New START Treaty

[bobbymike]

From Aviation Week

Obama, Medvedev Agree on Start Terms - Mar 26, 2010

By Michael Bruno michael_bruno@aviationweek.com
WASHINGTON

The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) that the Russian and U.S. Presidents agreed to early March 26 still allows for U.S. development of conventional Prompt Global Strike capability, does not disrupt the strategic triad, and does not impinge on missile defenses, top U.S. national security leaders declare.

Indeed, the follow-on Start deal, to be signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in Prague on April 8, may well underpin and promote Obama’s Aegis-based Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to European missile defense, the officials indicated at a White House press conference.

“We think there still is a broad opportunity to not only engage the Russians, but hopefully make them a participant in a European-wide defense capability,” U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said. The PAA actually boosts the potential integration of Russian radars, and this Start regime elevates bilateral verification, transparency and mutual understanding.

“There are no constraints on missile defense,” echoed Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

According to a White House statement and the officials’ statements, the new regime would run 10 years and cut existing arsenals of deployed strategic warheads by almost a third from the levels set by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As expected, aggregate arsenals will be capped at 1,550 warheads within seven years, with each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counting as one warhead toward this limit.
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Now let's try and keep any comments on the strategic and not political merits, or lack thereof, of the treaty.

 

[Austin]

Its true that “There are no constraints on missile defense" but in the same breath there are no constrains in developing qualitatively better offensive system for Russia.

All in all this is one step forward and two step back with some cosmetic change in numbers to please anti-nuclear lobby , the heart and mind is still the same

 

[sferrin]

Its true that “There are no constraints on missile defense" but in the same breath there are no constrains in developing qualitatively better offensive system for Russia.

That's no different than the SALT and START treaties. Neither prohibited further development.

 

[bobbymike]

Well my concern is if there were any "nudge nudge wink wink" outside the treaty agreements like let's not include missile defense or prompt global strike because we aren't going to develop them further anyways.

So far the poll results surprise me considering the deterrent effects of having a large, robust Triad and the lack of any superpower or "great power" conflicts since the inception of nuclear weapons. How soon we forget maybe my next poll should be asking who would sign the Kellogg Briand Pact signed in 1929 that outlawed war. How'd that work out for the world.

 

[sferrin]

Well my concern is if there were any "nudge nudge wink wink" outside the treaty agreements like let's not include missile defense or prompt global strike because we aren't going to develop them further anyways.

So far the poll results surprise me considering the deterrent effects of having a large, robust Triad and the lack of any superpower or "great power" conflicts since the inception of nuclear weapons. How soon we forget maybe my next poll should be asking who would sign the Kellogg Briand Pact signed in 1929 that outlawed war. How'd that work out for the world.

I voted with ya. If I say anymore I'm going to just piss people off so I'll leave it at that.

 

[bobbymike]

White House START fact sheet attached. As a strong proponent of our strategic deterrent forces even I would "maybe" have said that during the Cold War we had enough weapons to use the term overkill accurately mainly because we were only targeting the USSR and Warsaw Pact. Now the situation is different with weapons proliferating to some pretty scary countries. Arms control advocates have long been saying that the lower we go the rest of the world will either join us or the countries with nuclear ambitions will say "gee the US has no nukes so why should we build any?" I believe the exact opposite the lower we go the lower the bar to achieve nuclear "superpower" status.

Think of a high school football team challenging the New Orleans Saints, no competition. Now the Saints start taking players off the field at some point the high school team will determine that they can compete just as it will be eventually (with few players on the field) impossible for the Saint players now matter how good to cover the field anymore.

Here an interesting scenario - Under the 700/800 launcher limit, if the US's 12 Tridents could be targeted with, in theory 12 or say 24 warheads (yes this is theoretical) then Russia's remaining 1526 warheads could be targeted at the US's remaining 450, or less, Minuteman III's. Using the "two warhead each silo" scenario the Russians would have 626 warheads left for city busting or to target our conventional forces. If we assume a 90% success rate targeting the US will be left with 45 warheads vs 626 for the Russians.

I find this a dangerous development. There is no reason for the Senate to ratify this treaty. In fact I would at least increase the launcher limit to make a first strike impossible with only 1550 warheads (like 1550 launchers) Deterrence would be much more assured with those numbers. This would allow a larger ICBM fleet - with a new ICBM (single warhead (new warhead as well) but with upload capacity) - built into new super hardened silos making a one warhead per silo attack impossible for the foreseeable future despite improvements in missile accuracy. This program would also facilitate a renewal of the nuclear weapon infrastructure including delivery vehicles and all subsystems.

