New Canadian Prime Minister committed to withdrawing from F-35 program

Triton

Donald McKelvy
Senior Member
Joined
14 August 2009
Messages
9,707
Reaction score
2,049
Website
deeptowild.blogspot.com
The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy is valued at $33 billion CDN.

$25 billion for 21 combatant (warships) vessels to serve in the Royal Canadian Navy:
* 5-6 vessels from the Arctic Patrol Ship Project
* 15 vessels from the Single Class Surface Combatant Project

$8 billion for 8 non-combatant vessels to serve in the Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Navy, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada
* 3 vessels from the Joint Support Ship Project (for the RCN)
* 1 vessel, CCGS John G. Diefenbaker (for the CCG)
* 1 vessel from the Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel Project (for the CCG)
* 3 vessels from the Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels Project (for FOC)

Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Shipbuilding_Procurement_Strategy
 
lastdingo said:
sferrin said:
Sure. And we could pull all that job-producing F-35 work back. Period. Should probably make Canada shoulder an equal load when it comes to the Arctic as well. Period.

Wikipedia says
"As a result of the Government of Canada's investment in the JSF project, 144 contracts were awarded to Canadian companies, universities, and government facilities. Financially, the contracts are valued at US$490 million for the period 2002 to 2012, with an expected value of US$1.1 billion from current contracts in the period between 2013 and 2023, and a total potential estimated value of Canada's involvement in the JSF project from US$4.8 billion to US$6.8 billion.[6] By 2013 the potential benefits to Canadian firms had risen to $9.9 billion."

So ten billion USD. That's at most 40% of the purchase - normally under domestic procurement 40-60% does not only go to domestic companies, but returns as taxes to the treasury!

The Canadians are MUCH better off economically if they negotiate a deal with SAAB with offset purchases, and spend about half the money on Canadian shipbuilding or simply training.

$10 billion in work is nothing to sneeze at. As for SAAB were you planning on flying with no engine or were you going to pay to requal a different one?
 
Include these terms:

"NCFA shall be acquired on a firm fixed price basis, and bidders will also provide guaranteed estimates of operating cost per flight hour."

"The NCFA system shall include a Canadian sovereign facility for the maintenance and updating of target and threat data."

Note that these are terms that LM/USG can meet if it wishes to, unlike the exclusionary requirements in Harper's SoR.

As for Gripen engines: as yet, the U.S. Government is not the marketing arm of LM Aeronautics, although I do understand how people can be confused on this point. And while there are lots of retired Generals working for LM, there's one very important General who wouldn't appreciate losing a $XXX million sale to soothe LM's ruffled pride.
 
LowObservable said:
Include these terms:

"NCFA shall be acquired on a firm fixed price basis, and bidders will also provide guaranteed estimates of operating cost per flight hour."

"And be responsible for paying up any differences when reality rears it's ugly head."

LowObservable said:
As for Gripen engines: as yet, the U.S. Government is not the marketing arm of LM Aeronautics, although I do understand how people can be confused on this point.

For real? Ask South Korea how that works, or anybody else who's tried to sell US-supplied equipment where it isn't wanted by Uncle Sugar. Hell, that's a selling point European vendors never tire of promoting. Not sure what LM has to do with it. No doubt it's some jab at the F-35 that's so subtle and sophisticated only you understand it.
 
sferrin said:
$10 billion in work is nothing to sneeze at. As for SAAB were you planning on flying with no engine or were you going to pay to requal a different one?

Gripen NG would be available with EJ200 for Canada, since it's a large-enough customer and SAAB would love to have this engine option anyway.
 
lastdingo said:
sferrin said:
$10 billion in work is nothing to sneeze at. As for SAAB were you planning on flying with no engine or were you going to pay to requal a different one?

Gripen NG would be available with EJ200 for Canada, since it's a large-enough customer and SAAB would love to have this engine option anyway.

