CVA-01 - What was the RN carrier plan 1966-1976

We all know CVA-01 was scheduled to start building in 1966 and that F-4 Phantoms had been ordered as a stop gap replacement for the Sea Vixen following the cancellation of the Naval P1154.

So if the fateful decision to cancel the CVA-01 and dispose of the fixed wing carrier fleet hadn't occured, what was the planning regarding the existing carriers, aircraft etc, in the period between CVA-01 being ordered and entereing operational service ?

HMS Centaur was at that time deemed too small to operate larger front line aircraft and was then used as an Accomdation ship until scrapping, but if the carrier fleet still had a role, would she have been converted as per Albion & Bulwark or might she be sold off abroad as she was probably more capable than the Colossus/majestic ships being traded about.

HMS Victorious dumped for scrapping early following a fire during refit in a mess deck, but was supposed to carry on til 1969-72. Too small to operate Phantoms but would she have been viable for sales in the Early 70's given original age and mid life rebuild ?. Was to be replaced by CVA-01

HMS Hermes, became a Commando Carrier replacing Albion, as was too small for Phantoms and limited with the current Sea Vixen/Buccaneer & Ganet. Did see a note in 1966 concerning the replacement of the carrier fleet by F-111K EoS that Hermes might be used as an AEW carrier.

HMS Eagle - Recently modernised and refurbished, was expected to have refit to replace JBD's to enable Phantom operations, i suppose the same refit would have seen the replacement of the last 4.5" turrets to be replaced by deck edge extentions as per the Ark Rebuild. In this role would she have accompanied CVA-01 until replacement by CVA-02 or possibly CVA-03 ?.

HMS Ark Royal - unmodernised, but still a large carrier, was she to soldier on until the early 70's providing cover for Eagle during her refits using Sea Vixen & Buccaneer until she was replaced by CVA-01/CVA-02 ?. After which point she would have acted as a source of spare for Eagle (much as Eagle did for Ark following her withdrawl in 1972 ). I can't see them doing a refit to enable Phantom operations when the money would be needed for the new builds instead ?

Just I was wondering if anybody has seen relevant document to what the original intention was rather the rather different policy once the Carrier fleet was deemed surplus to requirements as most material tends to cover what happened ?

G

Eagle had the SeaCat launchers, Ark Royal did'nt or at least was'nt fitted with them.

Thorvic

Like you I have not found any original sources explaining the appearance of the
RN with CVA 01 in the period 1966-1980

My best guess from available sources is that CVA 01 was planned to be the main
carrier with HMS Eagle as the other, until such time funds could be found for a CVA 02.

The only other carrier slated for fixed wing ops in this period was the unfortunate HMS Hermes.
It was the limited capacity of this ship and its inability to operate Phantoms safely that permitted
the Treasury to kill off the carrier force even before the decision to withdraw from East of Suez.

Reinforcement of Singapore from the UK and forward deployment of F-111s and other RAF types
was seen as more realistic than the mix of Bucs and Phantoms offered by CVA 01 or one of its substitutes.

The Commando Carrier force had already been established with Bulwark and Albion. As only two ships
were proposed for the period 1966-1980 it is possible that Centaur or Hermes might have replaced one of the existing ships, but I do not think so. Cheaper merchant hull ships based on the USS Iwo Jima or
versions of the Escort Cruiser were looked at as mid 70s replacements, but nothing fixed by 1966.

Blake and Tiger (and Lion if it had been converted) were due for replacement by Escort Cruisers at some point in the 70s using the design postponed because of Polaris in 1962. Up to 6 ships were planned (later becoming the Invincible class).

Ark Royal and Victorious were planned to be out of service by the time CVA 01 entered service.

Planned escorts were a mix of County class, Type 82s, the new frigate design, and Type 12s.

Fearless and Intrepid had already been ordered and there were no plans for additional ships.

Hope this helps!

UK 75

The 1960s report into replacing the RAN's carrier capability has some more information about the RN's plans for the CVA-01. They briefed the RAN as to when they could provide carriers. From memory the RN planned to build two or three CVA-01s. I have attached this report here somewhere. Think it is in the Sea Projects.

Projection in Nov 1958 for the CV fleet out of service dates is the following.