During the Cold War strategists talked about the danger of uncertainty. Well at these numbers if the Trident boats became vulnerable (maybe, maybe not but not an unthinkable proposition) the US would be totally uncertain whether any delivery vehicles could survive a first strike. Very dangerous.

Now if anyone says "The Russians are "kind of" our friend (or maybe more accurately not our enemy) why would they attack?" My response, "Then why are we still signing arms treaties with them or did I miss the negotiations with Britain and France."

 

[SOC]

Is there a limit to warheads per launcher in this one? I can't seem to find the complete text anywhere yet.

 

[shivering]

Something else to consider:

http://books.google.se/books?id=lN0w6X0PG3QC&lpg=PA1&ots=DxFF2iH8tz&dq=lightning%20bolts%20%20william%20yengst&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

MRVs are such pesky things....

 

[Austin]

New START treaty in numbers

New START Treaty deal reached

 

[sferrin]

Something else to consider:

http://books.google.se/books?id=lN0w6X0PG3QC&lpg=PA1&ots=DxFF2iH8tz&dq=lightning%20bolts%20%20william%20yengst&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

MRVs are such pesky things....

PAC-3 doesn't seem to care.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Now if anyone says "The Russians are "kind of" our friend (or maybe more accurately not our enemy) why would they attack?"

Russia and the US were allies (of a sort) in 1945. How long did *that* last? Who in 1930 would have believed that the Weimar Republic would turn into a force that could overrun Europe within a decade? Who would have believed in 1930 that in 15 years the US would occupy a good chunk of the entire planet? Who in, say, late 1800's Europe would have believed that by the middle of the 20th century the British empire would essentially collapse... or that the one global power that could have held on to global dominance would essentially give it all back? Who in 1985 would have believed that the US and Russia would be allies inside of ten years? Right after the end of Gulf War 1, who would have believed that Prsident Bush would not only lose the '92 elections, but get *spanked* but essentially an unknown? Who would have believed that a catsuit on the lamest of the Star Trek TV series would lead directly to the election of a "black liberation theologist" to the Presidency of the US?

History is replete with "Huh, I didn't see *that* coming."

 

[SOC]

Who would have believed that a catsuit on the lamest of the Star Trek TV series would lead directly to the election of a "black liberation theologist" to the Presidency of the US?

OK, you gotta explain that one!

 

[Orionblamblam]

Who would have believed that a catsuit on the lamest of the Star Trek TV series would lead directly to the election of a "black liberation theologist" to the Presidency of the US?

OK, you gotta explain that one!

Star Trek: Voyager premiered in 1995. There were a number of primary female characters:
Captain Janeway: irritating
Engineer Torres: Scary semi-Klingon chick
Kes: Supposedly cute, but since she was only four or so years old... not a sex symbol.
Kes:

After three years, Kes, who was not the draw for the pimply male demographic, is booted off the show and replaced with the catsuited Borg character Seven Of Nine. Seven's sole purpose was bucka-bucka-wow SEXSYMBOL. Seven:

Seven of Nine is played by actress Jeri Ryan, who prior to this was basically an unknown. The reason why her last name is Ryan was because she was married to Jack Ryan. The two divorced in 1999 for reasons left largely unexplored publicly, although stress from separation due to Jeri's work in Hollywood, CA on ST:V was claimed to have been a major part.

In 2003, Jack Ryan ran for an open US Senate seat from the state of Illinois on the Republican ticket. The two Ryans decided to allow the divorce records to be made public, but not the child custody records. Nevertheless, those records were also released by LA Superior Court Judge Robert Schnieder ("makin' copies"), showing that the reason why Jeri had wanted a divorce from Jack was because he wanted to do some, er, decidedly non-Traditional Family Values stuff with her in public venues. Admittedly, so did most Star Trek fanboys who saw her in that silver catsuit. Still, the release of this selacious info was enough to torpedo Jack Ryan's run for the Senate; his bid on the Republican ticket was taken up by noted nutjob and inevitable loser, Alan Keyes. Thus the election was won by another relative unknown, a twenty-year veteran of the Trinity United Church of Christ, an avowed "black liberation theology" institution. Given the complete disaster that was the Republican run for the Senate that year, the Democratic party didn't really need to try very hard, and the candidate was able to basically walk in on the promise of Hope, Change, charisma and a complete lack of any real knowledge of him by the public. He did essentially the same thing four years later in a run for a somewhat higher office.

