of the above as well as the USAF/AAF Studies that show the slow swing of the AAF boat toward a modern battlefield attack and defend concepts. My speculation based on surrounding facts is that Arnold went to NAA solely on Eaker's recommendations. Eaker specfic in Air Force Spoken Here, but Arnold vague in Global Power.
For 1943+ onwards, we've got the R-40C program (whatever may come of it).

So, how do we slot the Mustang into the AAF production program?
The answer is...we can't.

Not when North American is working on:

AT-6 Texan (we kind of need this to train the thousands of pilots for the thousands of planes FDR wants)

B-25 Mitchell (to equip the 1940-41 medium bomber program)

B-28 (to equip the 1942-1943 high altitude medium bomber program).
In 1941 NAA was in full production of 620 Mustang I, shifting to 1A in February. Kindelberger letter to Echols. cc t Arnold was plea for AAF orders as the Mustang IA was scheduled to complete run Nov 1942.
More to the point (and this is REALLY important) was that the Mustang had not been built to AAF specifications -- it was basically built "out of the system", to British/Commercial specifications, so there was a strong institutional distrust of the Mustang as it was not invented here (NIH).
NIH was in full bloom, but the Mustang was exactly built to the Sructural and Design Standards published by Materiel Division in 1930s. Lee Atwood was NAA Chief, Engineering, Chief Structures at Douglas and was a structures engineer at Materiel Command some time before his move to NAA.

You may be thinking of Lightweight Fighter seies NA-105, 105A and 105B - all designed to 7G Limit/10.3 Utimate, but at 9600 pound Combat weight. They were more rubust than A/B/Dbecause of GW growth over spec 8000 pounds
[Back then, there was always a problem of "cranks" claiming that their idea was a world beater, if only the HIDEBOUND CONSERVATIVES WOULD SEE IT.]

It took time for the AAF's "next generation" fighter programs to fail as miserably as everyone else's (Look at Germany's Me 109/209/309 and Me 210/410) before people started remembering the spectacular range and performance of the Allison engined Mustangs in flight test.
Actually the fate of the P-51, P-51A, A-36, P-51B remained in TAC inventory through 1943. There are a lot of moving parts beginning July 1943 with the test 90 gal SS fuselage Tank, the startling losses during Blitz Week for 8th AF, then successive disasters at RegensburgSchweinfurt before the P-38s were re-directed and the P-51B assigned to ETO. Then there was wrestling between Leigh Mallory and Spaatz to subborn 9th AF FC to support 8th AF up to Overlord.
The P-51A with 2 x 75 gallon drop tanks had a combat radius of about 600 miles due to it's extremely low drag versus other fighters.

So if the Allison Mustang could fly to Berlin and back, why the switch to the Merlin, imposing about half a years' delay?
The first P-51A flew in Feb 1943. The XP-51B in Nov 1943. The production P-51B was complete save 1650-3 in late February and flew May 1943. More P-51Bs had been completed than P-51A total production by July 1943. The delay was due to the obstinance of the CG Air Defense Command who was the desision maker for the allocations.
Because by the time people had finally circled back to the Mustang as the solution to the AAF's problem(s), the threat had advanced -- no longer was the likely threat B-17 type aircraft...but now B-29 type aircraft.
The immediate threat (FW 190, Bf 109/110s) was the survival of the 8th AF and the concept of long range strategic bombing - hinging on effective LR escort - and the P-47 was a long way from being a solution.
Additionally, theoretical enemy fighter capabilities had increased -- in order to be capable of intercepting a B-29 class target.

Only the Merlin had a working two-stage supercharger -- the Allison two-stage supercharger was too immature for production.
You made some good points, and Tomo already discussed his valid POV - but I would suggest the following consideration after reviewing comments above..

Early History

The two 'real' competitors to the NAA XP-51 41-038/039 Mustang were a.) the badly flawed XP-46 and b.) NIH.

I would add that IMO, Col/Gen Oliver Echols Chief Materiel Division, was the leading evangalist of NIH for two reasons - 1.) NAA Gently raised a single digit salute to Echols when he requested NAA to subcontract P-40s so he could clear production capacity for P-46., and 2.) NAA raised the middle digit again a month later after Anglo France Purchasing Board rejected the Ryan Powered P-500 concept.