Victorious 1972
Eagle and Centaur 1973
Albion 1974
Ark Royal 1975
Hermes 1980

Which is why CVA-01 is launched as a process in 1960.

1958 plans are for three such ships, construction dates
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
The 1957 White paper had aproved the existing five modern carriers, so the 58-60 board was thinking of a one for one replacement.

By May 1963 there where still four ships in the long term building programe.
July 30 Cabinet agreed the CV fleet be maintained at three, a reduction of one ship and the new carrier should be built to replace Ark Royal.
This being because by 1963 her material condition was poor, and a refit would only extend her to 1972 with a 2 year refit, or to 1974 with a 3 year refit. The exorbitant costs to gain so few years of extra life not being worth the effort.

By cancelation only two CVA-01 types where being budgeted, and the figure along with eight Type 82 used to justify the cancelation. Presumably becuase it exagerated the cost on the one hand and defered the third ship and AAW assets to some later date when the finances might work out.

The case for modernising the existing CVs to take the F4 was poor IMO, beyond Eagle, (which wuld come out of refit in '64) which could be kept running by the scrapping of Ark Royal.
Relegating Hermes and Victorious to strike only operations, maybe some AEW and ASW until the new ASW cruisers came into service.
Not as much folly as one might think since offensive aircraft outnumber fighters for the Tactical Air Unit, 64 strike to 32 fighter and 8 AEW, in the revised numbers of 1960 and still reflected in projections of CVA-01s airwing in 1963 of 4 AEW, 12 F4 and 24 S.2.
Fighter numbers were required to perform continious CAP, hence CVA-01s layout for continious operations.
Thus offloading strike operations to the older carriers makes some sense if they cannot operate the F4. After all it was based on two CVA-01 types operating together to provide the full TAU, hence 16 Fighters per CV. Assumption being 18 Fighters where needed for a single carrier to provide continious CAP of four aircraft for four hours per flight, as per the early studies for carriers in 1960.

Cheers Zen

Thats exactly what i was looking for, as i know the plans went out the window with the cancellation of the CVA-01 and the Carriers.

Geoff

Its why the numbers for CVA-01 don't quite seem to stack up when they speak of 18 F4 and 18 S2.

too small a number on strike, and too large a number for the fighter.

But both numbers are indicative of a continous operational cycle, so perhaps the 18/18 figure suggests a 'normal' number with a surge to 16/24 for the worst case requirements of a TAU.

The full TAU is 96 aircraft plus 8 AEW (104), and the studies in 1960 show that only the 68,000ton ship can carry half that figure plus the 2 SAR helcopters (the 68,000ton ship carrying 62 Buccaneer sized machines or 59 plus three helicopters). However at the early stage its 107 plus 8 AEW until they realise the long range strikes are in the early phase of operations while the short range are mainly later on and both can be handled by the one type of aircraft.
Thus the CVA-01 seems suggestive of not a half but a third of a TAU, implying three of this class operational needed to meet the TAU for the most stressing mission. To meet this you need at least five such CVs, and preferably six maybe seven.
No wonder the Treasurey did'nt like it!
But then they had made this situation with the artificial limit on tonnage, assuming tonnage = cost. Whereas the larger CV would be cheaper per plane and to run and requires only two operational CVs to make up the TAU and in turn a minimum of three to four in total.

Hi one and all,

May an ex blue-job pose a question ?

Is any naval historian able to confirm that the aircraft carrier returning to the UK in March 1966 (about 3 March) was in fact HMS Ark Royal ? She would have left Singapore the same day or the previous day I guess.

I was part of a Vulcan crew which was low level over Malaya (as it then was called) that evening and we spoke to the duty radar officer. He was able to give us some help with a problem. I think the callsign was X-ray Juliet ?

If it wasn’t the Ark Royal, maybe it was the Bulwark but I think she was based in Malta that year, might have been HMS Eagle.

Any help would be much appreciated.

Thanks in advance from ernest0

HMS Eagle was at sea in that area on that date, Ark was at Mombassa in Kenya at the time.

G

Hi Thorvic.,

Ok, so it was HMS Eagle, I was not entirely sure.

Many thanks indeed, that's very helpful for me.