 

[Orionblamblam]

There are two good lessons to be drawn from that:
1) If the selection of a space-elf only a few years old to be the sex symbol on a Star trek series can have massive and completely unpredictable long-term real-world consequences... then setting long-term national foreign policy based on the notion that the way things are Right Now are the way things are Going To Be is silly.
2) Jack. Dude. Yer married to Jeri Fricken' Ryan. You get to do the horizontal mambo with the hottest chick in Sci Fi EVAR. Be happy with that. Otherwise your libido can ruin not only your political career, but [fill in the blank] as well for decades to come.

 

[saintkatanalegacy]

I'm confused ???

 

[Orionblamblam]

I'm confused ???

Yeah, the threads of history will do that to a feller. Suggestion: watch the documentary series "Connections." It's awesome how seemingly unrelated things tie history together.

風　Swift as the wind
林　Quiet as the forest
火　Conquer like the fire
山　Steady as the mountain

Burma Shave

 

[saintkatanalegacy]

Burma Shave

*cough*

and back to our regular programming. . .

 

[Abraham Gubler]

American domestic politicking aside the most important issue in deployed ballistic missiles today is the lack of Russian replacement production capacity. Of course the Russians will sign a new START because they probably will have a huge shortfall in actual launchable missiles in the next decades unless there is an unprecedented cash and infrastructure injection into their missile building industry. Or they give up on Topol and go back to sticking warheads on top of the likes of Soyouz and Kosmos rockets. Signing the treaty enables them to degrade gracefully while perhaps getting a concession of two from America.

With hypersonics on the horizon and several capable and proven ballistic missiles for any emergency expansion the USA hardly needs to develop new ICBM capability.

 

[Orionblamblam]

With hypersonics on the horizon and several capable and proven ballistic missiles for any emergency expansion the USA hardly needs to develop new ICBM capability.

Arguably true, but we certainly need to develop new bomb capabilities. The existing stock is old. And while WWII era bombs worked just fine decades late, nukes degrade over time. Tritium has a half life. Electronics don't care for ionizing radiation and increased neutron flux.

The answer is clear: pull out of the atmospheric test ban treaty, and once a year - I suggest July 4 - a single nuke is set off in the desert. Done specifically for the purpose of testing old nukes and new ideas, a side benefit will be the tourism industry that should be set up around it. Build observation stands at the right distance and not downwind; hotels/motels, theme parks, etc.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Building new bombs and designing new bombs are not the same, so there is no need in the former for a live testing regime. Besides the USA maintains the inactive stockpile (as opposed to bang read operationally deployed and active stockpile weapons) in a state with limited life components removed (tritium, neutron generators, etc). As to nuclear tourism - while I’m sure it could work - who would underwrite it for insurance purposes?

 

[Orionblamblam]

Building new bombs and designing new bombs are not the same, so there is no need in the former for a live testing regime.

Hogwash. In both cases one needs to know if ones bombs will work as advertised. A bomb built in 2020 woul not be the same as one built in 1990; the electronics will be different, the materials will be different, the fissile material will almost certainly be somewhat different due to more advanced processing, etc.

As to nuclear tourism - while I’m sure it could work - who would underwrite it for insurance purposes?

Step 1: Invite the nations lawyers for a special viewing.
Step 2: Ooops.
Step 3: You may now proceed with a more rational, lawyer-free society.

 

[bobbymike]

American domestic politicking aside the most important issue in deployed ballistic missiles today is the lack of Russian replacement production capacity. Of course the Russians will sign a new START because they probably will have a huge shortfall in actual launchable missiles in the next decades unless there is an unprecedented cash and infrastructure injection into their missile building industry. Or they give up on Topol and go back to sticking warheads on top of the likes of Soyouz and Kosmos rockets. Signing the treaty enables them to degrade gracefully while perhaps getting a concession of two from America.

With hypersonics on the horizon and several capable and proven ballistic missiles for any emergency expansion the USA hardly needs to develop new ICBM capability.

To add to Orionblamblam's point you need a active industrial base to be able to pursue state of the art systems and insure next generation workers, the latter being equally important. Is we can't entice the next generation of weapons scientists with interesting work (yes building actual systems) good bye capability.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Ohh come on. Enough is known about nuclear weapons technology to have a pretty good indication it will work if you upgrade components. Of the 10,000 weapons in the US stockpile (as of 2007) only 600 were inactive anyway. The other 9,400 (including 5,700 in reserve) were all active and being maintained (LEP) despite all being at least 20 years old.

