Will The US Army ever build a NEW MBT?

There is certainly a place for AFVs with autocannons and ATGMs, these could either be IFVs or "tank support vehicles" like the BMPT. But it seems like the old fashioned large caliber tank gun has a lot of good qualities to justify keeping it around. You can also have some gun-launched ATGMs for situations that call for them.
 
The problem for trucks is that they are cheap kills for artillery with even basic DPICM cluster munitions.
That's what, in part, killed the original FOG-M NLOS effort.
The original FOG missiles have relatively limited range compared to radio controlled or autonomous ones. Current 30~40km range Anti-tank NLOS missiles can counterbattery many 155mm systems. NLOS missiles designed for range can reach even further, for example the GM501X cruise loitering munition have 70km range with loiter and can outrange/counter-battery large and more expensive artillery systems, and the same capability exists from things like Spear-3. With missiles untethered from wires, shoot and scoot is also easy. It is unclear that traditional artillery pieces, whose position is largely located by artillery radar when it fires, actually have advantages against cheaper and more numerous missile shooters.

The FOG versions of the 90's were able to get to 40 Km no problem. Spear 3 is going to be slow terminally
and well within APS engagement envelopes. And it's just as vulnerable as the other weapons to obscurants.

It wasn't shoot-and-scoot that was the concern for light-vehicles with missiles; it was the vulnerability to
supporting barrages in front and along the flanks of the tank columns.

Counter-battery radars need to see a portion of the ascent phase of the artillery or missile round in flight
to have any hope of minimizing the target location error to the point where CB that doesn't exhaust
the ammunition supply is useful.

And even the very modern fire-finder radars that have good mobility (they are vulnerable to CB fire/SEAD weapons)
can't see beyond 60 km. Hence the focus on longer range fires.

Translating longer range fires into useful anti-tank capability is a legitimate discussion but it
will come probably come down to terminally guided weapons with aero-control surfaces, sensor fuzed munitions of cluster munitions.


Tank armor also isn't all that effective against modern artillery.

I'd love to see some evidence for this assuming you aren't taking about sensor-fuzed
or other HTK type weapons.

Hiding far from from enemy sensors and weapons in cover with non-ballistic weapons plus shoot and scoot with huge area to operate in beats very limited and detectable positions needed to employ LOS weapons.

And if heavy use of obscurants (smoke generators + own-ship self protect) + APS permits tanks with direct fire weapons
to close the gap it's over for the light force.

DPICM either cannon or MLRS delivered will make short work of light vehicles. You don't need very good
target location error either. And if you want to bring airborne weapons into it a stealthy standoff
like JSOW(-ER) carrier with cluster munitions quickly makes the light force very vulnerable.
 
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It will be interesting to see where the defensive units like Trophy balance out the guided and cluster type weapons generally.
 
Tank armor also isn't all that effective against modern artillery.

I'd love to see some evidence for this assuming you aren't taking about sensor-fuzed
or other HTK type weapons.
The tank Gun, Sensors, Tracks, ERA, etc are all incompletely covered by armor and good old 155mm HE can destroy them with near misses. For the MBT, so much of the armor is focused in defeating frontal attacks that defense against artillery is not that much better than lighter vehicles. From the perspective of tactical objectives, mission kill removes the vehicle from play. Historically the tank's primary countermeasure against artillery is its mobility, however artillery reaction time have increased far more than tank's tactical mobility in recent decades. Even with dumb shells artillery is a bigger threat then ever.

Then there is all the other sorts of munitions artillery can throw out in both direct attack and shaping operations: From dumb top attack submunitions to sensor fuzed to HTK to scatterable mines.
---------------------------------

Common APS known today can not deal with many of these threats at all, and one would need powerful sensors and long range high volume, high power anti-projectile firepower to defeat many of those threats, which means C-RAM and it is much more expensive than a steel box with a big gun. Look at air defense systems today, the $30mil pantsir gets wrecked by $0.5mil drone dropping glide bombs. If one wants to have C-Ram that works one may have to pay the same as a decent fighter bomber! Might as well get a fighter bomber instead which can take the air war to the enemy and blow up land targets across the entire theater in hours.