All the best from Ernesto

This seems like the most appropriate place to ask this, I was scanning Hansard from November 1967 about the cuts undertaken at that time. In the part of the statement where the Prime Minister mentions the retirement of HMS Victorious he goes on to state that:

What it means for the Navy is a reduction in the numbers of Buccaneer aircraft now on order.

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Does anybody know how many aircraft were on order prior to this reduction and what the overall reduction in orders for the Royal Navy was?
Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1967/nov/22/economic-situation#S5CV0754P0_19671122_HOC_279

My understanding: 92 RN S.2 on order while CVA-01 was alive. Secretary of State for Defence Healey in November,1967 planned to transfer the survivors to RAF with the Maritime Strike Task as the 3 remaining Strike carriers (Ark/Eagle/Hermes) decommissioned (and 65 were so). In mid-1968 Healey joined NKF75 (to be MRCA/Tornado) and shifted the last 8, as yet unbuilt RN, to join 18 more as new-build RAF S.2B, becoming in all 49, built to 10/77.

Zen

I have been re-reading your fascinating account of the aircraft loadings for CVA 01 and other carriers.

Things must indeed have looked pretty tight for the deployable carrier force in the late 70s. With only 1 CVA 01 in service and HMS Eagle and HMS Hermes as limited ships, even with CVA 02 joining the force in say 1979 things would have been tight.

Allowing for refits etc, the risk of having just HMS Hermes available was very high. Given the cost of the overall force and the aircraft requirements the RAF were offering F-111Ks as a substitute for Buccaneers. Buccaneer was not as well thought of then as it is now.

A tricky problem and one that went away with the collapse of Sterling and withdrawal from East of Suez. It would be interesting to know what NATO and the US thought of the British carriers versus TFX in a European War. NATO planning documents may one day become available.

Well I'd say its speculative as to how long each CVA ship would take to complete.
Not sure I can remember what the projected timetable was by cancelation, nor how realistic that was. But I suspect they thought -02 would complete before '78. Depends on the speed of progress, but they might have kept Eagle running as long as Ark Royal was, the strain being less due to HMS Queen Elizibeth being in service. So its not clear how 'worn out' Eagle or Hermes would be.
That said the arguments for a third are strong once you accept the principle your going to retain and maintain carrier operations. For a sustainable force its the practical minimum, as just two leaves gaps.
We also don't know what effect this will have on French decision making over successors to the Clemenceaus. If they continue with UK sourcing, they'll jump in and buy mk6 and DAX-2 systems to fit new CVs, though its doubtful they'd either buy or build CVA-01 types.
We also don't know what happens if the UK carries on with the Type 988, but we know the Dutch persevere. What does this do to the market if the UK is buying some 10 sets at least?
What is missed of course is F111K is just F111K, whereas CVA-01's CAG is a variety of aircraft, none of which are as expensive initialy to buy or operate (take alone, though of course collectively and with the CVBG rather more expensive, though more flexible and potent). Granted if the UK does wrangle F14s that metric rather changes.
USN last I heard, were not too happy to see NATO loose a CV.
That said Ark Royal had demonstrated what a dangerous force a carrier could be in excercises, and just how much trouble it can cause before its caught. Indeed if its caught as they located her by accident.

JFC Fuller said:

This seems like the most appropriate place to ask this, I was scanning Hansard from November 1967 about the cuts undertaken at that time. In the part of the statement where the Prime Minister mentions the retirement of HMS Victorious he goes on to state that:

What it means for the Navy is a reduction in the numbers of Buccaneer aircraft now on order.

Click to expand...

Does anybody know how many aircraft were on order prior to this reduction and what the overall reduction in orders for the Royal Navy was?
Source: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/...conomic-situation#S5CV0754P0_19671122_HOC_279

Click to expand...

How long is a piece of string?

According to this Parliamentary debate of 27th November 1967 eight aircraft were cancelled.

I come to the Buccaneers. Partly as a result—but not wholly as a result—of phasing out "Victorious", I believe that we can cancel the last eight Buccaneers which were due to be delivered to the Royal Navy. They were intended for backing, anyway, and they would have been handed over in 1976 with a larger number of Buccaneers to the R.A.F. when the carrier is finally phased out. This will still save about £6 million next year and the Ministry of Technology is negotiating with the firms concerned about cancellation charges and is trying to meet the problems of work-load which the cancellation has created.

