P&W TF30 for Orao II of Yugoslavia in 1978

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A memorandum of conversation between US and Yugoslavian defence ministers in 1978 show that Yugoslavia was interested in producing P&W TF30 for its Orao II.

Is there any artist impression of this Orao II powered by a TF30?

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d258

Ljubicic , with a serious expression‎, said that Yugoslavia would not use such equipment to conduct reconnaissance against these countries. He then said that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from the Middle East, Soviet efforts would be more intense in areas around Yugoslavia. He suggested that already the Soviets somehow were behind Bulgarian actions that irritate Yugoslavia.

Brown said that Yugoslavia’s military needs were recognized and asked about the status of the eval‎uation of the TF–30 engine for possible use in the Yugoslav Eagle aircraft. Ljubicic recited the history of the Yugoslav request for a high technology engine (but gave no hint on the progress or possible outcome of the eval‎uation). He said that Yugoslav experts should come to the US as part of the eval‎uation, because, if the engine were selected, the US and Yugoslavia would need to enter into large-scale cooperation. In response to a question from Brown on the type of cooperation he had in mind, Ljubicic said, if the TF–30 suits their needs, they would like to build it. They would purchase several engines, and then buy the license and documentation to permit production in Yugoslavia with US assistance. Brown , in questioning further whether the Yugoslavs were suggesting that they produce the entire engine themselves, explained that some components were difficult to make and that there were difficulties with US policy. He said there were many components which the US would consider for Yugoslav manufacture and that assembly and testing of the engine could be considered. He explained that even these possibilities would require careful review in the USG and an exception to policy which only the President could grant. Brown asked that Ljubicic put together the specifics of their request for consideration by the USG.

Ljubicic asked if the group from Yugoslavia could have all the data on the engine, whether anything is secret. Brown said all information would be made available. (Senior Defense Security Assistance Agency representatives explained later to General Popovic and Major Stankovic, the assistant attache who deals with FMS, that requests for information beyond the limits of the present export licenses must be submitted to the Department of State for USG consideration, but that the answers would be given as quickly as possible.)

Brown said the USG would have to see how many components could be manufactured in Yugoslavia. He said that turbine blades were very difficult to make. Ljubicic said that the Yugoslavs were making turbine blades with the British, who are satisfied with Yugoslav practices. Ljubicic said that entering into arrangements for production of the Orao II aircraft—not just the engine—would open up a big field and produce a significant increase in bilateral cooperation. Brown did not answer this point, but noted that the group of Yugoslav aircraft engine experts was to arrive soon and that he wanted to press forward for the present with that aspect of the TF–30 question.
 

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe - Office of the Historian

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231. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Platt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1​

Washington, March 9, 1985

SUBJECT​

  • Advanced Aircraft Engine Coproduction in Yugoslavia
For the past twelve months, Defense and State have been engaged in a detailed study into the merits of authorizing a commercial coproduction agreement for an advanced US aircraft engine in Yugoslavia.2 During this study, which involved numerous government to government exchanges and unprecedented access to Yugoslav industrial facilities by USG personnel, agreement was reached upon the nature of sensitive US technology, the unlikelihood of reverse engineering, the potential for success of the Yugoslav program, the need for a government to government agreement for security, and other facets of such a major program. Based upon the results of this study, the Department of State believes that we have worked out a viable coproduction agreement which can be initiated with Yugoslavia without significant risk to US security.

A decision in this case has major foreign policy and national security implications. Since 1948, we have attempted to support Yugoslavia as an independent, stable buffer against Soviet expansion. The President affirmed this policy most recently in NSDD 133,3 which states that the United States will foster sales of military equipment to Yugoslavia in a manner consistent with our policy on technology transfer. Our participation in the Yugoslav fighter program would accelerate the recent trend in Yugoslav military policy towards linkages with the West, reestablish the US as a significant military partner, and provide a badly needed opportunity to influence the development of Yugoslavia’s governmental, military and industrial sectors. The Yugoslavs view the engine coproduction decision as a key indicator of the extent to which we take them seriously as an independent state, and our relations with them would be harmed severely if we demonstrated a lack of trust.

Our technology transfer concerns can be satisfied through the agreed-upon safeguards. In addition, these engines have already been released for coproduction in Israel and Sweden, and French and British competitors have already indicated a willingness to provide the same or greater technology than we. It is therefore in our strategic interest in the Balkans to proceed with this project. We believe it is important that we, rather than West European competitors, be in a position to influence the flow of technology to the Yugoslavs. On the understanding that the White House is comfortable with this decision, we intend to issue the initial export licenses soon to ensure we do not lose out to the British or French.

CIA Director Casey agrees with the Department’s risk analysis, but Secretary Weinberger continues to express reservations. The Secretary has discussed this case with him on several occasions and believes that his concerns have been adequately dealt with. However, we wish to draw this difference of opinion to your attention before he proceeds.

Nicholas Platt4
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, Lot 92 D 52, ES Sensitive, March 1–6 1985. Secret. Copies were sent to Weinberger and Casey. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “3/9 delivered via WH courier per S/S—cdb.”↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. See Document 219.↩
 
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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe - Office of the Historian

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225. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1​

6384.
Belgrade, August 7, 1984, 1059Z

SUBJECT​

  • US-Yugoslav Military Cooperation: Need for a New Look?