Canada would have to pay for the integration. Don't forget to add that into your price. Oh, and it's under powered so you'd also have to foot the bill for the upgrade. Don't forget to add that in too. (F414 is about 10% more powerful than the EJ200.)
 
What did it cost and how long did it take for Saab to demo the F414 on the Gripen - a significantly different engine from the RM12?

Also, the F414's thrust margin erodes as speed increases.
 
LowObservable said:
What did it cost and how long did it take for Saab to demo the F414 on the Gripen - a significantly different engine from the RM12?

Also, the F414's thrust margin erodes as speed increases.

No idea. But the F414 is a lot more similar to the RM12 than the EJ200 is. (Frankly I'm surprised that the Gripen uses an F404/414 at all. You'd think with the EJ200/EJ230 being European it would have been a no-brainer.)
 
sferrin said:
LowObservable said:
What did it cost and how long did it take for Saab to demo the F414 on the Gripen - a significantly different engine from the RM12?

Also, the F414's thrust margin erodes as speed increases.

No idea. But the F414 is a lot more similar to the RM12 than the EJ200 is. (Frankly I'm surprised that the Gripen uses an F404/414 at all. You'd think with the EJ200/EJ230 being European it would have been a no-brainer.)

My recollection was that there was a competition and the F414 beat the EJ200 based alternative.
Found the 1998 article below re: this apparent competition (mentions thrust vectoring, wonder where that went re: the Gripen F requirements);
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/eurojet-aims-ej200-variant-at-thrust-vectored-gripen-37567/

India made a similar decision re: the Mk.2 LCA, perhaps the F414 is seen as more proven than any EJ200 based alternative for single engined fighters.
 
F414 is slightly shorter, but also heavier and fatter. In worst case they could add some titanium armour at the rear to rebalance the centre of gravity.

I suppose a Canadian order would be about 60-100 planes, so that would justify the effort of integrating a different engine type.
SAAB would probably agree to a good price because it could afterwards offer the Gripen NG to countries affected by American veto attempts, particularly those where F-18E/F or F-35 are competing. Gripen NG is after all available with all-European armament already.
 
Hopefully the US would refuse Sweden a permission to sell the Gripen's US-made components to Canada.

Spare us that under performing piece of trash!

Edit: The Super Hornet is hardly ideal, and buying 65 of them brand new is a terrible waste of money in the 21st century, but it is still far and away the best alternative option for Canada. It is similar to what the RCAF already has, is fully interoperable with the USAF (the only actual requirement for continental air defense), has sufficient range and that precious second engine to operate in the Canadian arctic and can use the full range of US munitions.
 
The EJ200 was quite new in service when Gripen Demo was being put together, and I should think the F414 was significantly cheaper.

There's also a stimulus-response effect. If the US was to try to block JAS 39E/F exports, the Swedes would be motivated to de-ITAR the airplane and might well eat the nonrecurring cost of doing so.
 
Void said:
Hopefully the US would refuse Sweden a permission to sell the Gripen's US-made components to Canada.

Spare us that under performing piece of trash!

Edit: The Super Hornet is hardly ideal, and buying 65 of them brand new is a terrible waste of money in the 21st century, but it is still far and away the best alternative option for Canada. It is similar to what the RCAF already has, is fully interoperable with the USAF (the only actual requirement for continental air defense), has sufficient range and that precious second engine to operate in the Canadian arctic and can use the full range of US munitions.

Largely the same can be said for the Typhoon which would have significantly higher performance.
Super Hornet would only make any sense if a very cheap deal was on offer; if I was Canadian I'd be worried that the airframe's basic lack of performance would come back to bite at some point in the future.

In such a scenario of "cheaper-is-better" I would also query if the 2nd engine was really worth the premium versus a Gripen E/F (which may well have better kinetic performance).
Indeed if the single engine was not a deal breaker new F16s would potentially a better deal per pure cost and some significant performance aspects (for example my understanding that F16s with conformal tanks and other external fuel would relatively easily out-range the Super Hornet with external tanks).
 
