unexploited MiG-21's agility: Phantom vs MiG-21

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adriann

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Greetings All,

The first book in "Fighter Performance in Practice" serie is now available:
Phantom versus MIG-21
-How to do split-S in MiG-21 within 3000 ft: Unexploited low speed maneuverability-

authors: Predrag Pavlovic and Nenad Pavlovic.

publisher: Naucna KMD (Scientific KMD), Belgrade, Serbia. 2009. format B5 24*17 cm, softback, 104pp. highly illustrated - 53 graphs, 13 tables and 15 photos.

seller: eBay.com http://cgi.ebay.com/Fighter-Performance-Practice-Phantom-versus-MIG-21-/290431956256?cmd=ViewItem&pt=US_Texbook_Education&hash=item439f17f520

ISBN 978-86-6021-017-5

The book deals with practical aspects of performances with operational limitations. Why aircraft does not turn sideways or why lift is limited, does it stops at certain angle of attack as textbooks teach, why the envelope curve is dented at transonic speeds, what limits aircraft at max speed, how aircraft that has ceiling 50,000 feet can fly to 70,000 ft and in record flights to 100,000 ft, why take-off speed definition is outdated are some of the issues dealt with simple words and graphically.

It is the first in series about aircraft performance, direct comparison of what the two particular aircrafts are capable of. This time, these are two supersonic cold war legends, F-4 Phantom II and MiG-21. The aim is to compare the two aircraft under the same terms at proportionally same weights and defined conditions using official manufacturer data but in easily understandable format. That includes take-off, climb, acceleration, max and min speed, ceiling 1-g and dynamic, turns – maximum attainable, structural, actuator power or aerodynamic and thrust limited, range and endurance, descent and landing performance. One could find completely opposite facts than previously thought.

The book also explains how it was possible for MiG to do a Split-S maneuver within 3000 feet during one wartime situation, the figure which aircraft operators couldn’t duplicate in latter date, nor it was in aircraft manual. The chapter resolves unexploited low speed maneuvering capability useful to aircraft operators.
 
I already have it...nice, hard to find graphs comparing two planes in all phases of flight. Some 21's maneuverability issues was cleared to me (angles of attack, instantaneous turns..).
 
From below article it appears that 21 can still hold its own in dogfight:


Try to point at and shoot well flown MiG-21!

Predrag Pavlovic, dipl.ing. and Nenad Pavlovic, dipl.ing, JAT Airways


Maneuverability of modern fighter is measured by how slow it can fly and how high angle of attack it can sustain and still turn. During some war situations, US evaluation and Aggressor use, MiG-21 has shown it can keep pace with modern planes in this area. Aircraft manufacturer at one time considered this irrelevant and imposed restrictions on angle of attack. Flying above allowed 28-33 degrees local angle of attack at low speeds makes possible to relatively safely achieve a maneuverability once considered privilege of modern fighters.


Couple years ago reports and testimonies appeared in the media about a dogfight during the Israeli-Arab War '73. when the Egyptian MiG-21 pilot managed to do a Split-S maneuver at the start altitude of 3000 feet, less than half minimum airspace the manual says (about 6750 ft). Appropriate simulation can be found on the internet:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQMzK2WfYYM&feature=player_embedded




Figure 1.


Initiated by this event, some American and Israeli enthusiasts (once pilots of their AF fighters), one of which has a private squadron of various Russian fighters, attempted to replicate that minimum altitude needed to complete Split-S figure in the two-seater MiG-21. Previous consultation with Israeli ace, who participated in that dogfight in '73. war, did not help test to be successful. Attempts were carried out at the higher altitude (5 km) and the height loss during the figure was in accordance with flight manual. It remained unclear whether ’73 event was result of "special skills or superhuman strength of the Egyptian pilot needed to withstand the required g-loads”.


Recently disclosed files of the official MiG-21 evaluation in the U.S. revealed some unexpected capabilities that can be correlated with the "inexplicable" ’73. maneuver. MiGs were brought to America via Israel, in the late '60s as a result of pilot error or fled from Iraq and Algeria. Later they were bought from Indonesia. The MiG-21 in the U.S. Air Force is designated YF-110.
The report of a MiG-21F shows nothing particularly unusual, except for maneuvering capabilities and behavior/handling at low speeds described as "class above competition”. Besides that, if competitors tried to follow MiG-21F at high alpha, their engine experienced shutdown or compressor stall. MiG could perform "hammerhead" turn (wing over/stall turn/renversement) at 100 knots (knot = 1.853 km/h), figure where at the end of the vertical climb pilot add rudder (with the opposite aileron and forward stick) to push the plane in the dive. Rudder is effective from 30 knots. With the stick fully backward, the plane flies at 210 km/h, the rolling oscillations are present, but there is no lift breakdown or the tendency towards spin. If during the evaluation, loss of control due to uncoordinated controls occurred, it was in the form of roll-off (usually for 180°) instead of much more dangerous yaw-off. To put the plane back under control it was necessary only to release controls. MiG-21 proved to be docile, safer to fly than MIG-17. During the hundred flight tests engine compressor stall was never experienced.
U.S. of course, used MiGs in dogfight evaluation against their aircraft. Latter, they formed "Aggressor" squadron of MiGs and other fighters for the dogfight simulation with regular American aircraft.





Figure 2, 3. MiG-21 on testing in the U.S.

