P&W TF30 for Orao II of Yugoslavia in 1978

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A memorandum of conversation between US and Yugoslavian defence ministers in 1978 show that Yugoslavia was interested in producing P&W TF30 for its Orao II.

Is there any artist impression of this Orao II powered by a TF30?

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v20/d258

Ljubicic , with a serious expression‎, said that Yugoslavia would not use such equipment to conduct reconnaissance against these countries. He then said that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from the Middle East, Soviet efforts would be more intense in areas around Yugoslavia. He suggested that already the Soviets somehow were behind Bulgarian actions that irritate Yugoslavia.

Brown said that Yugoslavia’s military needs were recognized and asked about the status of the eval‎uation of the TF–30 engine for possible use in the Yugoslav Eagle aircraft. Ljubicic recited the history of the Yugoslav request for a high technology engine (but gave no hint on the progress or possible outcome of the eval‎uation). He said that Yugoslav experts should come to the US as part of the eval‎uation, because, if the engine were selected, the US and Yugoslavia would need to enter into large-scale cooperation. In response to a question from Brown on the type of cooperation he had in mind, Ljubicic said, if the TF–30 suits their needs, they would like to build it. They would purchase several engines, and then buy the license and documentation to permit production in Yugoslavia with US assistance. Brown , in questioning further whether the Yugoslavs were suggesting that they produce the entire engine themselves, explained that some components were difficult to make and that there were difficulties with US policy. He said there were many components which the US would consider for Yugoslav manufacture and that assembly and testing of the engine could be considered. He explained that even these possibilities would require careful review in the USG and an exception to policy which only the President could grant. Brown asked that Ljubicic put together the specifics of their request for consideration by the USG.

Ljubicic asked if the group from Yugoslavia could have all the data on the engine, whether anything is secret. Brown said all information would be made available. (Senior Defense Security Assistance Agency representatives explained later to General Popovic and Major Stankovic, the assistant attache who deals with FMS, that requests for information beyond the limits of the present export licenses must be submitted to the Department of State for USG consideration, but that the answers would be given as quickly as possible.)

Brown said the USG would have to see how many components could be manufactured in Yugoslavia. He said that turbine blades were very difficult to make. Ljubicic said that the Yugoslavs were making turbine blades with the British, who are satisfied with Yugoslav practices. Ljubicic said that entering into arrangements for production of the Orao II aircraft—not just the engine—would open up a big field and produce a significant increase in bilateral cooperation. Brown did not answer this point, but noted that the group of Yugoslav aircraft engine experts was to arrive soon and that he wanted to press forward for the present with that aspect of the TF–30 question.
 
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