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Original spec DH121 vs B727

PMN1

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Both Derek Woods' 'Project Cancelled' and Richard Payne's 'Stuck on the Drawing Board' describe how BEA's insistence that the original spec for the DH121 be scaled down to what became the Trident cost it massive sales (and the sales figures do suggest that to be the case), but how many of those B727 sales could the DH121 have hoped to secure had it been built to the original spec.

Both authors mention visits by each company to the others facilities and Derek Woods says that de Havilland showed the Boeing people everything while Boeing not surprisingly showed the de Havilland people little or nothing.

Is there any evidence to suggest the visit to de Havilland helped Boeing?
 

LowObservable

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A couple of points...
Boeing changed the 727 design relatively late in the game (after the Feb 1960 visit to de Havilland) with more sweep and no Tu-style landing gear pods, and proceeded to make intensive efforts to combine high speed (a hallmark of the Trident from the word go) with low landing speeds.
Boeing considered a tie-up with deH on a 727/Trident (now that WOULD have changed history) but the two companies could not agree. Until quite late, too, the leading engine candidate for the 727 was an Allison-built RR Medway.
But it was the wing design and the complex high-lift system (not without its handling quirks - the 727 had the low-speed grace of a Steinway) that made the 727 what it was.
 

alertken

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This is even more iffy than most of your (fun) counter-factuals. Airco (DH/Fairey/Hunting) was doomed by death of Blue Streak, which forced the DH Enterprise into a distress sale. Engines to BSEL, (modest)GW and declining airframe volume to HSAL, who ejected the cuckoos to keep 100% of a (presumed) large BEAC order, and redefined it because the flush customer is always right. His Spec. met a unique operation: capacity-constrained cartel (first flight of the day LHR-Paris: BEAC; 2nd, AF; 3rd, BEAC...and on, revenue pooled, and so for most routes). Why would HSAL/RR tell the gifthorse he did not know his own business? Mouth, shut; hand, outstretched.

Loss of LH hurt DH.121; loss of TAA/Ansett killed it. v 727-100 would a Medway/121 have won either fight? Not on engineering quality alone (NB:for non-Brits here: a Brit conceit was that we had more couth than agri-Boeing). DH/HSAL would need to match the total Offer: B.377 had sold poorly because of high cost, low care (free-flight propellors). LH now had on 707-400/720B a Product Support regime imposed by Pan Am when launching 707-100. That served LH better than BAC was doing on Viscount, so presumably better than HSAL would on 121. TAA/Ansett would have talked to Qantas: J.Gunn,High Corridors,1988,QUP has a piece on Brit efforts to sell Britannia, where QF had despaired that Bristol would ever spell r-e-s-p-o-n-s-e. Why would Hatfield be better?
 

PMN1

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LowObservable said:
Boeing considered a tie-up with deH on a 727/Trident (now that WOULD have changed history) but the two companies could not agree. Until quite late, too, the leading engine candidate for the 727 was an Allison-built RR Medway.

What were the diasgrements on a joint programme - workshare?

What happened to push the Allison built Medway out?
 

alertken

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What happened to push the Allison built Medway out? Pratt invented JT8D.
 

PMN1

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If the original spec DH121 had been proceeded with and the Medway used, where does that leave the Spey Buccaneer and Phantom?
 

TinWing

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alertken said:
What happened to push the Allison built Medway out? Pratt invented JT8D.

It is worth noting that military funding of the JT8/J52 gave P&W an advantage in developing the JT8D.

In comparision, each and every military application for the Medway was cancelled, starting with the infamous 1957 defence review, which caused Rolls Royce to mothball the entire Medway program until the early 60s, when it was again revived for the HS.681, only to be cancelled again.
 

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Re: Original specification DH121 Trident versus B727-100......

Dear Boys and Girls, here is a nice advert in French for the Boeing 727-100 (stating 250 aircraft delivered & 500 ordered); it comes from the 15th September 1966 issue of Aviation Magazine International......

I wonder if such adverts made the De Havilland/Hawker-Siddeley Trident sales/management team......

Cry?
Cringe?
Hang their heads in shame?
Sulk?
Resign and go to work for Boeing?

Does any one out there know exactly how many Tridents had been delivered (I count 30) and ordered by September 1966? Were they even still actively trying to sell the aircraft worldwide by that date?

Terry (Caravellarella)
 

alertken

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The (ex-DH, by then) HSAL civil team had been awarded 15 Trident 2E for BEAC in August,1965 and was desultorily trying to peddle it elsewhere, burdened by noises from BEAC that they would rather have anything made-in-Seattle. In November,1965 HSAL had been funded by UK Govt. to scheme (to be) HBN-100, where they tried to present to Breguet and Nord that civil marketing was a proven Hatfield skill. Around about September,1966, HSAL started the process of scheming Trident 3B that led to 26 being ordered for, though unwanted by, BEAC in July,1968. A factor in UK Govt. denying BEAC the 727-200ADV they sought was that China, very happy with its V.843 Viscounts, was showing interest in buying Trident precisely because it was not made-in-US, so was not subject to political fuss.

The conventional wisdom is that BEAC destroyed DH121 by shrinking it from Medway-size to Spey-size. The option of course was open to HSAL to build what they perceived the rest of the world might want...but they lacked the gumption. The lesson was learned by the Airbus Industrie marketing team (in that 1970s inter-regnum where HSAL was a mere supplier): you will recall that the penetration of Eastern, who thought they wanted a few seat-rows less than A300B4, was done by deferring part of the purchase price, to be conditional on achieved load factors.

UK Aero was risk-averse, commercially, despite being paid by Govt. 50% of project R&D expense. Wet. Hang head in shame.
 

JFC Fuller

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UK Aero was risk-averse, commercially, despite being paid by Govt. 50% of project R&D expense.

I think that is at least part of what made them risk-averse, the nice world of government interfering (subsidising, not to mention creating) in BEA/BOAC and the airline industry created what they falsely perceived to be a captive market- Brabazon had done everything to give them that impression. Even if it had been captive it is difficult to see it being big enough to sustain a fully independent British industry. In addition the airlines did not play ball, and if we are honest the quality of the aerospace industries products compared to their competition was sometimes questionable, rather justifying the position of the airlines.

Many have blamed the government for not prodding BOAC/BEA hard enough, others for underinvesting in the industry. In reality the government poured cash into the UK Aerospace industry, including into some pretty bad decisions, but often at the behest of industry. Brabazon, Rotodyne and Concorde all stick out as particularly bad examples post war (though lets not forget the airship folly in the late 20s). They also prodded BEA/BOAC reasonably hard, they just got fed up.

What should government have done? Never built the whole rotten edifice in the first place.
 

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sealordlawrence said:
In reality the government poured cash into the UK Aerospace industry, including into some pretty bad decisions, but often at the behest of industry. Brabazon, Rotodyne and Concorde all stick out as particularly bad examples post war (though lets not forget the airship folly in the late 20s). They also prodded BEA/BOAC reasonably hard, they just got fed up.

