Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche

[Dynoman]

Hughes had a NOTAR system with a scimitar main rotar (Testor kits) and a convential rotar in early drawings.

 

[Nick]

Regarding the Hughes project/Testors kit, have you seen the American Aircraft Penetrator?

http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/bell_penetrator.php

Really just a fancy body based on a Bell UH-1 Huey. Apparently still in flying condition...
http://www.stealthstar.com/

 

[F-14D]

Some (including me) thought the project was doomed from the start when Army lowered the requirements to specify a conventional rotorcraft. As a result, the airframe (as opposed to the electronics within) was not that much of an advance and made it a hard "sell", given its cost vs. performance, IMHO.

What non-conventional designs were looked at?

The original specifications were such that only an advanced concept could meet them. As Dynoman said, Bell was going to bid a Tilt-Rotor "cousin" of the BAT (Bell Advanced Tilt-Rotor). Boeing had not completely decided which way they were going to go, but had a Tilt-Rotor design in the works. For reasons, never explained, Army withdrew the original specifications and "dumbed-down" the requirements to what a regular helo could do, and gave no credit performance above that. In addition, they put in certain strictures in (which the Comanche didn't meet, it turned out) to insure a Tilt-Rotor could not win. Maybe they feared that Bell and Boeing would team again and bid one Tilt-Rotor that would dominate the competition and no one else would bid. Can't say. The net effect of changing the specs also killed any chance for other advanced concepts such as the Hughes ideas.

The SuperTeam proposal was a combined effort by Bell and Hughes (now owned by McDonnell Douglas). It featured Hughes' NOTAR combined with Bell's remarkable 680 rotor. Derivatives of that went on to be used in Bell's civil helicopters, and an upscaled version of it is on the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.

 

[yasotay]

The decision to go with a conventional helicopter was dictated by the Secretary of the Army. Fearing a long process to bring new technology to fruition, it was directed. RAND Corp. did a study on ten attributes for the aircraft and used senior Army aviation (warrant) officers to do the simulation runs to compare a conventional rotorcraft and a tilt rotor LHX. At the end of the study these officer had assessed that six of ten were performed better by the tilt rotor, two were tied and two were better executed by the conventional rotorcraft. Ironically the two done better by standard rotorcraft were reconnaissance and security missions. The SecArmy's position was validated. RAND recommended a conventional helicopter for the mission be built but that the Army continue to look seriously at tilt rotor technology for other missions. A recommendation promptly ignored, other than a conventional rotorcraft.

If both the Army and the Marine Corps had gone to tilt rotor a number of rotorcraft industries would have been at risk of going out of business due to inability to compete with the new technology.

 

[F-14D]

The decision to go with a conventional helicopter was dictated by the Secretary of the Army. Fearing a long process to bring new technology to fruition, it was directed. RAND Corp. did a study on ten attributes for the aircraft and used senior Army aviation (warrant) officers to do the simulation runs to compare a conventional rotorcraft and a tilt rotor LHX. At the end of the study these officer had assessed that six of ten were performed better by the tilt rotor, two were tied and two were better executed by the conventional rotorcraft. Ironically the two done better by standard rotorcraft were reconnaissance and security missions. The SecArmy's position was validated. RAND recommended a conventional helicopter for the mission be built but that the Army continue to look seriously at tilt rotor technology for other missions. A recommendation promptly ignored, other than a conventional rotorcraft.

If both the Army and the Marine Corps had gone to tilt rotor a number of rotorcraft industries would have been at risk of going out of business due to inability to compete with the new technology.

Basically agree. Points of contention would be that there wasn't much to indicate that a Tilt-Rotor would take longer to develop than a conventional brand new helo Sikorsky, BTW, originally proposed an ABC aircraft with a V-Tail, but that wouldn't have gone very far because of the high risk associated with the design.

Requirement of Operational Capability # 23, the foundation of the original LHX solicitation, asked for so much that it's doubtful that anything but a Tilt-Rotor could have pulled it off. there was some thought that the requirement would be split into two: LHX-Scat, which is basically what eventually became in less capable form the RAH-66 and would probably be a Tilt-Rotor, and LHX-Util, which would have some of the requirements backed off to let conventional helos have a chance. LHX-Util eventually got dropped from the program. However, the the Army, again for reasons not disclosed, unilaterally over three additional ROCs lowered the requirements (not just speed) to a point where a conventional rotorcraft was viable. In fact, the final solicitation included constraints (max aircraft weight and max engine power, among others ) that made it impossible for a Tilt-Rotor to meet. Ironically, Comanche missed those requirements and they had to be relaxed to a point where a Tilt-Rotor was viable. To make sure that the message got across, the solicitation specifically required a conventional rotorcraft.

As you intimated, the purpose of the RAND study was to validate the decision that had already been made. Tilt-Rotor still came out better 83% of the time, and that's assuming the conventional rotorcraft met its promises. Keep in mind that LHX-Scat involved much more than just recon, but all other missions were ignored in the justification if a conventional helo didn't come out on top. Didn't matter, they got the answer they wanted. So, Bell and Boeing walked away from Tilt-Rotor and bid conventional helos, teaming up with MDD Helicopters and Sikorsky, respectively. I wonder if the reason that SuperTeam lost was because its NOTAR might not have been as "conventional" as Sikorsky's shrouded tail rotor?

I absolutely agree with your last sentence, that is my personal belief for the motivation behind lowering the requirements. To me that's just sad...if you've got the better technology and are willing to invest your own money in it (as Bell and Boeing did), then you should reap the rewards.

 

[turboshaft]

I recall a couple of proposals to develop the RAH-66 Block II Heavy Attack version (the one with the external pylons) into a direct replacement for the Apache as a true attack helicopter.

The formal announcement that Comanche was to replace Apache, made during the AUSA seminar in November 2001, was one of the knives that eventually helped kill the program. Although only a long-term plan (2025-30) under the Objective Force roadmap, the announcement was taken badly by the Apache mafia, and necessitated a distracting year-long effort to mend relations between the two programs. At the time, the intention was that the attack birds would roll off the line as later blocks under the existing buy (essentially protecting the stated requirement at that time of 1,213 Comanches), but within a year the DAB had slashed the program to 650 units, and this -- together with the continued opposition of the Apache backers -- led to the plan being quietly dropped.

The external pylons (EFAMS) were not unique to the attack version -- they also offered a useful range extension capability for ferrying or special ops, and were part of the baseline development effort until being put on hold during the 2002 DAB.