And if heavy use of obscurants (smoke generators + own-ship self protect) + APS permits tanks with direct fire weapons
to close the gap it's over for the light force.
Trying to close in on a "shoot and scoot" enemy with dozens of kilometer headstart using the combat vehicle type with the worst operational mobility while pinned under a smoke cloud is not what one would expect much success: the enemy can just drive away, while a few UAV/loitering munition circling overhead or even just sneaky use of sensor mast vehicles and force persistent obscurant usage. Throw some mines in the way, drop bridges in your line of advance and the odds of catching enemy indirect fire assets falls further. (also have you tried chasing long range missile firing helicopters...with tanks?) A deep attack would find supply convoys shot up by long range fires even if defenses manage to keep the spearhead alive, and one end up encircled without fuel and lacking firepower reach to hit much while behind enemy lines.

Even if with huge expenditure of obscurants to limit PGM strikes, traditional artillery/big HE can still do serious damage. Wide dispersion to counter traditional artillery and efficient obsurant usage is basically inversely related and both can not be maintained.

Not saying that advancing is impossible, but it is about the worst way to kill mobile enemy vehicles. The objective of the advance ought to be capturing territory, and the enemy would fight because he wants to keep the territory.

Which is where we get to the latter part:
DPICM either cannon or MLRS delivered will make short work of light vehicles. You don't need very good
target location error either. And if you want to bring airborne weapons into it a stealthy standoff
like JSOW(-ER) carrier with cluster munitions quickly makes the light force very vulnerable.
Yes, artillery can kill at long range. But it is not limited to light vehicles, but all vehicles can be destroyed with sufficient application of suitable munitions.

The main constraint with artillery deep strikes is ISR. It is impossible to have artillery shell the entire front, dozen to dozens of kilometers deep. Instead, one has to find the enemy first.

In many ways, artillery can neutralize tanks easier than it can neutralize light, long range forces, because:
1. There are fewer tanks because of cost and the logistics trail. So one can use greater quality and quantity of munitions for the task. In the world of PGMs, warhead size is small part of the cost anyways, while armor just demands warhead size.
2. MBTs are one of the less stealthy vehicles: tracked vehicles can be filtered on radar, the size is large, the engine emission is high and APS is a huge beacon. The large size also render decoys difficult, while stuff like NLOS ATGM launchers can hide in standard sized garages and be made indistinguishable from empty transports, civilian vehicles, or even rectangular boxes on the ground!
3. MBT's constraints in both mobility and firepower projection makes them predictable: they have to end up with LOS of your own forces to be a serious threat and can only cross certain pieces of terrain. One can greatly lower the ISR needed and win the SEAD conflict in a small area to keep tanks at bay relative to suppressing long range fires.
4. MBT's don't have standoff. The enemy artillery/missile/etc could be dozens to hundreds of kilometers deep within their territory, making it inaccessible to your own artillery and ISR, while enemy MBTs can't if it intends to influence the battle.
5. An MBT force can not counter battery your own artillery force which lowers ROF and induces attrition.
6. An MBT that is fighting is clearly detected. Obscurants work both ways. Either the tank is ineffective or it is spotted.
7. An MBT force inflicts damages relatively slowly if one is not completely surprised in the open. Just duck under the hill out of LOS and you have some time for reach-back fires to deal with the problem, if you are even accessible to tank fire at all. This is unlike MRSI TOT salvos where your first warning is can be too late for the entire formation. A wall of obscurant and mines also enables one to disengage from MBTs while not from artillery.
 
Tank armor also isn't all that effective against modern artillery.

I'd love to see some evidence for this assuming you aren't taking about sensor-fuzed
or other HTK type weapons.
The tank Gun, Sensors, Tracks, ERA, etc are all incompletely covered by armor and good old 155mm HE can destroy them with near misses. For the MBT, so much of the armor is focused in defeating frontal attacks that defense against artillery is not that much better than lighter vehicles. From the perspective of tactical objectives, mission kill removes the vehicle from play. Historically the tank's primary countermeasure against artillery is its mobility, however artillery reaction time have increased far more than tank's tactical mobility in recent decades. Even with dumb shells artillery is a bigger threat then ever.

So no actual evidence/studies?

Modern ERA is deliberately designed with insensitive munition fill and covered with plate so as not to be stripped
off by anything less than an EFP or RPG impact.