During MiG testing, it was clear that U.S. pilots have not relied on Soviet pilot’s manuals or they did not have one at the beginning. That is why the aircraft ability was fully exploited. Test pilots had thousands of flight hours experience on dozens of types of aircraft. Those who have survived the testing of U.S. supersonic fighters
F-100/101/104/4 (many of planes were called "widow makers"), learned to recognize the pre-stall/spin signs and use rudder for rolling the aircraft at higher angles of attack.




Figure 4. Some of the results of MiG-21 testing in the United States



Reportedly, if Vietnamese pilots had adequate training, the U.S. fighter shot-down ratio figures would be much worse in that war. In the hands of the well trained pilots, MiG would always outmaneuvered Phantom. US unveils graphs depicting not only far better instantaneous turn performance of Fishbed C compared to F-4D but also better sustained maneuverability. MiG-21 Aggressor pilots respected only the most modern fighters because they do not lose so much speed in turn even at low speeds. However, appearance of all-aspect infrared missiles reduced the importance of sustained turns (M2000, F-18E, Gripen …are not brilliant in the maintaining speed in turn). If MiG-21 had R-73 missile, it could easily take advantage of first shoot opportunity at close range against any new fighter.
The F-5E, fighter which does not fly above Mach 1.5, MiG-21 simulator, reportedly has shade better subsonic sustained turn maneuverability, but inferior controllability at low speeds. Maneuverability is the ability to change speed and direction of flight path (velocity vector pointing) and controllability - ability of change aircraft attitude (pitch/roll/yaw - nose pointing) and thrust (engine response - spool up time matters). When the aircraft initial flight path in dogfight is anti-parallel flyby, combat will inevitably develop so that someone goes in a climb with rolling scissors - turn reversals along the opponent’s flight path to remain behind the opponent. If the F-5E does not gain an advantage before the speed drops below 200 knots, MiG will start winning. First look at the configuration of the aircraft, MiG – delta with the sweep near 60°, and Tiger with nearly straight wings, would suggest the opposite, that MiG is in trouble at low speed.

Even the mighty F-15 Eagle had no solution in dogfight below 150-250 knots against MiG-21 in US Aggressor hands. At the beginning of dogfight, at the speed of 400-500 knots MiG-21 will turn at max g loosing 70 knots per second, ending at the speed of 70 knots in less than 90º of turn (deceleration of 3.5 g, more intensive than Harrier’s VIFF turn). Reportedly, no other aircraft can do that. This way MiG will remain behind every opponent still having sufficient controllability for gun tracking using rudder rolls. Opponents would think that at this speed MiG can only bring down the nose and dive, but the MiG at less than 100 knots has sufficient pitch authority to raise the nose at enemy. If F-15 tries to follow, ’21 should execute 'barrel-roll ' to remain behind the Eagle.
It is obvious that MiG-21 'Aggressor' pilots pulled full aft stick in turn regardless of the lateral oscillations, roll-off and temporary loss of control.





Figure 5. Scissors maneuver

Latter, the F-15 pilots learned (in a hard way) not to accept maneuvering at slow speeds, not to allow to be drown into a series of turn reversals, but to withdraw and re-attack at higher speeds using 3D turns and it’s higher thrust/weight ratio. F-15 with 45º swept wing and low horizontal tail, at higher angle of attack becomes longitudinally superstable, so it can not achieve more than about 30º angle of attack.

On the example of lift and stability of the aircraft with the 45º swept wing and high-set horizontal tail it can be seen that the lift begins to decline at 10º (buffeting starts), the wings are stalled at the 20º (the airflow separates from the wing), and max body lift is at 35-40º after which it decreases. Delta wing of MiG-21 with sweep of 57 º retains stable airflow to very high angles of attack.
Longitudinal stability is positive where the curve has a downward slope. In this case, the position of the horizontal tail is causing longitudinal instability at 15º, and at 35-40º angle of attack aircraft is trimmed without tail deflection. MiG-21 has no problem with longitudinal stability (except with air to ground armament with low fuel) and the plane in the example would have a limit at 15º angle of attack.
Yaw stability curve shows that the aircraft is unstable at 15º, what is not uncommon. Few modern fighters are stable at over 20º, but it is not a problem if the aircraft maintains lateral stability i.e. roll due to yaw. Roll stability curve is increasing as the lift increase, so it similarly comes to the instability, in this case at about 20º angle of attack. Shall the plane have a tendency toward spin (at no deflection of the control surfaces!) show the curve of dynamic directional stability where factors are static yaw and roll stability along the inertial characteristics of the aircraft. In this example, the plane is at stall just above 20º angle of attack, while MiG-21 is stable at well over 30º at low Mach numbers.
Curves correspond to a particular Mach number, at some other speed they can vary significantly.



Figure 6. Example lift and stability of aircraft

Soviet training was based on a relatively small number of flight hours on a MiG, which is used for training the primary purpose of aircraft, interception of fighters-bombers, under ground control. Pilots are not encouraged to explore the flight envelope. The aircraft is designed to fly faster and higher. Slow speeds were irrelevant, except for landing. In the first combat manuals, the performance at altitudes only above 5 km were presented. Later, it turned out that there are many practical constraints due to which the projected max altitudes and speeds are rarely used.
MiG-21 wing has no camber or twist along span. The relative thickness of the higher end of the wing than in the root. There are few prestall signs. Prestall buffet begins much earlier (at 50-100 km/h higher speed), its intensity is light and slightly decreases at higher α. Below Mach 0.4 buffet does not develop. Just before stall α, aircraft nose would start wandering accompanied by more noticeable wing rocking (roll oscillations that intensify thru the stall), symptoms of dynamic directional instability.
Stalling proceeds more vigorously with fewer signs at higher subsonic speeds.