 

[donnage99]

tilt rotors can't hover and do maneuvers like conventional helicopters do. All nessecary for the program's MAIN mission: reconnaissance. F14D's reasoning has problem. There's nothing ganranteed that the conventional helicopter can deliver its promise, but the same thing can be said about tilt rotor. In fact, at that time, tilt rotor technology was unproven (not that it has proven itself now anyway : ), so if assumption is involved, than alot more is needed for tilt rotor.
But anyway, it's funny if one think about it. You would think the the a-12 avenger ii screwed up the navy big time. However, Commanche was cancelled; UCAR was cancelled; Bell ARH-70 cancelled; Crusader cancelled because of FCS, but FCS was subsequently cancelled (not to mention these programs absorbed a load of money through cost overrun). After spending enough money to bring Russia's military to its former Soviet-like glory, the Army is left with nothing.

 

[F-14D]

tilt rotors can't hover and do maneuvers like conventional helicopters do. All nessecary for the program's MAIN mission: reconnaissance. F14D's reasoning has problem. There's nothing ganranteed that the conventional helicopter can deliver its promise, but the same thing can be said about tilt rotor. In fact, at that time, tilt rotor technology was unproven (not that it has proven itself now anyway : ), so if assumption is involved, than alot more is needed for tilt rotor.
But anyway, it's funny if one think about it. You would think the the a-12 avenger ii screwed up the navy big time. However, Commanche was cancelled; UCAR was cancelled; Bell ARH-70 cancelled; Crusader cancelled because of FCS, but FCS was subsequently cancelled (not to mention these programs absorbed a load of money through cost overrun). After spending enough money to bring Russia's military to its former Soviet-like glory, the Army is left with nothing.

I kinda thought this might be coming.

The original LHX-Scat required far more capability than just good hovering or very slow speed maneuver. A Tilt-Rotor will never match the hovering performance of a pure helo, if for no other reason than it has to carry the weight of the wing and downwash over said wing also hurts efficiency. that weight fraction of the wing goes up as the vehicle gets smaller. That was part of the "dumbing down", basically restricting the evaluative factors to those portions of the mission where a helo design would come out on top. If all you want to do, though, is hover or move very slow, you might as well keep building OH-58s or a derivative--oh wait a minute, we tried that with the ARH-70. You will also be known as a "missile magnet".

Regarding proven technology, while at the time it was still a very new technology, data developed from the XV-15 program made it far more proven than any other type of advanced rotorcraft technology, and advanced rotorcraft technology was what would be needed to truly meet the Army's requirements. Today, while some question the V-22 as an air vehicle, it is not the Tilt-Rotor portion that is in question, but rather the aircraft's execution. One would have to say that today Tilt-Rotor is a proven technology. In any case, the LHX would be much closer in size to the XV-15, so some of the scaling up concerns wouldn't be there. Also one can't extrapolate the maneuverability that a Tilt-Rotor designed for the LHX mission would demonstrate from the maneuverability of the V-22 any more than one could say how an F/A-18 would maneuver based on the performance of a C-17. An LHX Tilt-Rotor would be very maneuverable, even in the hover, and the faster you go, the more the disparity would widen.

It also offered many other advantages for the full LHX requirement. For example, on a 35C day at 2,220m, it could climb at 509m/min while carrying four Hellfires and two Stingers. On a standard 21 C day, it could carry 18 Hellfires, four Stingers and 750 rounds and still hover OGE @ 610m.

However, cutting back and refining the mission the way they did and with the way they structured the new solicitation, Tilt-Rotor was no longer a viable candidate.

We're kind of going down a side street here, I think. Tilt-Rotor came into it because it was the only sufficiently developed advanced rotorcraft technology that could make the program risk-manageable, but the program was really about meeting a spectrum of Army needs, not just recon. What I was getting at in my March 30 post was that one of the big things the Army used to sell the whole concept to Congress was that one of the spinoffs of the program would be the development of advanced rotorcraft technology; a big "push" forward. When that went away, you were basically left with spending a stupendous sum for an airframe not that much more than was already out there. The obvious question was: why not just work on the new avionics and stick them in something more off the shelf?. The Army never really had a good answer for that so to me, and all right-thinking individuals who agreed with me, the program was living on borrowed time from then on.

 

[Sundog]

Sort of OT, but related; a side street.

Why isn't ducted fan considered anymore? It just seemed to me it was simpler than a tilt rotor and the downwash doesn't have to contend with a wing blocking it and the duct acts like a wing in forward flight. Granted, I realize it isn't nearly as efficient as a large rotor, but how much of the mission is spent in hover? I realize it probably also incurs a larger weight fraction penalty, but it just seems less complicated and more robust to me, when compared to a tilt rotor. BTW, I mean a twin duct like the Doak design, as opposed to the X-22. I can see the drawback to the four duct design on the X-22 due to all of the shafting. Of course, I think the quad TR would suffer the same problem.

My first guess is the high efficiency of the TR just completely outclasses the ducted fan in efficiency to the point where no matter how much simpler a DF may be, it just can't compete in terms of performance. I'm still rereading my V/STOL aerodynamics book, but I've never really found any good info on the X-22's performance, at least with regard to efficiency and actual performance, such as range/payload. I remember there was some good info on it in Jay Miller's book, but I haven't been able to locate it since I've moved.

 

[yasotay]

While there are certainly advantaged to ducted fan from accoustic and radar considerations, not to mention protected rotors, it is not very efficient in a hover and has even worse downwash than tilt-rotors. It would be very handy for urban operations though. I hope it is not forgotten.

Your point about amount of hover is very relevant to the discussion. When LHX was originated, philosphically the Army was still locked into the focus of fighting WarPac forces by hovering behind hills and treelines observing and sniping at tank columns. Ironically today with the very different requirements; long ranges, rapid response, endurance and payload the tilt rotor is again a very viable option.

Also remember that the primary threat to rotorcraft are light and medium caliber guns, RPG and MANPADS. The MANPADS threat you have to overcome with technology, but RPG and guns still have less time to accurately engage the faster you go.

Sadly the fact that it takes so long to bring a new aircraft to fruition (like what happended to Comanche) means that programs will become increasingly hard to bring about in a world that changes in far less time. This is the epitate of the RAH-66.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

While there are certainly advantaged to ducted fan from accoustic and radar considerations, not to mention protected rotors, it is not very efficient in a hover and has even worse downwash than tilt-rotors. It would be very handy for urban operations though. I hope it is not forgotten.