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According to this Parliamentary debate of 19th December 1967 eight were cancelled.

Mr. James Johnson asked the Minister of Technology if he will make a statement about his negotiations with the Hawker Siddeley Company on the problems of work-load which the cancellation of the eight Buccaneer aircraft has created.

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And as 84 Buccaneer S.2s were built for the RN that would make a total of 92.

However, on 14th February 1968.

Sir Ian Orr-Ewing asked the Minister of Technology what are the current estimates for the cancellation charges for 10 Buccaneers and their associated equipment.

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And on 1st March 1968.

Mr. Wall asked the Minister of Technology what cancellation charges have been paid for the ten cancelled Buccaneers.

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And as 84 Buccaneer S.2s were built for the RN that would make a total of 94.


The last batch of Buccaneers for the RN was Contract No. KC/2F/179 on 27.06.67 for 17 S.2 aircraft (XV863-879). The UK Serials website also says 17 aircraft (XV863-879) and that the last 10 aircraft (XV870-879) were cancelled. The UK Serials website also says that the S.2B XW989 (ordered for the RAE) were cancelled.

However, I thought the UK Serials website said 19 aircraft (XV863-881) were in this batch and that the last 12 (XV770-881) were cancelled, which would have made a total of 96 S.2s ordered and 12 cancelled, but when I checked it (on 16.09.22) it ended at XV879, which matches the Aeromilitaria article.

I had confused it with Page 222 of the British Military Aircraft Serials book which said 19 aircraft (XV863-881) with the last 12 (XV7770-881) cancelled. If that's correct it was 84 built + 12 cancelled = 96 ordered for the RN.

Unfortunately, Putnam's Blackburn Aircraft Since 1909 by A.J. Jackson is of no help, because the production list on pages 503 to 505 only has the aircraft that were built. However, it does say that the 7 aircraft XV863-869 were delivered from 25.07.68 to 06.03.69 and that they were used by 736, 803 & 809 Sqns. It also says that all 7 were converted to S.2Bs which were used by all 5 RAF squadrons and the OCU.

This quote is from the Air History Branch monograph "Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1964-1970" by A.S. Bennell (National Archives reference Air 41/91) and straddles Page 7-5 & 7-6 of Chapter 7 "London, Washington, Canberra (January 1966)".

In opening discussion on the aircraft programme two days later Healey pointed out that his proposals significantly reduced the number of combat aircraft and the scale of aircraft purchases from those envisaged at the time of the 1965 Defence White Paper. The planned purchase of the F111A had been reduced from 110 to 50, that of the C130 from 82 to 70, and that of the Buccaneer from 171 to 96. The requirement of Phantoms for the RN had been reduced, though that for the RAF had been increased. There would be two substantial Anglo-French projects, that for the Jaguar strike/trainer and that of the proposed variable geometry strike aircraft planned to enter service in 1974/75. All this would lead to a substantial loading on the British aircraft industry, although a reduction of £1,250m over ten years when compared with the aircraft programme of the previous administration. The dollar element of the programme had been reduced since the time of the previous White Paper by a further £175m equivalent. Healey dismissed the Spey/Mirage concept, not only on performance grounds, but also because neither France nor the Federal Republic of Germany intended to adopt the aircraft. In a detailed presentation of the comparative merits of the F111A and the developed Buccaneer, he contended that the capacity of the F111A at long range and at both high and low altitudes and its avionics fit enabled it to find and record target information in all weathers. The developed Buccaneer with the Elliot nav/attack system would certainly be between 3½ and 4 years later than the F111A; it was "the best of a dying generation of fixed-wing subsonic aircraft". Development effort would be better devoted, jointly, to the AFVG aircraft. With all of this CAS spoke in agreement.8

8 OPD (66) 5th M 21 Jan 66 Cab 148.

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The 1965 Defence White Paper was published in February 1965 and Dennis Healey said the above on 21st January 1966. Therefore does ...

and that of the Buccaneer from 171 to 96.

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... mean 171 Buccaneer S.2s were planned for the RN in February 1965? I think it does because it was well before the decision to phase out the strike carriers by 1975 and transfer the surviving Buccaneers to the RAF.

