In the last week or so, there was a RFI related to adding a catapult to a ship in the near term (<5 years). The requested specs would not be enough to operate F-35C, so the logical assumption is that it is to support an AEW UAS. And based on timing, the platform is probably the QE2s.

If they are going to add cats and traps, would it not make sense to do the thing properly? After all, the uav's will be growth limited unless they go for a decent setup so building the ability to launch F-35's or bigger would be getting ahead of the game.
 
It certainly would cut costs to mount AAW onto a Type 26 hull and propulsion setup. Frankly the Australian Hunter class will have an impressive radar fit. It's potentially possible to achieve the merger of ASW and AAW on such a ship.

While in theory a dedicated AAW could be achieved on the Type 31 as that's It's Danish roots anyway.

Which costs do you believe would be saved by retaining the T26 hull? Especially considering that hull design is very compromised and incapable of being stretched?

Systems, like propulsion, I agree should be reused unless there's been a significant improvement over time. Certainly technology insertion. Hull forms? No - no significant savings, insures making different contents harder to fit.
Costs...you have evidence to the contrary?
Incapable of being stretched?
Does it need stretching?
 
In the last week or so, there was a RFI related to adding a catapult to a ship in the near term (<5 years). The requested specs would not be enough to operate F-35C, so the logical assumption is that it is to support an AEW UAS. And based on timing, the platform is probably the QE2s.


This may give more clues ..


 
It certainly would cut costs to mount AAW onto a Type 26 hull and propulsion setup. Frankly the Australian Hunter class will have an impressive radar fit. It's potentially possible to achieve the merger of ASW and AAW on such a ship.

While in theory a dedicated AAW could be achieved on the Type 31 as that's It's Danish roots anyway.

Which costs do you believe would be saved by retaining the T26 hull? Especially considering that hull design is very compromised and incapable of being stretched?

Systems, like propulsion, I agree should be reused unless there's been a significant improvement over time. Certainly technology insertion. Hull forms? No - no significant savings, insures making different contents harder to fit.
Costs...you have evidence to the contrary?
Incapable of being stretched?
Does it need stretching?

I don't understand your 1st question and I've already answered your 3rd. As for stretching, the T26 design is already at its L/D limit so it's incapable of stretch.
 
What is your opinion on Gas Pebble reactors for naval applications, if I may ask?
 
What is your opinion on Gas Pebble reactors for naval applications, if I may ask?
While Pebble Bed Helium coold High Temperature reactors have massive potential they have a low power density compared to submarine PWRs. The interesting concept considered by one country in the 1990s was a very low power pebble bed reactor using a stirling engine for about 500kW electrical output. It would have been a very simple system and would have been the ultimate AIP.
 
And why pair with the Italians, they haven't produced a ship on par with T45 yet, so what's to be gained for the UK?
Italy, nor Sweden, has never produced a fighter comparable to F22, still is a partner in Tempest program. Even if you partner with a country with a much lower technical know how still you have vast cost savings. And by the way Italy is probably the current European leader is surface platform development, I can only hope T31 emerges as something as advanced as the PPA or T26 as a project as effective and flexible as the Bergaminis. Also the new DDX project is basically the only current western active program for a ship of size and capability comparable with the 055s or the KDX3. The idea that the T45 demonstrate some technology or solution that is outside the ability of the Italian shipbuilding industry is just ridiculous while the idea of a cooperation is a sound one even if the timeline could be different for the two programs.
 
Airplanes can be sold with relatively minor modification by forcing something down someone's throat. This is how the UK sold Typhoon, Tornado, and JSF to the Europeans.

FWIW, international programs likely incur have penalties, not savings, with respect to cost. Any minor savings in unit cost from larger orders is more than offset by the need to accommodate various differing standards (and the unfortunate problems and complications of "work-sharing"), assuming those can be accommodated at all. The last time the UK tried to cooperate with Italy on a common warship design it resulted in two different ships: the Horizons and the Darings. There's no reason to expect any different with Type 4X/Type 83 and whatever will replace the FREMM.

Very likely the UK will simply make the ship on its own. Its proven it can do this fairly consistently so there's no particular reason it won't be able to do it again at the moment.

The absolute best outcome of course would be that everyone simply makes their own things for their own use, as Sweden did for decades, and Italy attempted to, but that is probably not possible anymore, unfortunately. Thus international cooperation in weapons development is something of a necessary evil and should be avoided at all costs when it can be, not sought out as some panacea, as it more often than not results in the very problems it purports to address.
 
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Airplanes can be sold with relatively minor modification by forcing something down someone's throat. This is how the UK sold Typhoon, Tornado, and JSF to the Europeans.

FWIW, international programs likely incur have penalties, not savings, with respect to cost. Any minor savings in unit cost from larger orders is more than offset by the need to accommodate various differing standards (and the unfortunate problems and complications of "work-sharing"), assuming those can be accommodated at all. The last time the UK tried to cooperate with Italy on a common warship design it resulted in two different ships: the Horizons and the Darings. There's no reason to expect any different with Type 4X/Type 83 and whatever will replace the FREMM.

Very likely the UK will simply make the ship on its own. Its proven it can do this fairly consistently so there's no particular reason it won't be able to do it again at the moment.

The absolute best outcome of course would be that everyone simply makes their own things for their own use, as Sweden did for decades, and Italy attempted to, but that is probably not possible anymore, unfortunately. Thus international cooperation in weapons development is something of a necessary evil and should be avoided at all costs when it can be, not sought out as some panacea, as it more often than not results in the very problems it purports to address.
Naval platform are more more easily adaptable to different systems than aircraft platforms, that means you can share the platforms development cost if you only can agree on some broad common requirements. The FREMM program is basically two quite different class of ships each with multiple subvariants still having a common platform. Nations part of the same alliance, with a common command structure, the same foe and lying in the same continent are highly unlikely to have objective operational differences resulting in radically different requirements for the major weapon systems. Much more pressing in making the cooperative efforts often ineffective is the legitimate interest in promoting and defending the national military industry, it's a difficult ballance between two contrasting conditions of a country's military credibility: the need to have a sovereign weapon industry and the need to have up to date weapons requiring level of investment too much great for the middle powers like the european ones to be taken alone.
 