We touched on some of this in the thread on the Convair Model 49 AAFS:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,6188.45.html

For a ducted fan, annular wing type design it may not be as good as a pure hover as a conventional helicopter but it can do two other things. It can land in close terrain and maintain observation from a stationary perspective (as was part of the Convair 49 concept where it could shoot its weapons from the landed attitude). It can also generate lift at low speeds from its wing enabling it to fly forward at a very slow speed (<50 knots) with fuel efficient thrust levels. So rather than hover for surveillance it can 'creep'…

As to downdraft while no doubt a major problem the flight crew are positioned on top of the aircraft so they might be out of the cloud when landing and taking off? Since the configuration allows for bumping into things with the airframe the effect of the cause (downdraft) should also be mitigated somewhat.

 

[GLAR]

ARTI was AFTI for the Army at a time when all the services still thought they should each grab a piece of whatever new systems or doctrinal approach came along 'for trials' (The military industrial base sustains itself on false promises and exhorbitant, drawn out, development programs. They then sell the technology which was found to be 'too expensive' overseas, having had their R&D paid off by the U.S. taxpayer.).

We've seen this from the Atom Bomb to the F-teens and onwards.

Of course there is the opposed side of things which is that the USAF is a lousy CAS provider (average 25 minute lag between call and fast ambulance in OEF, as much as _17hrs_ if the call was not programmed into the daily frag list) and thus Key West, which killed the ideal 'reconaissance' platform, the AH-56, was and is a criminal as much as conscientious division of roles and missions.

The allocation of which 'turf' generally sets the funding thresholds and accessibility to new technology for everyone.

That said, tactical radar LO over the battlefield is an enormous technology-loss WASTE under all conditions. Watch the footage of the old geezer standing beside the AH-64D he shot down with a Carcano rifle bullet. Or look at the results for the 101st airborne's attack aviation after Najaf and dare to tell me I'm wrong.

The helo's number one defining operational limiter is that it _never leaves the threat envelope_. Period. And not simply the S-300 class but the wire across the river. The AHM field which is also a UGS network. The guy with an RPD or DShK. i.e. The cheap stuff.

In SEA, things got so bad that we went to 3-5K foot transits because we were tired of pulling helos out of the soup (4,427 IIRR) with small arms damage. Of course then they brought in SA-7s, forced the sugarscoop ideal on us and cost us 20% of our hot and high performance at the same time they created a veritable updraft of concentrated IR energy. Total waste of time, even beyond the stupidity of sending a teetering rotor AH-1/UH-1 setup against guided shoulderfire weapons.

At which point it should probably be mentioned that, at least /publically/, what drove the initial LHX spec were the Red Book announced performance figures of the then-new Mi-28 Havoc and particularly Ka-50 Hokum. The latter was not seen as a bumbling exercise in Russian macro industrialism that it was, fitting a non-rigid, close spaced, heavily articulated _ASW platform_ rotor system to a supposed-to-be agile mission threat. Rather, it was seen much as our own S-69 Advancing Blade Concept was: as a 300 knot platform whose speed could only be intended to provide airborne dominance of U.S. attack helicopter teams.

And with the AH-1 firmly rooted in the weeds and the AH-64 set to become a pig nuzzling for acorns in the bushes after dark, there was some justification. For the places you employ this type of time-critical CAS are in emergency 'fluid' conditions of breakout and deep maneuver containment. Such as the Soviets proclaimed they had perfected as an answer to the NATO 'seven belt' system. This makes you predictable with your snout in the dirt doing popups from forward hides and trying to avoid getting clipped by VSHORADS like the SA-8/9/13 and Zoos. Furthermore, since the Russians were already in the habit of doing 3D envelopment around things like forced river crossings (employing 70-100 helicopters and thinking nothing of losing half) just to get the guard tank division in a position to become an OMG, looking to get the higher ground and control the approaches on everything from helicopters to armor to TACP teams with MULE, it stands to reason that you would see a lot of them, even conventionally. And if a Hind rolls over your rotor disk while your NOE waiting for that guy in the OH-58 to stick his head out and zot the target for your hellfires, you're gonna get raped. Because USAF will not be there.

Now imagine how bad this is when you are holding at the preattack position as the scouts move forward and a 300 knot threat crosses the FLOT ten kilometers down and starts rolling up the flanks. It won't be one helo getting hit. It may well be an entire JAAT attack team.

Hence the 'super sleek' LHX which was supposed to duke it out with this monster of the East in mano a mano 'escort fighter' roles. Well, of course it doesn't work that way really well either. Because, contrary to conventional fixed wing air combat, the first thing a rotary wing fight does is MOVE UP. As each side tries desperately to deny optics, doorgunners and turret weapons a line of sight through the rotor disk. And as soon as that happens, you are right back to dodging ground threats as your A#1 priority "Where did THAT come from?" scare.

Furthermore, the weapons systems of the time would not allow even a dedicated air-sniper 'using stealth' to win most battles:

1. Because ATGW imposed severe maneuvering and designation limits, were smokey and too slow.
2. Because ATAS (then MLMS) couldn't hardly see nothin' below about 10-15` above the horizon and was particularly crippled in it's associative ability to accept handoff cues from the sensor package. The AIM-9L was only a very little better in terms of below horizon targeting and target cue and could not be fired below about 100 knots.
3. Because the avionics also did not support the mission. Both offensively as stated (in Europe, in winter, optics are about 60% constrained, even during daylight). And defensively. Because the ALQ-136 was expensive and unreliable (not installed in most aircraft nominally stated to have it) and the ALQ-144 was so bad that it not only gave zero FQ coverage but could actually act as a beacon. Flares then being outlawed because they started fires under the airframe and chaff of limited use due to the small number of buckets and combined EO/Radar packages of most threat ADV.

It was around this time (mid-80s) that the USMC held an advanced helo air combat tactics course and aside from proving the that AH-1 was indeed a lead sled and the AH-64 powerful but porcine vs. nearly ANY _civilian_ rotorcraft (the top contenders proved to be the H-500 and H-76 civil helos with their better rotor systems, cleaner fuselage and more balanced layout); it was discovered that short of a look down radar that could see into hills and gullies, almost all rotary wing air combats happened purely by chance. And at ranges where the definition of technologic vs. positional dominance was very marginal indeed.

A fact being born out in the Iran/Iraq war where PC-7 were found to be the most useful killer of Iranian AH-1T to the extent that the Iranians copied the logic and bought the PC-9. See Key West for what the U.S. thinks about that.

With these conditions as nominal, your best anti helo weapon is a combination of artillery deliverable AHM and UGS, coupled to a MALI type (converted target drone/decoy) long range turbojet hunting missile. There are those that say that, before it was sold to Israel to become the HARPY, the German KDAR/PAB drone was in fact exactly that: a lethal attack system _for use against helos_. Not radars.