Actually the XP-51 had, IIRC, 8 test flights with constructive critism delivered to NAA. The design change to 'long carb intake' resulted and were retro fitted to the first 10 production articles. 41-039 was delivered in December and received favorable opinions at pilot level. Kelsey flew it once in January 1940 and grudgingly admitted that is was faster than the P-40, not quite as good in manuever - then depared in a cloud of dust to his assignment to 8th AF.

The West Coast based 20th PG tested one of the two XP-51 against P-38D, P-39, P-40, P-64 and deemed it 'Best in Show'. Col Ira Eaker formerly 20th Pursuit stopped at NAA in December 41 and flew it. He was delighted but remarked that it needed more power at higher altitudes - he so stated to Arnold. A letter from CG West Coast command to Arnold in early January spawned the Spaatz/Arnold visit.
 
Part of Post 136 about the Luftwaffe's "Z-Plan".
By 7 November 1938, there were further details on the 1942 Luftwaffe OBAT:

16 x Fighter Geschwaders (Bf-109)
16 x Zerstorer Geschwaders (50% Bf-110 and 50% Me-210)
8 x Stuka Geschwaders (converting from Ju-87 to Me 210 as it became available)
4 x Heavy Bomber Geschwaders (He-177s)
54 x Medium Bomber Geschwaders (Ju-88s)
According to "The Birth of the Luftwaffe" by Hanfried Schliephake the ORDBAT for the autumn of 1942 (as planned in the autumn of 1938) was:
  • 58 Kampfgeschwader - Ju 88 and He 177 (as many He 177s as possible at least sufficient for four Geschwader) that is.
    • 13 Seekampgeschwader or "Pirate Formations" to be used exclusively for operations against naval targets, in which the enemy fleet was to be attacked with bombs and torpedoes, and mines laid in enemy waters.
    • 30 Kampfgeschwader were to be used as a strategic air force against England, as is clear for the demand for as many He 177 long-range bombers as possible.
    • 15 Kampgeschwader for the air war against France.
  • 8 (later increased to 12) Sturzkampgeschwader - Me 210 (Ju 87B at time being established).
  • 16 Zerstörergeschwader - Me 210, Bf 110 (as many Me 210s as possible, at least sufficient for 7-8 Geschwader).
  • 16 Jagdgeschwader - Bf 109 and types developed there from.
  • 10 Nahaufklärer Gruppen (Short-range reconnaissance) - Hs 126 and Fw 189.
  • 10 Fernaufklärer Staffeln (Long-range reconnaissance) for the Army - Do 17P & Z and Fw 189.
  • 13 Fernaufklärer Staffeln (Long-range reconnaissance) for the Luftwaffe - Ju 88 and He 177.
  • 1 Schlachtgeschwader (Ground attack) - Fw 189.
  • 4 Transportgeschwader - Ju 90 (if available in insufficient quantities, decision on substitute equipment deferred).
  • 36 Bord- und Tragägerflugseugstaffel (Shipboard and Carrier aircraft) Bf 109 (Carrier), Ju 87B, Fi 167 or Ar 195 (distribution worked out in consultation with Naval HQ 'Ob.d.M.').
Each Geschwader was divided into a staff unit and 3 or 4 Gruppen with each Gruppe divided into 3 Staffeln with an authorised allowance of 12 aircraft (9 operational and 3 reserve) with the exception of the fighter Staffeln which were to have 18 aircraft each without increased personnel. Schliephake didn't say so explicitly, but my guess is that the 18 aircraft in each fighter Staffeln would have consisted of 12 operational and 6 reserve aircraft. The total amounted to 20,000 aircraft and that the AA artillery schedule comprised 2,500 heavy & 3,000 light batteries.

The list doesn't include any reconnaissance aircraft for the Navy and I think the number of shipboard and carrier aircraft Staffeln is too high. I think it's a mistake for 41 squadrons which were to consist of: 2 shipboard, 12 carrier and 27 reconnaissance squadrons, because that's what was the strength agreed between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe in late 1938/early 1939 according to what I've read elsewhere.
 