The UK and Italy have different requirements. Italy is confined mainly to the Mediterranean, the UK has global committments. One of the reasons why Italian ships are so heavily armed is because they accept lower habitability standards. For a navy with worldwide commitments this is unacceptable.

Another factor is an independent design capability. Britain ended paying much more than it should have for the Astute class by allowing it's Submarine design and manufacturing capabilities to atrophy following the end of the Cold War. Given the current low rate of warship construction, relying upon a foreign design will mean a gap of years if not decades of potential design experience.
 
So the UK didn't force anything on Eurofighter partners.....save the forcing of Germany politicians to back their own industry.

Italy is no slouch in a variety of aerospace areas.

The Horizon story is one of French takeover of a collaborative project despite the then largest order being the RN's (12 for the RN I think 4 for the MN and 2 for the Italian Navy)....effectively lowering requirements to make French products fit. The UK walked away as time was pressing on Type 42/Sea Dart/ADAWS replacement (and parts of that had been under pressure since 1968) and it didn't want to compromise requirements and domestic industry.

Hence why they stuck with the diesels and the WR.21 with US designed intercooler (a legacy of NF-90). Though it's the lack of diesel power that's actually been the problem.

So the strongest National argument is to sustain capacity (see Astute Saga). So a new design for Type 83 is the way forward. Anything less means abandoning the capacity to design high end warships.

Capacity, like Logistics and Training are the strategic necessities for victory in war.
 
And why pair with the Italians, they haven't produced a ship on par with T45 yet, so what's to be gained for the UK?
Italy, nor Sweden, has never produced a fighter comparable to F22, still is a partner in Tempest program. Even if you partner with a country with a much lower technical know how still you have vast cost savings. And by the way Italy is probably the current European leader is surface platform development, I can only hope T31 emerges as something as advanced as the PPA or T26 as a project as effective and flexible as the Bergaminis. Also the new DDX project is basically the only current western active program for a ship of size and capability comparable with the 055s or the KDX3. The idea that the T45 demonstrate some technology or solution that is outside the ability of the Italian shipbuilding industry is just ridiculous while the idea of a cooperation is a sound one even if the timeline could be different for the two programs.

Both the French and Italians are procuring the Mk2 Aster the Block 1NT, development contract signed 2016, the Italians will be installing them on the new PPA's Full, Pattugliatori Polivalenti d’Altura class frigates and its new 175 m destroyers planned for delivery in 2028.

The Blk 1NT extends Aster capability to target 1,500 km ballistic missiles, increased from the original Blk 1s 600 km capability. Blk 1NT features a new Ka-band active seeker replacing the Ku-band unit which with its narrower beam giving longer range and better angular resolution so allowing the missile to engage a target missile earlier in its trajectory with its more refined course corrections during the fly-out plus a new computer for an improved weapon controller.

As at this moment there is no suggestion the RN has the funding to procure the Blk 1NT's for the Type 45.

On the future horizon is the Aster Block 2, a near new missile with capability to target 3,000 km ballistic missiles. The second stage rocket and kill vehicle appear to be increased from current diameter of 180 mm / 7" to the same diameter as the booster ,380 mm / 15", the same method USN using with the SM-6 Block 1A to 1B where the second stage rocket increased in diameter from 13 1/2" to 21".

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JG2B-Ot9SL4&ab_channel=MBDA
 

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Airplanes can be sold with relatively minor modification by forcing something down someone's throat. This is how the UK sold Typhoon, Tornado, and JSF to the Europeans.

FWIW, international programs likely incur have penalties, not savings, with respect to cost. Any minor savings in unit cost from larger orders is more than offset by the need to accommodate various differing standards (and the unfortunate problems and complications of "work-sharing"), assuming those can be accommodated at all. The last time the UK tried to cooperate with Italy on a common warship design it resulted in two different ships: the Horizons and the Darings. There's no reason to expect any different with Type 4X/Type 83 and whatever will replace the FREMM.

Very likely the UK will simply make the ship on its own. Its proven it can do this fairly consistently so there's no particular reason it won't be able to do it again at the moment.

The absolute best outcome of course would be that everyone simply makes their own things for their own use, as Sweden did for decades, and Italy attempted to, but that is probably not possible anymore, unfortunately. Thus international cooperation in weapons development is something of a necessary evil and should be avoided at all costs when it can be, not sought out as some panacea, as it more often than not results in the very problems it purports to address.
Naval platform are more more easily adaptable to different systems than aircraft platforms, that means you can share the platforms development cost if you only can agree on some broad common requirements. The FREMM program is basically two quite different class of ships each with multiple subvariants still having a common platform. Nations part of the same alliance, with a common command structure, the same foe and lying in the same continent are highly unlikely to have objective operational differences resulting in radically different requirements for the major weapon systems. Much more pressing in making the cooperative efforts often ineffective is the legitimate interest in promoting and defending the national military industry, it's a difficult ballance between two contrasting conditions of a country's military credibility: the need to have a sovereign weapon industry and the need to have up to date weapons requiring level of investment too much great for the middle powers like the european ones to be taken alone.

None of that is really true at all, except that cooperative efforts undermine national interests and sovereignty in the realm of defense industries.

FREMM and Type 45 come from the failed NFR 90, which never was able to resolve its problems due to mutually exclusive design preferences of the partner navies.