Okay, so air to air is useless within the given mission platform constraints. Which brings us to the 'scout' element of the mission. The best way to scout is to turn the helicopter sideways, pop up to about 1,500-3,000ft and either focus a 20" optical barrel (the Mi-24K does exactly this as an artillery spotter platform) about 20km off in the distance. Or sweep the area with about a 10ft long radar array (UH-60 SOTAS). Here, ironically, radar LO may actually do you some good as an angled side profile will deflect radar and the longer you can remain up, without having to bunt and quick-shift elsewhere (a real problem with the suspended SOTAS in particular), the more useful your mission becomes. This is where the UTIL mission should have seen real emphasis as a platform function that would also have held the high ground vs. the coming wave of Eurochoppers. As indeed programs like the ACAP looked set to do, a full decade before composite construction became standard in the Ecureil and BK-117 followons.

The point remains however that you DO NOT want to close with the enemy to take freakin' pictures. It's not only stupid in a limited airframe force, it's also _pointless_ because the best way to kill armor in breakout is with ATACMS and a snootfull of TGSM. Not Hellfires. Those are the FIRES platforms which can in fact stand back 100km from the FSCL and shoot both the 2E/FOF and the main assault columns all to pieces. And they can do it to _either side_ of their position, faster than a helo or fixed wing systems can respond. Indeed, Pave Mover, which was SOTAS with a bigger budget was specifically designed to include a side-channel capable of providing multiple midcourse updates to tactical missile systems.

Now comes the sucker punch. The MQM-105 Aquila and the DARPA Amber programs were doing essentially the same mission as the Hunter/Outrider/Shadow class 'divisional/maneuver' UAVs, almost 25 years ago. And they were doing it with radiometric and later active radar (precursor to the APY-8 Lynx and all weather capable) as well as electrooptical systems that had _sufficient accuracy_, pre-GPS, to put artillery into splash on point targets.

Indeed, it was the terror of the manned macho-muchacho military that overloaded Aquila to the point where it could no longer accomplish the mission. Just like they did to the J-UCAS (U-system fear is universal among all the service unions).

And why does this matter? Because you can take cheap CCD technology and flood the battlefield with it. Using a set number of channels and an IP system to send drones wherever the hell you like to take very close range snaps. Lose one? Fine. Call up another (airframe code) to the same channel and move it forward. You can even 'stream' UAVs to overlap spectrum coverage and show things like where the leading drone got shot down.

And if you can afford to lose a few to guided fire because they are _too small_ to be seen by the unaided eye (at 5-10K feet), then you can also do something else: use straight shot routing.

Whereby a scout helicopter that has to do NOE at 60-90 knots through a SERIES of waypoints that might, or might not, contain a desired target. A simple drone moving at 90-100 knots can beat it to any given point because it is doing an as-the-crow-flies. Not the airborne equivalent of low-crawl. And since, at roughly $564,120.00 vs. $42,600,000.00 you can afford about 75 Aquila (Ex-Drone, Brave etc.) level units for each RAH-66, you can do a lot of tooling about for no gain and still come out ahead in the kinds of high intensity combats for which both were designed and each would like face it's destruction by an atomic warhead or a T-72 running over it's basing mode.

Of course it only took about 22 years to reach this conclusion but as I recall, one of the last nails in the Comanche Coffin was in fact an attempt to make a 'scout for the scout' TRIPLE tier system (remembering that the LHX was itself to replace the OH-58 as an aircraft able to 'keep up with' the 130 knot Apache...). One of the programs was called 'A-MUST' for Advanced Manned/Unmanned Systems Technology. And the competing program was called, hmmmm, 'ALERT' I think it was. The latter being a final recognition of how exceptionally dated even the Comanche mission equipment package had become since it's 1983 mission spec had been hardened as the attempt was to take the EOTASS sensor (which was a linear bar scan system based on the limited performance of period SFPAs, long since surpassed by Arrowhead and Hawkeye technology) and turn it from a 'snapshot' (horizon line) imager to a real time, wide-FOV interpretative intelligence gathering device.

More or less along the same lines as they are now wunderwaffen promoting for EOTS/DAS on the F-35.

They couldn't make it happen. Or at least not without vastly escalating the already astronomical price target (1983 price for LHX-SCAT was to be around 6.3 million, it died a ca. 42 million dollar airframe...).

And so chilluns, the dragon known as RAH-66 died a deserved death at the hands of Nunn McCurdy and Anti-Deficiency laws, long after the successors to the generals whose retirement had come and gone during the program's extended lapse could no longer gain more than exasperated indifference from a Congress that had FINALLY (for a little while) seen how readily helicopters can be killed. And how little area they really cover compared to the logistics footprint required to keep them moving up with the ground combat elements.

BHD, Najaf, Takur Gar and other places have essentially proven what everyone with a thinking brain has known since the nazis flew the damn things: good for emergency lift. Lousy for frontline or 'patrol' (across FLOT) combat work.

From March 2003 to February 2009, we have lost approximately 127 helicopters vs. only 23 fixed wing aircraft in Iraq. Even at a 4:1 price ratio of say 12.5 vs. 50 million averaged cost, you are talking a difference of 1.58 billion vs. 1.15 billion dollars. We can better spend the difference (430 million dollars) on a system that doesn't have to point it's nose at a target to see or DROP weapons upon it. Indeed, that's approximately 30 MQ-9B Reapers and a 1,000 GBU-39 which are collectively better than either an attack helicopter or a fighter jet.


GLAR


P.S. The problem with a BAT (Bell Attack Tiltrotor) or any similar system is that, to make it aerodynamic and light enough to fly agilely, you have to reduce it's fuselage profile considerably. This means you cannot stuff the belly with a weapons bay, particularly on those variants which in fact went with a single T800 turboshaft on the centerline and left the wingtip pods empty. While you can theoretically use superior dropfire technology weapons from these wings, the combination of stiffening for pylons (re-adding weight and roll inertia, outboard) and the fact that clearing the proprotor disks in anything but clean and level flight becomes somewhat 'sporty', tends to argue against the type.