Which programs would you have funded instead?
 

JFC Fuller

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Ideally, none of them. The problem, and this was the point of my post, was that excessive government intervention created an entirely artificial ecosystem that was utterly unsustainable and ultimately suffocated itself.
 

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sealordlawrence said:
Ideally, none of them. The problem, and this was the point of my post, was that excessive government intervention created an entirely artificial ecosystem that was utterly unsustainable and ultimately suffocated itself.

Buy American all the way, you mean? And on BEA/BOAC, government policy and oversight in that area was generally poor, IMO. Look at the VC-10 subsidy fiasco for example.
 

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Grey Havoc said:
Buy American all the way, you mean? And on BEA/BOAC, government policy and oversight in that area was generally poor, IMO. Look at the VC-10 subsidy fiasco for example.

I am afraid you still dont understand me, maybe I was unclear. The UK govt should not have subsidised either the airlines or the aerospace industry. Instead they should have competed on their own merit, should have been forced to take their own corporate risks without the implicit financial backing of the state. Boeing was successful because it took risks, but sensible calculated risks based on market feedback, it took those risks because it knew it had to make money of its own back. DH121 is just one example of the UK civilian aerospace industry failing to grasp the nettle, add to that the Super VC-10 (scaled down at BOAC request), and VC7 (killed when BOAC lost interest), all could have been developed by the manfacturers and pushed on the export market if the firms had been prepared to take the risk. They were not. BOAC/BEA were given too much power through their subsidised status so could make such ridiculous demands rather than being forced to buy from the free market.

The very fact that people remark that the alternative was
Buy American all the way, you mean?
rather than making the suggestion that perhaps Vickers or DeHavilland (Or Avro, which never manages to produce a creible large airliner product) should have been in a position where they could compete with Boeing in the US market (and internationally) underscores the depressing underambition that has infected British industry since before WW2.

And let us not forget the complicity of the electorate who contunually voted for this self destroying economic model and went on strike for additional goodies whenever they felt like it.
 

Nick Sumner

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sealordlawrence said:
The UK govt should not have subsidised either the airlines or the aerospace industry. Instead they should have competed on their own merit, should have been forced to take their own corporate risks without the implicit financial backing of the state. Boeing was successful because it took risks, but sensible calculated risks based on market feedback, it took those risks because it knew it had to make money of its own back.

Not to be all contradictory but that's not the whole story. Boeing was effectively subsidised by large US government orders for military aircraft throughout the 40s 50s and 60s (despite this the 747 still came close to bankrupting them) plus they had shed loads of capital built up by charging market rates for WW2 weaponry where UK manufacturers were forced into 'cost plus' during 39-45 which essentially meant price by govt fiat. Any profits left over were then mostly clawed back by the UK govt in taxes. The UK aircraft industry emerged from WW2 with no capital and worn out plant. In these circumstances government subsidy was essential to survival.

Most of the world's most profitable manufacturing industries have government subsidy or subsidy like practices (protection) behind their success somewhere along the way. The UK govt were forced by the US to give up its restrictive practices (Imperial Preference) at Bretton Woods while the Americans hung on to theirs (Tarriffs). Free Trade only favours excellence if everyone does it. The UK govt could have done the same as everyone else. Make a lot of noise about free trade while finding every way possible to restrict penetration of home markets by foreign goods the way the Japanese and Koreans did (and do). Our British notions of honourable behaviour are an impediment in business.
 

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Nick Sumner said:
Most of the world's most profitable manufacturing industries have government subsidy or subsidy like practices (protection) behind their success somewhere along the way. The UK govt were forced by the US to give up its restrictive practices (Imperial Preference) at Bretton Woods while the Americans hung on to theirs (Tarriffs). Free Trade only favours excellence if everyone does it. The UK govt could have done the same as everyone else. Make a lot of noise about free trade while finding every way possible to restrict penetration of home markets by foreign goods the way the Japanese and Koreans did (and do). Our British notions of honourable behaviour are an impediment in business.

True enough.
 

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Nick Sumner said:
Not to be all contradictory but that's not the whole story. Boeing was effectively subsidised by large US government orders for military aircraft throughout the 40s 50s and 60s (despite this the 747 still came close to bankrupting them) plus they had shed loads of capital built up by charging market rates for WW2 weaponry where UK manufacturers were forced into 'cost plus' during 39-45 which essentially meant price by govt fiat. Any profits left over were then mostly clawed back by the UK govt in taxes. The UK aircraft industry emerged from WW2 with no capital and worn out plant. In these circumstances government subsidy was essential to survival.

Most of the world's most profitable manufacturing industries have government subsidy or subsidy like practices (protection) behind their success somewhere along the way. The UK govt were forced by the US to give up its restrictive practices (Imperial Preference) at Bretton Woods while the Americans hung on to theirs (Tarriffs). Free Trade only favours excellence if everyone does it. The UK govt could have done the same as everyone else. Make a lot of noise about free trade while finding every way possible to restrict penetration of home markets by foreign goods the way the Japanese and Koreans did (and do). Our British notions of honourable behaviour are an impediment in business.

No it was not, industry can raise capital from multiple places, that is the point of capital markets not to mention the stock market. US DoD was just another customer, it was certainly not a subsidy. Boeing had to compete ruthlessly with the rest of US industry for those orders. That the 747 nearly bankrupted them is demonstrative of the risks they were prepared to take that UK industry was not.

As for the UK being honourable? Perhaps you should ask Tanzania how they are getting on with that radar? Or ask the Saudi's why they acquired so many Tornadoes?
 

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NS:your #16, ameriphobe, emphasises the wrong things. US had their own form of Armaments Profits Duty/Excess Profits Tax. Much Federal Aid, of course - Boeing's move to Renton, a USN Plant first managed by North American Aviation; expansion of little Stearman at Wichita; Bell's management of Marietta for B-29, then transferred to Lockheed: all Federally funded, all "sold" much later to the incumbent tenant on favourable terms....just like the ditto-likewise of much/most UK plant. Clearly Boeing was able to shrug off the market failure of Stratocruiser, clearly the risk of Model 80, becoming 707, leading to 727, was cushioned by 888(K)C-97/820(K)C-135/744 B-52/1,373 B-47. But...

Vickers-Armstrongs sold 107 Valiants, built apace; that permitted risk investment...but they chose Viscount Major because BEAC liked the underfloor freight bonus, so viola! a launch order for props just as Caravelle emerged (French Govt. funded). They could have chosen to tell BOAC they were wrong to reject VC7 and to put their ample money where their mouth was (Edwards: the worst blunder..)
HSAL cascaded Hunters, Javelins, Sea Hawks, and courageously ploughed some of that contribution into a civil project...but chose Argosy, Dart-power because RR would not pick up installation R&D for a Tyne variant.
DH cascaded Venoms, Fairey, Gannets, Hunting,(Jet) Provosts, encouraging them to collaborate on scheming DH.121.New DH owner HSAL was only interested in a firm launch order, so bye-bye risk-sharing partners, hello shrunk ship tailored to cartel Euro-routes.