This is probably less noticeable for various air forces within NATO, who operate to common standards and languages (as does the aviation industry at large, to a lesser extent), and when the weather really isn't much different from Gibraltar to Orkney in terms of flying, except there might be a few more clouds now and again in the latter. Warships OTOH almost invariably flounder outside of extremely limited mission sets, or more or less ignored ones, like the Tripartite minesweeper. Even then the Tripartites were intended to operate within the same sea and geographic locale, so it's not as much of a difference as you'd think.

There is no real balance, except for the perceived political need and actual fiscal support. International cooperation is one or two steps away from non-existence, or subservience to nearby regional economies. It's less a contrast and more a decline that can either be allowed to continue to its natural conclusion, as has occurred already in France where their armored fighting vehicle industry is being subsumed into the greater German AFV production industry, or arrested and restored, as was the case with the Japanese military-industrial firms such as Howa, through the 1970's.

To arrest the decline and extinction of local military-industrial firms you have to subsidize them through periods of famine with a bit of busywork. If you don't do this it will wither and die, and either need to be regenerated ex nihilo (usually bad) or subsumed by foreign investors and interests (always bad). You can see the results of such atrophy in the United States Navy and its inability to produce a new hullform to replace the DDG-51.

The vast majority of barriers to a healthy military-industrial, and indeed local industry, are perceived rather than actual. There's no real need for international cooperation, it is generally bad for industrial and political sovereignty, and it generally means that one large regional economy emerges as the dominant partner outright.

You could fund the subsidies of local industries through major import taxes I suppose and that would probably arrest the decline and buoy local industrial concerns, assuming there are any to be buoyed in the first place, but import taxes probably aren't enough to rejuvenate an industrial concern from nothing. You'd be looking at pure import substitution like was done by the Asian Tigers in the 1970's and '80's to rejuvenate from nothing, and that brings its own problems which can be ironed out with time and relearned experience.

But once you start relying on and arguing that international cooperation is "necessary" you're pretty far down the road of deindustrialization of whatever portion of the economy is being discussed.

At that point you're better off turning off all international cooperation, subsidizing local industry with whatever you have left (for instance, Rolls would be a lot more effective if they were incentivized to produce turbines for all UK domestic gas turbine power needs at the expense of GE or something; ditto SNECMA in France etc.), and waiting a few decades of sustained and appreciable subsidy to rebuild your local industry. The part where modern democracies tend to fail is that they never have stable leadership over a period of time necessary to actually develop major industries (or at the very least, a stable industrial policy), Korea and Japan aside, and potentially France. Which is probably why they tend to deindustrialize instead of maintain industrial leads. And why international cooperation in certain industrial sectors is so popular a bugbear, despite its perniciousness.

It's not a very popular idea in Europe but every European country would be better off, in terms of political-economic sovereignty, if they focused on their domestic markets to the exclusion of international cooperation. Import substitution for a defense industry should be a major priority for every country seriously interested in its own defense, for example. But a lot of European countries are fine being associate or vassal states of America, and America is probably the least bad imperial ruler in the world today, so I guess they're kinda stuck with what they have except for a couple niches they've carved out that America simply can't budge them on (UK's naval construction, Germany's AFV production, Turkey's burgeoning domestic UAS and PGM industry, etc.).

Most of this comes down to the fact that defense industries are basically inverted in how they work from something like buying a car or a new television.

Despite what modern Parliaments and economists will tell you, you're not "shopping for a fighter jet". You're trading real political and economic clout in favor of vassalage. You might buy F-35, but that's going to tie your hands in other areas as Turkey found out. Or you can forgo F-35 and make a new thing like Germany and France want to. Or you can buy F-35 for now, but have a backup plan, like Korea, UK, and Japan do. Instead of being bribed by Lockheed, Lockheed is now tying you at the hip to the American military-industrial, and by extension the political-military, apparatuses. You buy F-35? Okay, come with us to this far off war. Or don't buy this particular thing. Or don't trade with these particular people. Or we're going to cut you off from F-35.

Well, America doesn't really do that, at least not yet, aside from Turkey.

With a domestic industry you avoid this somewhat Faustian bargain at a minor expense of needing to subsidize a company every couple of years to keep them afloat. It doesn't seem to bother Japan. Not sure why it would bother any other "middle power" like France, Germany, or the UK, except that the former has a sound and rational economic policy that has been stable for the decades because the same party has consistently won elections over and over, and the latter three flip flop on major policy decisions every 10 or 5 or 2 years when a general election comes up.

So the UK didn't force anything on Eurofighter partners.....save the forcing of Germany politicians to back their own industry.

Italy is no slouch in a variety of aerospace areas.

Yes, Italy owns a lot of patents through a variety of European corporate mergers. It doesn't mean they can make their own aircraft.

Typhoon, Tornado, and Harrier are British fighters. JSF is more generally Anglo-American.

The last Italian military jet built was the Fiat G.91. Everything after G.91 has been Italy buying things from the UK or USA, or modifying designs thereof. Japan has far more substantial aviation experience than Italy. Which is why they're going ahead with their own 5th gen while Italy is still deciding how many JSFs it really wants.

Italy has a far more substantial naval industrial base than aviation, and about all it can make there is something roughly comparable to the Invincibles.

Predictably, any Italian assistance offered for less than zero cost with regards to Type 83 will go nowhere. Considering the UK can make something more akin to Kitty Hawk, it really doesn't need, nor want, Italy's help in shipbuilding. On the other hand Italy has a lot more to gain by offering something to sell to the UK.

At the moment Europe is divided into four, possibly five, major military-industrial blocs in the naval realm: France and Italy, Germany, and Britain, Spain, and potentially Turkey. Germany, Britain, and Spain can do everything by themselves basically, to lesser or greater degrees. France and Italy sort of bounce off each other because they share an ocean. Turkey might be forced to grow a naval industry because it's being ostracized, or it may merge with the Franco-Italian maritime industry.
 