As to the workforce base is there actually a requirement to build new types of nuclear warheads in such a rapid timeframe as to require a fully functioning Cold War level capability? The Cold War stock was pretty thorough in its coverage of warhead types.

I understand a desire to have a more realistic appreciation of nuclear technology in the public’s mind and more jobs for the boys. But it is very much a strawman argument to make that the USA is facing some kind of nuclear black hole.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Ohh come on. Enough is known about nuclear weapons technology to have a pretty good indication it will work if you upgrade components.

You need to *quantify* how it'll work. Plus, if enough time goes by, materials knowledge can evaporate. See the Fogbank issue, already discussed here: http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,6409.0/highlight,nuclear+fog.html

Of the 10,000 weapons in the US stockpile (as of 2007) only 600 were inactive anyway. The other 9,400 (including 5,700 in reserve) were all active and being maintained (LEP) despite all being at least 20 years old.

And if it came time to set one off... how reliable would it be? What would happen to yield statistics?

As to the workforce base is there actually a requirement to build new types of nuclear warheads in such a rapid timeframe as to require a fully functioning Cold War level capability? The Cold War stock was pretty thorough in its coverage of warhead types.

Same can be said for fighters. Why build F-22's when F-4's were just so freakin' AWESOME?

But it is very much a strawman argument to make that the USA is facing some kind of nuclear black hole.

Any mechanism needs to be tested from time to time. The more complex it is, the more testing it'll need. If it's based on a type of physics that goes well beyond mechanical systems and chemistry, the more can go wrong with it in ways you might not understand.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Same can be said for fighters. Why build F-22's when F-4's were just so freakin' AWESOME?

Ohh come on Mk 2. A nuclear weapon is just a big bomb (Harry S Truman) it has one purpose: to produce energy. A strike fighter jet is a lot more complex in its role description and the interactions which determine its level of lethality and survivability.

While a 500 kiloton bomb built with 21st century design and technology may be a lot better than similar built with 1960s technology the effect on the nuclear battlefield is going to be the same (release of 500 kt). Since we don't have a deficit in deployment technology halving the weight of the 500 kt bomb isn't going to make much of a difference. This is all exacerbated by using nuclear fission/fusion to release energy and therefore providing a whole range of political limitations.

However the same can't be said for the difference between the F-4 and the F-35 (better example). The F-4 is going to be severely limited in what it can do and how it can survive compared to an F-35.

 

[sferrin]

And how many "whoops that didn't work like we thought" have there been? I seem to recall several types of warheads having to go back for redesign/rework after they'd been fielded in large numbers for years because of problems they hadn't forseen. How do you deal with that when your skilled work force has retired or died? When was the last time a new warhead was designed? How old were the people who designed it and are they still in the workforce? Without continued design work and testing eventually we'll be to the point where not a single individual in the workforce has ever designed a nuke that was actually confirmed to go bang. Would we do that with aircraft building? Turbine engines? Cars? Ships? Why not?

 

[bobbymike]

Oh oh Russian foreign ministry/media telling a different story on conventional prompt global strike:

From the Russian foreign ministry via the Voice of Russia:

The new START Treaty, to be signed shortly, for the first time sets limits on both nuclear and non-nuclear carriers. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, as he spoke on the 'TV Centr' Television channel on Saturday, that the provision restricting carriers with non-nuclear warheads was included in the Russian-American treaty because the United States has been producing such carriers in large quantities.
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I also find it interesting that the Indian foreign minister called his arsenal "weapons of peace" and talked about how nuclear weapons are important for global stability and asked that we be reminded about that lack of great power mass warfare since their inception. Interesting that he would have this perspective while the US only sees nukes as a danger.

 

[sferrin]

"has been producing such carriers in large quantities."

Nothing bigger than ATACMs. Must be for local consumption.

 

[bobbymike]

Or is he talking about conventional cruise missiles? Which still would not make sense because bombers are counted as one warhead/one carrier despite actual payload.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Or is he talking about conventional cruise missiles? Which still would not make sense because bombers are counted as one warhead/one carrier despite actual payload.

That's only one part of START 2010. It is to limit operationally deployed nuclear warheads (those weapons that are ready to be launched on missiles or bombs assigned to air wings) to 1,550 and the number of launching systems which includes ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear bombers but not the latter’s missiles to 800. So you could have 100 nuclear bombers and 700 ballistic missiles. If each ballistic missile has a single warhead you would then have 750 nuclear gravity bombs, cruise missiles, etc for launching from your 100 bombers.