My favorite, though always an outsider (and offered rather late), was the MP-18 Dragonslayer and MP-36 Dragon. These employed a large central fan bay under the fuselage, a dorsal inlet (with protective screens) for the turbojet and a complex conch-geometry plenum which could both vent centrally and provide a ready source of RCS and directional stabilization before transitioning to forward flight. Principle takeoff mode was ESTOL. It was relatively small, having only two wing pylons plus tip mounts for sidewinder class weapons. But it was capable of 500 knots and a 30,000ft ceiling which means it could drop X8 GBU-39 from overtop any practical (CAS) threat floor. In forward flight, principle maneuver was through airplane moded aerodynamic control and active leading and trailing edge flaperons. A USB lift flap came into play during transition, lowering approach speeds and providing a duct seal to begin venting through the plenum. i.e. No anti torque mechanical takeoff losses. No dead weight ala VTDP. Good design. Key West.

Lastly, if you want to bring the helo into the target terminal area, you have to be able to do two basic things:

1. Scout under/behind any masking terrain before commitment. A system like Silent Eyes or Finder could theoretically accomplish this.

2. FLY beyond the threat terminal _acquisition_ range with a cheap weapon. JASSM was never cheap. But PAM could have been. With a thermobaric warhead and good trajectory control on a 20km powered flight, you only really need about a 10m CEP. The AH-64s that got their heads handed to them at Najaf did so ONLY AFTER the town had been warned (by blinking the lights) of their approach and they continued into the attack over builtup terrain. They were thus taken under fire by small arms from rooftops because the enemy knew that they would pass nearby.

 

[F-14D]

<big <snip>
GLAR


P.S. The problem with a BAT (Bell Attack Tiltrotor) or any similar system is that, to make it aerodynamic and light enough to fly agilely, you have to reduce it's fuselage profile considerably. This means you cannot stuff the belly with a weapons bay, particularly on those variants which in fact went with a single T800 turboshaft on the centerline and left the wingtip pods empty. While you can theoretically use superior dropfire technology weapons from these wings, the combination of stiffening for pylons (re-adding weight and roll inertia, outboard) and the fact that clearing the proprotor disks in anything but clean and level flight becomes somewhat 'sporty', tends to argue against the type.

<and another one>

Quite an interesting post. I for one thank you, even though I might not agree with all of it. A few notes, on the paragraph above, if I may: BAT actually stood for Bell Advanced, not Attack, Tilt Rotor.. Bell (and everyone) would use two engines. Bell would not have the engines internal, as their preference was to have the engines at the wingtips and they would tilt along with the proprotors. In those days Boeing favored having non-tilting engines in the fuselage with much slimmer nacelles. There are advantages and disadvantages to both concepts. As I recall, Bell's proposal for a Tilt-Rotor LHX carried eight embedded Hellfires, two more than Comanche's internal load. It could additionally carry more under the wings. You could forward fire weapons from the wings once the nacelles were tilted enough so that the proprotor arc was clear (XV-15 repeatedly demonstrated the ability to operate normally at all kinds of tilt angles). Of course, that nacelle tilt plus the drag of a bunch of Hellfires or whatever under the wings could slow the a/c down to conventional helo speeds while firing, but if you were carrying that kind of load, top speed wasn't your driver at that time, anyway.

 

[F-14D]

While there are certainly advantaged to ducted fan from accoustic and radar considerations, not to mention protected rotors, it is not very efficient in a hover and has even worse downwash than tilt-rotors. It would be very handy for urban operations though. I hope it is not forgotten.

Your point about amount of hover is very relevant to the discussion. When LHX was originated, philosphically the Army was still locked into the focus of fighting WarPac forces by hovering behind hills and treelines observing and sniping at tank columns. Ironically today with the very different requirements; long ranges, rapid response, endurance and payload the tilt rotor is again a very viable option.

Also remember that the primary threat to rotorcraft are light and medium caliber guns, RPG and MANPADS. The MANPADS threat you have to overcome with technology, but RPG and guns still have less time to accurately engage the faster you go.

Sadly the fact that it takes so long to bring a new aircraft to fruition (like what happended to Comanche) means that programs will become increasingly hard to bring about in a world that changes in far less time. This is the epitate of the RAH-66.

I may have misled some with my wording...a Tilt-Rotor can hover and demonstrate low speed maneuverability quite well. It can not, however, do it as efficiently as a pure helo. The longer you stay very slow, the more the helo has an efficiency advantage at that corner of the envelope. The Tilt-Rotor proposals would have met all the Army requirements in those areas, but at the expense of greater empty weight and power requirements. That's how they were "designed" out of the later solicitations: Focus on only a portion of the LHX total mission, and specify weight and power limits that effectively preclude Tilt-Rotor (and other advanced concepts as well).

Your comment on hiding behind trees and hills is particularly relevant to demonstrating this. The original LHX specs had mission profiles that were clearly Middle East scenarios. The desert tends to be somewhat limited when it comes to hills and treelines, but that was brushed aside in the lowering of requirements, as were other factors as well. Hovering or moving at low speeds for sustained periods can often turn you into an RPG or bullet sponge, even when you do have trees.

 

[quellish]

My favorite, though always an outsider (and offered rather late), was the MP-18 Dragonslayer and MP-36 Dragon. These employed a large central fan bay under the fuselage, a dorsal inlet (with protective screens) for the turbojet and a complex conch-geometry plenum which could both vent centrally and provide a ready source of RCS and directional stabilization before transitioning to forward flight. Principle takeoff mode was ESTOL. It was relatively small, having only two wing pylons plus tip mounts for sidewinder class weapons. But it was capable of 500 knots and a 30,000ft ceiling which means it could drop X8 GBU-39 from overtop any practical (CAS) threat floor. In forward flight, principle maneuver was through airplane moded aerodynamic control and active leading and trailing edge flaperons. A USB lift flap came into play during transition, lowering approach speeds and providing a duct seal to begin venting through the plenum. i.e. No anti torque mechanical takeoff losses. No dead weight ala VTDP. Good design. Key West.

Surely you don't mean the Phalanx Dragon series. Good design, if the world worked by cartoon physics.

 

[donnage99]

I kinda thought this might be coming.
The original LHX-Scat required far more capability than just good hovering or very slow speed maneuver. A Tilt-Rotor will never match the hovering performance of a pure helo, if for no other reason than it has to carry the weight of the wing and downwash over said wing also hurts efficiency. that weight fraction of the wing goes up as the vehicle gets smaller. That was part of the "dumbing down", basically restricting the evaluative factors to those portions of the mission where a helo design would come out on top. If all you want to do, though, is hover or move very slow, you might as well keep building OH-58s or a derivative--oh wait a minute, we tried that with the ARH-70. You will also be known as a "missile magnet".

