Rebuilding the Royal Navy in the 50s

The Type 12s were definitely a bright spot and even the 2nd rate ASW frigates were okish.
I tend to the view that we needed to lease some more effective weapons systems from the US until ours became availsble. The Darings could easily have shipped Tartsr from the late 50s until the 70s. ASROC pepperbox launchers could have been fitted on some Whitby and Rothesay class ships aft instead of a Wasp helo.
 
The 1959 NATO assessment of the RN is pretty damning.
Could the RN have made a better job of reequipping its destroyer and frigate squadrons?
Obviously.
But expedient decisions and emergency decisions (Korea) haunt this period.
So the bigger question then would be, what would it take for the UK to make more rational/ long term decisions?
I would guess something like not thinking 1957 would be the year of maximum danger for WWIII.
Not overreacting to Korea.....
Things of that sort.
 
Irrespective of the gun issue, which is somewhat of a distraction, the chief problems seem to be not achieving rapid to service enough SAM systems and anti-submarine systems.
Yet this is not for a lack of concepts, designs and some research.
Arguably, Small Sea Slug ought to have been achieved and then rolled out in modernisations as well as on new build ships.
Arguably, the ASW efforts ought to be been more thoroughly pursed.
The whole nuclear submarine effort could have been pushed, harder earlier.
 
It might well have been possible to have commissioned a Royal Navy nuclear submarine earlier IF the early studies had not concentrated so much on gas cooled reactors. They were then found to be too large for submarine use, so time was lost (wasted) before the pressurised water reactor studies were properly implemented.
 
That gas cooled reactor was a design of 1951, which was very speculative. The idea of pressurised water reactors in 1951 was fanciful in the extreme. Later studies, in the early 1950s, considered both a PWR and a liquid cooled reactor.

The idea that time was wasted by considering the earlier gas cooled reactors shows an ignorance of the atomic programme at that time.
 
The 1959 NATO assessment of the RN is pretty damning.
Could the RN have made a better job of reequipping its destroyer and frigate squadrons?
Obviously.
But expedient decisions and emergency decisions (Korea) haunt this period.
So the bigger question then would be, what would it take for the UK to make more rational/ long term decisions?
A different universe where the United Kingdom comes out better and stronger out of World War II I guess.
 
That gas cooled reactor was a design of 1951, which was very speculative. The idea of pressurised water reactors in 1951 was fanciful in the extreme. Later studies, in the early 1950s, considered both a PWR and a liquid cooled reactor.

The idea that time was wasted by considering the earlier gas cooled reactors shows an ignorance of the atomic programme at that time.
My apologies.
I was typing after a LONG day at work and from memory having read your 'Atomic Empire' book.
I did not intend to show ignorance of the subject, but just a quick recollection of something I had read. I did not mean to take it out of context so to speak.
 
So the bigger question then would be, what would it take for the UK to make more rational/ long term decisions?
A different universe where the United Kingdom comes out better and stronger out of World War II I guess.

Or with a government that appreciates the value of technical and scientific expertese.
 
The idea that time was wasted by considering the earlier gas cooled reactors shows an ignorance of the atomic programme at that time.
My apologies.
I was typing after a LONG day at work and from memory having read your 'Atomic Empire' book.
I did not intend to show ignorance of the subject, but just a quick recollection of something I had read. I did not mean to take it out of context so to speak.

And my apologies for being so intemperate in my reply.
 
So the bigger question then would be, what would it take for the UK to make more rational/ long term decisions?
A different universe where the United Kingdom comes out better and stronger out of World War II I guess.

Or with a government that appreciates the value of technical and scientific expertese.

We could get into class warfare here - the sciences were always looked down upon by the classics graduates of Whitehall.
 
So the bigger question then would be, what would it take for the UK to make more rational/ long term decisions?
A different universe where the United Kingdom comes out better and stronger out of World War II I guess.

Or with a government that appreciates the value of technical and scientific expertese.

We could get into class warfare here - the sciences were always are still looked down upon by the classics graduates of Whitehall.
Fixed it for you... ;)
 
We could get into class warfare here - the sciences were always looked down upon by the classics graduates of Whitehall.

A discussion from another thread, but I don't believe that's necessarily true. It would seem rather odd nobody in government took science serious when we had a nuclear programme, H-bomb programme, fast breeder reactors, tokamaks, advanced gas cooled reactors, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, steam catapults, guided weapons, advanced military aircraft, high-speed rail, Concorde, motorways, computers, telecommunications, colour television, CT-scanners, radar development, jet engines... and so on.