 

[bobbymike]

My understanding of the treaty is that bombers are counted as one warhead. I think it was the Arms Control Association that brought up their concern that if the US's "nuclear capable" bomber force were fully outfitted the US could deploy up to 1725 warheads or some such number. Of course the Russian bombers are counted the same.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

My understanding of the treaty is that bombers are counted as one warhead. I think it was the Arms Control Association that brought up their concern that if the US's "nuclear capable" bomber force were fully outfitted the US could deploy up to 1725 warheads or some such number. Of course the Russian bombers are counted the same.

OK just to clarify it is 700 deployed launching systems (ICBM, SLBM, bombers) and 800 deployed and non deployed (so you can have 100 spare missiles).

From the White House press release:

1,550 deployed warheads, which is about 30% lower than the upper warhead limit of the Moscow Treaty;
800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; and
700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons.

Its pretty straight forward: 1,550 warheads and 700 major launchers. While a nuclear bomber is counted as a single launcher and a single warhead it can carry as many cruise missiles and gravity bombs as you want as long as the gross number of warheads does not exceed 1,550.

What this means is each bomber will be limited in the number of deployed warheads it can carry while the treaty is in effect. However since there is the active stockpile to draw upon if the treaty was to be abandoned those nulcear bombers could very quickly start to carry and deploy many more warheads.

 

[bobbymike]

Ok maybe I'm just dense but if a bomber counts as one launcher and one warhead but if you deploy say 10 cruise missiles on each it has to be under the 1550 limit? But if it only counts as one warhead regardless of how many missiles are on it then does it count as 10 or one?

Just came over from Armscontrolwonk's discussion and one person posted that the US could, in theory, in extremis , deploy 700 bombers with 20 cruise missiles under this treaty.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Ok maybe I'm just dense but if a bomber counts as one launcher and one warhead but if you deploy say 10 cruise missiles on each it has to be under the 1550 limit? But if it only counts as one warhead regardless of how many missiles are on it then does it count as 10 or one?

Just came over from Armscontrolwonk's discussion and one person posted that the US could, in theory, in extremis , deploy 700 bombers with 20 cruise missiles under this treaty.

Perhaps these are the magic words: there are two tallies: one for warheads and one for launchers. Each cruise missile with a nuclear warhead still counts as a nuclear warhead from your 1,550 total. However a cruise missile launched by a bomber does not count against your 700 launcher total. So NO you can't have 700 bombers each with 20 nuclear tipped cruise missiles because that would count as 14,700 warheads.

Grounding this in reality: The previous US nuclear weapons arsenal (SORT treaty level) includes:

450 Minuteman-III ICBM with 500 warheads. 400 with a single warhead and 50 with 2 MIRVs. There will be 200 W78 warheads and 300 W87 warheads.
12 operational Ohio-class submarines with another 2 in overhaul. Each has 24 Trident-II missiles with 4 MIRV warheads of the W76 and W88 warheads, that will be a total of 1152 warheads. There will be 384 W88 and 768 W76 warheads for submarines.
94 B-52 and 20 B-2 strategic bombers with 540 warheads of the AGM-86 and B61 and B83. There will be 528 nuclear AGM-86B cruise Missiles with 300 active and 228 in reserve. Along with the 528 ALCM there will be 120 B61-7, 20 B61-11 and 100 B83 nuclear bombs for the bomber fleet.

This is a total of 852 operational launchers and 48 in reserve. So a reduction of 152 from this total will have to be achieved (already 37 B-52s withdrawn from service). Also in deployed warheads there is 2,286 (counting each bomber as an additional warhead). So there will have to be a reduction of 736 from this tally.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Notional START 2010 compliant US nuclear force:

8 Ohio SSBNs each with 24 Trident II SLBM (plus four in refit and two more converted to SSGN) for 384 launchers and 96 in reserve
20 B-2 and 57 B-52s for 77 launchers
239 Minuteman III ICBM for 239 launchers

Each Trident II with two warheads (768)
Each Minuteman III with a single warhead (239)
266 ALCM
200 gravity bombs

This complies to the 700+100 launchers and 1,550 deployed warheads according to the treaty.

 

[bobbymike]

Thanks AG now I get it ;D It will be interesting to see what the NPR says and the US's launchers are deployed within the Triad. There are a growing numbers of senators in the "so called" ICBM Coalition, including powerful democrats. There is also the House's version called the long range strike caucus plus 41 senators (before the Scott Brown election so I assume 42 senators now) have already signed on to not ratifying the treaty unless a fully outlined and funded nuclear modernization.