REF​

  • State 228562.2
1. S—Entire text.

2. I arrived in Yugoslavia three years ago under the clear impression that I was to bolster the bilateral military relationship in accordance with the President’s June 1, 1981 memorandum to Secretary Weinburger. In my view, the rationale in that memorandum is as valid today as it was then, namely: “This administration views a militarily capable Yugoslavia as a key element in preventing Soviet expansionism and hegemony in southern Europe.” The memorandum cites as a central element of the administration’s policy one of arms transfer to Yugoslavia and “to be forthcoming in approving sales of arms and equipment required for Yugoslav defensive needs as circumstances warrant.”3

3. These words ring hollow in the light of recent experience. Despite promising statements of readiness for military cooperation from the President, Vice President and Secretary Weinburger in the past year or so, the USG has failed to provide one major system sought by the Yugoslav military in recent years.4 All of the earlier significant deliveries (Mavericks and Mark–44 Torpedoes date back to 1978 and 1981). The engine for the next Yugoslav-built fighter is an issue that has dragged on for almost two years with no positive result in sight. The Hughes and Johnson license requirements for ECM/EW and command and control systems are encountering further delays in Washington. The request for the Harpoon has been turned down flat. I am asked, in explaining the latter position, to inform the Yugoslavs that their primary threat comes from the land not the sea (see State 228562). That sort of condescension smacks of arrogance if not total incomprehension of just what sort of country we are dealing with. The Yugoslavs have a long and proud military tradition and hardly need us to tell them whence comes the threat.

4. I have no problem going to the Defense Secretary to explain the turndowns and delays. I am paid to do that in the best way I professionally can. But he will ask, with some justification, just why we so painfully negotiated the recently signed GSMIA if nothing the Yugoslavs ask for is forthcoming.5 He will also ask about the status of other requests for equipment. My present instincts tell me that none of these will be approved for release either.

5. I am not arguing here that we should try to meet every Yugoslav wish. On the contrary, there are bound to be items that we simply cannot release to them and we should tell them so frankly. But the stalling, foot-dragging approach we have adopted (viz. the aircraft engines and licenses for ECM/EW systems) are causing the Yugoslavs to question the value of the bilateral relationship in the military field. Secretary Mamula told me on his return from the U.S. in May that he was now waiting for concrete signs of cooperation from our side. The Yugoslav CNO (Admiral Vilovic) made the same point to me in Split two weeks ago. Both expressed disappointment that the military relationship seemed to be lagging and indeed deteriorating from earlier years. Judging by State 228562 and other signs of U.S. negativism in the military cooperation area, I conclude these Yugoslav military leaders are reading the tea leaves correctly.

6. This brings me to the final point. We have Yugoslavia’s excellent record of not/not transferring sensitive technology to the East; we have the GSOMIA; we have fairly regular high-level military exchanges; we have our Joint Military Committee—but what is all of this producing besides fine words and promises for the future? Is it not perhaps time to face the fact that words are fairly empty, the promises largely unfulfilled and the military relationship assuming an ever smaller place in the scheme of US-Yugoslav relations? I wonder whether we should not make this minimalist position clear at the next JMC meeting and save a lot of frustration and disappointment among our Yugoslav friends and allow them to go on about procuring their equipment from other more reliable sources, either the Soviets or from Western countries.

7. I am not at this time recommending this position for the next JMC meeting, for it seems to me to run directly counter to our geo-strategic interests in this part of the world. However, I do consider that it is high time for the USG to review its position on military cooperation with Yugoslavia and hopefully bring it into line with reality.6 Based on my experience here in recent years, I do not believe that the position adopted by those who are charged with implementing the President’s policy accurately represents that laid down in his 1981 memorandum.7

8. In the meantime, my staff will try to produce some ideas for a positive agenda for the JMC meeting. Hopefully, they will be able to come up with some alternative systems, equipment and material to those requested by the Yugoslavs. However, I repeat that we should also be considering how best to emerge from a JMC meeting with an acceptable military relationship that keeps our overall bilateral relations with the GOY from being seriously harmed. At this point, I confess to being stumped, given the recent indications from Washington that nothing of any sensitivity can be released to the Yugoslavs. I only ask myself, where will they be and what will they do if and when we count on them to defend their independence in an East-West crunch? They certainly will not be equipped with modern U.S. weaponry: of that I am sure.

9. Action requested. Washington agencies’ reactions to this message.10.Please pass White House for Ambassador Matlock and Admiral Murphy.