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And why pair with the Italians, they haven't produced a ship on par with T45 yet, so what's to be gained for the UK?
Italy, nor Sweden, has never produced a fighter comparable to F22, still is a partner in Tempest program. Even if you partner with a country with a much lower technical know how still you have vast cost savings. And by the way Italy is probably the current European leader is surface platform development, I can only hope T31 emerges as something as advanced as the PPA or T26 as a project as effective and flexible as the Bergaminis. Also the new DDX project is basically the only current western active program for a ship of size and capability comparable with the 055s or the KDX3. The idea that the T45 demonstrate some technology or solution that is outside the ability of the Italian shipbuilding industry is just ridiculous while the idea of a cooperation is a sound one even if the timeline could be different for the two programs.

I apologize for using ugly words.

I should have said that the Horizon project, with the UK leaving at the last minute to build the Type 45's, shows us how hard it is for different countries to reconcile their different needs and requirements for new warships. Even two countries, like the UK and Italy, that have worked so well, and so successfully, on a number of other advanced military projects. CAMM-ER comes to mind as its recent been announced by Italy as Albatros NG.

I think the success both countries enjoyed with Tornado and Typhoon will be continued with Tempest. :)
 
You need sufficient production to keep any kind of national defence industry going. You can't keep trickling in R&D money to build one-off prototypes and fancy CAD models forever to sustain an industry.
You can't build critical mass from building 150 fighters or 150 tanks every 40 years or 8 frigates every 25 years. Rising unit costs and manpower costs have drastically reduced what can be acquired.

This problem was most keenly felt in the nuclear submarine field in Britain, but surface warship production plummeted off a cliff post-1991 apart from the last few T23s, a couple of amphibs and OPVs. The Type 26/31/32/83 building plan is probably the largest since the Type 42/21/22 programme of the late 1970s/early 1980s (even the whole T26-83 force won't exceed the number of T23s built) and its taken a long time to get to a position to once again be able to complete such a programme. Perhaps the Type 45 would have gone smoother (a programme that was cutback in terms of hulls) had there been some continuity of warship production post Type 23.

And let's not forget that companies like BAE Systems themselves divested from expensive airframe production and I suspect would have ditched military aircraft production long ago if there wasn't a political national strategic need which needed to be maintained and kept income trickling in.

Naval co-operation rarely seems to work, in terms of genuine co-design rather than simply buying off-the-shelf or licence-building (Spain once upon a time did just that with numerous US designs). The reasons seem to be many, even in cases where systems and armaments and powerplants can be shared quite happily in different hulls.
 
You need sufficient production to keep any kind of national defence industry going. You can't keep trickling in R&D money to build one-off prototypes and fancy CAD models forever to sustain an industry.
You can't build critical mass from building 150 fighters or 150 tanks every 40 years or 8 frigates every 25 years. Rising unit costs and manpower costs have drastically reduced what can be acquired.

What is "critical mass" in this case? If you mean sustainable returns on investment, the UK is well past that point. Which is why it's sort of floundering, at least in areas of armored vehicles and aircraft, and to a lesser extent surface escorts.

Production isn't important aside from a minimum scale to maintain a pool of talented welders and production specialists, which can be extremely low rates of production per month. Something like 10 tanks a year or one large ship (T45/FREMM/Burke sized) laid down every year and a half or so for each shipyard, and a plane every two months.

Japan and Korea builds tanks and aircraft at similar rates over long periods in small ateliers. The only problem being it's not easily scaled.

For reference, Japan was producing F-2s at a blistering speed of...about five or six a year, at maximum rate. The minimum economic rate was around eight but the LDP sorta just muscled it through anyway with the SDF getting about two squadrons' fewer fighters (~30) than it wanted.. You really don't need many fighters to be built to be economic at the lower end of the production scales, assuming you're just feeding a domestic market anyway. Domestic markets are small and have known quantities. Export markets can potentially be lucrative but are not serious in almost all realms for European production aside from extremely small missile boats or whatnot. No one who is buying major surface escorts, aside from the usual flaky suspects (Australia and Canada, well known renegers), are interested in British large ships. They want Spanish, German, or French. Or they make their own.

So, instead of 8 frigates in 4 years, why not 8 frigates in 16? Or 150 fighters or tanks over 15 years? That would be comparable to Japanese production rates of warship classes and fighters, respectively, and seems to be adequate to sustain industrial base. It's also long enough period that by the time you finish rolling out the last airplane or frigate, you're ready to do work on the next thing. Whether that's a mid-life upgraded version of the old ships, or a "technology insertion", or an entirely new ship; or upgrading old airframes to a new standard, or producing the next airplane's prototype.

FWIW the UK really hasn't lost its shipbuilding prowess though, which aside from airplanes, is the only thing it really needs.

The only thing European countries really need to do is realize that their arms markets aren't sustainable at their current grossly inflated sizes and scale back accordingly. Some international concerns are probably going to be necessary (Ericsson, Thales, etc.) since not every can make super radars like the SMART-L, but nearly every country in Europe has oversized basic AFV, ship, and aviation industries that results in bizarre and silly work sharing agreements that probably do more long term damage than not.

I guess long term (a few decades from now) those concerns are going to be consolidated into two or three major pan-European conglomerates, like how Airbus was formed, or they're going to be bought by Americans or Chinese or German investors at some point. Neither outcomes are particularly good for the individual countries those firms exist in, though.
 
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And let's not forget that companies like BAE Systems themselves divested from expensive airframe production and I suspect would have ditched military aircraft production long ago if there wasn't a political national strategic need which needed to be maintained and kept income trickling in.

Seriously????
 
Flipside of certain comments is Sweden retaking it's submarine industry back from the Germans.

Reliance on others, sharing with others depends on trust. Abuse that relationship and there are consequences.
 
Flipside of certain comments is Sweden retaking it's submarine industry back from the Germans.