The very recent US Army C-DAEM analysis is rather explicit in discounting conventional artillery less than SFM of
any utility against MBTs. And they assess DPICM as requiring 10 bomblet hits to kill an APC; an MBT is well out of scope.

And if we're talking about MBTs with gun-fired missiles then a mobility kill doesn't necessarily take it out of the fight.

Then there is all the other sorts of munitions artillery can throw out in both direct attack and shaping operations: From dumb top attack submunitions to sensor fuzed to HTK to scatterable mines.

The sort of artillery munitions that can directly threaten a modern, well protected MBT assuming realistic target location errors
are going to be very expensive. They will look like Copperhead or Excalibur HTK or SDB II.

Common APS known today can not deal with many of these threats at all, and one would need powerful sensors and long range high volume, high power anti-projectile firepower to defeat many of those threats, which means C-RAM and it is much more expensive than a steel box with a big gun. Look at air defense systems today, the $30mil pantsir gets wrecked by $0.5mil drone dropping glide bombs. If one wants to have C-Ram that works one may have to pay the same as a decent fighter bomber! Might as well get a fighter bomber instead which can take the air war to the enemy and blow up land targets across the entire theater in hours.

Those small panel, vehicle mountable AESAs out there keep improving in power and bandwidth.
And tanks keep getting uprated generators so there's no issue with more power. And interceptors will
continue to improve. Like I said, if MSDM can affordably intercept AAMs and SAMs then anything less than
that in terms of velocity will be well within the envelopes of MSDM for tanks.

Of course, ATGMs haven't stood still; the latest versions of TOW have some sort of
repeater jammer to counter APS and other munitions exploit elevation angle limitations (> 70 degrees) in APS.

But without some detailed modeling, it's difficult to come to summary conclusions about survivability.

Panstir is not well armored so even near misses are practically fatal. And the operators need extensive training
which is not a major feature of Arab armies.

Tanks tend to be cheaper SPAAGs/SHORAD and their defensive systems are strictly self-protect which
simplifies engagements and training.


Even if with huge expenditure of obscurants to limit PGM strikes, traditional artillery/big HE can still do serious damage. Wide dispersion to counter traditional artillery and efficient obsurant usage is basically inversely related and both can not be maintained.

Completely untrue; the dedicated vehicle obscurant generators cover many square miles. And there's nothing
preventing friendly artillery from providing rolling obscurant barrages. And that's before you get to self-protect obscurants.


but all vehicles can be destroyed with sufficient application of suitable munitions.

Well that's about the most vacuously true statement ever uttered on these forums
and completely misses the point.

Artillery units need to deploy with some fixed-allocation of projectiles unless you can
come-up with a generally good guided munition that can service the entire artillery
target set. Given the tradeoffs inherent in gun-launched projectiles this does not seem to be likely.

Maybe rocket munitions could since they have more payload (>= 200 lbs) to play with
but ER-GMLRS rounds without any anti-armor capability are > $200k a rocket.

If you start adding seekers and dedicated anti-armor warheads you'll start seeing
prices that are 1.5 - 2x greater.


The main constraint with artillery deep strikes is ISR.

That's true for all of the NLOS/over-the-horizon/indirect fire weapons you've been advocating.

None of them are cheap enough to be used in combined recon-fire mode.

FOG-M where all of the logic/complexity was aboard the launch vehicle and the seeker was
just streaming back video imagery was about the only one of those NLOS concepts that was affordable
to use in the above fashion.
 
The problem with "artillery", "missiles" and "airpower" is that it can not detect many types of the enemy and advance and take ground, not that they could not extract advantageous exchange ratios. Artillery and airpower have advanced to the point that it can deal with MBT sized targets just fine.

I would argue that in a truly networked environment (which I would presume when talking about a future tank/prime land combat vehicle) if the 'tank' can spot an enemy then they can pass the location instantly to the other systems. A model might be the integration of the F-35's MADL to tanks - everyone can see what everyone else sees - this includes tanks seeing the feed from UAVs, Aircraft and the like (the tank crew is no longer limited to their own sensors but can easily see what's over the next hill or the one after that or even kms away.