Yes, but those are the core capabilities which a tiltrotor cannot meet. By the numbers of capabilities, the tiltrotor might hold more, but if one looks at that alone to come to a conclusion, then it's just oversimplistic. I never said I think the comanche was the perfect candidate. I agree that dumping huge load of money into a conventional rotorcraft concept doesn't make alot of sense (the tail rotor would not work very well for stealth either). I was partly glad that the comanche was killed, as we have escaped from the scenario where we have to commit to buying the thing for a decade to come while watching newer concepts that would be superior to comanche arises without the money to buy them (but that was when UCAR still existed). However, that doesn't mean tiltrotor was the right answer. That's my point. I think it's the same reason why the UCAR program, being very aggressive in its goals, still did not see contractors offering tilt rotor said something about whether or not the technology would fullfill the RECON mission.

 

[F-14D]

I kinda thought this might be coming.
The original LHX-Scat required far more capability than just good hovering or very slow speed maneuver. A Tilt-Rotor will never match the hovering performance of a pure helo, if for no other reason than it has to carry the weight of the wing and downwash over said wing also hurts efficiency. that weight fraction of the wing goes up as the vehicle gets smaller. That was part of the "dumbing down", basically restricting the evaluative factors to those portions of the mission where a helo design would come out on top. If all you want to do, though, is hover or move very slow, you might as well keep building OH-58s or a derivative--oh wait a minute, we tried that with the ARH-70. You will also be known as a "missile magnet".

Yes, but those are the core capabilities which a tiltrotor cannot meet. By the numbers of capabilities, the tiltrotor might hold more, but if one looks at that alone to come to a conclusion, then it's just oversimplistic. I never said I think the comanche was the perfect candidate. I agree that dumping huge load of money into a conventional rotorcraft concept doesn't make alot of sense (the tail rotor would not work very well for stealth either). I was partly glad that the comanche was killed, as we have escaped from the scenario where we have to commit to buying the thing for a decade to come while watching newer concepts that would be superior to comanche arises without the money to buy them (but that was when UCAR still existed). However, that doesn't mean tiltrotor was the right answer. That's my point. I think it's the same reason why the UCAR program, being very aggressive in its goals, still did not see contractors offering tilt rotor said something about whether or not the technology would fullfill the RECON mission.

Our posts may have crossed earlier today. To reiterate: Assuming everyone's proposal would do what it said, there were no "...core capabilities that a Tilt-Rotor cannot meet". But, in certain missions it would weigh more and require more power than a conventional helo would doing just that portion of the missions. You can't get past the "penalty" of the wing, and the smaller the vehicle the greater percentage of it is taken up by the wing. However, in most of the requirement it was better, sometimes by a very large amount, acceleration, for example. As a result the requirements were "dumbed down" to conventional rotorcraft levels, no credit for capability above that. At that point there were "core requirements that a Tilt-Rotor couldn't meet, but they were not performance or capability, but weight and power. As it turned out, Comanche didn't meet them either.

Again, my original post was not so much to hijack this topic into a Tilt-Rotor (which you might detect a hint that I like) or any advanced rotorcraft forum. Tilt-Rotor wasn't even mentioned in my original post. My point was that when the Army deliberately took advanced rotorcraft technology off the table in the early stages, they doomed the project. They never really were able to make a strong case after that why a totally new airframe (as opposed to avionics) was necessary. Then when hit with the inevitable delays, overruns and funding stretchouts, they entered the death spiral.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

They never really were able to make a strong case after that why a totally new airframe (as opposed to avionics) was necessary.

Couldn't they just point at the stealth aspects of the design, reduced RCS, audio, and IR signature?

 

[F-14D]

They never really were able to make a strong case after that why a totally new airframe (as opposed to avionics) was necessary.

Couldn't they just point at the stealth aspects of the design, reduced RCS, audio, and IR signature?

When you're operating down low, none of those were enough to make a convincing case for the enormous costs of developing a whole new airframe that didn't offer any radical advance in performance or produce a leap forward that could be applied to civil rotorcraft.

"Look, Ivan, what do you see hovering by that ridge line"? "Hmm, it seems to be a reduced RCS helicopter, let me take a picture. I wonder if its stealth will fool our bullets and RPGs"?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Well if it were Ivan and not Abdul I think the reduced signature would be pretty convincing argument. Still, on those grounds it should have been canceled much sooner rather than get to near-production status. We might as well have gone all the way.

Perhaps this was discussed earlier but did the USMC ever consider the RAH-66 for some roles?

 

[donnage99]

The reduced signature isn't useless, since it would enable the comanche close enough to use its sensors or just take out the target before it react. However, it isn't adequate. It is truly a leap of capability, but definitely not the f-22 of the army as some has claimed. By the time near its cancellation, the recent war has demonstrated that uav was potentially superior than what the comanche could do. Adding with the cost overrun, there isn't anything left for comanche. The only regretable thing is that it should have been cancelled long ago, and use that money elsewhere. And by that, I meant UCAR.

 

[F-14D]

Well if it were Ivan and not Abdul I think you the reduced signature option would be pretty convincing. Still, on those grounds it should have been canceled much sooner rather than get to near-production status. We might as well have gone all the way.

Perhaps this was discussed earlier but did the USMC ever consider the RAH-66 for some roles?

"Ivan" was one of the main scenarios which it was first designed around before the requirement was dumbed down.

Regarding the USMC, the answer no doubt is probably , "No". Especially after the "dumb down", it was designed for a role they didn't need (seen any Marine OH-58s lately?), wasn't marinized, offered no performance advantages they couldn't get elsewhere and was going to be really expensive for what was a conventional helo.

 

[Vpanoptes]

...
Perhaps this was discussed earlier but did the USMC ever consider the RAH-66 for some roles?

Interesting thread. A friend and highly reliable observer told me of a "very unusual looking" helicopter, relatively quiet, with an angled fuselage and a fenestron that he observed on MCB Camp Pendleton. This would have been in the 1996-1997 time frame. Any chance the RAH-66 might have paid a visit? I recall seeing MQ-1s on MCAS Camp Pendleton a year or two after that (just visiting as I recall).

 

[SOC]

Maybe it was an Aerocraft Stealth Star demonstrator? Did they fit that with a fenestron?

 

[turboshaft]

Not aware of any substantive discussions with the Corps, though the Comanche was penciled in as the replacement for the 160th's Little Birds, which would have involved some 'interesting' deck compatibility effort. Though the work never progressed beyond the initial design stage, the SOCOM aircraft would have featured AAR, blade fold and other mission mods.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

The only regretable thing is that it should have been cancelled long ago, and use that money elsewhere. And by that, I meant UCAR.