Anderson
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Steve Rosen File, Subject File, Technology Transfer—Yugoslavia. Secret; Priority; Nodis.↩
  2. Telegram 228562 to Belgrade, August 3, dealt with Yugoslav concerns about license requirements and the sale of Harpoon missiles. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840494–0533)↩
  3. An unknown hand drew a line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.↩
  4. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the words “the USG has failed” to the end.↩
  5. An unknown hand drew a line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.↩
  6. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word “for” to the end.↩
  7. An unknown hand drew a line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.↩
 

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe - Office of the Historian

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205. Telegram From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan1​

86970.
December 4, 1982, 2007Z

SUBJECT​

  • My Visit to Yugoslavia.
1. (S) I have just concluded a 24 hour visit to Yugoslavia, during which I found the Yugoslavs to be very warm and gracious and obviously pleased to have me visit. I might add that they are also an intensely patriotic group, very frank in their dealings, and deeply proud of their neutral, non-aligned status. They were also extremely adaptable as weather prevented us landing at Belgrade as planned, and we diverted to the coastal city of Dubrovnic on the Adriatic Sea. I met with my counterpart, Admiral Mamula, and his key staff, laid a wreath at the tomb and memorial of former President Tito in Belgrade, and concluded my visit with a one hour meeting with President Petar Stambolic. He was very grateful for your letter2 and expressed great satisfaction at its content. The general substance of our conversations and discussions in Yugoslavia follow.

2. (S) Political: Yugoslavia is deeply committed to its neutral and non-aligned status. While they are acutely aware that some of their policies will not coincide at all times with ours, they are nevertheless appreciative that we are willing to accept Yugoslavia in the non-aligned role. They have great hopes for a settlement of the Middle East crisis and appear appreciative of your Mid-East initiative3 and the efforts of Phil Habib. They indicated that Yassir Arafat, President Mubarak, Mengistu and Quaddafi had all been to Belgrade in the recent past and seemed hopeful that elements of our Mid-East proposal and the Fez proposals could be brought together into a proposal that both sides could accept. They indicated that Libya and Ethiopia wanted better relations with the United States. President Stambolic indicated that during his recent visit to Moscow for the Brezhnev funeral, he had met with Andropov to reiterate the basis of Yugoslavian-Soviet relations—complete independence and non-alignment. He did not characterize the response if indeed there was one from Andropov. On several occaions he characterized Yugoslav-U.S. relations as having been on an upward trend since the war, with only a few “oscillations.”

3. (S) Economic: President Stambolic went into some detail regarding their economic condition, which he termed serious. He was quick to point out, however, that the leaders and people of Yugoslavia had charted a course for the next several years to get their fiscal house in order by themselves. The people had just taken a ten percent reduction in their standard of living, rationing of petrol and electricity was obvious in the city, and their banking institutions were undergoing some changes to make them more efficient. He was particularly pleased with the help of the United States and other Western banks and again referred to the content of your letter as being the hand of friendship and understanding. Admiral Mamula spent some time discussing reciprocal trade balances between the United States and Yugoslavia. Although most of the imbalance was in the military area, he made a general plea for the United States and the West to buy additional goods from his country. They are obviously proud of their industrial capability and the sophistication they have achieved.

4. (S) Security/Military: It is obvious the Yugoslavs want to end their dependence on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact for their military equipment and munitions. They want to increase activity between our two countries in this area and are aware of our concerns regarding safeguarding our military technology, a concern which we reemphasized repeatedly. They assured us several times that the threat to Yugoslavia was from the east and north and not from the west. Whatever technology the United States provided would be closely held, and they expressed their willingness to enter into whatever kind of terms or agreement which would satisfy our concerns. They realized there would be some technology we simply would not be able to provide, and they would accept a straightforward “no” on those technologies we considered to be highly sensitive. They asked us to assist them in building a new supersonic fighter, realizing it would be several years (early 1990s) before they could afford to do so. But planning had to begin soon on the general size, performance and capability of such an aircraft. They also stated their interest (in fact Admiral Mamula told me “they had decided to buy—we have made our decision”) in purchasing the Northrop F–5G2 aircraft as the first step in modernizing their air force. They have never purchased an aircraft from the United States and made it very clear that Soviet equipment is the least desirable for Yugoslavia. They have formally requested briefings from the manufacturer of the F–5G2 at our earliest convenience and will thereafter submit a request for the first twenty (20) F–5G2, if we can work out the details. We agreed in principle to permit the sale of this aircraft, subject to adequate technology safeguards and suitable financing arrangements. I believe it likely that Yugoslavia may well ask for information regarding Foreign Military Sales credits.

5. (C) Finally, I believe this was a significant visit in that it came at a critical time when Yugoslavia is attempting to overcome its economic difficulties, is gearing up for what promises to be a tough belt-tightening period, and is in need of strong support, both morally and materially in the years ahead. The Embassy will be following up with a more detailed report and analysis of the visit. I was assured, however, by both our Ambassador (who is doing an extremely effective job and is very well liked and respected), and by Admiral Mamula that they felt the visit had gone exceptionally well and had been most useful.

Cap Weinberger
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Department of Defense (10/29/1982–12/05/1982). Secret. Sent for information to Clark, Shultz, and Carlucci. Sent while Weinberger was aboard a Special Air Mission. Poindexter wrote in the upper right hand corner of the telegram, “W[illiam] C[lark] said in Pres’ wkly report. JP.” A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on December 4 at 9:30 p.m.↩
  2. See Document 204.↩
  3. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. II, pp. 1093–1097; and Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.↩
 

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