Ailerons are ineffective in countering roll oscillations and rudder would push aircraft into a spin. Setting control surfaces to the neutral position immediately after the onset of stall would restore normal flight conditions. The aircraft is longitudinally stable in air combat configuration at any internal fuel quantity.

Aircraft’s stall speed (speed at which dynamic directional stability breakdown occurs) is function of Mach number, because directional and lateral static stability usually decreases with speed. Stall angle of attack decreases from above 30º (far beyond indicated α) at Mach 0.2 to 20º (i.e. 33 units local angle of attack on indicator) at Mach 0.95.

In those days when MiG-21 was designed, electronic flight controls to limit the angle of attack in function of Mach number didn’t exist. A fighter was built primarily for high speeds, high altitude interceptions. At slower speeds previous generations MiG-19/17 were better.

Designers put the angle of attack indicator, calibrated in local angle of attack, to warn the pilot of approaching stall limit. At recommended and allowed limit 28 units (about 17º true angle of attack) safety margin to stall is from 13º at Mach 0.2 to 3º at Mach 0.95.
So there is large margin between allowed angle of attack and stall angles of attack especially at lower Mach numbers.
At higher speeds, the angle of attack is limited by tail pitching power.









Mach number 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.95
Stall angle of attack (α) > 30º ~ 25º ~ 23º ~ 20º
Stall speed
weight = 7500 kg 233 km/h 254 km/h 260 km/h 267 km/h
Speed at 33 units local α
(~20º α ) 287 km/h 287 km/h 282 km/h 267 km/h (stall)
Speed at 28 units local α
(~17º α ) 311 km/h 311 km/h 305 km/h 291 km/h



So, the low speed turning capabilities were not fully exploited. If situation comes, like it happened to that Egyptian pilot during war, there is an additional lift potential.

During the Split-S figure, speed should not be increased. The closer to stall α is, the lesser the altitude loss is during figure. Below 600 km/h CAS entry speed aircraft cannot aerodynamically reach the allowed structural load factor so there is no need for superhuman physical stress. At higher speeds height loss in split-S at stall angle of attack is much more than 3000 ft.








Figure 7, 8, 9.











Because of its very high stall angle of attack at lower Mach numbers and good pitch control authority (large wing leading edge sweep produces strong vortical flow which shifts aerodynamic centre forward at high alpha, reducing stability thus allowing the tail to easily trim aircraft at more than 30° alpha), aircraft has a great point and shoot potential with modern IR missiles.

Although it is often said that the MiG-21 looses a lot of energy in turn, the truth is also that it has better sustained turn performance than most aircraft of its generation.
Tumansky engine proved almost stall/surge free at speeds far below minimums quoted in conservative Soviet flight manuals. All U.S. and European contemporary designs flamed out under same conditions. Engine has two shafts for optimized - different rotational speeds of low and high pressure compressors stages for a compressor blade stall resistance, feature that allows more compressors stages to be added for lowering specific fuel consumption. But it has unusually low number of compressor stages for a two-shaft design, contributing to reliability. Bad side of this philosophy is higher fuel consumption.
Despite the resistance of the compressor to the extreme conditions of airflow at the inlet, if afterburner is engaged at almost zero speed (well below the conservative engine envelope) other undesirable phenomena are possible. Distortions of the inlet airflow causes disruption of relations of air and fuel in the AB chamber, which changes the speed of combustion. Pressure fluctuations coupled to acoustic velocity fluctuation (AB chamber is also exposed to sound fatigue, the noise is up to 180 decibels) associated with combustion instability (called rumbling), can cause extreme resonant structural vibrations of the engine with subsequent engine destruction and the loss of the aircraft.

The published results of American evaluation relates to the F/PF models. BIS model has 15-20% higher ratio of inertia moments in yaw to roll. It certainly results in more sideslip during rolls and somewhat lower stall angle of attack, angle when breakdown of dynamic directional stability occurs. But the prevailing factor in this equation is the dihedral effect i.e. roll stability and it is the same in all models because it depends on airflow around the delta wing, so it can be expected good behavior of BIS model at low speeds also.

It should be borne in mind that prevailing effects at high angles of attack are dihedral and adverse yaw due to aileron deflection. Rudder is used for rolling and if the sideslip angle or yaw rate (induced in this way) crosses critical, result is the spin. Opposite aileron increases the roll rate through an additional sideslip angle i.e. 'adverse yaw'. In most modern aircraft application of such cross controls for 5-15 seconds, usually causes spin.