I would say it is regretable they progressed so far with it then cancelled it, rather than cancelling it years earlier or just going ahead and building a few hundred to replace the Kiowas.

Regarding where that money could have gone if it was cancelled earlier, why UCAR?

 

[F-14D]

...
Perhaps this was discussed earlier but did the USMC ever consider the RAH-66 for some roles?

Interesting thread. A friend and highly reliable observer told me of a "very unusual looking" helicopter, relatively quiet, with an angled fuselage and a fenestron that he observed on MCB Camp Pendleton. This would have been in the 1996-1997 time frame. Any chance the RAH-66 might have paid a visit? I recall seeing MQ-1s on MCAS Camp Pendleton a year or two after that (just visiting as I recall).

At that time frame there was only one RAH-66 in existence so it's theoretically possible, but one has to wonder whether they'd risk moving it across the country and disrupting the program.

In an update to my earlier post regarding on the first question above, a USMC Major did write a paper in 1997 advocating consideration of the RAH-66, there are no indications that after review it went any further. It would have been enormously expensive, and given the problems that later ensued, it was probably just as well that it didn't.

 

[donnage99]

I would say it is regretable they progressed so far with it then cancelled it, rather than cancelling it years earlier or just going ahead and building a few hundred to replace the Kiowas.

Regarding where that money could have gone if it was cancelled earlier, why UCAR?

Buying a few hundreds would exhaust the money that could be spent in the unmanned market for the same missions. UCAR was simply transformative, stealth, novel airframe and propulsion systems, on top with Sci-fi autonomy. On the other hand, the competing contractors were doing very well in demonstrating technology, too. The continuing of UCAR could see other branches dip in some money, and even if the program only achieved a portion of its ambition, it still bring a leap in technology advancement to the military. Its autonomy research could be later used in other programs for other branches since it bring autonomy to a new definition in both capability and cost effectiveness.

In simple word: UCAR is a platform that packs technology that is fundamental to the military as a whole, and not just the army.

 

[F-14D]

I would say it is regretable they progressed so far with it then cancelled it, rather than cancelling it years earlier or just going ahead and building a few hundred to replace the Kiowas.

Regarding where that money could have gone if it was cancelled earlier, why UCAR?

Buying a few hundreds would exhaust the money that could be spent in the unmanned market for the same missions. UCAR was simply transformative, stealth, novel airframe and propulsion systems, on top with Sci-fi autonomy. On the other hand, the competing contractors were doing very well in demonstrating technology, too. The continuing of UCAR could see other branches dip in some money, and even if the program only achieved a portion of its ambition, it still bring a leap in technology advancement to the military. Its autonomy research could be later used in other programs for other branches since it bring autonomy to a new definition in both capability and cost effectiveness.

In simple word: UCAR is a platform that packs technology that is fundamental to the military as a whole, and not just the army.

When LHX/Comanche was first mooted, the tech didn't exist to produce something like UCAR. I wonder if it does yet, or were they being overly ambitious; but even if some of its hoped for capabilities didn't materialize, it would have been a valuable asset. I wonder about the "armed" part, though. Given the restrictions imposed on our forces, especially in the last year, I don't see something like UCAR being allowed to function autonomously, and if it isn't, why have it? But, we're getting a bit off-topic there.

 

[yasotay]

F-14D makes a great point about the tech level when LHX was first considered. All of the stealthiness came later when the WARPAC massive ADA threat made a simple scout aircraft less viable with the money changers. UCAR was a very promising program with some impressive technology, however as the scouting function became increasingly humanistic (find the guy in a man-dress with combat boots in the village market vice a tank column) the investment seemed less than viable, not to mention the increased expense of maintaining the current rotorcraft fleet. To be sure there was at least a little attack-helo mafia angst thrown in. Still this does not mean that the Army is anti-UAS. Far from it. It is just that the sensor packages on UAS do not have the same capabilites (five senses) that an aero scout uses daily. The OH-58D has the highest operational utilization of all of the aircraft in the Army. The Army will start seriously working on manned/unmanned operations soon. They annouced as much at the AUSA Aviation Symposium earlier this year.

 

[donnage99]

When LHX/Comanche was first mooted, the tech didn't exist to produce something like UCAR. I wonder if it does yet, or were they being overly ambitious; but even if some of its hoped for capabilities didn't materialize, it would have been a valuable asset. I wonder about the "armed" part, though. Given the restrictions imposed on our forces, especially in the last year, I don't see something like UCAR being allowed to function autonomously, and if it isn't, why have it? But, we're getting a bit off-topic there.

Nope. Contractors have successfully demonstrated that the technology was feasible. And fielding could begin 2012 (perhaps too optimistic, but remember unmanned vehicles are much quicker to develop and field than manned aircraft). Program manager noted that the contractors provided what was asked for and more, all on time and on budget.

The UCAR would not completely function autonomously. It would draw up battle plan based on the dynamic of the scenario, suggest the plan to the pilot in some other platform, get permission to execute. The big thing here is that the pilot only say yes or no, and not having to overload himself by doing the planning himself. The whole slogan of UCAR is that it work with the pilot, not by the pilot. However, that still means the final decision in the kill chain still belongs to man.

 

[donnage99]

F-14D makes a great point about the tech level when LHX was first considered. All of the stealthiness came later when the WARPAC massive ADA threat made a simple scout aircraft less viable with the money changers. UCAR was a very promising program with some impressive technology, however as the scouting function became increasingly humanistic (find the guy in a man-dress with combat boots in the village market vice a tank column) the investment seemed less than viable, not to mention the increased expense of maintaining the current rotorcraft fleet.

To my knowlege, the UCAR was designed specifically to tackle that issue of finding a guy in a man-dress with combat boots, differentiate combatants from non-combatants. As for maintainance, it bring up a interesting sale point of UCAR, is that it promised to get rid of the dedicated ground control station that comes along with a particular uav packcage. The supporting station usually cost more than the uav platform itself. UCAR would scale down that station into the loop of an apache or nighthawk.

The Army was very enthusiastic until the last minute when it canceled the program. If it was any doubt in the program's philosophy, ambitions or viability, then the Army would have shown it so. The drop was so sudden that it could only be explained that Army didn't have money in term of fiscal funding.

 

[F-14D]

F-14D makes a great point about the tech level when LHX was first considered. All of the stealthiness came later when the WARPAC massive ADA threat made a simple scout aircraft less viable with the money changers. UCAR was a very promising program with some impressive technology, however as the scouting function became increasingly humanistic (find the guy in a man-dress with combat boots in the village market vice a tank column) the investment seemed less than viable, not to mention the increased expense of maintaining the current rotorcraft fleet.