LowObservable said:
The EJ200 was quite new in service when Gripen Demo was being put together, and I should think the F414 was significantly cheaper.

There's also a stimulus-response effect. If the US was to try to block JAS 39E/F exports, the Swedes would be motivated to de-ITAR the airplane and might well eat the nonrecurring cost of doing so.

Your probably right re: the principle reasons for the decision for the F414, presumably SAAB and the Swedish airforce would have been very focused on limiting risk and achieving the lowest price.

Ultimately not sure if Sweden would have the appetite to sell the Gripen to countries the US would block a sale to; given that the same issue would have been in play with the Viggen's engine back in the day and the F404 based engine for the Gripen A-D the Swedes haven't yet seen the need to leave this option open.
For example I wouldn't see the US actively blocking a Gripen sale to Canada.
 
I agree. It's an unlikely scenario. GE would hate it. Saab could circumvent it (and thereby, possibly, cost GE more business). And if anyone's pondering Gripen E they're a pretty unlikely customer for anything the U.S. makes, once new F-16 production shuts down.
 
The Canadians are MUCH better off economically if they negotiate a deal with SAAB with offset purchases, and spend about half the money on Canadian shipbuilding or simply training.

Offsets and Saab don't go well together. I'm sure every other competitor will be providing a complimentary copy of this book to
the Canadian government.

In short: the tech transfer didn't, the joint firms went bust shortly after the compliance period and most of the offset money ended up
back in Sweden. The Hungarians have a few (and fewer) aircraft with availability rates that make the scandalously low Swedish Gripen
availability rates look good.
 

Attachments

  • gripen-hungary-offset.jpg
    gripen-hungary-offset.jpg
    30.5 KB · Views: 259
marauder2048 said:
Offsets and Saab don't go well together. I'm sure every other competitor will be providing a complimentary copy of this book to
the Canadian government.

In short: the tech transfer didn't, the joint firms went bust shortly after the compliance period and most of the offset money ended up
back in Sweden.
On October 10, Zsolt Lázár wrote about the matter here: http://www.sldinfo.com/the-gripen-sale-to-hungary-a-look-back-at-the-results/
The Gripen offset program stretched across several government terms.

At the beginning, the decision was made by the right-wing cabinet (1998-2002).

The implementation was carried out by a socialist-liberal government, which was led by three different prime ministers between 2002 and 2010.

Since the decision-making process and the implementation were passed from one government to another and the judgment of the fighter jet tender and procurement differed according to each government’s political standpoint, the evaluation of the program is rather ambiguous – the official evaluation is still confidential.

Originally, according to the agreement, the offset should have been completed in 14 years and 50 % of the program should have been completed within the first eight years.

In contrast, the entire program was completed in seven years.

This is not particularly anomalous in the ‘world of offsets’, but is quite rapid compared to the initial plans, implying a very intensive compliance period.

Based on the offset results, several conclusions can be drawn.

Above all, it is worth mentioning that the implementation was completed before the deadline and there was not even a single report claiming that financial resources had been stolen.

Although the Hungarian economy benefited from the technology transfer (stemming primarily from Electrolux) and export opportunities originating from the Gripen offset, many of these initiatives were not sustainable.
According to the Hungarian company information service provider Ceginfo.hu, almost all the Hungarian-owned offset participant companies went bankrupt and/or were deleted from the company register without a legal successor between 2009 and 2014.

The final outcomes were a joint consequence of the political environment, the regulations and the implementation process.

Some goals were reached (such like the technology transfer and job creation), but the stimulation of the Hungarian SMEs and the investments into the less developed / prioritized geographical areas were neglected.

Since the decision itself had been made just before the election, the investment areas had been defined on the basis of current political issues.

The right-wing government subsequently lost power and thus did not have a chance to continue the program. The political mentality of a non-cooperative party system had serious impact on the offset implementation.