Figure 10. MiG-21 derivatives J-7G and JL-9

In general, the plane that has a lower stall speed is more maneuverable. At some speed, it will be able to achieve g-load equal to the square of the mentioned speeds quotient. The U.S. experience from simulated dogfights during exercises indicates the importance of the minimum speed and controllability at high angles of attack. That is why F-18 gets F-15/16 although its performances are considerably lower. Latest F-18E has still weaker performance, but better controllability. Angle of attack, at low speeds, of the F-16 and Gripen is limited to about 26º (Rafale and the Typhoon to a shade more). F-15 has max trimmed angle of attack 30-33º with poor roll response here. Against 'stealth' fighters F-22/35 and corresponding new Russian (whose all planform contour lines are parallel to a few main sweep angles - cm wavelength radar return angles, in addition to other 'stealth' measures and cost of 50 MiG-21), none of the listed has significant chances at medium range. Analysts agree that the close combat will remain inevitable, and that each aircraft armed with missiles cued by helmet sight has a chance, especially if it can reach high angles of attack. Even stealth fighters do not destroy opponents with death rays. Every component of the fire control/weapon system chain has limitations, from fighter radar to missile fuze. Towed mini decoy (laterally separated) with monopulse deception jammer/repeater or just simple towed corner reflector can draw away radar return signal centroid from towing aircraft. It could help surviving medium range combat even against stealth fighters.

The main disadvantages of MiG-21 are poor cockpit downward visibility, a proportionally small (but inline to generation) wingspan i.e. large induced drag (afterburner is needed for level flight at the absolute minimum speed, as at max allowed Mach number) and relatively slow response of two-shaft engine. All this causes poor performance on landing, especially in the case of go-around. Small fighter size means limited mission equipment carriage capacity.

It turns out that only important is to have a reliable and economical aircraft, a platform for carrying payload, with attack speed in the Mach 1.5+ class (that’s why a 15-20 years younger A-10 was withdrawn prematurely). The modern nav-attack equipment (simplified inertial system, GPS, displays…) is now relatively inexpensive to install even in a small propeller planes. MiG-21 operators missed opportunity to realize fact that with helmet cued, large acquisition angle R-73 missile that was available upgrade, MiG could achieve 50:1 kill ratio in dogfight against F-18/Gripen/Typhoon class fighters just because latter were 10-15 years late with similar weapon system. Instead of making best of it, MiG-21 operators opted to admire newer fighters.
Because of its good characteristics, even 50 years after MiG-21 became operational, some of its modifications are still in production in Asia.





Reference:

- Fighter Performance in Practice, Phantom versus MiG-21, Predrag and Nenad Pavlović,
eBay.com;
- Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Interviews;
 
Perhaps the U.S. should buy 2nd-hand MiG-21's to complemente or even replace the F-22 in WVR-combat ::)
 
Very interesting. Why can't I see the figures? ???
 
Maneuverability of modern fighter is measured by how slow it can fly and how high angle of attack it can sustain and still turn.

I've no idea when this became a metric for manoeuverability. Much more like a metric for just how easily you're going to shot down by something like F-22/Typhoon/Rafale/Fulcrum in a sustained fight.
 
There is no need for US to buy Chinese MiG-21 for now. But if some country is lacking money to buy Stealth fighters, if people is starving...it should consider buying or if it already has 21, upgrading is option.
Point is you do not throw away yesterday's bread, it can be useful.
Personaly I recommend F-35 to all.

Maneuverability metric is the ability to change speed and direction of flight path (velocity vector pointing) and controllability - ability of change aircraft attitude (pitch/roll/yaw - nose pointing) and thrust (engine response - spool up time) or in simple words "how slow it can fly and how high angle of attack it can sustain and still turn". In guns only combat sustained turns are of prime importance, possibly at higher practical speeds.
http://cgi.ebay.com/Fighter-Performance-in-Practice-Phantom-versus-MIG-21_W0QQitemZ290453596718QQcategoryZ2228QQcmdZViewItemQQ_trksidZp4340.m263QQ_trkparmsZalgo%3DSIC%26its%3DI%252BC%26itu%3DMRU-267%252BUCI%252BIA%252BUA%252BFICS%252BUFI%252BDDSIC%26otn%3D20%26pmod%3D290443813778%26ps%3D63%26clkid%3D7157192915047727014

I know that shootdown ratio figures against helmet cued AAMs from excersises. I think that at some time they stopped counting because it was waste of time and went to the drawing boards.
 
Typical professional metrics for agility in combat aircraft are:

Maximum Negative Specific Excess Power
Maximum negative specific excess power (Ps) is a metric that was created to describe the energy loss of an aircraft while executing an unsteady turn. This metric attempts to quantify an aircraft's potential for losing energy by measuring the minimum (or maximum negative) PS (rate of change in specific energy) achieved during a maneuver. Maximum negative specific excess power corresponds to an aircraft's maximum instantaneous turn rate capability.
Energy exchange during combat is a combination of speed loss (kinetic energy) and/or altitude loss (potential energy) and depends on the controls applied by the pilot or flight control system and the aircraft's aerodynamic characteristics. The classical approach to combat management is to minimize energy loss during combat.
Maneuver employed to attain the maximum instantaneous turn rate consists of using the elevator to increase the aircraft angle-of-attack and, in some cases, the application of aileron, rudder, speed brakes, and maneuver flaps. Although a reduction of thrust would result in a reduction of the net axial force on the aircraft (and thus a reduction of specific excess power) this technique is not normally used. Engine response time is of the same order of magnitude as the time needed to achieve the desired conditions. Furthermore, the capability to gain speed following the turn would be seriously compromised.