A recent story from insidedefense.com say Obama hopes treaty ratification by December 2010. With the possibility of five to nine new Republican Senators (and probably conservative pro-defense ones) I don't think ratification will happen anytime soon.

 

[bobbymike]

From Ares Defense Technology Blog - Some pretty interesting people agree with my interpretation of the treaty.

Bombe Surprise
Posted by Bill Sweetman at 3/30/2010 5:41 AM CDT

The New START Treaty agreed on by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev - to be signed in Prague next month - leaves the door open to an increase in nuclear weapon numbers, arms control veteran Keith Payne noted on Monday at a forum hosted by the Brookings Institution.

Noting that long-range bombers are counted as a single weapon in the treaty - equivalent to a single missile warhead - National Institute for Public Policy President Payne asked: "Who has announced a requirement for a strategic bomber? Who is working on a long-range cruise missile?"

The answer in both cases is Russia, where Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reaffirmed a military requirement for a PAK-DA bomber weeks ago, and the Kh-101/102 cruise missile, bigger than the earlier Kh-55 and with a greater range, has been tested on the Tu-95MS16. Each side is permitted a total of 800 missile launchers and bombers, so aggressive deployment of bombers could increase the total of long-range nuclear weapons to 3,000-3500 - well over the limit of 1550 "warheads".

The same point's being made over at the Federation of American Scientists blog by Ivan Oelrich: "If we define corn as a type of tree, then suddenly Iowa would be covered in forests. If we define a bomber with 20 bombs as a single bomb, then suddenly we get a substantial reduction in the nuclear of weapons."

Payne and fellow panelist Tom Donnelly from the American Enterprise Institute were both skeptical about the effect of the administration's "nuclear zero" doctrine and rhetoric on arms negotiations. Donnelly argues that nuclear posture should be a subset of US strategic goals and that nuclear weapons "have been recognized as a useful tool of statecraft."

Even Brookings' own Michael O'Hanlon argues that "a very low state of readiness" is a more realistic goal than "zero" - as a hedge against cheating, as a deterrent against conventional force build-ups, and as a deterrent against non-nuclear weapons such a pathogens.

Payne goes further, saying that many nuclear powers see Global Zero "as a trick" designed to render them vulnerable to US conventional superiority, "and if that seems improper and unfair, it's because US officials have said just that."

 

[Abraham Gubler]

From Ares Defense Technology Blog - Some pretty interesting people agree with my interpretation of the treaty.

The thing about bomber weapons is they can easily draw upon the non-deployed stockpile of active nuclear weapons (the responsive force). The 1,550 limit only applies to operationally deployed nuclear weapons. As in the SORT treaty a compliant USAF would only have 240 nuclear gravity bombs on issue but there are hundreds if not thousands more held ready to go in the stockpile. All they need is a truck to drive them to a nearby US bomber air base and Wing Attack Plan R is back on the table. It’s a lot harder to utilise quickly the nuclear warheads packaged in re-entry vehicles in the stockpile because there is not a matching stockpile of ballistic missiles.

As to ARES blog and various think tank commentators it’s not as if these types have never been wrong before… Further the slant that this is somehow Russia taking the lead because on paper they say they want to build a new bomber is just crazy.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

OK it turns out that the fineprint of the START 2010 treaty is to NOT count the bomber warheads in the total! Apparently this is because unlike the SORT 2002 treaty that counted bomber warheads this treaty has an inspection regime and the Russians don't want their bomber base bomb stores to be inspected.

http://www.state.gov/t/us/139205.htm

Anyway it’s disastrous for the Russians despite Bill Sweetman's Russophobia (or is it really Pentamisia). The USA is clearly far ahead of the rest of the world in deploying nuclear bombers and air launched cruise missiles.

But like I said first on this threat START 2010 is really of second importance to Russia’s failing missile replacement rate.

For some serious analysis on this see:

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newstart.php

 

[bobbymike]

Wait until the next generation bomber loaded with the next generation cruise missile (hypersonic?) is counted as ONE NUKE!

And because there is no limit on non-deployed warheads I would replace the Minuteman III with a larger missile able to be "uploaded" to 6 to 10 warheads taken from storage. Under those circumstances along with full modernization of the "bomb making" infrastructure I "might" support this treaty (not that my support or lack thereof matters to anyone ).