In fact, the new left-wing government treated the program as a stepchild.

So, according to Zsolt Lázár, local politics were a factor too.

marauder2048 said:
The Hungarians have a few (and fewer) aircraft with availability rates that make the scandalously low Swedish Gripen availability rates look good.
Numbers please.

Hungary extended its Gripen-lease in 2012.
 
"How much has Canada spent on the F-35 so far?"
David Pugliese, Postmedia News | October 30, 2015 12:43 PM ET

Source:
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/how-much-has-canada-spent-on-the-f-35-so-far

Canada has been a participant in the Joint Strike Fighter Program since 1997 and has spent US$309.3 million to date to participate in the program, Jessica Kingsbury, a spokeswoman for Public Works and Government Services tells Defence Watch.

The figure is broken down as follows:

* Concept demonstration phase (1997 to 2001): Canada has contributed approximately US$10.6 million;

* System development and demonstration phase (SDD) (2001 to 2018): Canada has contributed approximately US$94.4 million to date;

* Production, sustainment, and follow-on development phase (2006 to 2051): Canada has contributed approximately US$204.3 million to date.

* A December 2014 government update noted a little more than 30 Canadian firms have active contracts. They have secured contracts worth US$637 million.
 
"Is Canada’s F-35 program turning into another Sea King debacle?"
by Levon Sevunts | english@rcinet.ca
Wednesday 28 October, 2015

Source:
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2015/10/28/is-c ... g-debacle/
As Prime Minister-designate Justin Trudeau prepares to formally assume power on Nov. 4, one of the first decisions he’ll have to make is whether to keep his campaign promise and cancel the increasingly pricey F-35 fighter jet program.

Trudeau shook up the election campaign and the aerospace industry with his Sept. 20 announcement that he would not buy the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter jets to replace Canada’s ageing CF-18 fighters. The Conservatives committed in 2010 to buying 65 of the latest generation strike aircraft but put the purchase on hold because of the increased costs of the jet, which is already $200 billion over budget.

There were also allegations that the procurement process was not properly handled, and critics argued that the strike fighter capable of vertical take-off was not the right aircraft for Canada’s needs: it was too slow compared to Russian fighter jets and its single engine made it too vulnerable to mechanical failures during long flights over the country’s vast territory.

But as Trudeau ponders his choices, he’s facing a ghost of a campaign promise kept by his Liberal predecessor Jean Chretien over twenty years ago, one that still haunts the Canadian military.

Chretien’s 1993 campaign promise to cancel the planned acquisition of EH-101 maritime helicopters cost Ottawa up to $500 million in contract cancellation penalties and left the air force with a fleet of ageing CH-124 Sea King helicopters that it’s still struggling to replace today.

Unlike the EH-101 contract cancellation, Trudeau’s promise to opt out of the F-35 program would not mean contract penalties, but some experts warn it would not bring the desired savings to bankroll the purchase of more ships for the Royal Canadian Navy.

Instead, the purchase cancellation could affect Canadian aerospace companies working on the stealth fighter, resulting in lost tax revenue for the federal purse and possibly loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs.

Former military procurement boss Alan Williams, told the Canadian Press that the key for Trudeau would be to open up a new bidder.
 
Arjen said:
marauder2048 said:
Offsets and Saab don't go well together. I'm sure every other competitor will be providing a complimentary copy of this book to
the Canadian government.

In short: the tech transfer didn't, the joint firms went bust shortly after the compliance period and most of the offset money ended up
back in Sweden.
On October 10, Zsolt Lázár wrote about the matter here: http://www.sldinfo.com/the-gripen-sale-to-hungary-a-look-back-at-the-results/


So, according to Zsolt Lázár, local politics were a factor too.

marauder2048 said:
The Hungarians have a few (and fewer) aircraft with availability rates that make the scandalously low Swedish Gripen availability rates look good.
Numbers please.

Hungary extended its Gripen-lease in 2012.