Time-to-Bank and Capture 90-Degrees
In air combat, the offensive pilot attempts to achieve target acquisition. To achieve his objective of destroying the enemy, the pilot must successfully deploy his weapon, which requires aiming or locking-on. To lock-on or aim a weapon the pilot must precisely control his aircraft. During this phase, the defensive pilot tries to evade the offensive pilot's attempt by jinking of-of-plane and changing the battle geometry. The offensive pilot has to reacquire the target and track sufficiently to deploy his weapon. The cycle of acquire, jink, reacquire, jink, etc., is characterized by the offensive pilot's banking with the intent of capturing a specific bank angle as determined by the jinking maneuver of the defensive participant. Time-to-bank to and capture 90 -degrees was chosen as an agility metric because it quantifies an aircraft's ability to offensively reacquire an evading target.
Airplane roll performance is measured with respect to a single-degree-of-freedom system. While the pilot may use the rudder peddles to slip the airplane and increase roll acceleration, the designer is not permitted to take advantage of this maneuver. Indeed, for a class IV airplane, automatic turn coordination is already required, insuring that the airplane behaves as a single-degree-of-freedom system in roll. Therefore, the performance of the roll control system can, to a great extent, be described by two terms: maximum roll acceleration and the roll time constant. Maximum roll acceleration is proportional to the roll control moment available. Roll time constant is related to the airplane roll damping. Roll damping can be influenced by roll rate feedback if required. Much research has been done to determine optimum values for roll acceleration requirements and time constants.
Specifying a minimum roll acceleration capability and time constant, along with a control rate input, results in a unique roll angle time history. Frequently, specifications are expressed as the time required to roll through a certain roll angle. For a class IV airplane at combat flight conditions, this is usually 90 degrees in 1 second. It is the task of the preliminary design engineer to ensure enough roll control to meet this specification. Adequate roll control must be designed into the airplane during preliminary design. The designer has some control over the time constant through roll rate feedback.

Maximum Nose-Down Pitch Acceleration
Many times in air combat the roles of the offensive and defensive pilots are reversed. When an offensive pilot is faced with role reversal his objective changes from that of destroying the enemy to not being destroyed. A frequently successful defensive tactic is to disengage, break off the battle, and retum to safe air space. As the defensive pilot attempts this action, the offensive pilot will continue his pursuit. The success of the defensive pilot depends on his ability to transition from an engagement mode characterized by high load factors and high turn rates to an escape mode characterized by high longitudinal accelerations to maximize the separation distance. This maneuver requires the pilot to unload his airplane as quickly as possible and achieve a minimum drag flight angle of attack. Maximum nose-down pitch acceleration was chosen as an agility metric to quantify the aircraft's transition from a highly loaded air combat flight condition to an escape or maximum longitudinal acceleration condition.

Maximum Achievable Trimmed Angle-of-Attack
Modem air combat research has shown that high angle-of-attack or post-stall flight may provide a tactical advantage on both offensive and defensive aerial engagements. In an offensive mode the pilot's ability to turn at higher turn rates with smaller turn radii provides him with the option to more quickly achieve shot opportunity by out-maneuvering his opponent. In a defensive mode high angle of attack capability can be utilized by a pilot to bleed energy more quickly, thus forcing the offensive pilot to overshoot and providing role reversal. In either case high-angle-of-attack capability will be utilized by a pilot only if the airplane remains controllable and has good handling qualities. Maximum Achievable (Departure-Free) Trimmed Angle-of-Attack was chosen as an agility metric to quantify an aircraft's ability to utilize the post-stall flight regime.

Maximum Lateral Acceleration
It has been proposed that an aircraft's ability to laterally translate its position may be of significant tactical advantage. In a real engagement this ability may provide useful defensively as a jinking maneuver. However, this characteristic may be of even greater importance in a ground attack mode. Typically, high value ground targets are attacked in a manner requiring a single pass or flyby for each target. An airplane with substantial lateral displacement capability may be able to attack a target, laterally displace its position, acquire and attack a second target on the same pass. Maximum lateral acceleration was chosen as an agility metric to quantify an airplane's ability to attack multiple ground targets on a single pass.
 

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Thanks, Abraham for comment and appropriate Boeing table...
For simplicity I used one in pic attachment and one, in bold, more accurate in text :

3.3 HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS
Generally speaking, agility is defined as the quick moving of a body or of the mind.
The historical background reveals an evolution of the concept of agility or similar concepts applied to highly
maneuverable aircraft. This evolution is of course linked with the progress of aircraft technologies and with the
consecutive extension of flying capabilities.

3.3.1 Supermaneuverability and Post Stall Flight
Before agility, supermaneuverability was first defined, as the "ability to fly in the post-stall regime".
The post stall regime is the domain of flight at high angles of attack.
In the conventional regime, angle of attack is limited to low values, where lift increase almost proportionally with the
angle of attack.
In the post stall regime, lift no longer increases but decreases with the angle of attack (Figure 1). So, the aircraft
trajectory may go down while the aircraft nose is high, and the actual aircraft trajectory may become difficult to perceive
for the pilot.
Also, aircraft capable of controlled flight at high angles of attack usually have very efficient control devices and
demonstrate high angular rates, which make rapid changes of the flight trajectory possible.
These facts are illustrated in an other definition of supermaneuverability, which "refers to the unusual flight trajectories
presently investigated by high performance fighter aircraft" [1].
Flying at high angles of attack raises difficult problems in term of aerodynamic behavior, propulsion and flight controls.
It requires a powerful and sophisticated integrated control system so that the aircraft can be effectively flown by a
human pilot. The progress in computer power was a sine qua non for opening this new domain of controlled flight.