The MBTs being overbuilt generalist vehicles do an okay job as assault guns blasting trenches and buildings. Then there are ever more capable IFVs. In some sense, the "future" tank is already here, autocannon plus missiles plus armor plus APS. What can one say about $10mil IFVs or those that weight 64tons?

I tend to agree - maybe the future 'tank' is already here or at least the precursor elements are and they will be based upon the IFVs etc.

It'd take unlikely situations and big screw ups on both sides for battles and campaigns to come down to long rod performance.

Agreed.

What do you want to bet that the F-35I has a SDR that can talk to the SDRs in IDF vehicles and share the BMS picture? Then there's all those SDRs the Europeans are buying being able to simulate a Link 16 connection...
 
The problem with "artillery", "missiles" and "airpower" is that it can not detect many types of the enemy and advance and take ground, not that they could not extract advantageous exchange ratios. Artillery and airpower have advanced to the point that it can deal with MBT sized targets just fine.

I would argue that in a truly networked environment (which I would presume when talking about a future tank/prime land combat vehicle) if the 'tank' can spot an enemy then they can pass the location instantly to the other systems. A model might be the integration of the F-35's MADL to tanks - everyone can see what everyone else sees - this includes tanks seeing the feed from UAVs, Aircraft and the like (the tank crew is no longer limited to their own sensors but can easily see what's over the next hill or the one after that or even kms away.

The MBTs being overbuilt generalist vehicles do an okay job as assault guns blasting trenches and buildings. Then there are ever more capable IFVs. In some sense, the "future" tank is already here, autocannon plus missiles plus armor plus APS. What can one say about $10mil IFVs or those that weight 64tons?

I tend to agree - maybe the future 'tank' is already here or at least the precursor elements are and they will be based upon the IFVs etc.

It'd take unlikely situations and big screw ups on both sides for battles and campaigns to come down to long rod performance.

Agreed.

What do you want to bet that the F-35I has a SDR that can talk to the SDRs in IDF vehicles and share the BMS picture? Then there's all those SDRs the Europeans are buying being able to simulate a Link 16 connection...

Given that the poster above doesn't believe in small radars on tanks why would he believe in MADL arrays on tanks?

And I really hope you don't think that Link 16 is going to be resilient in the A2/AD environment.
 
The problem with "artillery", "missiles" and "airpower" is that it can not detect many types of the enemy and advance and take ground, not that they could not extract advantageous exchange ratios. Artillery and airpower have advanced to the point that it can deal with MBT sized targets just fine.

I would argue that in a truly networked environment (which I would presume when talking about a future tank/prime land combat vehicle) if the 'tank' can spot an enemy then they can pass the location instantly to the other systems. A model might be the integration of the F-35's MADL to tanks - everyone can see what everyone else sees - this includes tanks seeing the feed from UAVs, Aircraft and the like (the tank crew is no longer limited to their own sensors but can easily see what's over the next hill or the one after that or even kms away.

The MBTs being overbuilt generalist vehicles do an okay job as assault guns blasting trenches and buildings. Then there are ever more capable IFVs. In some sense, the "future" tank is already here, autocannon plus missiles plus armor plus APS. What can one say about $10mil IFVs or those that weight 64tons?

I tend to agree - maybe the future 'tank' is already here or at least the precursor elements are and they will be based upon the IFVs etc.

It'd take unlikely situations and big screw ups on both sides for battles and campaigns to come down to long rod performance.

Agreed.

What do you want to bet that the F-35I has a SDR that can talk to the SDRs in IDF vehicles and share the BMS picture? Then there's all those SDRs the Europeans are buying being able to simulate a Link 16 connection...

Given that the poster above doesn't believe in small radars on tanks why would he believe in MADL arrays on tanks?

And I really hope you don't think that Link 16 is going to be resilient in the A2/AD environment.

Link 16 is a NATO standard from the 1980s, Until there becomes a new either SDR link, Link 16 will keep getting used. The standard F-35s really need to get a roadmap for a new SDR, so they can talk to more platforms easier and Link 16 sucks and should only be used with very antiquated systems.
 
Link 16 is a NATO standard from the 1980s, Until there becomes a new either SDR link, Link 16 will keep getting used. The standard F-35s really need to get a roadmap for a new SDR, so they can talk to more platforms easier and Link 16 sucks and should only be used with very antiquated systems.