Reliance on others, sharing with others depends on trust. Abuse that relationship and there are consequences.

The purchase of Karlskrona by the Germans was never really bigly popular anyway. Thyssen Krupp wanted to send all the submarine building back to Germany so they could employ Germans instead of Swedes. AIUI the Swedish Army sent in motor riflemen to forcibly retake some FMV documents from the shipyard after Thyssen-Krupp managers tried to lock a gate or something.

A good comparison is the purchase of GIAT by KMW and subsequent integration of the French and German land MICs OTOH.

Reliance on others depends on alignment of strategic objectives (lesser) and whether or not the partners exist in the same, or at least mutually beneficial, currency areas (greater). The United States and Mexico, like Germany/France and Czechia/Poland, are two regions whose economic qualities benefit each other mutually without interference, because they cover gaps for each other. The United States, France/Germany, and other high-income economies have expensive costs of labor. Mexico, Eastern Europe, and other middle income economies have low costs of labor and cheap real estate that make it easier for high incomes to invest in them.

France and Germany's beneficial alignment versus Sweden and Germany's, which is more comparable to the Swedish-UK arms alignment, is generally due to Sweden having competitive edges in the submarine market vis-a-vis Germany. France has no competitive edges in armored vehicles, but Airbus Defense and Space would be extremely hard pressed to acquire Dassault. Because France has an edge in aviation relative to Germany's more primitive aviation industry.

Germany wants to sell T216s more than it wants to make Eurofighter 2 though, so the grab of Karlskrona was an anti-competitive move that ultimately failed.

Reliance on international cooperation is not inherently bad (look at Franco-Italian naval cooperation or Franco-German land AFV cooperation), it's just bad in a market where you're cooperating with direct competitors. If you have a choice between reliance on a competent and willing ally who will not flake, and resurrecting an industry ex nihilo, the former is superior. If your choice is reliance on a competitor, or resurrection ex nihilo, the latter is superior but a very bitter pill regardless. Which is why the UK is buying JSF, and building them, while learning to make Tempest. It is also why Japan made F-2 and bought F-15J, and is making F-3. The United States is not flaky, has a highly robust aviation industry, and is willing to prop up sovereign domestic markets in exchange for work because it has an extremely large domestic market in itself. It's also why Sweden sent trucks full of motor riflemen to Karlskrona to stop the Germans from stealing submarine secrets.

As I said, Europe is effectively three to four major firms in the naval arena. Britain constitutes a major naval construction bloc all by itself, possibly the single largest in Europe by sheer capability and scale, if not in terms of exports or profit.

There's nothing for Britain to gain in cooperation in naval construction or ship design with its political allies in Europe, really, unless Sweden decides it wants to become a major power again, eats Norway, and proceeds to desire a major, ocean-going Atlantic surface squadron. That's about the only case where Britain might find a willing, and not flaky, partner.
 
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Flipside of certain comments is Sweden retaking it's submarine industry back from the Germans.

Reliance on others, sharing with others depends on trust. Abuse that relationship and there are consequences.

The purchase of Karlskrona by the Germans was never really bigly popular anyway. Thyssen Krupp wanted to send all the submarine building back to Germany so they could employ Germans instead of Swedes. AIUI the Swedish Army sent in motor riflemen to forcibly retake some FMV documents from the shipyard after Thyssen-Krupp managers tried to lock a gate or something.

A good comparison is the purchase of GIAT by KMW and subsequent integration of the French and German land MICs OTOH.

Reliance on others depends on alignment of strategic objectives (lesser) and whether or not the partners exist in the same, or at least mutually beneficial, currency areas (greater). The United States and Mexico, like Germany/France and Czechia/Poland, are two regions whose economic qualities benefit each other mutually without interference, because they cover gaps for each other. The United States, France/Germany, and other high-income economies have expensive costs of labor. Mexico, Eastern Europe, and other middle income economies have low costs of labor and cheap real estate that make it easier for high incomes to invest in them.

France and Germany's beneficial alignment versus Sweden and Germany's, which is more comparable to the Swedish-UK arms alignment, is generally due to Sweden having competitive edges in the submarine market vis-a-vis Germany. France has no competitive edges in armored vehicles, but Airbus Defense and Space would be extremely hard pressed to acquire Dassault. Because France has an edge in aviation relative to Germany's more primitive aviation industry.

Germany wants to sell T216s more than it wants to make Eurofighter 2 though, so the grab of Karlskrona was an anti-competitive move that ultimately failed.

Reliance on international cooperation is not inherently bad (look at Franco-Italian naval cooperation or Franco-German land AFV cooperation), it's just bad in a market where you're cooperating with direct competitors. And as I said, Europe is effectively three to four major firms in the naval arena. Britain constitutes a major naval construction bloc all by itself, possibly the single largest in Europe by sheer capability and scale, if not in terms of exports or profit.

There's nothing for Britain to gain in cooperation in naval construction or ship design with its political allies in Europe, really, unless Sweden decides it wants to become a major power again, eats Norway, and proceeds to desire a major, ocean-going Atlantic surface squadron. That's about the only case where Britain might find a willing, and not flaky, partner.
Most of that seems quite agreeable.
But one point.
How TK managed to takeover Kockkums was under the propaganda of collaboration sharing of costs and supposedly mutual respect shared interests "we're all in the EU now" sort of thing.
Willing espoused among politicians in both capitals at the time.

That it turned out that TK was trying to removed classified and proprietary (Swedish state funded and owned) technology out of Sweden was, along with different views of Russia and how to best react. The reason why Swedish state forces got involved.

And why Germany didn't make a scene over the issue is:-
A) they got caught and they wish everyone to forget about it.

B) certain politicians don't want their behaviour vis-a-vis Russia made a matter of international media attention.
C) TK had it's own internal issues and didn't want to be branded as playing underhand tactics, that might risk those issues exposed.
Ultimately TK has quality and schedule problems. Though I'm not sure if they are over them yet.