The post stall regime is necessary synonymous of low speed flight ; this fact makes its practical utility somewhat
questionable and probably limited to particular combat conditions, such as one-versus-one closed-in combat.
However, historically, the research necessary to extend the flight domain of some prototypes to the post stall regime has
widely contributed to the progress in the robustness and reliability of the flight control systems installed on most modern
aircraft and in their handling qualities at low speed, which is needed also in conventional critical flight phases such as
take off and landing.

3.3.2 Agility, Super Agility and Hyper Agility
The notion of agility appears with the generalization of naturally unstable flown-by-wire aircraft and the development of
thrust vectored prototypes. Those aircraft exhibit high maneuverability and turn rates even at high angles of attack and
an extended flight envelope, sometimes including the post stall regime.
Many similar definitions exist and are now well accepted to define the airframe agility [2]:
"Ability to shift from one maneuver to the other" (Col. Boyd, 1986)
"Time rate of change of the aircraft velocity vector" (W.B. Herbst, 1988).
Next, a more general definition emphasize the shift of the concept of agility towards global agility, including the role of
each element of the system into its efficiency:
"Ability of the entire weapon system to minimize the time delays between target acquisition and target destruction"
(A.M. Skow, 1989).
This recent concept of global agility was used in various studies on the practical impacts of agility, sometimes with
slightly different denominations: weapon system agility, full envelope agility, practical agility, operational agility.
For instance, a parametrical study on the tactical utility of new technologies such as post stall flight, enhanced radar
coverage and agile missiles addressed the full envelope agility; its results emphasize the need for the balance and proper
integration of the various components of the weapon system, including aircraft, armament, avionics and pilot [3].
Only a few references exist for the denominations of super agility or hyper agility [4]. These denominations could be
understood as either augmented agility or supermaneuverability (post stall) plus agility, but it seems that they may lead
to some confusion and that there is no need for new terms, unless they relate to a particular new technology or
capability.
3.4 RECENT DEFINITIONS
In recent years, the Working Group 19 of the Flight Mechanics Panel of AGARD [5] made a considerable effort to
synthesize the various and sometimes differing viewpoints on the topic of agility.
This group eventually identified several possible aspects of agility and provided some consensus definitions as follow:
Airframe Agility: the physical properties of the aircraft which relate to its ability to change, rapidly and precisely its
flight path vector or pointing axis and to its ease of completing that change.
Systems Agility: the ability to rapidly change mission functions of the individual systems which provide the pilot with
his tactical awareness and his ability to direct and launch weapons in response to and to alter the environment in which
he is operating.
Weapons Agility: ability to engage rapidly characteristics of the weapons and its associated onboard systems in response
to hostile intent or counter measures.
Transient Agility is a continuously defined property reflecting the instantaneous state of the system under consideration.
Operational Agility: the ability to adapt and respond rapidly and precisely, with safety and poise, to maximize mission
effectiveness.
The quickness and precision are critical elements of all these definitions.
The concept of Operational Agility was established with the essential intent to provide definitions and metrics
appropriate to capture the role of the component parts of the weapon system and their interaction, as the main
contributor to the global effectiveness of a complex aircraft design.
24
The Working Group 19 also covers the pilot-vehicle interface and finally give some recommendations, two of whom are
directly related to the human consequences of agility:
• Establish the Influences on Awareness of High Rate and Acceleration Maneuvers.
• Establish the Influence of Prolonged Exposure to Sustained ‘g’ at Moderate Levels.
In the following chapters, we will briefly examine the concepts of agility relative to each component of the system
(airframe, systems, weapons) and give some orders of magnitude of nowadays and future weapon systems performances,
which may have particular consequences on the human in flight. We will then examine the concept of operational
agility and conclude with some perspectives for potential areas of preoccupation relative to the future combat scenarios
and tactical environment.
3.5 COMPONENTS AGILITY
3.5.1 Airframe Agility
3.5.1.1 Two Complementary Considerations
Airframe agility relates to its ability to change, rapidly and precisely its flight path vector or pointing axis and to its ease
of completing that change.
This definition covers two complementary considerations:
- maneuverability, the ability to change magnitude and direction of the velocity vector, and
- controllability, the ability to change the pointing axis through rotation about the center of gravity, independent to
the flight path vector
(Figure 2).
MANEUVERABILITY
ABILITY TO CHANGE SPEED AND
DIRECTION OF FLIGHT PATH
ABILITY TO CHANGE AIRCRAFT
ATTITUDE AND THRUST
Velocity vector pointing Nose pointing
CONTROLLABILITY
AIRFRAME AGILITY :
TWO CONSIDERATIONS
Figure 2: Airframe agility: maneuverability and controllability.
25
In the common sense, those considerations are sometimes conflicting and, indeed, they reveal that agility is the result of
a compromise in the aircraft design: on one hand, it is desirable for the aircraft to be able of high peak velocities and
turn rates, i.e. to have a high maneuverability, and in the same time it is highly desirable to be able to precisely control
those parameters, which is obviously easier to obtain when the peak values are limited.
As such, airframe agility relates closely to, and may be regarded as an extension to, flying qualities. The considerations
above are related to the distinction classically made in flight dynamics between, respectively, the study of aircraft
performance and the study of handling qualities.
The airframe agility may or not include the aircraft ability to fly and to maneuver at high angles of attack, also described
as the post stall flight region, which give rise to new problems to the designer (aerodynamic stall, propulsion ignition,
non linear and non stationary behavior, unstable configuration, control of the possible departure).
This ability to fly at very high angles of attack may also pose some specific problems to the pilot, for instance to
perceive what is the actual flight path of the aircraft. This problem is partially due to the technical difficulty to present
the direction of the velocity vector on a display with a limited field of view. Some possible future solutions will be
covered in the pilot-vehicle interface chapter of this lecture.
This problem is also clearly due to a necessary change into the basic flying habits of ordinary pilots. On light aircraft,
the primary flight parameter is the aircraft body pitch angle; it is visually controlled and the consequence of any change
on the flight path is also visually controlled. On aircraft equipped with a head up display and an inertial navigation unit,
the direction of the velocity vector is usually displayed. It is used for instance when achieving a precise head up
landing. Pilots usually get used quite easily to this new way of piloting, there is no deep conflict between body and
velocity axis because the angular difference are still limited. On an agile aircraft flying at very high angle of attack, the
body axis and the velocity axis may get completely decoupled, resulting in a complete difference between the perceived
aircraft attitude and the actual path, which are no longer linked by the traditional flight equations.
Some similar problem may occur as soon as a technology is introduced that radically extend the possible solutions
available for the pilot to achieve a given goal. This class of problem will be addressed in the chapters of this lecture
dealing with psychological aspects, and selection and training.
 