What does being software defined have anything to do with NATO standard links or Link 16 in particular?
Link 16 long predates SDR.

IBCS and Aegis have both gotten MADL relays so I'm clear why SDR is relevant here?

If anything, I would expect there to be competition between TTNT and the omni-directional or other versions of MADL
that NG was pitching a few years ago.

spacemadl.png
 

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Ok, was always a fan of TTNT but now this MADL stuff. MADL wins. Surprised that slide is open source.

Any discussion of SDRs leads to that nightmare JTRS. has that ever been unstuck. Spagetti chocolate mess.
The USG can never implement what needs to be done because noone is harsh enough in the USG to demand and enforce an real open arch...SDR. JTRS had such dreams more than 10 yrs ago.
 
Ok, was always a fan of TTNT but now this MADL stuff. MADL wins. Surprised that slide is open source.

Any discussion of SDRs leads to that nightmare JTRS. has that ever been unstuck. Spagetti chocolate mess.
The USG can never implement what needs to be done because noone is harsh enough in the USG to demand and enforce an real open arch...SDR. JTRS had such dreams more than 10 yrs ago.

The services can't agree on a common waveform beyond what comes factory installed on F-35.
TTNT was adopted by the Navy after the Air Force rejected it as being unsuitable for the A2/AD environment.
It's fundamentally not much better than Link-16 wrt jamming.
 
Ok, was always a fan of TTNT but now this MADL stuff. MADL wins. Surprised that slide is open source.

Any discussion of SDRs leads to that nightmare JTRS. has that ever been unstuck. Spagetti chocolate mess.
The USG can never implement what needs to be done because noone is harsh enough in the USG to demand and enforce an real open arch...SDR. JTRS had such dreams more than 10 yrs ago.

The services can't agree on a common waveform beyond what comes factory installed on F-35.
TTNT was adopted by the Navy after the Air Force rejected it as being unsuitable for the A2/AD environment.
It's fundamentally not much better than Link-16 wrt jamming.
That is funny as the TTNT was initially introduced as AF ACTD after NCCT. Sad no anti-jamming advances..probably classified.
 
Ok, was always a fan of TTNT but now this MADL stuff. MADL wins. Surprised that slide is open source.

Any discussion of SDRs leads to that nightmare JTRS. has that ever been unstuck. Spagetti chocolate mess.
The USG can never implement what needs to be done because noone is harsh enough in the USG to demand and enforce an real open arch...SDR. JTRS had such dreams more than 10 yrs ago.

The services can't agree on a common waveform beyond what comes factory installed on F-35.
TTNT was adopted by the Navy after the Air Force rejected it as being unsuitable for the A2/AD environment.
It's fundamentally not much better than Link-16 wrt jamming.
That is funny as the TTNT was initially introduced as AF ACTD after NCCT. Sad no anti-jamming advances..probably classified.

Some of the analysis is public domain:

NON-COOPERATIVE DETECTION OF FREQUENCY-HOPPED GMSK SIGNALS THESIS Clint R. Sikes, First Lieutenant, USAF AFIT/GE/ENG/06-52
 

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Hope you enjoy it. I'm not suggesting that TTNT is useless but it's best use, to me, seems to be for those
scenarios where you need very low latency comms but in an environment where anti-jam performance
or LPI/LPD isn't a survivability consideration. Sort of a SCUD-hunt repeat.
 

Hope you enjoy it. I'm not suggesting that TTNT is useless but it's best use, to me, seems to be for those
scenarios where you need very low latency comms but in an environment where anti-jam performance
or LPI/LPD isn't a survivability consideration. Sort of a SCUD-hunt repeat.
sounds like two separate links might be in order for fast movers. Fast movers cannot and should not assume stealth and LPI/LPD all the time.
 
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Hope you enjoy it. I'm not suggesting that TTNT is useless but it's best use, to me, seems to be for those
scenarios where you need very low latency comms but in an environment where anti-jam performance
or LPI/LPD isn't a survivability consideration. Sort of a SCUD-hunt repeat.
sounds like two separate links might be in order for fast movers. Fast movers cannot and should not assume stealth and LPI/LPD all the time.