Anyway from a (searches for non triggering term....) UK 'perspective'. There is every reason to conclude you cannot keep a 'pillar of excellence' (as it was once termed) without it being part of a wider and deeper industrial landscape.

Like Special Forces, you can't really keep numbers up unless you have a substantial military generally.

Or to sum it up, you cannot skim more cream off less milk. Let alone do it to an empty jug.

Hence why there is now concern over ARM being sold to NVIDIA.
 
Anyway back to topic....of a sort.

Anyone notice how CAMM-ER, Barak M/LRAD and Buk missiles are all trending towards a similar general layout?
Is this a sign of convergence?
Even when I think of current versions of Standard, they too exhibit this formula.
Long thing strakes along the sides, and tail fins.
 
Flipside of certain comments is Sweden retaking it's submarine industry back from the Germans.

Reliance on others, sharing with others depends on trust. Abuse that relationship and there are consequences.

The purchase of Karlskrona by the Germans was never really bigly popular anyway. Thyssen Krupp wanted to send all the submarine building back to Germany so they could employ Germans instead of Swedes. AIUI the Swedish Army sent in motor riflemen to forcibly retake some FMV documents from the shipyard after Thyssen-Krupp managers tried to lock a gate or something.

A good comparison is the purchase of GIAT by KMW and subsequent integration of the French and German land MICs OTOH.

Reliance on others depends on alignment of strategic objectives (lesser) and whether or not the partners exist in the same, or at least mutually beneficial, currency areas (greater). The United States and Mexico, like Germany/France and Czechia/Poland, are two regions whose economic qualities benefit each other mutually without interference, because they cover gaps for each other. The United States, France/Germany, and other high-income economies have expensive costs of labor. Mexico, Eastern Europe, and other middle income economies have low costs of labor and cheap real estate that make it easier for high incomes to invest in them.

France and Germany's beneficial alignment versus Sweden and Germany's, which is more comparable to the Swedish-UK arms alignment, is generally due to Sweden having competitive edges in the submarine market vis-a-vis Germany. France has no competitive edges in armored vehicles, but Airbus Defense and Space would be extremely hard pressed to acquire Dassault. Because France has an edge in aviation relative to Germany's more primitive aviation industry.

Germany wants to sell T216s more than it wants to make Eurofighter 2 though, so the grab of Karlskrona was an anti-competitive move that ultimately failed.

Reliance on international cooperation is not inherently bad (look at Franco-Italian naval cooperation or Franco-German land AFV cooperation), it's just bad in a market where you're cooperating with direct competitors. And as I said, Europe is effectively three to four major firms in the naval arena. Britain constitutes a major naval construction bloc all by itself, possibly the single largest in Europe by sheer capability and scale, if not in terms of exports or profit.

There's nothing for Britain to gain in cooperation in naval construction or ship design with its political allies in Europe, really, unless Sweden decides it wants to become a major power again, eats Norway, and proceeds to desire a major, ocean-going Atlantic surface squadron. That's about the only case where Britain might find a willing, and not flaky, partner.
Most of that seems quite agreeable.
But one point.
How TK managed to takeover Kockkums was under the propaganda of collaboration sharing of costs and supposedly mutual respect shared interests "we're all in the EU now" sort of thing.
Willing espoused among politicians in both capitals at the time.

That it turned out that TK was trying to removed classified and proprietary (Swedish state funded and owned) technology out of Sweden was, along with different views of Russia and how to best react. The reason why Swedish state forces got involved.

And why Germany didn't make a scene over the issue is:-
A) they got caught and they wish everyone to forget about it.

B) certain politicians don't want their behaviour vis-a-vis Russia made a matter of international media attention.
C) TK had it's own internal issues and didn't want to be branded as playing underhand tactics, that might risk those issues exposed.
Ultimately TK has quality and schedule problems. Though I'm not sure if they are over them yet.

Well, it's just national-industrial politics, really. TK is a competitor with Kockums in the Baltic sub arena and wanted to own A26. It failed. And Germany/France/the Low Countries have very different views about the regional politics compared to UK/Fenno-Scandinavia/Poland. That's it, really. The specifics aren't hugely important, as the same playbooks were used by Lockheed to sell F-104s to Europe, just maybe with more suitcases full of money (we're all in NATO, the Soviet Union is going to invade, and if we all operate the same airplane we'll be better off and cheaper for it).

This is getting off topic but my point was basically that you need to have a similar view of how things are going to be in the future and you need to be compatible economically for major sovereign industrial cooperation to work. However, this is (as history can tell us with innumerable examples) much, much, much easier said than done.

Given that Italy was the weaker partner in the FREMM program, and the French themselves are not particularly known as naval industrial powerhouses, it's a bit ludicrous to suggest that the UK has anything to gain from working with them, though.

Anyway back to topic....of a sort.

Anyone notice how CAMM-ER, Barak M/LRAD and Buk missiles are all trending towards a similar general layout?
Is this a sign of convergence?
Even when I think of current versions of Standard, they too exhibit this formula.
Long thing strakes along the sides, and tail fins.

Yes. There are only so many ways to make a long range, length- and diameter-limited missile in absence of exotic propulsion methods.
 
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Yes it was ludicrous....at the time.
Still espoused now though in a host of areas like this. Passionately, coherently and with little tolerance of concerns.

Frankly what the whole sorry saga of NF-90 to Horizon and Kockkums takeover by TK really show is the failure at a political level.

But back to topic, the move to designing possibly a Type 32 and a Type 83 is good news for domestic design capability and good news for industry.
Could it be that lessons have been learnt?
 