Part of Post 137.
On 1 September 1939, the Luftwaffe's bomber force first line inventory was:
400 x He-111H​
349 x He-111P​
38 x He-111E​
257 x Do-17E​
212 x Do-17Z​
40 x Do-17M​
18 x Ju-88​

Out of this, only the 749 x He-111s are capable of reaching England; and even then you might not be able to fit all of them into the Bremen-Cuxhaven area in Northern Germany due to airfield limitations. Plus, due to the increasing obsolescence of the Dornier 17 force (about half are older E models, versus the newer Z); you'll need to use your He-111s to backstop them.
According to "The Birth of the Luftwaffe" by Hanfried Schliephake the Luftwaffe had 1,176 bombers at the end of August 1939 as follows:
400 He 111H - as above​
349 He 111P - as above​
38 He 111E - as above​
119 Do 17E - not 257 as above.​
212 Do 17Z - as above​
40 Do 17M - as above​
18 Ju 88 - as above​

However, it also lists 257 Do 17 long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Could that be where your figure of 257 Do 17E bombers comes from?

Edit: Were you using this?

Table 3-G Luftwaffe First Line Inventory on 31 August 1939 (4,033 including 3,646 ready)
Page 49 of "German Aircraft Industry and Production 1933-1945
by Ferenc A. Vajda & Peter Dancey


Table 3-G Luftwaffe First Line inventory on 31.08.39.png
According to "The Birth of the Luftwaffe" by Hanfried Schliephake the total at 31.03.39 was 4,093 front-line aircraft available at the start of the war of which 3,646 were ready for immediate action, representing an effectiveness rate of 90%. The table on Page 54 says.

P.54 of The Birth of the Luftwaffe - Combat Aircraft at 31.08.39..png

Therefore, I think there are some printing errors in Vajda & Dancey's book. That is 4,093 first-line aircraft instead of 4,033 and the 119 Do 17E bombers have been omitted entirely.
 
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Another part of Post 136 about the Luftwaffe's "Z-Plan".
The Luftwaffe by Spring 1942 was to have 10,300 operational aircraft and 8,200 in reserve.
I did a reconciliation of my information from Hanfried Schliephake's book and the above which comes from Vajda & Dancey's book. This was the result.

P.49 of The Birth of the Luftwaffe - Combat Aircraft in 1938 Plan.png

I'm assuming:
  • 4 operational aircraft per Geschwader staff flight.
  • 3 operational aircraft per Gruppe staff flight.
  • 9 operational aircraft per Staffel.
  • All Geschwader have 3 Gruppen.
  • All Gruppen have 3 Staffeln.
For comparison the RAF's Expansion Scheme M, which was approved by the Cabinet on 17.11.38 was to provide the RAF with a Metropolitan Air Force of 2,549 first-line aircraft in 163 squadrons plus 636 first-line aircraft in 49 squadrons overseas for a total of 3,185 first-line aircraft in 212 squadrons on 31st March 1942. See below.

RAF Expansion Scheme M.png
The heavy bombers were to have been a mix of Halifaxes, Manchesters and Stirlings with a grand total of 3,500 to be delivered by 31.03.42. As far as I know the 800 fighters were to have been Tornados and Typhoons. The 108 army co-operation aircraft were to have been Lysanders. The 245 T.B./G.R. and T.D. aircraft were to have been a mix of Bothas and Beauforts. The flying boats were to have been a mix of Lerwicks and Sunderlands.

Furthermore, what was still the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force was to have 504 first-line aircraft in the equivalent of 42 squadrons on 31.03.42 under Expansion Scheme F of February 1936, but the Admiralty was now asking for 650 first-line aircraft in the equivalent of 54 squadrons by 31.03.42 which would have increased the first-line strength of the British air services on that date to 3,835 aircraft in the equivalent of 266 squadrons.

So the strength of the Luftwaffe in 1942 (as planned in late 1938) was about 2½ times larger than the strength for the British air services in 1942 (as planned in late 1938). Although the British planned to have reserves on a much larger scale and they also planned to have 1,360 heavy bombers in 1942 when the Germans planned to have 376.
 
This thread contains the usual amount of Goering & Udet bashing. How much of that was deserved and how much of it was the likes of Milch distancing themselves from the Luftwaffe's failures by blaming them on people who were dead and therefore couldn't tell their side of the story?
 
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