Some of the latency issues for directional links comes for the Pointing, Acquisition and Tracking messages that are needed
for link acquisition/re-acquisition. If element-level digital beam-forming is attainable at MMW (per DARPA's MIDAS effort)
that latency component (sometimes up to 200 ms in flight-tests) can be substantially reduced.
 
would not all purposed military non IPv6 swarm networking tech (which deals w acquisition/re-acquisition) then need a Pointing, Acquisition and Tracking software and hardware acquisition/re-acquisition capabiliy as some non IPv6 swarm networking tech still are LOS and broadcast.
 
one could afford more of this XM-8 based vehicles to replace the M-10, and M1 and they are light and would carry four troops.

Just1n Nic0las on Artstation
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Well, it is surprising that a large land war have broken out since the start of this thread. Lets see what my predictions were.

The problem with "artillery", "missiles" and "airpower" is that it can not detect many types of the enemy and advance and take ground, not that they could not extract advantageous exchange ratios. Artillery and airpower have advanced to the point that it can deal with MBT sized targets just fine.

The previous era of artillery dominance was WWI. In that war, every piece of artillery and area weapon chews up infantry with much superior exchange ratio, to the point where infantry forces are withdrawn from the front to build more shells.

This did not mean infantry and primitive tanks (which had terrible exchange ratios against artillery and field pieces, if not defeated by mud and itself), were not important and employed. The offensive required advantageous artillery strength that can suppress if not defeat opponent artillery, followed by attack by superior ground forces to clean up what can not be effectively defeated by artillery.

I see modern and near future war as similar. First one side wins local superiority in the artillery and air war, than the rest of the combined arms team advance. While precise long range strike can defeat large land vehicles, there is still huge problems with mines and infantry that an attacker need to clear. In the near future, cheap UAVs and UGV would be also a serious problem that artillery and traditional air power can only serve as a partial solution.

In looking at the war that broke out, it is shocking in the lack of preparation and doctrine-technological failure of the aggressor. The time to field effective anti-ATGM solution is not waiting for 2030s, but perhaps a week after 1973 war showing what primitive missiles can do. The Spike NLOS/Tamuz was secretly fielded in 1981, and any armored force could expect sudden defeat by ever since. It can be considered criminal that neither technical or doctrinal solutions were found to deal with sensor fuzed munitions, DPICM, artillery scattered mines, javelin and FOG missiles when they were made public and the force structure and doctrine just continue like such things doesn't exist leading to cases of clear operational failure in war.

Some people would like to blame failures on the personnel on the ground, but war planning ought to take into account realistic personnel quality. In any case it is not clear the personnel quality could have solved some of the more difficult tactical issues attempts at maneuver runs into.

It seems to me that military bureaucracies are generally dysfunctional and would totally endorse ideas like horseback charges against machineguns if not proven suicidal with actual tactical experience. While technology have improved, given the sociology of military organizations, predictions probably have not moved towards greater realism.
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Light forces like truck mounted missile launchers survive the entire campaigns without loss while inflicting strategic level damage in the process while heavily armored tank forces suffer massive attrition is what I'd expect. Longer range and hiding in the backline far from enemy sensors and weapons coverage is far more beneficial for survivability than a bit more armor that doesn't prevent mobility kill from mere high explosives. The combined arms force's vulnerability is also measured by the most vulnerable enabling element as well.
 
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Some people would like to blame failures on the personnel on the ground, but war planning ought to take into account realistic personnel quality. In any case it is not clear the personnel quality could have solved some of the more difficult tactical issues attempts at maneuver runs into.

It seems to me that military bureaucracies are generally dysfunctional and would totally endorse ideas like horseback charges against machineguns if not proven suicidal with actual tactical experience. While technology have improved, given the sociology of military organizations, predictions probably have not moved towards greater realism.
View: https://youtu.be/Fz59GWeTIik?t=20
 
It seems to me the biggest MBT differentiators in the current fighting tend to be optics/IR and FCS related. The tank that sees the other first seems to have the decisive advantage. I think the future of MBT development will tend to focus on increasing sensor coverage both in angle and in spectrum, and linking it to AI models that recognize threats and cue them for the operators.

The main weapon will continue to be a large caliber, high velocity gun, because that system is unique to tanks (heavy enough to be a stable firing platform) and enables very high response times to threats compared to even missiles. It also enables larger ammunition loads and less expensive rounds.