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I suppose article was written to Fishbed users to highlight unexploited low speed lift and pitch pointing, for those that have no money to buy T-50 or F-35...or do not see point in wasting money in crisis time.

Egyptian pilot was in trouble, forgot about alpha limits by pulling stick back all the way and happily discovered plenty of lift margin. I personaly do not like MiG-21 like aircraft but it seems it has important low speed lift and pitch pointing potential, that is not in the manuals, but can be useful to operators.

I think US Aggressor 21 showed itself dangerous in low speed turns and pointing. At least F-15 pilots said so. And all that with just gun and old AIM-9 type AAMs.
I exercises with MiG-29 (with F-16 like AOA limt) US learned that combat against helmet pointed R-73 was thing to avoid as kill ratio was countless. Any aircraft with such weapon system would do similarly. That why Western priority was AIM-9X, AMRAAM and Stealth. Remember what was kill ratio during Falkland war just because of AIM-9L (Harriers didn't dare to use VIFF).
But confronting F-22 with AIM-9X with MiG-21 with R-73 in dogfight is not wise for F-22 because chances exists for both and F-22 is hundred times more expensive. And stealth does not works always as history showed. Situations will always come that most sci-fi fighters must engage in dogfight.
 
Personally, I'm a bit sceptical about the "WVR-invincible Mig-21" as I interprete it to be from the posts here, and by so the book you quote from.

michael62 said:
If MiG-21 had R-73 missile, it could easily take advantage of first shoot opportunity at close range against any new fighter.

I'm not so sure it could take on with a lot of success (even WVR) the Gripen, Typhoon, and Rafale, not to speak about the F-22 or F-35.
Yes, legacy F-15s, Vipers and Hornets would probably have had a much rougher time when close-in with a fighter with HMS-cued HOB-missiles, but they would have made use of their superior BVR-capability anyway; f.e. during Operation Desert Storm in Irak (1990) and the War in Kosovo (Airwar with Serbia), legacy Western fighters took on Mig-29's and the Mig's were shot down.

michael62 said:
Although it is often said that the MiG-21 looses a lot of energy in turn, the truth is also that it has better sustained turn performance than most aircraft of its generation.

So? Other paragraphs in your post/bookquote stress the importancy of instantanious manveouvrability to get a quick lock-on / first-look-first-kill? Btw, the F-15 also has better sustained maneouvrability then the Su-27.


michael62 said:
MiG-21 operators missed opportunity to realize fact that with helmet cued, large acquisition angle R-73 missile that was available upgrade, MiG could achieve 50:1 kill ratio in dogfight against F-18/Gripen/Typhoon class fighters

A "little" exaggerated IMHO.
 
Dreamfighter said:
A "little" exaggerated IMHO.

Very much so. Besides none of this addresses the core issue as to why MiG-21s have been consistently thumped in air to air combat. Its because the majority of its combat users have been repressive regimes or unsophisticated societies that don’t promote the kind of warfighting professionalism, extensive training and technical understanding needed to perform at high level in a domain as demanding as air combat.
 
adriann said:
And stealth does not works always as history showed.

Care to elaborate on that?
 
adriann said:
I exercises with MiG-29 (with F-16 like AOA limt) US learned that combat against helmet pointed R-73 was thing to avoid as kill ratio was countless. Any aircraft with such weapon system would do similarly. That why Western priority was AIM-9X, AMRAAM and Stealth. Remember what was kill ratio during Falkland war just because of AIM-9L (Harriers didn't dare to use VIFF).

All kills with AIM-9L in the Falklands conflict were achieved from behind - AIM-9J would have done the same trick.

The kill ratio was that advantageous because the Argentinians were sometimes surprised (as some A-4s), sometimes even lower on fuel than the Brits and then there was also the occasional Argentinian rookie pilot.
 
lastdingo said:
The kill ratio was that advantageous because the Argentinians were sometimes surprised (as some A-4s), sometimes even lower on fuel than the Brits and then there was also the occasional Argentinian rookie pilot.