But back to topic, the move to designing possibly a Type 32 and a Type 83 is good news for domestic design capability and good news for industry.
Could it be that lessons have been learnt?
As I've mentioned in the Puma Replacement thread, since Covid and Brexit have changed the economic situation, the Government has realised (hopefully) that supporting jobs domestically is vital, for both individuals and their families, and the economy, both local and national. Shipbuilding is an easy way to do this. It employs a large number of people, for a relatively long time.
 
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I think he is referring to the fact that, like Great Britain, brilliant national naval expertise keeps getting let down by political fecklessness (putting it very politely!).
 

.... the French themselves are not particularly known as naval industrial powerhouses.....


Seriously??

They can make some surface escorts, but any attempts at building a replacement, or a repeat, of R91 have failed consistently, despite French political aspirations to the contrary (ostensibly, anyway). But I wouldn't consider a country that struggles to make a single Essex sized nuclear carrier to be a "powerhouse" in shipbuilding, though. France is not in an enviable position in any of military arms industries, but of them all, the naval industry is the most intact. Even then, it will likely be entirely subsumed by a greater, consolidated European arms industry, like Airbus subsumed the commercial businesses, with the French Parliament kicking and screaming the whole way.

Comparatively speaking, Britain managed to produce two CVFs, which are twice the displacement of CdG, with relatively little trouble, and without "help" from a international partner.

As I said earlier, international partnerships are generally a negative sign for a defense industry. France went from being the main designer of FREMM and the program's primary customer to playing second fiddle to Fincantieri and Leonardo. Its aviation industry will likely be eventually eaten by Airbus Defense, no matter how much France protests, as its land armaments industry is currently being eaten by KMW, Rheinmetall, and H&K. I guess Italy will buy DCNS, but it will possibly be the last holdout of a sovereign French armaments industry.

Of course, that's assuming nothing changes, but people probably felt the same until the frigate orders were cut in 2008.

I think he is referring to the fact that, like Great Britain, brilliant national naval expertise keeps getting let down by political fecklessness (putting it very politely!).

Alternatively, it's referring to the fact that DCNS lacks an understanding how to navigate politics to push their own projects through, or the French Navy simply doesn't know what it wants to do outside of the Med. Nor does the French government have good answers with why they need a navy, but they have a navy.

That said the French Navy is not a particularly staunch redoubt of nautical knowledge either. The Clemenceaus likely saw fewer combat days than the Invincibles despite being twice the age, and certainly fewer combat actions against similar threats (fighters and cruise missiles), so I'd suspect that the French Navy is a bit less experienced on the matter of what it takes to maintain a combat carrier force at sea (especially a nuclear one, which requires more ships than conventionally powered ones), and substantially so nowadays given that they have one nuclear ship.

You generally need two or three carriers for yearlong readiness, in order to cover the gaps of selective availability and complex overhauls. Two for a conventional design, and three for a nuclear, since nuke ships need to refuel and undergo complex maintenance for extended periods (more than a year).

Very likely the most pressing reason France wants a nuclear carrier, as opposed to two (or one!) ships of similar size, is simply for the prestige of having an atomic carrier. CdG is less available, costlier, and less useful than a conventional carrier, according to everyone who actually cares about operating fleet carriers (the RN and USN). But it's a nuclear ship and they're not going to have more than of the glorified wall hangers, so why not.

If French politicians had realistic combat readiness of their navy in mind they would likely pursue somewhat larger amphibious ships (comparable to Juan Carlos) rather than Mistral, nix PANG entirely and send R91 to the breakers, and build larger, and more, nuclear submarines. This would let them defend their far east EEZ while also doing colonial wars on the cheap in the Med, which is all France seems interested in. That might actually happen, though, at least in the dreams of French parliament and admirals. The only real bugbear there is that they don't have anything comparable to F-35B, but I guess Dassault could make something. That open question is probably the only reason PANG is proceeding: there wouldn't be a way for Mistral to operate fixed wing aviation without a new jet to replace Rafale-M.

Either way, France is not a particularly strong weapons developer or producer anymore. They were in the 1980's, I guess, but that was 40 years ago. Their naval industry is just the most coherent one left, and even that can only produce average to small size surface ships and submarines.
 
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An important stage in the procurement of the Type 83 has begun:

Wonder if we're going to get a similar slew of images as we got in the runup to T45, including a new round of trimarans :D
 
“It is clear that we now have a unique opportunity to create a truly international naval shipbuilding alliance with Canada and Australia with Type 26 (both countries have purchased the design) – and consideration is already being given to the development of an Anti-Air Warfare variant of the Type 26 as an eventual replacement for Type 45 – known currently as T4X. The aspiration is to achieve continuous shipbuilding with the Type 26 programme in Glasgow beyond the current planned number of eight vessels.”
And yet people tell me I'm full of ....
 
UKDJ on the BAE concept.


There's a nice cleaned up image.

The concept reveals a ship comparable in size to the Chinese Type 055 Destroyer (which is around 12,000 tonnes) and armed with a five-inch main gun, Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems, two 30 or 40mm guns and additional unidentified close-in weapons systems, plus a significant missile payload. The missile payload seems to be divided into two sets of Mk 41 vertical launch system cells, each holding an estimated 64 VLS, resulting in potentially 128 missile cells per ship.

Navy Lookout discusses it in the context of the RN's Future Air Dominance System.


While the concept we've seen is referred to as the 'cruiser solution', individual ships would be very expensive and an alternative is a smaller, extremely specialised design (the third image that looks like a small Zumwalt).

Instead of building a typical surface combatant with a mix of capabilities, the proposal is to build a ship of around 4,000 tonnes that is only equipped with high-end radar and plenty of VLS cells. (Main concept image above) The ship would have no guns (except light weapons for force protection), no ASW capability, no hangar and a crew of less than 50. Manning would be so taught that small teams might need to be embarked by helicopter or boat for specific evolutions such as replenishment at sea, preventative maintenance or additional force protection for high-threat transits.