I think armor conversely becomes thicker all around the tank to defend against ubiquitous UAV and top attack weapons while thinning across the frontal arc as a weight trade off. This likely would involve shrinking the turret profile (crew reduction or moving crew to the hull) rather than actually making the armor universally weaker, and potentially leaving some systems or equipment unprotected in the turret.

Active protection systems are probably a must at this point. Additionally, some capacity to engage UAVs. The latter would likely take the form of a remote weapons station cued by wrap around passive EO/IR sensors (already needed for general target detection, see above) rather than a purpose built radar directed system.

I think the time for hybrid power packs has also arrived, both as a fuel saving measure and as way of handling overwatch (or even short advances) with a lower thermal and acoustic signature when needed.

It also seems likely MBTs get there own UAV launcher/dispenser as an organic option, though this could alternatively be handled by a platoon or even company level asset instead. But given the relatively light weight and storage requirements of modern UAVs, it seems to me you would break up the capability across all of the platforms and that the unit commander would command their deployment as needed.
 
It seems to me the biggest MBT differentiators in the current fighting tend to be optics/IR and FCS related. The tank that sees the other first seems to have the decisive advantage.
The biggest differentiator between 2020s warfare and 1990s warfare is that cheap and powerful sensors is everywhere, thrown onto cheap elevated platforms easily. Even a firefight between 5 rifleman can have 3 aerial video feeds tracking the fight. Aerial sensors is best positioned to spot the enemy first and commonly spot deep behind enemy lines as the numerous counterbattery and destruction of air defense videos show.

Vehicle-organic sensors just not that important compared to formation level sensors.

The main weapon will continue to be a large caliber, high velocity gun, because that system is unique to tanks (heavy enough to be a stable firing platform) and enables very high response times to threats compared to even missiles.
Fast response time depends on the distance of obtaining a fire-control level track of the enemy.

If you get a worthy track of the enemy at 500m, a high velocity direct fire gun is indeed one of the fastest solution.

If you get a worthy track of the enemy at 10,000m or 30,000m, a high velocity direct fire gun is not in range and you need to maneuver significantly to be able to fire on the target.

The modern sensor improvements means it is increasingly likely to get a good track of enemy at long range. The large number of videos of long range precision strikes by both sides in conflicts shows that long range acquistion of targets is feasible.

Some people are pinning further improvement in sensors to enable defeat of UAV to return warfare to ground based sensors. This wouldn't generally work as improvement in sensors means aerial vehicles will detect ground vehicles at increased range. Powerful and cheap sensors can also be put on masts, disposable platforms or made even smaller and harder to detect itself. Powerful sensor tech in general just increases detection ranges, especially against non-stealthy platforms with fixed size and energy emissions.

Of course, detection range also depends on the target in question. It is not too hard to get a track of MBT sized vehicle at 10km, but quite hard to get a track of quadcopter sized vehicle at 1km. If you are shooting tank sized targets at 10km you'd be using artillery or missiles and you'd be using lasers and autocannons against copters at 1km.

Both are weapons already available on the battlefield. This is why the MBT is in an awkward positions where it evolves to adapt features of other existing vehicles. The MBT gets artillery like shells and self defense autocannon, while other people wonder why not just use artillery and autocannon vehicles.

It also enables larger ammunition loads and less expensive rounds.
This is false economy in a lot of contexts. You are risking $10mil platforms to save from using $100k per shot munitions. You need to succeed a lot to make the risk worth it. This is like saying that we should equip infantry with swords, because it is cheaper to kill people than using bullets.

Now, part of this depends on the target being engaged. It is generally not worth it to shoot up a machine gunner with a 100k munition. However it is generally worth it to shoot up a $10mil target with $100k projectiles.

As such, enemy tanks can be engaged with costly weapons like precision artillery or high performance anti-tank missiles, while cheap enemy forces like infantry or drones or mines can be dealt with by cheaper assets. We do see this is why tanks gets employed shooting up trenches a lot more than tank battles, because enemy tanks can be dealt with by expensive munitions while opponent infantry less so.