I thought there were more references to 96 Buccaneers being planned between 1966 and 1968, but I did a search of the document looking for the number 96 & the words Buccaneer & Buccaneers and the above was the only one I found. Although, it did mention the batch of 26 Buccaneer S.2Bs ordered for the RAF in September 1968 and said that the decision to order them was made after the 50 F-111Ks were cancelled.

According to the table from Aeromilitaria 47 Buccaneer S.2s were on order at January 1966. 30 were ordered in April 1966 increasing the total to 77 and 15, 17 or 19 were ordered in June 1966 increasing the total to 92, 94 or 96 of which 8, 10 or 12 were cancelled in 1967 reducing the total to 84.

Incidentally the order before the last Buccaneer S.2 order for the Royal Navy (in June 1967) was a SRN.6 hovercraft (XV859) on 31.05.67 & the one before that was the 15 CH-47A Chinooks (XV841-855) and the order immediately after was the 50 F-111Ks (XV884-887 & XV901-947) on 08.08.67.

So depending upon whom you believe 8, 10 or 12 aircraft were cancelled and the total on order at the time of cancellation was 92, 94 or 96 aircraft.

Just to confuse matters further, my 1980 edition of British Military Aircraft Serials and Markings by BARG (British Aviation Research Group) states that XV870-877 were cancelled and has the order for XV863-877 as a 15 aircraft order, reduced to 7 and ultimately built as S.2D standard and later transferred to the RAF as S.2Bs.

British Military Aircraft Serials: 1911-1979 by Bruce Robertson is of no help as it only lists the 7 built aircraft of that batch.

So I guess it all hinges on whether contract KC/2F/179 was for 17 or 15 airframes. I wonder if the Air Britain listing in Aeromilitaria has a typo? 879 as a slip of the finger instead of 877?

Hood said:

Just to confuse matters further, my 1980 edition of British Military Aircraft Serials and Markings by BARG (British Aviation Research Group) states that XV870-877 were cancelled and has the order for XV863-877 as a 15 aircraft order, reduced to 7 and ultimately built as S.2D standard and later transferred to the RAF as S.2Bs.

British Military Aircraft Serials: 1911-1979 by Bruce Robertson is of no help as it only lists the 7 built aircraft of that batch.

So I guess it all hinges on whether contract KC/2F/179 was for 17 or 15 airframes. I wonder if the Air Britain listing in Aeromilitaria has a typo? 879 as a slip of the finger instead of 877?

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Air Britain "The Fleet Air Arm Fixed-Wing Aircraft since 1946" published in 2004 says this:-

"15 Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer S.2 Martel ordered 27.6.67 under Cont No KC/2F/179/CB.58(b), built at HSA Brough, flown from HoSM and numbered XV863 to XV877 (8 cancelled from XV870 21.11.67). (Two 11,000ibs st Rolls Royce Spey 101)"
First flights were between 29 May 1968 & 21 Jan 1969.

Previous S.2 contracts were :-
KC/2F/O5/CB.9(a) dated 25/9/59 - 10 aircraft ordered as S.1 changed to S.2 May 1961 - serialled XN974-XN983 (XN974 first flew 5/6/64)
KC/2F/048/CB.9(a) dated 5/5/64 - 20 aircraft serialled XT269-XT288
KC/2F/125/CB.58(a) dated 25/10/65 - 17 aircraft serialled XV152-XV168
KC/2F/153/CB.58(a) dated 12/4/66 - 30 aircraft serialled XV332-XV361

Total S.2 for the RN - 92.

Hood said:

British Military Aircraft Serials: 1911-1979 by Bruce Robertson is of no help as it only lists the 7 built aircraft of that batch.

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For what it's worth, the photo copy of Page 222 that I made from my local reference library's copy of British Military Aircraft Serials (I don't remember which edition) by Bruce Robinson says:

XV863-XV881 Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer S.2 7(19)
XV863-XV869 built as S.2B for Royal Navy. Most later converted to S.2D. XV870-XV881 cancelled.

Click to expand...

Hood said:

So I guess it all hinges on whether contract KC/2F/179 was for 17 or 15 airframes. I wonder if the Air Britain listing in Aeromilitaria has a typo? 879 as a slip of the finger instead of 877?

Click to expand...