Every word from SLL is so. And, BTW, a goodly chunk of payments for all above UK 1950s' production (bar Provosts) was from US.
 

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Frankly Vickers were the worst offenders, having managed to build and sell over 400 Viscounts, 107 Valiants (nearly 115) not to mention the Scimitars and Swifts that came out of the Supermarine house they failed to show the initiative to push ahead with the VC-7 or VC-11 and DB265, and bowed to BEA/BOAC on the Vanguard, VC-10 and Super VC-10.
 

Nick Sumner

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I say again I don't want to get all contradictory, I'm not disagreeing with you, but SLL I think there are a couple of issues that you may be under emphasising. I certainly agree that British industrial management was poor in comparison to management in many of the worlds other industrialised nations I agree that many of the U.K.'s industrial wounds have been self inflicted. But that isn't the whole story.

sealordlawrence said:
industry can raise capital from multiple places, that is the point of capital markets not to mention the stock market. US DoD was just another customer, it was certainly not a subsidy.

The phrase I was so careful to use was 'subsidy like practices' and I used it in the context of the Bretton Woods agreement which was a lever used by the US to demolish the British method of protection which was Imperial Preference while ensuring the favoured American method of protection - tariffs - continued. The British had to agree, we owed America far too much money to argue. (Barnett Lost Victory, Youngson Britain's Economic Growth 1906 to 1966)

As to the raising of capital, you are of course right, but the first place any business tends to look for capital is its home markets which in the case of Britain were wrecked by the war. Hence the overreliance on the poisoned teat of government subsidy. This was true of capital markets just about everywhere, except in America, but if you're an American venture capitalist with a mind to invest in aerospace why would you go abroad? So it's back to the poisoned teat for the UK aircraft industry which made it hard to tell BOAC and BEA how an aircraft should be configured to get exports.

sealordlawrence said:
Boeing had to compete ruthlessly with the rest of US industry for those orders. That the 747 nearly bankrupted them is demonstrative of the risks they were prepared to take that UK industry was not.

But the point I was trying to make is that they had the advantage of strong demand in their home market. They had strong demand because they had a strong economy. Britain did not. Also - you know why the 747 has that funny upper deck cockpit arrangement don't you?

sealordlawrence said:
As for the UK being honourable? Perhaps you should ask Tanzania how they are getting on with that radar? Or ask the Saudi's why they acquired so many Tornadoes?

I fear I have no idea about Tanzanian radar or Saudi Arabian Tornadoes. Are they perhaps related to Canadian submarines? If so then all I can say is never mistake incompetence for malice.
 

Nick Sumner

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alertken said:
NS:your #16, ameriphobe,

I certainly did not wish to come across as 'Ameriphobe', but there is no denying the US plays hardball when it comes to business and during the 40s and 50s the UK was not in a position to play hardball back.
 

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sealordlawrence said:
The phrase I was so careful to use was 'subsidy like practices' and I used it in the context of the Bretton Woods agreement which was a lever used by the US to demolish the British method of protection which was Imperial Preference while ensuring the favoured American method of protection - tariffs - continued. The British had to agree, we owed America far too much money to argue. (Barnett Lost Victory, Youngson Britain's Economic Growth 1906 to 1966)

If you choose to believe that argument, and as you point out it has been made by some, then you must also accept that a great many in Britain were will participants. The commitment to Imperial Preference was always tenuous and Parliament and industry, had as many people against it as in favour. The empire was more a product of economic dominance than it was the reason and imperial preference was a reaction to the early stages of economic decline rather than the reason for prosperity. And let us not forget the informal empire which was if anything a greater contributor than the actual. UK economic dominance was the product of technological and business prowess, not of protectionism.

As to the raising of capital, you are of course right, but the first place any business tends to look for capital is its home markets which in the case of Britain were wrecked by the war. Hence the overreliance on the poisoned teat of government subsidy. This was true of capital markets just about everywhere, except in America, but if you're an American venture capitalist with a mind to invest in aerospace why would you go abroad? So it's back to the poisoned teat for the UK aircraft industry which made it hard to tell BOAC and BEA how an aircraft should be configured to get exports.

As ken pointed out, UK companies had plenty of cash and could have deployed it as they chose (Vickers as a perfect example). But let us not forget that interventionism had infected UK economic thinking well before the war. Take the Royal Mail Steam Packet company affair as a case in point, or the abortion that was the Imperial Air Ship company. Post war policy was in many respects a continuance of pre-war policy.

sealordlawrence said:
Boeing had to compete ruthlessly with the rest of US industry for those orders. That the 747 nearly bankrupted them is demonstrative of the risks they were prepared to take that UK industry was not.

But the point I was trying to make is that they had the advantage of strong demand in their home market. They had strong demand because they had a strong economy. Britain did not. Also - you know why the 747 has that funny upper deck cockpit arrangement don't you?

Advantage is not the same as subsidy and that advantage I have already pointed out in this thread.

I fear I have no idea about Tanzanian radar or Saudi Arabian Tornadoes. Are they perhaps related to Canadian submarines? If so then all I can say is never mistake incompetence for malice.

Neither can be confused for incompetence and both were the product of malice.
 

Nick Sumner

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SLL - I'm not disagreeing with your salient points (sorry if I've given that impression), I'm simply trying to add a little context to a subject that I think defies easy explanation. It's always useful, when considering errors, to not merely identify the errors but find out why they were made.
sealordlawrence said:
If you choose to believe that argument, and as you point out it has been made by some, then you must also accept that a great many in Britain were will participants. The commitment to Imperial Preference was always tenuous and Parliament and industry, had as many people against it as in favour. The empire was more a product of economic dominance than it was the reason and imperial preference was a reaction to the early stages of economic decline rather than the reason for prosperity. And let us not forget the informal empire which was if anything a greater contributor than the actual. UK economic dominance was the product of technological and business prowess, not of protectionism.

I don't think there is an argument to be had. I'll say it again, Free Trade only works if everyone is playing by the same rules. At Bretton Woods the US stripped Britain of its methods of protection while retaining its own. This meant a sharp US advantage in the terms of trade and is just a matter of historical record.

As ken pointed out, UK companies had plenty of cash and could have deployed it as they chose (Vickers as a perfect example).

No offence but from where was this 'plenty of cash' coming? Not from 115 Valiants and penny packets of Swifts and Scimitars! The industry had to do as govt said because it wasn't making any money and aircraft development is an expensive business. The govt paid the piper, the govt called the tune. The tune was the wrong tune.