To my knowlege, the UCAR was designed specifically to tackle that issue of finding a guy in a man-dress with combat boots, differentiate combatants from non-combatants. As for maintainance, it bring up a interesting sale point of UCAR, is that it promised to get rid of the dedicated ground control station that comes along with a particular uav packcage. The supporting station usually cost more than the uav platform itself. UCAR would scale down that station into the loop of an apache or nighthawk.

The Army was very enthusiastic until the last minute when it canceled the program. If it was any doubt in the program's philosophy, ambitions or viability, then the Army would have shown it so. The drop was so sudden that it could only be explained that Army didn't have money in term of fiscal funding.

UCAR was really pushing the state of the art in its ability to recognize threats, and may have been too much of a leap to fast (look at all the software problems we're having in aerospace programs that don't ask for as much), I doubt we'd have an operational system by 2012. Still, the main reason Army pulled its share out was it wanted the money for immediate operational needs. My concern would be that to develop something that sophisticated and build it might take more money than a manned system. Still, it was and is worth pursuing.

However, I don't see such a system being allowed to "roam free". Instead of the mandrels, what about the situation of the enemy standing behind women and children, as they've already shown a willingness to do, while firing over their hostages shoulders? UCAR would deduce that was a disguised enemy and return fire. I just can't see those in Washington who are running things allowing such a system to operate, given the hand-tying that's presently going on with manned assets.

I think, though, that eventually, we'll see something like this in the not too distant future. Maybe the concept and control system just needs a more catchy name to garner support in the bureaucracy. Maybe something like, say,

"Skynet".

 

[yasotay]

Donnage99 and F-14D are both correct I believe. UCAR was the death of Comanche. ;D

I really do enjoy this particular discussion having been neck deep in it, but it is begining to drift from a RAH-66 discussion.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Buying a few hundreds would exhaust the money that could be spent in the unmanned market for the same missions.

If you always decide to hold off for the next thing however, you never get new aircraft, tanks, ships, rifles, or anything. At a certain point you have to decide "we buy these now" even when there is always something nicer looking over the horizon.

Regarding the capabilities of UCAR, I think it would be foolish to abandoned all development of all manned attack and reconnaissance helicopters in favor of unmanned designs. As far as the IFF issues go, even with the latest technology, I think it is an awful lot to expect swarms of unmanned helicopters to be flying around Afghanistan and taking out individual militants autonomously. Your still going to need a human operator to take look at some actual video feed, check the location, and determine who the UCAR is looking at.

In a conventional war zone, I suppose it would be possible to have a UCAV or UCAR execute a mission fully autonomously. I am sure it could attempt to avoid enemy radar systems, patrol an area, and pick out and destroy vehicles, weapon systems, and other targets. Yet I can't say the idea of a UCAV determining and executing it's own combat missions sounds good. I don't see any reason you wouldn't want somebody to at least designate the area the UCAV will fly to and engage targets in. And once a mission has actually been completed, how are you going to determine what the aircraft destroyed, the strength of the enemy in the area, or anything useful if it is operating fully autonomously?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Regarding the bureaucratic and political issues, friendly fire is understood by most as situations that will occur despite whatever systems exist that are designed to prevent that. IFF gear malfunctions and target identification systems will never be 100% accurate. Sooner or later an autonomous UCAV or UCAR would kill some friendlies, and I imagine it would be taken far worse than a screw up by a manned system.

 

[donnage99]

If you always decide to hold off for the next thing however, you never get new aircraft, tanks, ships, rifles, or anything. At a certain point you have to decide "we buy these now" even when there is always something nicer looking over the horizon.

Regarding the capabilities of UCAR, I think it would be foolish to abandoned all development of all manned attack and reconnaissance helicopters in favor of unmanned designs. As far as the IFF issues go, even with the latest technology, I think it is an awful lot to expect swarms of unmanned helicopters to be flying around Afghanistan and taking out individual militants autonomously. Your still going to need a human operator to take look at some actual video feed, check the location, and determine who the UCAR is looking at.

The point isn't hold off for the next thing to come. As f-14D pointed out, the comanche didn't offer enough advancement from the start, so it quickly became outpaced during its development phrase by other hypothetical platforms that we could have built with comanche's money. Of course, that can apply for anything, but much more so for comanche. And as I said, it certainly isn't the equivalance of the f-22.
As for UCAR, I don't know if you read my earlier post, but it was never intended to be fully autonomous. For a team of 4 to 6 UCAR, there will be a manned helicopter such as the apache to act as the moderator.

 

[F-14D]

Regarding the bureaucratic and political issues, friendly fire is understood by most as situations that will occur despite whatever systems exist that are designed to prevent that. IFF gear malfunctions and target identification systems will never be 100% accurate. Sooner or later an autonomous UCAV or UCAR would kill some friendlies, and I imagine it would be taken far worse than a screw up by a manned system.

True, but the Biiig hoopla will be when one kills some civilians being used as human shields. that's what the press will seize on. With a human making the decision or being deceived, there's some understanding, but when the Washington Post or New York Times puts out its headline, "Innocents Slaughtered by Robocopter", well,,,

 

[F-14D]

Donnage99 and F-14D are both correct I believe. UCAR was the death of Comanche. ;D

I really do enjoy this particular discussion having been neck deep in it, but it is begining to drift from a RAH-66 discussion.

I appreciate the support, but I sort of see the UCAR concept as something that would have followed Comanche. RAH-66 was canceled in the same year that Army pulled out of its partnership with DARPA on UCAR. Personally, I believe the seeds were sown when the army chose to limit the airframe to a conventional rotorcraft. They never really could come up with a good explanation of why we needed to spend so much money to develop an air vehicle that didn't have all that much performance over what was already available. I mean, I love aerospace and new aircraft, and I didn't believe them! Imagine trying to convince Senator Jubilation T. Blowhard.

 

[yasotay]

Regarding the bureaucratic and political issues, friendly fire is understood by most as situations that will occur despite whatever systems exist that are designed to prevent that. IFF gear malfunctions and target identification systems will never be 100% accurate. Sooner or later an autonomous UCAV or UCAR would kill some friendlies, and I imagine it would be taken far worse than a screw up by a manned system.

True, but the Biiig hoopla will be when one kills some civilians being used as human shields. that's what the press will seize on. With a human making the decision or being deceived, there's some understanding, but when the Washington Post or New York Times puts out its headline, "Innocents Slaughtered by Robocopter", well,,,

Not to mention there are already petitions and agendas calling for an end to using "drones" to kill people.