Maybe you're right because all it says is

Serial Numbers: XV863-879 Type: Buccaneer S.2 Contractor: HSA Contract No.: KC/2F/179 Date: 27/06/67

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I'd say given that Sturtivant in The Fleet Air Arm Fixed-Wing Aircraft since 1946 also specifically states the number of airframes as 15 for KC/2F/179 that the Aeromilitaria article probably is a serial typo.

If one TAU comprises 64 Strike Aircraft, then on the basis of then reserve being approximately of equal size, the total should be over 128.
So 92 or 98 is still some 34 to 30 Aircraft short and consequently another order is likely sometime from '68.

A figure of 171 allowes for OEU/OCU.

I guess they may have factored in the Scimitar as a reserve aircraft, of course those were withdrawn in 1969.
I reckon there would have been one or two orders in 1968-69 to complete the TAU.

Good point on the Scimitar!

The Twosader proposed to the RN seems to me the most practical way of keeping Hermes as a working carrier.
Ark Royal/Eagle and Hermes could have been viable into the 1980s if the RN had not decided to focus on ASW warfare.
I suspect the US were grateful for this shift as an ASW task force was more useful to SACLANT than a single small fixed wing carrier and escorts.

uk 75 said:

Ark Royal/Eagle and Hermes could have been viable into the 1980s if the RN had not decided to focus on ASW warfare.
I suspect the US were grateful for this shift as an ASW task force was more useful to SACLANT than a single small fixed wing carrier and escorts.

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I‘d say “it depends”. The US found the UK’s presence in the Indian Ocean useful and I’m sure a more active carrier force would have been nice to relieve the pressure for USN commitments.

uk 75 said:

The Twosader proposed to the RN seems to me the most practical way of keeping Hermes as a working carrier.

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I am still doubtful about Crusader for Hermes and co.

- Even with a different engine the F-8 design would be close to the F-8J or F-8E(FN)
- The F-8J single seater with internal fuel and 4 sidewinders or 2 bvr missiles weighs 32k lbs. No droptanks. Rather short legs
- At 32k lbs, the F-8 needs 10 kts wind over deck with the C-11 catapult
- Even the longer 175 ft BS5 for the phantomized Hermes is still about 20 kts weaker than the C-11
- So even "F-4 Hermes" needs ~30 kts WOD to launch a Crusader
- Make that ~35 kts in the tropics
- Ship speed is only 25 kts

Does not look practical. The F-8J and the the phantomized Hermes would both be pretty maxed out designs, so I doubt you could improve substantially on that.

uk 75 said:

The Twosader proposed to the RN seems to me the most practical way of keeping Hermes as a working carrier.
Ark Royal/Eagle and Hermes could have been viable into the 1980s if the RN had not decided to focus on ASW warfare.
I suspect the US were grateful for this shift as an ASW task force was more useful to SACLANT than a single small fixed wing carrier and escorts.

Click to expand...

orlovsky said:

I am still doubtful about Crusader for Hermes and co.

- Even with a different engine the F-8 design would be close to the F-8J or F-8E(FN)
- The F-8J single seater with internal fuel and 4 sidewinders or 2 bvr missiles weighs 32k lbs. No droptanks. Rather short legs
- At 32k lbs, the F-8 needs 10 kts wind over deck with the C-11 catapult
- Even the longer 175 ft BS5 for the phantomized Hermes is still about 20 kts weaker than the C-11
- So even "F-4 Hermes" needs ~30 kts WOD to launch a Crusader
- Make that ~35 kts in the tropics
- Ship speed is only 25 kts

Does not look practical. The F-8J and the the phantomized Hermes would both be pretty maxed out designs, so I doubt you could improve substantially on that.

Click to expand...

The plan for the RN-Twosader would include the Spey engine... which used ~76% of the fuel used by the J57 for the same thrust (~83% afterburning) - thus a noticeable range increase.

The afterburning Spey produced ~1,500 lb more thrust dry and ~2,500 lb more thrust afterburning. Might help launch performance.

The F-8E, F-8E(FN), and all the remanufactured F-8s had an underwing stores pylon under each wing - that were plumbed for drop tanks (300 gal per wing). Yes, the added drag of the tanks meant that there wasn't a big range increase - but with the less-guzzling Spey that range increase would be greater.