But let us not forget that interventionism had infected UK economic thinking well before the war. Take the Royal Mail Steam Packet company affair as a case in point, or the abortion that was the Imperial Air Ship company. Post war policy was in many respects a continuance of pre-war policy.
I quite agree, but why was interventionism attractive? Necessary even? Because the UK economy was too weak to compete effectively.
Advantage is not the same as subsidy

Well on the balance books they can have much the same effect. The Japanese car industry did not reach its current global dominance without protection from foreign penetration of its home market. I'm not saying Japanese cars aren't good, what I'm saying is, is that isn't the whole story of their success.

The main point I am trying to make in all this is that Britain's fundamental problem was the weakness of the economy which forced error after error, often through underfunding. The failures of the aircraft industry and other sectors of manufacturing (heck most of the UK's difficulties from 1939 to the middle 80s) come down to the fact that the UK was cash strapped. Governments tried to make up for the absence of money with cleverness of one sort or another - it didn't work.

For the aircraft industry this meant reliance on government, which stripped incentive, but incentive had already been part stripped by the wars, by over taxation and was compounded by cancellations and meddling. The way the aircraft industry had to function in the circumstances of WW2 (doing exactly what the government told them and not getting paid for it) was a direct cause (I do not say the only cause) of the malaise of the post war aircarft industry.

Neither can be confused for incompetence and both were the product of malice.
Forgive me but I know nothing about either the Tornadoes or the radar - care to share?
 

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Hi

Excuse me dipping in, here but I do not agree with Nick's premise.

" I'll say it again, Free Trade only works if everyone is playing by the same rules"

If US taxpayers want to/get told to pay taxes to benefit US companies, and the result is that British consumers get a product cheaper, Free Trade is still working. The problem is where one country has some tariff or subsidy and the government of another, at the behest of directly interested parties in the country - plane and engine manufacturers, in this example - respond in kind, citing (their own definitions of )need, fair play or patriotism, in support The US and British interested parties do fine, but flying ends up costing more.

The less tinkering there is by Government and interested parties, the better.

Will
 

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Nick Sumner said:
I don't think there is an argument to be had. I'll say it again, Free Trade only works if everyone is playing by the same rules. At Bretton Woods the US stripped Britain of its methods of protection while retaining its own. This meant a sharp US advantage in the terms of trade and is just a matter of historical record.

There is absolutely an argument to be had, all protectionism is not equal. Multiple UK firms found ways of operating in the US, take the EE Canberra licensed through Martin, the 1-11 was purchased by American Airlines, the Viscount by United etc. And the US is really just a distraction, the UK aerospace industry lost out across the globe, often after failing to push ahead with aircraft that airlines had already said they would buy.

No offence but from where was this 'plenty of cash' coming? Not from 115 Valiants and penny packets of Swifts and Scimitars! The industry had to do as govt said because it wasn't making any money and aircraft development is an expensive business. The govt paid the piper, the govt called the tune. The tune was the wrong tune.

And 400 Viscounts. ken has already more than covered less, UK industry, whilst not in as advantageous postion as US industry at the end of the war was well placed to capitalise on the relatively new facilities it had acquired, its design experience and and the cash it had left over from war contracts.

I quite agree, but why was interventionism attractive? Necessary even? Because the UK economy was too weak to compete effectively
.

It was not necessary and was an exercise in misplaced prestige, unless you think government creating a nationalised airship company from scratch is necessary.

Well on the balance books they can have much the same effect. The Japanese car industry did not reach its current global dominance without protection from foreign penetration of its home market. I'm not saying Japanese cars aren't good, what I'm saying is, is that isn't the whole story of their success.

No it does not, Boeing had to fight for its DoD contracts, the DoD was just another customer and Boeing was not gifted anything, unlike British industry which had government funding for virtually all of its civil aviation projects.

The main point I am trying to make in all this is that Britain's fundamental problem was the weakness of the economy which forced error after error, often through underfunding. The failures of the aircraft industry and other sectors of manufacturing (heck most of the UK's difficulties from 1939 to the middle 80s) come down to the fact that the UK was cash strapped. Governments tried to make up for the absence of money with cleverness of one sort or another - it didn't work.

The economies weakness was a contributing factor, the companies themselves however were the main culprits being under-ambitious, risk averse and making themselves dependent on government funding. The UK was not that cash strapped, it through money at civil aviation projects all the way through to airbus. You will have a hard time finding a UK civil aviation project that did not get funds from the Government.

For the aircraft industry this meant reliance on government, which stripped incentive, but incentive had already been part stripped by the wars, by over taxation and was compounded by cancellations and meddling. The way the aircraft industry had to function in the circumstances of WW2 (doing exactly what the government told them and not getting paid for it) was a direct cause (I do not say the only cause) of the malaise of the post war aircarft industry.

Government only meddled because industry failed and then begged for money, the industry killed itself, trying to blame government for industry mistakes, especially when one sees the sums of money ploughed into it is pathetic. As for the cancellations, in most cases the companies lost very little, the R&D costs were paid by the state and compensation was frequently provided. So again, why did Vickers not push ahead with the VC-7? or the VC-11? Why did DH bow to BEA on the DH121? Because they were unwilling to take the risks that Boeing took with the 747 and that is why they failed.

Forgive me but I know nothing about either the Tornadoes or the radar - care to share?

I suggest you google BAE Al Yamamah and BAE Tanzania air traffic control system.
 

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alertken said:
And, BTW, a goodly chunk of payments for all above UK 1950s' production (bar Provosts) was from US.

If I remember correctly, most of that money was conditional on large amounts of US sourced content (e.g. avionics, engines) being included in orders. Especially MAP related funds, although most of those were reserved for US built aircraft and systems.
 

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SLL I do hope you are enjoying this discussion as much as I, I really don't mean to be argumentative but you've given me much food for thought. So it is all your own fault. ;)

sealordlawrence said:
There is absolutely an argument to be had, all protectionism is not equal. Multiple UK firms found ways of operating in the US, take the EE Canberra licensed through Martin, the 1-11 was purchased by American Airlines, the Viscount by United etc. And the US is really just a distraction, the UK aerospace industry lost out across the globe, often after failing to push ahead with aircraft that airlines had already said they would buy.

The US a distraction? The wealthiest and most powerful economy in the world a distraction? No it was a market that had to be entered. The UK aircraft industry as never going to make enough money off of UK and commonwealth orders to fund the vast costs of developing new products.

UK industry, whilst not in as advantageous postion as US industry at the end of the war was well placed to capitalise on the relatively new facilities it had acquired, its design experience and the cash it had left over from war contracts.

Forgive me, but this is so enormous an understatement that I just cannot let it go. The British aircraft industry at the end of the Second World War was hampered by

1. Issues with infrastructure (Britain's transport network was in adequate before the war and was damaged by the war, Britain's telephone system was archaic and inadequate - these are serious business issues.)

