mrmalaya said:No propeller, so no interest I assume ;D
During 2019, British industry will demonstrate a directed-energy laser weapon for potential use on land and sea.
But the team behind the UK’s Dragonfire industry consortium developing the weapon is also beginning to consider how such a weapon could be mounted onto a future combat aircraft.
Dragonfire will demonstrate a fiber laser with a 50 kW output in 2019 tests.
Laser will put a focused beam the size of an English penny 5 km away.
The UK’s vision for a future combat aircraft—like that shown in mockup form at the Farnborough Air Show in July (AW&ST July 23-Aug. 19, p. 38) —envisions the integration of such a weapon, not only for self-defense, but also in target identification and visual range combat.
The Ministry of Defense has strengthened its policy to develop a successor to the Air Self Defense Force's F2 fighter aircraft. Government officials revealed. Three U.S. and U.S. companies had suggested the introduction of capacity enhancement type of existing models, but judged that they do not meet the requirements of Japan side in view of cost and performance. We will include development policy in the next medium-term defense buildup plan to be formulated at the end of the year, with the aim of joint development with foreign countries, we will also advance Japan's own technology development with engines and others. [Akiyama Shinichi]
The air force currently owns 92 F2, but it has exceeded its useful life since the 2030s. Because development of fighter aircraft takes more than ten years, the Ministry of Defense has been considering three proposals: (1) international joint development (2) domestic development (3) purchasing capacity enhancement of existing machines. We thought that defines the implementation strategy of the successor to the prospect of the end of the year now.
In FY2006 - FY 2006, we asked domestic and overseas companies, the U.S. and U.S. governments to provide information on new development of fighter aircraft and renovation of existing machines three times in total. Until this July, Lockheed Martin Company, F 22, Boeing Company F 15, British BAE Corp. had made refurbishment improvements based on existing machines of Eurofighter Typhoon. However, the renovation of the F22 with state-of-the-art stealth performance is costly and it says "There was no clear explanation about the prospect of the US government's export ban measures to be lifted" (executive in the Ministry of Defense). For the other two plans, the performance of the aircraft will not reach the level required by the Japanese side, and the Ministry of Defense will not wait to adopt the capacity enhancement type of existing machines.
However, it is difficult to newly develop a fighter aircraft that costs a budget of several trillion yen. In defense industrial groups and the LDP who want to maintain the domestic production and maintenance infrastructure, there is a strong voice to propose domestic development, but in that case the total development costs will be borne by Japan. Japanese companies lacking development experience of fighter aircraft are living anxiety in terms of technology.
The Ministry of Defense conducted a technical research on next-generation fighter aircraft such as engines and electronic systems over about 190 billion yen in FY09 - 2006, but at the stage where the developed domestically produced engine is still confirming basic performance, flight experiment It is not standing by me.
For this reason, the government is seeking to share development costs with international co-development with Britain and the German Federation and France, which are considering developing fighter aircraft. However, there is a risk that it will be difficult for co-development to adjust the timing, required performance, share of development field, etc. Meanwhile, the allies' United States has just begun full-scale operation of state-of-the-art F35 stealth fighter aircraft, and the development plan for the next model is not materialized. At the end of the year, the Ministry of Defense has decided to set up a new framework of new development, postponing the final decision on joint development or domestic development, and there are plans to advance technology development and negotiations with foreign countries.
Tempest and Japan's next-gen fighter are gonna be much longer programs than any single (legal) Administration. Seems like they might be hedging while they wait to see what the longer-term trend in US politics is.mrmalaya said:The rest of that twitter post ran something along the lines of "Tempest is not being considered because the Japanese are worried about Trumps's reaction to them ditching the US".
Not exactly technical.
Harrier said:3 squadrons of each?
Jackonicko said:I doubt that Typhoon OSD will move much. There will have been very careful calculations about fleet size, flying hours and likely attrition, as well as lifetime buys of particular spares that may otherwise be subject to DMR or obsolescence, and this will effectively place a fairly hard limit on how long the aircraft can last. It's not just about fatigue life consumption. A few years before OSD (perhaps as much as a decade) the RAF will start making decisions on support contracts that will then make the OSD absolutely 'set in stone'.
That's why the Jaguar left service when it did. The fleet still had unused fatigue life, but the support contracts for engines, ejection seats and a host of other systems all ran out at a particular point, and extending them would have been impossible in some cases, and prohibitively expensive in others.
Extending the Nimrod R1 in service by a few months was a really big deal - and it was not possible to stretch that aircraft's life sufficiently to bridge the gap between its planned retirement and the in service date of the Rivet Joint, despite a pressing operational need.
mrmalaya said:How interesting. This does support the idea that the UK intends this aircraft to go into service (and appears to be calling it Tempest).
If they are planning for it, then surely they are confident of it progressing beyond the mock-up stage (contrary to many an opinion on the web).
Harrier said:This RUSI discussion is interesting:
Senior figures say a number of things that clarify the situation. Tempest is a team, not the concept plane.
Most of the technology talked about is of open systems rather than fighter planes - indeed it is said it is wrong to even use that term.
If the outcome is UK sovereign software that does the job then the aeroplane it is in hardly seems to matter to several of the speakers.
kaiserd said:Agreed; at this stage probably best seen a technology development project to keep up to date (and remain a potentially “worthy” project partner) rather than a “traditional” aircraft project.
More importantly, an UCAS offers operational readiness with peer aggressors at a lower budget. Drones doesn't need to be trained. Systems only require continuous upgrades and development while only their interactions with humans necessitate regular training and OP refining. You then can own a large fleet of UCAS and regularly use only a fraction of the fleet produced. This is a clear path for the 5th and beyond generation of warfighters. Then your budget can be recapitalized upon preventing armed conflict to degenerate in a large confrontation (OP readiness, deployment of assets...).Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) offer a number of key advantages in high-intensity conflict scenarios, including expendability, comparative simplicity of manufacture, and combat endurance. Since UCAVs do not have to be flown regularly and in large numbers to maintain an aircrew cadre, they can be produced in relatively small numbers and regularly upgraded and iteratively improved as the threat picture changes over time, while still representing a potent combat asset.[...]
A mix of next generation manned combat aircraft limited to a modest level of technological ambition beyond the capabilities offered by current fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 and F-22, coupled with a stable of regularly evolving UCAVs in low-rate production, could offer both a way to rapidly expand NATO airpower if a crisis appeared imminent, and in a worst-case scenario at least offer a latent capability to replace losses and draw the worst attrition away from scarce manned assets in a high-intensity conflict. [...]