US UAV and UCAV Technology

Title is a bit deceptive. The article only describes a nifty MDO design methodology and tool chain. What's missing to make any of this meaningful is the little detail that viable morphing materials do not exist yet - viable being the keyword.
 
View: https://youtu.be/PDf4Fi20CZI

LOS ANGELES, January 31, 2022 – Silent Arrow today announced that the Air Force of a U.S. allied government in the Middle East has conducted the first overseas deployments of the Silent Arrow GD-2000 cargo delivery drone under a $1.5M operational evaluation contract.

In preparation for the flight operation, 1,026 lbs. (465 kg) of an undisclosed cargo load was secured inside the 26 cubic foot fuselage of two GD-2000s, bringing the gross vehicle weight of each aircraft to 1,520 lbs. (689 kg), below Silent Arrow’s certified max gross of 2,000 lbs. (907 kg).

Two C-130s were used in the operation, during which two GD-2000s were rigged in accordance with U.S. military standards for Container Delivery System (CDS) bundles. Deployment occurred over a desert environment where Silent Arrow demonstrated completely autonomous flight, autonomous waypoint selection and navigation, and during the auto landing sequence, Silent Arrow’s autonomous autopilot was able to command and achieve a zero-sink rate flare.

A series of 12 Block 1 GD-2000s are currently on station in the Middle East in support of the contract, with 15 Block 2 aircraft in production at Silent Arrow’s Irvine, California facility due to ship in the first half of 2022. To date, 45 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Silent Arrow® GD-2000s have been built, with Full Rate Production (FRP) into the thousands of units expected to begin in 2023.

Originally designed to replace GPS-steered parachutes (JPADS) under contract from the U.S. Marine Corps, the Silent Arrow line of autonomous cargo delivery aircraft has so far expanded to three platforms based on military tactical resupply requirements and has supplied or won contracts directly with all four U.S. military service branches for the following products:

- Silent Arrow GD-2000 (26 cubic feet for up to 1,500 pounds of payload)
- Silent Arrow Widebody (140 cubic feet for greater than 1,500 pounds of payload)
- Silent Arrow Precision Guided Bundle (7.6 cubic feet for 350 pounds of payload)

Silent Arrow’s tightly integrated packaging with its patented spring-deployed wing system, industry-leading payload capacity, 40+ mile standoff distance and low unit cost, has become a leading solution for non-parachute, heavy payload airdrop logistics around the world.

 
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Simultaneous drone towing system:

1646419428420


 
Long read overview on Ai drones and ACE program

Everyone following knows skydio technology has military application: and its here
 
 
 

The U.S. will deliver at least 121 of the new Phoenix Ghost tactical unmanned aerial systems to Ukraine as part of a new $800 million assistance package announced by Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby. But, what is the Phoenix Ghost?

“This is a drone that had been in development before the invasion, clearly,” Kirby said during an afternoon press briefing. “The Air Force was working this, and in discussions with the Ukrainians about their requirements, we believed that this particular system would very nicely suit their needs, particularly in eastern Ukraine.”

Kirby’s comments mark a slight change from those made by a senior defense official earlier in the day. In a background briefing, the official said the Phoenix Ghost was “rapidly developed by the Air Force, in response, specifically, to Ukrainian requirements.”

Kirby said he did not have an exact date for when Phoenix Ghost started development. But given that the Air Force had at least 120 to send from its inventory, “You’re not going to have 120 on your shelves if you just started buying them on the 24th of February,” the day Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began.

“What probably wasn’t as well worded as it should have been [is] it was developed for a set of requirements that very closely match what Ukrainians need right now in Donbas,” Kirby said, referring to the eastern region of Ukraine where Russia has focused its attack in recent days.

The exact capabilities that Phoenix Ghost will offer to Ukraine are being kept under wraps, as Kirby declined to comment. But he did say the drone is “akin” to the Switchblade drone that the U.S. has already delivered to Ukraine.

The Phoenix Ghost is “designed for tactical operations,” Kirby said. “In other words, largely but not exclusively to attack targets. It, like almost all unmanned aerial systems, of course, has optics. So it can also be used to give you a sight picture of what it’s seeing, of course, but its principal focus is attack.”

Kirby later added that the drone is a one-way system, meaning it is not meant to be recovered.


The Phoenix Ghost “is a different type of aircraft, it’s a one-way aircraft that is effective against medium armored ground targets,” said retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies and member of the Aevex board.

The drone can take off vertically, fly for six-plus hours searching for or tracking a target, and operate at night using its infrared sensors, Deptula said. Phoenix Ghost has a longer loitering capability than the Switchblade, which can fly for less than an hour, he said.
 
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Now integrate on a B-52 to carry about 10,000 of them :oops:
 
There are podded launchers for MQ-9s proposed. Larger one with a rotary magazine carried like 50-60; smaller one with no moving parts a dozen.
 
Now integrate on a B-52 to carry about 10,000 of them :oops:
why? if you just want a loitering arsenal plane that attacks pop up threat, it's better fit to several smaller uav's that can cover a much wider area for much longer time on station. if you want to take out a tank convoy, we have smart cluster bombs for that.
 