2. Issues with plant (many factories were damaged and most machine tools worn out)

3. Issues with the workforce. (People were knackered by six years of war, rationing, blackouts and politicians were promising them New Jerusalem, stripping incentives to work and compounding the cynicism that grew up between the wars that undermined ordinary people's faith in the British system which in turn led to the rise of militant trade unionism.)

4. Desperate undercapitalisation - cash left over from war contracts? There wasn't any. The government enforced cost plus at 7% at the beginning of the war then ratcheted it downwards as much as possible and confiscated any profits with massive taxation. Britain devoted as much as 55% of all economic output to the prosecution of the Second World War. This was the largest figure achieved by any of the democracies - in the United States the proportion of economic output devoted toward war never rose above 40%. Furthermore, the massive loans given to Britain by the United States were spent building homes and funding social services. The promise that won Clement Attlee the 1945 election effectively stripped British industry of the investment it needed.

The one thing the British industry had going for it was the fact that it built some of the best aircraft in the world. But this disguised the fact that investment was desperately needed to maintain that advantage. The money was there. It went on New Jerusalem.

The economies weakness was a contributing factor, the companies themselves however were the main culprits being under-ambitious, risk averse and making themselves dependent on government funding. The UK was not that cash strapped, it through money at civil aviation projects all the way through to airbus. You will have a hard time finding a UK civil aviation project that did not get funds from the Government.

No I'm sorry, you are understating again, the weakness of the economy rules the entire scenario. Boeing had the great good fortune to operate in a country that was economically strong, that was significantly richer in every way imaginable than every other country in the world and could thus afford to retain its economic edge through technological prowess. Boeing and the rest of the American aircraft manufacturers had new plant (a lot of which was paid for by the British in another of those little ironies) good infrastructure and most important of all a government with wads of money and the willingness to spend it on aerospace projects. The American government even did their industry the favour of destroying most of the war production (at the industry's request) so that they could continue to buy new aircraft!

These were advantages the British industry could only dream of!

Government only meddled because industry failed and then begged for money, the industry killed itself, trying to blame government for industry mistakes, especially when one sees the sums of money ploughed into it is pathetic. As for the cancellations, in most cases the companies lost very little, the R&D costs were paid by the state and compensation was frequently provided. So again, why did Vickers not push ahead with the VC-7? or the VC-11? Why did DH bow to BEA on the DH121? Because they were unwilling to take the risks that Boeing took with the 747 and that is why they failed.

DH bowed to BEA on the 121 because they were the customer.

The UK government built the entire notion of government and industry as a partnership during World War II. Lord Beaverbrook ran MAP as a fiefdom, he tolerated no dissent and destroyed all opposition. This was one of the factors that stripped the initiative from the management of the UK aircraft manufacturing firms. It seems unfair to then blame the industry for the government's failure to continue the leadership role that they had taken. Government policies made many UK industries sclerotic by turning them into government clients - and before you say it, yes I agree that that was a bad idea - but I'm not aware of any moment when the government relinquished the role and said 'Right, you lot have to stand on your own two feet now.' to the industry. I'm not sure that would even have been possible given the fact that the government was the industry's chief client.

Of course the rise of cynicism in British society that was directly caused by perceptions of World War I was also a significant factor before the 2nd World War. But if we look at Britain's industrial performance, both in terms of the quality of the products it produced and the scale of production it undertook during World War II it is hard not to see it as being a good performance. I'm not saying that the British industrial performance in World War II was without difficulties and mistakes - but in comparison with everyone else's and considering the difficulties under which it worked the performance is surprisingly good IMHO.

You also cannot let the government off the hook for their role in destroying design teams. Time and again projects were pursued and bought close to fruition only to be cancelled. The effect this must have had on highly motivated staff was devastating. They quit the industry or they went abroad, further weakening the industry. Yes it cost heaps of money - but there was never enough money. The government never put in enough, it wanted an aircraft industry on the cheap (it had to have that) but that was never going to work.

Please note I'm not saying the UK industry was not responsible for many of its own problems - it absolutely was. There is a truism that is attached to civil aircraft disasters - 'It takes more than one thing to kill a plane' and it usually does. When a civil aircraft goes down there are usually several factors that have caused the accident. Similarly there were many factors that caused the collapse of the British aircraft industry. Poor management was certainly one of them. (And the same can be said to be true of both the vehicle and shipbuilding industries) but it was not the only one. Poor government must also shoulder some of the blame.
 

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Nick Sumner said:
The US a distraction? The wealthiest and most powerful economy in the world a distraction? No it was a market that had to be entered. The UK aircraft industry as never going to make enough money off of UK and commonwealth orders to fund the vast costs of developing new products

And? There is also the rest of the world, the commonwealth, Continental Europe, Asia etc. The US is not the only market in the world.

Forgive me, but this is so enormous an understatement that I just cannot let it go. The British aircraft industry at the end of the Second World War was hampered by

1. Issues with infrastructure (Britain's transport network was in adequate before the war and was damaged by the war, Britain's telephone system was archaic and inadequate - these are serious business issues.)

2. Issues with plant (many factories were damaged and most machine tools worn out)

3. Issues with the workforce. (People were knackered by six years of war, rationing, blackouts and politicians were promising them New Jerusalem, stripping incentives to work and compounding the cynicism that grew up between the wars that undermined ordinary people's faith in the British system which in turn led to the rise of militant trade unionism.)

4. Desperate undercapitalisation - cash left over from war contracts? There wasn't any. The government enforced cost plus at 7% at the beginning of the war then ratcheted it downwards as much as possible and confiscated any profits with massive taxation. Britain devoted as much as 55% of all economic output to the prosecution of the Second World War. This was the largest figure achieved by any of the democracies - in the United States the proportion of economic output devoted toward war never rose above 40%. Furthermore, the massive loans given to Britain by the United States were spent building homes and funding social services. The promise that won Clement Attlee the 1945 election effectively stripped British industry of the investment it needed.

Nonsense, there had been massive investment in plant just prior to the war and during, as ken pointed out most of this made its way back to industry on favourable terms. The transport network and wider infrastructure were entirely adequate- take a look at Germany in 1945 and then what its manufacturers achieved in the decades afterwards. And the companies had plenty of cash.

The one thing the British industry had going for it was the fact that it built some of the best aircraft in the world. But this disguised the fact that investment was desperately needed to maintain that advantage. The money was there. It went on New Jerusalem.

hahahahahaha, it likes to think it did, that is not the same thing. I suggest you read Gordon Store's description of the Avro Tudor.

No I'm sorry, you are understating again, the weakness of the economy rules the entire scenario. Boeing had the great good fortune to operate in a country that was economically strong, that was significantly richer in every way imaginable than every other country in the world and could thus afford to retain its economic edge through technological prowess. Boeing and the rest of the American aircraft manufacturers had new plant (a lot of which was paid for by the British in another of those little ironies) good infrastructure and most important of all a government with wads of money and the willingness to spend it on aerospace projects. The American government even did their industry the favour of destroying most of the war production (at the industry's request) so that they could continue to buy new aircraft!