The F-4K was pretty much the same as a long-noselegged F-4B, so the effect on launch performance won't be much. Where would it come from? The exhaust angle can't be changed with the F-8 if I understand that correctly.

Endurance should be better, but the F-4K was also disappointing in that regard. If I got the right numbers, J57 airflow 165 lbs/s, Spey 205 lbs/s. So an inlet redesign, with all that comes along.

And the droptanks add 3000 lbs in weight which, with the F-8, is another ~15kts launch speed.

I feel sure I had put up a F8 fir the RN thread at some point. But perusing through my threads it turns out not.
Turns out it was UK75

Could we not move F8 discussions to that thread, rather than hijack this thread about CVA-01?

As both threads were started by me I am relaxed.
It is fair to say that F4 and CVA01 are linked in that CVA01 is necessary to operate aircraft of the F4 size and capability.
Buccaneers could operate from Hermes which was the next newest carrier and would be needed unless a third CVA was built.
F8 seems to me the only non paper airplane available to give Hermes some air defence.

Many here have suggested Mirage G (between paper and actual production). Would have been a perfect anglo-french design with an uprated Spey. If it works like other swingwings, maybe 110-120 kts launch speed. That would work on the short/low pressure bs5.

Similar performance for AFVG, but that was to a good extent killed by the end of RN carriers, so it won't save them....

I just stumbled upon the following whilst researching the CVA-01:

Life before Death: the 1963 decision to build the aircraft carrier CVA01​

Does anyone know if this seminar/presentation in 2018?


Regards
Pioneer

What is the purpose of the TAU?

Is it simply a mathematical equation to be used as a baseline assumption to work out requirements, a bit like the the assumptions about supersonic bombers used to work out the requirements for the F155 interceptor?

Or was it an actual aim point that RN planners realistically thought they could get to with the CVA01 programme? If so was it adjusted with the march of technology, and at some point dropped as a baseline or aim point?

Rule of cool said:

What is the purpose of the TAU?

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To define what was needed for the most stressing mission the Carrier Fleet would be required to perform.

Rule of cool said:

Is it simply a mathematical equation to be used as a baseline assumption to work out requirements

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Yes, how else do you get there?
It was based on historical examples, most notably those from WWII that would be relevant.

Rule of cool said:

Or was it an actual aim point that RN planners realistically thought they could get to with the CVA01 programme?

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Yes, you aim for what you hope you can achieve.

Rule of cool said:

If so was it adjusted with the march of technology, and at some point dropped as a baseline or aim point?

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It was realised they could cut shorter ranged Attack aircraft out and just task heavier Strike aircraft at a more modest increase.
This likely made NMBR.3 winner irrelevant.
Thus from 107 to 96 aircraft.

They had conceptually a Class II Fighter able to allow Fighter numbers to reduce from 36 to 12 or so. Essentially this sounds like the F14 capability of engaging multiple targets simultaneously.

Ironically RN finally got this with Sea Harrier FA.2 Blue Vixen and AMRAAM

zen said:

To define what was needed for the most stressing mission the Carrier Fleet would be required to perform.

Yes, how else do you get there?
It was based on historical examples, most notably those from WWII that would be relevant.

Yes, you aim for what you hope you can achieve.

It was realised they could cut shorter ranged Attack aircraft out and just task heavier Strike aircraft at a more modest increase.
This likely made NMBR.3 winner irrelevant.
Thus from 107 to 96 aircraft.

They had conceptually a Class II Fighter able to allow Fighter numbers to reduce from 36 to 12 or so. Essentially this sounds like the F14 capability of engaging multiple targets simultaneously.

Ironically RN finally got this with Sea Harrier FA.2 Blue Vixen and AMRAAM

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The reason I ask is because in 1960 the RN had a pretty good idea of how the future could pan out even in the best scenario.

They had the Sea Vixen and Scimitar in service with the Buccaneer in development so knew aircraft were going to be big going forward limiting raw numbers on each ship. They had the Ark, Eagle, Victorious, Hermes and Centaur on the books and knew future carriers would be limited to ~55,000t like the Malta and 1952 carrier, again limiting raw aircraft numbers. They also knew where these carriers would be deployed; 1 x Home and 2 x EoS. They also knew Britain was somewhat short on cash.