Now integrate on a B-52 to carry about 10,000 of them :oops:
why? if you just want a loitering arsenal plane that attacks pop up threat, it's better fit to several smaller uav's that can cover a much wider area for much longer time on station. if you want to take out a tank convoy, we have smart cluster bombs for that.
Tongue-in-cheek my dear Donnage
 

A good initial assessment.
1. Drone warfare is relevant to conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary , , ,
2. . . . but how relevant—and in what ways—is unclear.
3. Technology and concepts alone aren’t enough.
4. Targets especially vulnerable to drones must be identified.
5. Drones are expanding the information environment.
6. Drone warfare isn’t just for the big dogs.
7. Air superiority concepts may need to be adjusted.

Those items are hardly not forseen by visionaries.. Ask the minds behind assault breaker, recon strike complex, 20xx wargames and all would be self evident after some thought.

In fact, any mechanistic "weapon platform on weapon platform" contest can be analyzed by simulation and traditional means of analysis, and it is the human and sociological factor that ought to be the real lessons learned in wars, barring rapid technological change due to war for example development of nuclear weapons during ww2.

Some lessons relevant to drone warfare that I've learned in this war:
1. 3rd party ELINT can not be denied in regional conflict without military escalation or non-military leverage. There is no political norms that enables a combatant to deny third party aerial and space intelligence assets from operating near the conflict area.

It also make position of jamming equipment and non-LPI radar easily identifiable to externally supported powers. This actually makes drones more powerful in less constrained regional wars than proxy wars where sanctuary/standoff defense against drones are available. Aerial jamming may be necessary against opponents with long range precision strike complexes.

2. Civilian grade communication technology is superior due to scale and rapid iteration. There is no secret sause despite all the classification, especially for forces without support of organic electronics industry or particular large budget. Bandwidth congestion forcing civilian deployment of beam forming and frequency agility automatically translate to jamming resistance.

3. The quality of public "military analysis" is poor (which extends to analysis of drones). Some are proclaiming quick Russian victory a month or more into the campaign. There is no quality control and narrative manipulation is rife. Military narratives can translate directly political results, as the "ukraine can not be defended" can have decisive results and thus ought to be a factor in information warfare. As such expect "military analysts" to be agents in "war by other means" as shit-talk and midwit half-analysis can have real results.

I have lamented that why only develop 5th gen when you can buy a newspaper for cheap and run hit pieces on F-35 for a tiny fraction of the R&D cost. For this war, I see that this is not lost to state actors and the situation is not more muddled only due to the low competence and poor preparation of the Russians.

4. External supply of high performance precision strike and drone technology can be ramped up fast and there this conflict also somewhat set a precedent. With such a precedent, I suspect future political-physical reactions can be faster. One can imagine planeloads of (not) slaughterbots landing to support a side within hours of escalation of hostilities for the next war. The reduction in human training requirements for military effectiveness (how many articles denouncing armor tactics and training over the past month?) translates to real change in geopolitical calculus in proxy war and escalations.

5. Current balance of technology and tactics greatly favor drones, which have not saturated functional roles to the point of diminishing returns. This can be seen in that very poorly optimized airframes with off the shelf parts is combined with reuse and significant battlefield results. This means that survivability optimization is not essential for the role and there is huge potential for increased battlefield role with optimization, scale and deployment of relevant technology.

6. Armies have not adapted to the warfare environment despite a number items that could be known from simulation and exercises. The ineffectiveness of a number of battlefield concealment and defense methods is the most obvious one. It is clear that tactical integration and strategic level organization and doctrine adaption is also not pushed anywhere near the end point for technological environment.

Now, this is not very surprising if one views the peacetime military as another government function that have very poor oversight outside of some special cases. With priors, one expect things is unlikely to change for noncombatants until social norms involving warfare changes to make old ways seem ridiculous as other forces don't seems to work.

7. Battlefield management software is a thing for even weak powers like Ukraine, and it is basically doctrine for machine warfare. The design of such software should be analyzed like doctrine documents and it should be interesting to do so even today.

Things like workflows, permissions, roles, simplifying abstractions, and such is relevant beyond hardware factors as it can determine the character of how a force fights. This may be where the next military genius have the most leverage for the next conflict.
 
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The propeller-driven Eaglet weighs less than 200 pounds, has a span of 10.5 feet with its pop-out wings deployed, and can fly at a maximum airspeed of 115 knots with a range of about 700 kilometers (435 miles) or about eight hours with a payload of about 20 to 30 pounds. Its maximum service ceiling is about 15,000 feet.

It is now even more apparent that the design has at least some low observable (stealthy) features, with what appears to be a flush exhaust port on the top rear portion of the drone's body. What may be two air intakes are seen at the front on either side of the propeller shaft. A stealthy chined fuselage with sloped sides and v-tail round out the reduced signature design.

Seems cool, but unless the army is getting into the deep strike business, air launch for a 700km range vehicle is a meme~
 
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@shin_getter Sine the first render was released back then i've been entertained with the idea of how viable would a scaled up Eaglet or vehicle with similar configuration be in fulfilling the role of a modern Super Tucano or CAS aircraft. I mean, i'm i the only one or is this what a stealth piston plane would look like in an a AU where jet engines were never developed?
eaglet-model.jpg
 
POGO ARISES ONCE MORE!

 
where have I seen that "mid-tier drone" before...
 

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