Sounds like the usual excuses that the aircraft industry made, "boo-hoo, nobody in power understands us or science". Actually what they mean is "boo-hoo they didn't give me millions for my pet project".
 
We could get into class warfare here - the sciences were always looked down upon by the classics graduates of Whitehall.

A discussion from another thread, but I don't believe that's necessarily true. It would seem rather odd nobody in government took science serious when we had a nuclear programme, H-bomb programme, fast breeder reactors, tokamaks, advanced gas cooled reactors, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, steam catapults, guided weapons, advanced military aircraft, high-speed rail, Concorde, motorways, computers, telecommunications, colour television, CT-scanners, radar development, jet engines... and so on.

Sounds like the usual excuses that the aircraft industry made, "boo-hoo, nobody in power understands us or science". Actually what they mean is "boo-hoo they didn't give me millions for my pet project".

Ah, yes - 'the white heat of the technological revolution'.
And he appoints Frank Cousins as the relevant minister.
 
The public procurer (of holes in the road or of AEW aircraft) has only 2 measures to satisfy himself that he is spending our money well: a "comparable" - so fine for routine civil works; or a qualified competitor's bid. Defence (?and Big IT; ?and Big Pharma) gives him the problem that we have rationalised the industry to monopoly. So: Lockheed is recorded as doing a marvellous Polaris job on-Spec, on-time, and blew the budget. NASA went to the moon without a budget.

"But will you still love me tomorrow?" If you need to ask the question...you should not do this.

NASA had no budget because US (Ministers) accepted they had no clue what the cost might be, but the Buyer, JFK, had said: do it by 1969. So they did and Ministers paid the bill. Maybe it was inflated. How would we know? Inflated from what "comparable"? NASA delivered as required.

There is a class issue in UK on horny-handed sons of toil. But "waste" in Defence is not caused by mismatch, engineers: classics graduates from posh schools.
It's caused by Ministers contracting industry to boldly go where no man has gone before...and being so stupid as to demand an upfront cost/time number.

We don't have a clue is not an acceptable response. It should be.
 
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At vast expense McKinsey has sold to UK Ministers 2 solutions to waste in Defence Procurement:
1, don't buy things, buy effect, availability: yet better don't buy it for upfront capital, but lease it for downstream expenditure. So Voyager (A330MRTT) is hours in the sky, hoses dangled.

2. Don't try to go out to unreal market competition, but instead do Long Term Strategic Partnerships, where a Centre of Excellence will be chosen in his qualified field, and then try some form of openbook to satisfy auditors, critics and enemies that you have not been swindled.

There is Option 3: buy off-the-shelf at fixed price. To another man's Spec.

If anyone here knows a better 'ole, the address of the Minister of Defence is Whitehall Gardens, SW1.
 
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For the topic in hand, the Royal Navy designed its own warships. That must have saved something in design costs, although no doubt tank testing time at Haslar wasn't cheap.
The MoD whined that Vosper was provided more bang for buck in their export gunboats, but that was never really proven in the Type 21 design (as I have commented elsewhere). There was no real appreciable decline in costs or improvement in warship capability and design under the privatisation of warship design. Yarrow managed Type 23 ok, Ocean was buggered by MoD and Treasury interference, the SSN(Z)/ Astute was a complete bog-up at first, and the others have been dogged with issues. You get the sense the RN and the USN have rather lost their way now they rely on writing down and specs and seeing if industry can come up with something to match their dreams. Not having much of a functioning home construction capability/ monopolies has made it harder too. Normally what they get is a warmed over existing design designed for another Navy's dream requirements list.
 
Once you have a monopoly, leaving the capacity in private hands is just a Treasury Accounting trick. If anything it is anti-democratic.
 
The Type 12s were definitely a bright spot and even the second-rate ASW frigates were okay-ish.
I don't have the figures to hand currently but when I looked at the construction costs of various classes of ships – Blackwood-, Leopard-, Salisbury-, Tribal-class etc. – it was surprising, at least to me, how small the number of ships you would have to sacrifice to buy all Type 12s instead. I fully admit that this was just construction costs and didn't look at running costs with it also requiring a slight increase in manpower, you also then get into discussions about capabilities versus numbers.


Or with a government that appreciates the value of technical and scientific expertise.
I was under the impression that thanks to their endeavours during the war – radar, sonar, the jet engine, the atomic bomb etc. – scientists were held in high esteem by the public. How much of that translated to the government is up for debate.
 
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