I think the reason is a bit more systematic than that. The Argentines may have been excellent flying pilots but they really lacked the air combat tactics and technical skills to stand toe to toe with the RN FAA – which was one of the best forces in NATO. Also the Sea Harrier was a far superior air combat platform systems wise and agility wise in its element (low altitude) and except for some of the first missions the Argentine Mirage/Dagger didn’t stay high and fast where they had the aircraft advantage. That their initial aggressive air to air tactics consisted of trying to lob Shaffirs from up high and outside their range at the Sea Harriers does not speak highly for their tactical competence. After that they were basically on the defensive air to air for the rest of the war.
 
Dreamfighter:
I didn't want to say that 21 is invincible WVR, any ac armed with large aquisition angle AAMs is serious threat with big chances to point at any Buck Roger fighter WVR. Fact is that R-73 was available upgrade 10-15 years before corresponding AAMs were available in the West. Computer simulations and mock combat confirmed such high shoot ratio. I remember when F-16 stopped counting ratio against MiG-29 just because of R-73.
Incidentally 21 has also high trimmed (laterly/dynamicaly stable) alpha capability at slow speeds and also ability to make Mach 2+ interception. Even fuel fraction is not below average (0.4 bis at basic weight). But cockpit visibility and lift at low alpha is awful.
Off course that sustained turns are important. But inst is now even more. You set interesting issue: sust turns F-15 vs Su-27..any official data ?

quellish:
I know that 117 is downed because it was within the radar and missile range SAM-3. It happens ...

lastdingo:
I think trick was only in expanded acquisition mode of AIM-9L. Although all-aspect, its minimum controllable range in front hemisphere approaches seeker max acquisition range. Therefore rear engagement is most likely for any IC AAMs.
 
adriann said:
quellish:
I know that 117 is downed because it was within the radar and missile range SAM-3. It happens ...

Your assertion was that stealth "didn't work". This is simply not true. Very low observable aircraft are just that - very hard to observe in specific bands. The SA-3 Neva system that shot down an F-117 in 1999 had already been modified. There were also failures in mission planning that made the F-117 more vulnerable to several threats.

VLO technology is a survivability *enhancement*, not a cloak of invincibility. It is a set of methods to reduce the range to detect an aircraft, and only across certain bands.
 
Thanks for info.. Stealth was honestly decribed two decades ago. There is a balance of radar tracking accuracy and ability to see LO ac. I'm not saying that Stealth is not worthy, I'm saying that old model of warfighting - frontal duel is gone and that situation will come when LO ac will flash in front of some IC AAMs.
 
I didn't say MiG-21 is wonder, it is just useful and it has some surprising abilities that are not exploited..
As far as I know neighbor county's 1999. one big search (retractable) radar was never destroyed despite of harms, alarms...it passed 117 position data…There is one aphorism: It does not matter how big dog is in the fight, but how big 'fight' is in the dog.
I wonder is there any recent-fighter's performance comparison like "Fighter Performance in Practice"..
 
Wishful thinking

If the US would build an agile and single engined "stealthy but improved" mig -21 type aircraft in the $20M range that could perform air to air and some strike missions that would seem very attractive to me and on international market. Are we spending too much on the f-22/35 "hangar queens" I think so...just my opinion.

Would you want to be in an $80M f-35 up against 4 or 5 STEALTHY $20M "Mig-21" type aircraft?
 
Several years ago I read, that the price tag for a standard F-16C/D was around
$ 23 million. That's an "affordable", proven and relatively old fighter. An agile, improved and
STEALTHY MiG 21 type wouldn't be just a pimped out Fishbed, but a complete new aircraft.
And to my opinion, it would end up at around $ 80 million again.
 
adriann said:
You set interesting issue: sust turns F-15 vs Su-27..any official data ?
Well, everyone knows the Flanker is more agile then the Eagle, with better instantaneous turnrate. But the Eagle can sustain a turn better / longer then the (basic) Flanker, it's higher T/W is a major contributer to that.

I don't have an "official" performance-comparison at hand, sorry.
Back in the 90's, "Air International" ran a series of quite in-depth(*) articles on the evolution of aircraft design (both military and civilian) from the beginning to the present. The arcticles also discussed pro's & con's of specific designs. I remember very well one article included a chart, comparing both instant & stustained turn-rates of Flanker and Eagle. If the chart was from an official source or not, or totally accurate or not, I can't say for sure.

(*) in-depth for an amateur like me, not for engineers or other specialists
 
I agree, MiG-21 could never be stealth aircraft, as other existing a/c apart from F-22,35,T-50 will never be. I guess stealth philosophy must be implemented at the beginning with all that planform angle and protrusion discipline.
US could build half capable (as expensive) and lighter a/c than F-35 but it would be of little use for US which has to fight war at other side of the globe, but for some small country yes.
It is question who would dare to build another stealth fighter nowadays in economic crisis times. Maybe Chinese or Turkey (countries that realized that productivity is important, instead of fashion, marketing and empty talks) and they might try to do that what would finish some countries economy.
I saw some official Su-27 turn data and it seem optimistic for me, for example Su's lift at unit angle of attack decreases with Mach, subsonic, contrary to laws of physics. Not to mention far better sustained turns than other a/c's.
 

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