I think armor conversely becomes thicker all around the tank to defend against ubiquitous UAV and top attack weapons while thinning across the frontal arc as a weight trade off. This likely would involve shrinking the turret profile (crew reduction or moving crew to the hull) rather than actually making the armor universally weaker, and potentially leaving some systems or equipment unprotected in the turret.
360 degree armor may simply result in insufficient protection all round. I think vehicle generalized system survivability will overtake armor facing. Instead of not being penetrated, the vehicle can survive penetration by small warheads, as the post-penetration energies becomes insufficient to disable the vehicle completely.

The crew preserving western designs have shown value compared to eastern "all or nothing" protection schemes that blow up easily after penetration. Distributed electric propulsion may make mobility kill significantly more difficult.

A vehicle with great all round armor can still be useful if the opponent can not employ large warheads: eg insurgents, light forces, suppressed opponents and so on but they'd probably too immobile for "maneuver" warfare.

Active protection systems are probably a must at this point. Additionally, some capacity to engage UAVs. The latter would likely take the form of a remote weapons station cued by wrap around passive EO/IR sensors (already needed for general target detection, see above) rather than a purpose built radar directed system.
This is pretty uneconomic if the weapon is a projectile shooter. You spend a ton of money with high quality sensors and good fire control system to detect and hit the smallest, most agile and pretty damned fast target on the battlefield and not have enough payload for large amount of ammo? So a swarm shows up and you have like 150 rounds and goes bingo after the first few intercepts?

It makes sense to have a dedicated vehicle carry the defense system while being able to pack enough ammo to survive some level of saturation attacks if you are not so rich as able to afford full sensor + fcs on literally everything.

I think the time for hybrid power packs has also arrived, both as a fuel saving measure and as way of handling overwatch (or even short advances) with a lower thermal and acoustic signature when needed.

It also seems likely MBTs get there own UAV launcher/dispenser as an organic option, though this could alternatively be handled by a platoon or even company level asset instead. But given the relatively light weight and storage requirements of modern UAVs, it seems to me you would break up the capability across all of the platforms and that the unit commander would command their deployment as needed.
Those are neat features that improves vehicle capabilities, but doesn't fundamentally change vehicle performance and thus a hard sell for spending more money on old platforms though will likely go on new platforms.
 
I’m not addressing every single facet of changing warfare, I’m only thinking of how completely brand new MBTs might be designed in the future. I think MBTs might have less utility in the future with persistent, ubiquitous ISR linked to cheap precision long ranged fires, but I’m only addressing MBTs.

Vehicle’s sensors are still going to be of paramount importance to vehicle itself. Being tethered electronically to external UAVs as your primary sensors isn’t a viable option. The vehicle still needs to quickly be aware of any threat around it. Moreover a vehicle can carry sensors covering much wider arcs with much greater resolution than class 1-2 UAVs.

A high velocity canon is still the fastest response possible for targets inside direct fire range. This usually going to be inside several thousand meters in any terrain that isn’t open desert. Targets outside that range are for other platforms.

Ammunition amounts are very relevant and cost is factor with regards to total inventory. Firing a 100,000 missile at every couple guys in a Fox hole that might be an ATGM team isn’t going to practical.

360 degree armor doesn’t have to be thick, it is just the case that current MBTs sacrifice a lot of side and overhead coverage for frontal protection. We are finding out that at least some designs are relatively vulnerable to small grenade sized air dropped munitions, FPV UAVs, and artillery fragments. Greater protection against bomblets in the turret/hull and greater protection/redundancy around the running gear would like prevent a lot of vehicle KOs. We are rarely seeing frontal penetrations.

Active protection is expensive and probably gets reserved for specific units.But engaging UAVs that are detected by the vehicle’s own sensors should be perfectly cost effective. It seems likely any future design employs some kind of .50 cal/40mm GL/30mm cannon remote weapons station anyway; cueing it to engage a prop or rotor driven UAV is just a software problem. Dedicated SHORAD vehicles can carry radar, ECM, and short range missiles to augment that. But the vehicle should be able to see a quad copter or cheap loitering munition approaching and be able to shoot at it. Most of the kills we see involve vehicles that don’t see the attack coming or crews that have no way of responding except to abandon the vehicle.

Few of these changes likely can be retrofitted cost effectively to the existing tank fleet. I am only describing what I think a future from scratch MBT design might look like.
 
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