Not sure why you highlighted those points; they don't contradict what I wrote. Typically, tech transfer for military contracts doesn't mean home appliances (Electrolux).

Fighter aircraft leasing (for anything other than stop-gap purposes) is the pretty sure sign of corruption which is why BAE (which brokered the Hungarian deal) pleaded guilty and settled for $400+ million. Swedish Gripen readiness/availabilty rates were reported in the local press. Same with Hungary. Let me go dig up those articles.
 
kaiserd said:
Super Hornet would only make any sense if a very cheap deal was on offer; if I was Canadian I'd be worried that the airframe's basic lack of performance would come back to bite at some point in the future

Since the only identifiable or plausible threat to Canadian air space is the Russians, and the Russians are building 5th generation aircraft, if threats were actually an issue we wouldn't be looking at purchasing brand new 4th generation aircraft a decade from now.
 
Triton said:
"Is Canada’s F-35 program turning into another Sea King debacle?"
by Levon Sevunts | english@rcinet.ca
Wednesday 28 October, 2015

Source:
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2015/10/28/is-c ... g-debacle/
As Prime Minister-designate Justin Trudeau prepares to formally assume power on Nov. 4, one of the first decisions he’ll have to make is whether to keep his campaign promise and cancel the increasingly pricey F-35 fighter jet program.

Trudeau shook up the election campaign and the aerospace industry with his Sept. 20 announcement that he would not buy the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter jets to replace Canada’s ageing CF-18 fighters. The Conservatives committed in 2010 to buying 65 of the latest generation strike aircraft but put the purchase on hold because of the increased costs of the jet, which is already $200 billion over budget.

There were also allegations that the procurement process was not properly handled, and critics argued that the strike fighter capable of vertical take-off was not the right aircraft for Canada’s needs: it was too slow compared to Russian fighter jets and its single engine made it too vulnerable to mechanical failures during long flights over the country’s vast territory.

But as Trudeau ponders his choices, he’s facing a ghost of a campaign promise kept by his Liberal predecessor Jean Chretien over twenty years ago, one that still haunts the Canadian military.

Chretien’s 1993 campaign promise to cancel the planned acquisition of EH-101 maritime helicopters cost Ottawa up to $500 million in contract cancellation penalties and left the air force with a fleet of ageing CH-124 Sea King helicopters that it’s still struggling to replace today.

Unlike the EH-101 contract cancellation, Trudeau’s promise to opt out of the F-35 program would not mean contract penalties, but some experts warn it would not bring the desired savings to bankroll the purchase of more ships for the Royal Canadian Navy.

Instead, the purchase cancellation could affect Canadian aerospace companies working on the stealth fighter, resulting in lost tax revenue for the federal purse and possibly loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs.

Former military procurement boss Alan Williams, told the Canadian Press that the key for Trudeau would be to open up a new bidder.

It's a policy of the Federal parties to dump whatever the other party that is in power favorite project for one of their own when they get back in power, but also we're talking about another Trudeau ---- (a pot head one to boot [come to think about it, I think his dad was one too])
 
Void said:
kaiserd said:
Super Hornet would only make any sense if a very cheap deal was on offer; if I was Canadian I'd be worried that the airframe's basic lack of performance would come back to bite at some point in the future

Since the only identifiable or plausible threat to Canadian air space is the Russians, and the Russians are building 5th generation aircraft, if threats were actually an issue we wouldn't be looking at purchasing brand new 4th generation aircraft a decade from now.

Well I presume the threat of advanced Russian SAMs and fighters (in Russian or their customers hands) was a major reason for the selection of the F35 in the first place.
And the F18E/F wouldn't exactly offer the most future-proofed solution against those threats even if the F35 is apparently now off the table.
For example if looking at air-superiority role against advanced Flankers or even a PAK-FA I know I'd be happier (everything is relative) in a Typhoon, Rafale or probably even a Gripen-E/F (especially if armed with Meteors) rather than a F18E/F.
Not entirely following you point re: timing (are you saying new fighter not needed yet?).
If so my understanding that Canada's existing well-used Hornets need relatively urgent replacement and allowances need to be made for realistic timescales for a replacement to be phased into service and the classic Hornets to be phased out of service. In addition some alternatives production lines won't be around forever, unlike the F35's.
 