By simplifying the design to focus on a single role, the build and sustainment costs would be much-reduced and in theory, this could allow 3 or 4 times the number of hulls to be built for the equivalent price of a full-capability spectrum air-defence cruiser. More hulls increase availability and the force could be more widely distributed to provide a larger area of air dominance around the carrier strike group. The vessel would be reliant on ASW defence provided by other platforms in the group.


The author is very sceptical that it could work in political and logistical reality though:

It would require an unusually disciplined procurement process to build a large number of specialist hulls. Historical precedent suggests regular defence economies would likely see numbers trimmed over time and ‘mission creep’ could see additional capabilities added increasing costs. The result could be a ‘worst of all worlds’ scenario producing a low number of hulls only really good at one mission.

Both are just concepts at this point. No decision has been made to pursue either path yet.
 

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Given the cost of high-end air defense/TBMD radars, I'm pretty skeptical about buying 3-4 times as many ships, even with the deletion of all these other systems. Seriously, the cost of the radar, CMS, and launchers alone is probably a third to half of the price of a high-end DDG.

And then there's the problem that these specialized AAW-only ships can't be solo deployers like the current DDGs (even with a tanker). So you're left with only the T26s for a lot of missions.
 
One thing I noticed about the BAE concept that hasn't been remarked upon is the number of boat bays - three starboard and probably two, maybe three (depending on the forward funnel) port, making five at least. A Type 45 has two quite small ones. A Type 26 has a large full-width bay continuous with the hangar, and a Type 31 has two starboard bays and one port, all small compared to the Type 26's because of the placement of the port funnel and VLS.

Although it's only a concept, it does indicate their thinking and this suggests that while it's nominal role is as part of an air dominance system, maybe it has a secondary littoral strike role or carries surface/submersible drones.
 
Given the cost of high-end air defense/TBMD radars, I'm pretty skeptical about buying 3-4 times as many ships, even with the deletion of all these other systems. Seriously, the cost of the radar, CMS, and launchers alone is probably a third to half of the price of a high-end DDG.

And then there's the problem that these specialized AAW-only ships can't be solo deployers like the current DDGs (even with a tanker). So you're left with only the T26s for a lot of missions.
Worth pointing out that the 4000-ton design is essentially a fan-made design by Navy Lookout.
 
Instead of building a typical surface combatant with a mix of capabilities, the proposal is to build a ship of around 4,000 tonnes that is only equipped with high-end radar and plenty of VLS cells. (Main concept image above) The ship would have no guns (except light weapons for force protection), no ASW capability, no hangar and a crew of less than 50. Manning would be so taught that small teams might need to be embarked by helicopter or boat for specific evolutions such as replenishment at sea, preventative maintenance or additional force protection for high-threat transits.
It is beyond stupid to cut crewing that tight! The USN had originally run the LCS like that, and quickly discovered it wasn't possible to run a ship for any length of time like that. It's why the LCS have about tripled their embarked crew since the original commissioning.

You need sufficient production to keep any kind of national defence industry going. You can't keep trickling in R&D money to build one-off prototypes and fancy CAD models forever to sustain an industry.
You can't build critical mass from building 150 fighters or 150 tanks every 40 years or 8 frigates every 25 years. Rising unit costs and manpower costs have drastically reduced what can be acquired.

What is "critical mass" in this case? If you mean sustainable returns on investment, the UK is well past that point. Which is why it's sort of floundering, at least in areas of armored vehicles and aircraft, and to a lesser extent surface escorts.

Production isn't important aside from a minimum scale to maintain a pool of talented welders and production specialists, which can be extremely low rates of production per month. Something like 10 tanks a year or one large ship (T45/FREMM/Burke sized) laid down every year and a half or so for each shipyard, and a plane every two months.

Japan and Korea builds tanks and aircraft at similar rates over long periods in small ateliers. The only problem being it's not easily scaled.

For reference, Japan was producing F-2s at a blistering speed of...about five or six a year, at maximum rate. The minimum economic rate was around eight but the LDP sorta just muscled it through anyway with the SDF getting about two squadrons' fewer fighters (~30) than it wanted.. You really don't need many fighters to be built to be economic at the lower end of the production scales, assuming you're just feeding a domestic market anyway. Domestic markets are small and have known quantities. Export markets can potentially be lucrative but are not serious in almost all realms for European production aside from extremely small missile boats or whatnot. No one who is buying major surface escorts, aside from the usual flaky suspects (Australia and Canada, well known renegers), are interested in British large ships. They want Spanish, German, or French. Or they make their own.

So, instead of 8 frigates in 4 years, why not 8 frigates in 16? Or 150 fighters or tanks over 15 years? That would be comparable to Japanese production rates of warship classes and fighters, respectively, and seems to be adequate to sustain industrial base. It's also long enough period that by the time you finish rolling out the last airplane or frigate, you're ready to do work on the next thing. Whether that's a mid-life upgraded version of the old ships, or a "technology insertion", or an entirely new ship; or upgrading old airframes to a new standard, or producing the next airplane's prototype.

FWIW the UK really hasn't lost its shipbuilding prowess though, which aside from airplanes, is the only thing it really needs.

The only thing European countries really need to do is realize that their arms markets aren't sustainable at their current grossly inflated sizes and scale back accordingly. Some international concerns are probably going to be necessary (Ericsson, Thales, etc.) since not every can make super radars like the SMART-L, but nearly every country in Europe has oversized basic AFV, ship, and aviation industries that results in bizarre and silly work sharing agreements that probably do more long term damage than not.

I guess long term (a few decades from now) those concerns are going to be consolidated into two or three major pan-European conglomerates, like how Airbus was formed, or they're going to be bought by Americans or Chinese or German investors at some point. Neither outcomes are particularly good for the individual countries those firms exist in, though.
You might want to doublecheck your Japanese ship production numbers, they're honestly building one ship of each class every year or two.
 

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