Nonsense, UK industry was given every opportunity to compete and it never managed it because its products were poor and its companies lacked the courage to aggressively pursue a global market. The UK ended WW2 with what was in some areas the most advanced aerospace industry in the world equipped with modern plant and with plenty of capital and then that very industry destroyed itself. And you ignore the fact that virtually every UK civil aviation programme got dollops of public money. The idea of poverty is a myth.

DH bowed to BEA on the 121 because they were the customer.

Wrong, BEA was A customer. There were plenty more airlines in the world that needed planes and DH should have built to the wider market, not a single customer.

The UK government built the entire notion of government and industry as a partnership during World War II. Lord Beaverbrook ran MAP as a fiefdom, he tolerated no dissent and destroyed all opposition. This was one of the factors that stripped the initiative from the management of the UK aircraft manufacturing firms. It seems unfair to then blame the industry for the government's failure to continue the leadership role that they had taken. Government policies made many UK industries sclerotic by turning them into government clients - and before you say it, yes I agree that that was a bad idea - but I'm not aware of any moment when the government relinquished the role and said 'Right, you lot have to stand on your own two feet now.' to the industry. I'm not sure that would even have been possible given the fact that the government was the industry's chief client.

Please remember the difference between total war and peace time. Post war industry should have lead itself and found new clients, and it did not, unlike US industry which managed just that.

You also cannot let the government off the hook for their role in destroying design teams. Time and again projects were pursued and bought close to fruition only to be cancelled. The effect this must have had on highly motivated staff was devastating. They quit the industry or they went abroad, further weakening the industry. Yes it cost heaps of money - but there was never enough money. The government never put in enough, it wanted an aircraft industry on the cheap (it had to have that) but that was never going to work.

Yes you can, government is just another customer, it is the role if industry to serve the customer not the role of the customer to serve the industry. And you are conflating the military and civilian market. Industry should have pursued the civilian market on its own. If government made a mistake it was setting up the Brabazon commission and then ploughing money into the industry time and time again. In short, the Civil Aviation Act 1949 should never have become law.
 

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GH #27: US sourced content in $-Aided purchases.

Stalin, as 1947 became 1948, gave us all cause to worry. 3/4/48: US European Economic Recovery Act (Marshall Aid). Corelli Barnett has UK spending much of its share on Virginia tobacco, whereas W.Germany initiated its Wirtschaftswunder. Stalin's response was the Berlin Blockade. US then did NATO (4/4/49) and the Mutual Defense Aid Act, 6/10/49 (US/UK Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, 27/1/50). Stalin then did Korea, 25/6/50. US, 10/10/51, wound residual ERP, other Aid, and MDAP into the Mutual Security Act, extended 6/52 to cover (US payment for) recipients' "end-items". That covered Dassault Mystere IV (which is why a bunch of them were disposed of 1980s from (USAF base) RAF Sculthorpe) and the raft of UK types alluded to by me. Raw materials for all these things were priority-co-ordinated in NATO Committees; the US Acts paid for sheet metal, vendor items (such as AI radar - very pleased we were to receive them: Mark Nos. of {Sea} Venoms, Meteors, Javelins distinguish US:UK fit), for data exchange, and for end items. Certain UK types were nominated to be NATO-Standard, and MSP paid, for example, for Belgian, Dutch and Danish Hunters, French and Danish NF Meteors. UK MSP lapsed in 1954; in 1955 under US' Mutual Weapons Development Program funds flowed for i.a NATO's mud-mover (to be Bristol Orpheus/FIAT-Dornier G.91); for RN's nuclear strike type (to be Buccaneer S.1); for...for...

NS, #22: US hardball.

Oh, yes. UK PM Macmillan: a factor in his chopping BAC Blue Water SSM was that UK would be unable to spread its R&D over export sales, because US urged Sperry MGM-29A Sergeant SSM to “the tune of umpteen Mn.$”; UK declined “not a European rocket. It’s a racket of US industry.” Blue Water was: “a better weapon (but paper; pressure for Sergeant) was irresistible (on) favourable terms more common (for) washing machines (forcing) us to cancel at considerable loss.” Memoirs/VI,P335.
 

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It has been fascinating watching the evolution of the debate on why the UK aircraft industry died in the literature between the industry's view ('We made good products the government messed everything up') and the governments view ('We supported the industry all we could, they produced a load of rubbish it's all their fault'). I guess it was Project Cancelled that started it all off with an opening salvo for the industry view. Once again, there is merit in both views - the truth lies between the two poles.

sealordlawrence said:
And? There is also the rest of the world, the commonwealth, Continental Europe, Asia etc. The US is not the only market in the world.

1945 - 55 the US was the only market not wrecked and undergoing painful recovery therefore the only one able to afford high tech such as modern aircraft.
there had been massive investment in plant just prior to the war and during, as ken pointed out most of this made its way back to industry on favourable terms. The transport network and wider infrastructure were entirely adequate - take a look at Germany in 1945 and then what its manufacturers achieved in the decades afterwards. And the companies had plenty of cash.

The plant had been running 24/7 with minimum maintenance for six years - it was trashed. Transport and infrastructure in the UK was wholly inadequate Corelli Barnett - The Lost Victory Chapter 14 - the notes to that chapter run 102 different references most from Cabinet papers decrying the lamentable state of UK roads, rail and telecommunications in the 45-55 era.

One of the keys to German success was that in terms of infrastructure it was a blank slate. Everything industrial was destroyed so they had to order new machine tools, new factories, new plant. People were grateful to have a job and there was no burden of defence or social services so wages and taxes stayed low and capital could go where it could build industry. The German government were not so stupid as to try and run an enormous welfare state and a vastly expensive world role (including helping pay for German defence as the UK did) off the back of a shattered economy.

hahahahahaha, it likes to think it did, that is not the same thing. I suggest you read Gordon Store's description of the Avro Tudor.
Nonsense, UK industry was given every opportunity to compete and it never managed it because its products were poor and its companies lacked the courage to aggressively pursue a global market. The UK ended WW2 with what was in some areas the most advanced aerospace industry in the world equipped with modern plant and with plenty of capital and then that very industry destroyed itself. And you ignore the fact that virtually every UK civil aviation programme got dollops of public money. The idea of poverty is a myth.

Yes, it has often been pointed out that the UK industry in the 40s and 50s produced flocks of failed designs, the Avro Tudor was but one. What is usually missed is that ALL the aircraft manufacturing countries 1940-1970 produced flocks of turkeys and precious few decent aircraft. The difference is we Brits do so love to wallow in our failures so the UK literature concentrates on the bad UK aircraft and ignores everyone else's bad aircraft

This is the great canard of the 'The government was blameless' point of view and it is built on the notion that any aircraft industry using 40s, 50s and 60s technology and development practices could produce only successful designs. It is quite possible that in the UK the industry let the government think this was possible to secure funding but even the most cursory examination of the evidence shows how optimistic a view this was.