So at what point in time did they envisage ever getting a 96 plane TAU together; 1970, 75, 80?

Keep in mind half of 96 is 48 which just about fits on CVA-01.
So they'd need two CVA-01 type carriers on station to prosecute the most stressing case for a maximum of 4 days before resupply.
Which was I think an opposed landing, and examples being looked at for likely operations were EoS. Probably Malaysia, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea etc...

So the answer is however many carriers be necessary to deliver this.

As you said earlier only a Forestall etc can carry half an TAU, indeed the 'Grumman CAGs' of the 80s where several carriers swapped out 2 A7s sqns for a second A6 sqn did exactly that. However I think a CVA01 wouldn't get to 48 fighters and bombers in a crisis, I'd think 2 extra aircraft to each combat sqn, 1 extra AEW and 2 or 3 extra helicopters to push it from the theoretical standard 36 combat aircraft to 40 and 55 in total. This means a pair of CVAs falls short of a TAU by 16 aircraft, and the Hermes carried ~20 and Centaur 12 combat aircraft in the 60s.

That said the TAU is the number required for a theoretical maximum threat, so the RN isn't going to run away because the carriers available EoS are Phantomised Eagle, Ark Royal and HMAS Melbourne because CVA01 is at home and CVA02 still fitting out. The Admiral will pull his TF back a bit for a few hours in order to reduce the threat during lulls in operations for example.

zen said:

Ironically RN finally got this with Sea Harrier FA.2 Blue Vixen and AMRAAM

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Only to retire them after only sixteen years (1993-2006) for something more shiny and didn't enter operational service years later....

Regards
Pioneer

The CVA-01 was designed to accommodate 2/3 of the air wing in the hangar, and 2/3 on the deck - with the latter keeping the landing area, port catapult, and access to the lifts free.

The idea was that the extra 1/3 of the air wing to complete the TAU could be surged to the ship in a crisis.

Rule of cool said:

As you said earlier only a Forestall etc can carry half an TAU, indeed the 'Grumman CAGs' of the 80s where several carriers swapped out 2 A7s sqns for a second A6 sqn did exactly that. However I think a CVA01 wouldn't get to 48 fighters and bombers in a crisis, I'd think 2 extra aircraft to each combat sqn, 1 extra AEW and 2 or 3 extra helicopters to push it from the theoretical standard 36 combat aircraft to 40 and 55 in total. This means a pair of CVAs falls short of a TAU by 16 aircraft, and the Hermes carried ~20 and Centaur 12 combat aircraft in the 60s.

That said the TAU is the number required for a theoretical maximum threat, so the RN isn't going to run away because the carriers available EoS are Phantomised Eagle, Ark Royal and HMAS Melbourne because CVA01 is at home and CVA02 still fitting out. The Admiral will pull his TF back a bit for a few hours in order to reduce the threat during lulls in operations for example.

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Rule of cool said:

However I think a CVA01 wouldn't get to 48 fighters and bombers in a crisis, I'd think 2 extra aircraft to each combat sqn, 1 extra AEW and 2 or 3 extra helicopters to push it from the theoretical standard 36 combat aircraft to 40 and 55 in total. This means a pair of CVAs falls short of a TAU by 16 aircraft, and the Hermes carried ~20 and Centaur 12 combat aircraft in the 60s

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See you're doing what I did, run the numbers and I think that's what Treasury Officials did. Coming to the same conclusion. That you'd need three CVA-01 to actually provide the TAU.
So you do more numbers and come to the realisation, it's not a plan for three to four CVA-01. It's a plan for five to six CVA-01!!!!

zen said:

See you're doing what I did, run the numbers and I think that's what Treasury Officials did. Coming to the same conclusion. That you'd need three CVA-01 to actually provide the TAU.
So you do more numbers and come to the realisation, it's not a plan for three to four CVA-01. It's a plan for five to six CVA-01!!!!

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And at best they're getting 2 and keep Eagle in service until the early-mid 80s.

My guess is that this is where the 1966 DWP assertion that Britain won't be doing opposed landings without Allies came from. However that's a very limited view of what a carrier striking force can do in the Cold War. I think it was Hobbs who said any European NATO country can stand up an Armoured Brigade but only the UK can provide a carrier strike force.