Lets look at the German case, why were they still building He111s and Do217s at the end of the war? Because the two huge and vastly expensive programs designed to replace them (Bomber A - He177 and Bomber B - FW191, Ju288, Do317 et al) were complete failures. Yes a few He 177s were used operationally but they were death traps with constant engine fires.

German fighters - Ta 154? What a joke, Ta152, Me262? - only usable in the straightened circumstances of the end of the war where the Luftwaffe was in essence fighting from next to its factories so the laughable TBOs of the two types didn't matter. Imagine if the Luftwaffe had still been fighting on the Steppes of Russia or in North Africa - how would their servicability rates have looked? Pretty sick. Me163 - too fast and unmanouverable for the pilots to draw a bead on their targets. Me 210 - completely useless till the Hungarians re-designed it as the Me 410, Do335, incredibly fast but they couldn't cure the snaking and porpoising at high speed making it unusable in combat.

Too narrow a sample? What about the Americans?

How many truly first rate fighters did the US industry produced in WW2 without British help or a long and difficult teething period?

What of bombers? With the exception of the B17 and B25 which ones didn't have problem riddled service entries? The B24 was always a death trap even after it had been in squadron service for years, the B26 wasn't called the widow maker for nothing, the B29 took years to cure its engine fire problem and its defensive armament never worked properly.

But it didn't stop at WW2 - lets look at 1945-70

XP79- A flying ram? What were they thinking?
XP81 - Complete failure - lousy performance.
XP83 - Unable to perform its designed role.
F84H - Made people pass out and puke (I kid you not) AND had crap performance.
XF85 - A lethally stupid idea abandoned after 7 flights.
XP87 - So bad the XP89 was considered better.
XP89 - Pilots never knew whether the wings would fall off before the engines exploded or after.
XF88 - Complete failure, too slow, too thirsty
F94 - Underarmed, poor rate of climb, lousy engines, radar didn't work - ordered in quantity because there wasn't anything else.
F104 - so long and troublesome a development period that the USAF eventually walked away. Lockheed then bribed lots of European air forces to take it where it killed pilots in truly spectacular numbers.
XFV1 - An unworkable idea that logged only 23 flying hours before cancellation.
XF2Y - Abandoned because it was underpowered and prone to dangerous vibrations at takeoff and landing.
FJ1 - Abandoned due to poor performance.
F3H - Many crashes and many fatalities before the thing was fit for service and then it was too slow.
F4D - Ordered in '47, didn't get to the squadrons till '56 because it took that long to cure its problems.
F6U - Underpowered and laterally unstable.
F7U - 300 built, 25% lot in accidents, killed 24 pilots.
XFV12 - Built from spare parts and turned out to be rubbish.
And that's just the fighters...

So if you want to brand the UK industry as prone to failures - go right ahead, I won't deny it. Just don't be forgetting that everyone else's aircraft industry was too - so parading the UK design failures as evidence of the inferiority of the UK industry just doesn't wash.

Please remember the difference between total war and peace time. Post war industry should have lead itself and found new clients, and it did not, unlike US industry which managed just that.

I state again, US industry had significant advantages over British industry.

Yes you can, government is just another customer, it is the role if industry to serve the customer not the role of the customer to serve the industry. And you are conflating the military and civilian market. Industry should have pursued the civilian market on its own.

I say again, the government had already stripped the UK industry of its initiative and then having arrogated a leadership role failed to provide good leadership.

I also hardly need point out the crossover in the civil and military markets and the fact that whether the customer was BOAC or the RAF, UK aircraft purchases were still mostly funded by government money. MAP in WW2 led the industry by the nose, its successor continued the policy but there was never enough money to do the job it wanted done properly. This was a direct result of the UKs penury which was caused principally by government spending money on New Jerusalem projects not re - capitalising industry. This was not only true in the aircraft industry.

My own view is that both parties had a hand in the death of the UK aircraft industry, each has tried to absolve itself and blame the other, both are to some degree culpable, but as you will already have gathered I feel government was more culpable than the industry because the fundamental problems were

1. Poor government leadership of industry from 1945 to present.
2. A lack of money in the economy itself which I view to be the fault of various governments of all political persuasions from 1926 until the late 70s.
3. When the government had some money they spent it on 'New Jerusalem' panacea projects instead of rebuilding a wrecked economy.

SLL - I guess that we are not going to agree so I shall simply say it has been enjoyable and all the best to you!
 

Caravellarella

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Dear Boys and Girls; to get right back on topic;

The two major advantages that the Boeing 727 had over the original Airco DH-121 Trident (or even the production HS-121 Trident) were design for excellent field performance and design for a more capacious underfloor cargo/luggage capacity......

Terry (Caravellarella)
 

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British industry was not 'free' to move in the way US industry was.

Ultimately thats a product of WWII, and Labour not removing controls afterwards, even when the Tories won and there was the 'bonfire of controls' the remaining controls were still a problem.

The critical example is that of the movement of skilled labour, which was regulated and had to be approved by the government. It was not a simple matter for engineer A to leave company X for company Y.

So UK industry was hampered by its own government as much as anything to do with finances, or private sector decisions or even US practices.

If memory serves UK was spending rather more than 5% of GDP on defence in the 1950s.

Then there is this endemic business of doing the UK down. It was present then and is clearly very present now as it has been throughout the last 50 years or so. As surely as the concept of the grass being greener over there, feeds into this self denigration.
 

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NS #28: Desperate undercapitalisation. (Writing this as a former military procurer...)
What a hiding-to-nothing faces Public Procurers: Ministers require (us) to buy as best for the taxpayer (= cheapest+quickest+best), whilst not bankrupting Suppliers, so unemploying taxpayer-voters. Where contract outturn shows high profit...bad; where the firm expires, broke...bad.

Re-Armament, mid-1935-March,1938: (Aero and other munitions) firms came to the capital/equity markets. Treasury agreed "Capital Clause Indemnity": if Peace should emerge and outstanding orders were cancelled, firms' unamortised investment in plant would be settled as cash.

Anschluss, April,1938: "compulsion": civil activity stopped - Morris moved into light tanks, much other auto into Aero shadow work. Industry now evident prime target. Risk finance ceased, the State paid for, pretty much, everything. (Initially, Armaments Profits Duty, then from 9/41:) Excess Profits Tax took 80% of the excess of 7.5% on shareholders’ funds. It was a most complex process, trying hard to hold to pre-War rates of return: Ministers hoped, and broadly succeeded, to avoid fat cat profiteering while soldiers and their Blitzed families died. The factory worforce, in Reserved Occupations, did very well, thanks, and it's incomprehensible to our outlook today, that one, able and fit, brother earned £5 p.week and danced with the girls on Saturday night, while his brother watched his shilling a day mount up, while languishing, skeletal, in a PoW camp.

The basic approach to contract pricing was...not to waste too much penmanship: "men" had better things to do, with a War on. All R&D must, by definition, be on actual booked cost, plus formula profit: if the work could be measured in advance...it would not be research. Initial production batches were on actual booked costs, from which a primitive process of Task/Standard/Piecework was agreed to cover later batches (the phrase "learning curve" not then used, but that idea). All, then subsumed into audit of total yield on firm's capital: clawback of "excess".

To secure supplies of (largely US) rationed, prioritised material, most types as might have a peaceful market were covered by RAF Specs. (I can only think of COA Concordia, Percival Merganser that were not). R&D "counted" to MAP account, paid directly, monthly, or indirectly, in admissible overhead on other contracted jobs.

All back to normal in Victory, so, e.g COA, Miles, others, died.

But then began the $ cascade. There is scarcely a currently active site in W.European (or Japanese) Aero that was not tooled up by US, 1949-55. Much Airbus fabrication is still off residual, maybe tired, Cincinnati machinery put in on a Korean War ticket. Thanks, Uncle Sam.

zen: #36: UK indeed >10% Defence:GDP during Korea. But that is SLL's (and my) point: vast, fat cascades of what Chomsky derides as welfare for the military-industrial complex.

Not down-doing: but trying to defeat the notion that we wuz robbed. Contemplate Ministers' dismay when Swift and Hunter fell out of the sky after displacing (free) Sabres; when Deterrent Valiant's NBS could not find the Zone airfields we had just vacated; when BOAC wailed to roll Stratocruisers over for DC-7C, disinterested in, well anyBrit, really. F-27 (from a post-War upstart, who learnt his trade on licenced Meteors) thrashed HP heavyhouse's Herald because: “the pilot feels he is exercising some skill if he taxies (smoothly...cockpit is) tolerably comfortable for relatively short flights” Flight Intnl.23 December,98, obituary, as last operator ChanEx replaced it with...F-27.
 

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Dear alertken, here is a taste of what you mentioned in another topic......

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,12670.msg126820.html#msg126820

alertken said:
(Not moaning, but thanking you). The timing was that 24xAirco DH.121 (to be Trident 1) were ordered for BEAC, 1/3/58. DH was taken over by HS Group, 17/12/59. Blue Streak IRBM was chopped 13/4/60 and neither I, nor anyone, knows whether the due diligence in the deal detected that. MoA at that point told Ministers they guessed total project cost as >£600Mn., great glurpings of which were to pass through DH: that, not parts of some Tridents, comprised the asset attractive to HSGroup. HS dismantled Airco as soon as they acquired DH, so that all DH.121 business could stay within HSAL. Fairey went into Westland, 2/5/60, Hunting into BAC 9/60. BAC1-11 was launched by BUA, 9/5/61 and you have shown us how it evolved from H.107. I just had never seen a link, H.107: Airco.

Terry: all these Brits moaning about 727 "stealing" Trident's layout: can you scan a Sud Avn. advert in the 1958-59 period, when all these Avro 771, Bristol 200, 107, 121, VC10, VC11 were being puffed. It showed a small boy looking at a magazine, holding a model of a certain Toulouse product. The ad simply said "Oh! Ils ont copies Caravelle!"

I've found lots of material bemoaning imitations of Sud Aviation's Caravelle, but I haven't posted them here as the tone can seem jingoistic (in a French way) and maybe too France-centric for everyone's taste here......

I'm of the the opinion that the Sud Caravelle is the most wonderful and beautiful man-made object ever created; but that's just me ;D

Here is an artist's impression of the revised, smaller DH-121 Trident from the 8th October 1960 issue of Les Ailes......

Terry (Caravellarella)
 

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alertken

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Caravelle is the most wonderful and beautiful...that is an entirely sane position. Additionally, in business terms it was significant: a complex technology was made operable by "normal" air/ground teams. Sud and their vendors learnt about Illustrated Parts Catalogs, Structural Repair Manuals...and suchlike. This type's 3rd. operators inhabited some very challenging environments.

Do try to find that ad: it's not jingoistic, it's funny...and true. The true truth is that France did not "own" Caravelle any more than UK "owned" Comet, or Boeing "owned" Dash 80 becoming 707/720/727. From Gottingen aerofoil sections, to HP slots (owing much to the well-known Brit, Gustav Lachmann)...and on and on, technology diffuses and is "owned" by all with eyes to see and wit to apply. It's boring metallurgy, weird machine tools, that pace techno-change. Ohain and/or Whittle could do nothing about reaction thrust (didn't da Vinci get there first?) until forgemasters and puddlers worked out how to stop combustion chambers melting.
 

Caravellarella

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alertken said:
Caravelle is the most wonderful and beautiful...that is an entirely sane position. Additionally, in business terms it was significant: a complex technology was made operable by "normal" air/ground teams. Sud and their vendors learnt about Illustrated Parts Catalogs, Structural Repair Manuals...and suchlike. This type's 3rd. operators inhabited some very challenging environments.

We're SO off-topic that I fear for my sanity, but I must add that I have 1 volume of a Caravelle manual :)

alertken said:
Do try to find that ad: it's not jingoistic, it's funny...and true. The true truth is that France did not "own" Caravelle any more than UK "owned" Comet, or Boeing "owned" Dash 80 becoming 707/720/727. From Gottingen aerofoil sections, to HP slots (owing much to the well-known Brit, Gustav Lachmann)...and on and on, technology diffuses and is "owned" by all with eyes to see and wit to apply. It's boring metallurgy, weird machine tools, that pace techno-change. Ohain and/or Whittle could do nothing about reaction thrust (didn't da Vinci get there first?) until forgemasters and puddlers worked out how to stop combustion chambers melting.

I'll try to find it for you alertken, but I'll put it in a new topic if I do.

All best, Terry (Caravellarella)
 

Caravellarella

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Dear Boys and Girls, in an effort to get back on topic; here is an extensive article in French about the De Havilland DH-121 Trident which BEA had ordered on 12th August 1959 (24 plus 12 options)......

The article comes from the 26th September 1959 issue of Les Ailes......

Terry (Caravellarella)
 

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Stargazer2006

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index.php


"A copy of our Caravelle?" Not really.

I hereby wish to emphasize that the French word "réplique" does NOT necessarily imply the notion of copy. It must be understood in this context as a "counterpart", rather, or even better, a "reply", a "response".
 

Caravellarella

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Stargazer2006 said:
index.php


"A copy of our Caravelle?" Not really.

I hereby wish to emphasize that the French word "réplique" does NOT necessarily imply the notion of copy. It must be understood in this context as a "counterpart", rather, or even better, a "reply", a "response".

and it wouldn't have been necessary (the Trident) if BEA had been allowed to buy the Caravelle :eek:

Terry (Caravellarella)
 

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