Consider also what the political climate in the Arctic is going to look like in 20 years. The land grab is already starting to heat up, and China thinks it has a right to a piece of that pie too.
 
"More trouble for Canada’s Navy and it’s only destroyer"
by Marc Montgomery | english@rcinet.ca
Wednesday 7 October, 2015

Source:
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2015/10/07/more-trouble-for-canadas-navy-and-its-only-destroyer/

To the untrained eye, HMCS Athabaskan Canada’s east coast flagship, looks like a tough fighting ship. The truth is however, that at age 43, she is tired.

The ship has experienced a series of engine problems this year; a breakdown in Florida, another recall to Halifax from an exercise in the Caribbean, and an engine room fire just a week before the latest problem.

The ship was en route to participate in two multinational exercises overseas, when one of it’s engines failed due to a lubrication problem. The ship has four engines, two main engines and two cruise engines. It was the starboard cruise engine that failed this time.

The ship is currently tied up in the United Kingdom while a repair crew prepares to replace the engine, expected to take about a week. Other issues like cracks in the hull and problems with fresh water supply for the crew have also been indicated in the past.

“It was determined that the repairs will be made immediately to allow the ship to maintain its most economical modes of propulsion while also ensuring optimal engine redundancy,” said Isaac Donnelly, a public affairs officer with the Royal Canadian Navy.

Canada’s only destroyer is scheduled to be retired in 2017. Her two sister ships were retired in May and June of this year as being no longer seaworthy.

The Royal Canadian Navy faces other hardships. The Sea-King helicopters, slated to be retired 22 years ago, are still in service.

Canada also had two supply ships, HMCS Protecteur on the west coast and HMCS Preserver on the east coast. These ships ensured the RCN could travel long distances and remain on station. However, Protecteur suffered a serious fire and breakdown off Hawaii and was towed back to port. Because the ships were so old, the original manufacturers no long produced parts for them, and both have never left port since. A stop-gap upgrade to a commercial tanker is in the works, but proper supply ships are not expected until 2025.

The RCN is now in a mid-life refit of its 12 Halifax-class frigates, which are about 20 years old. They are smaller than the destroyer, carry a crew of about 220, one helicopter (vs two on the Athabaskan) have shorter-range radar, less firepower and far less capable command abilities.

Canada has four second-hand submarines purchased 20 years ago from Britain, but these have had a poor record of service, with a series of accidents, including a deadly fire, and costs of repairs and updates about double their purchase price.

For the first time, the fleet was announced as “operational” in February of this year, meaning three of the four are able to conduct naval operations, although at that time, only one was able to fire a torpedo.

RCN, Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, has described the subs capability as “fragile."

Canada has 12 Kingston-class coastal defence vessels, about a fifth the size of the destroyer with a crew of 35. Their role is surveillance, search and rescue, fisheries patrol, and training. They are also about 20 years old and have a spotty service record with chronic engine troubles.

Canada has 13 Coast Guard icebreakers, but only 6 with any polar cabability and none can travel in the Arctic in winter. The oldest, at 49, is the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent originally scheduled for decommissioning in 2000, but it has been necessary to keep it in service with two major refits.

One heavy polar-class icebreaker is planned, (scaled back from three) but it’s original cost estimate of $720,000,000 has now doubled. It was scheduled to be launched in 2017, but the launch date is now expected to be pushed back another five years.

The effectiveness of the world’s navies are ranked on a nine-point scale called the Todd/Lindberg classification system.

The United States for example is a level-1 navy, capable capable of “global-reach power projection.”

Canada has set itself a goal of Rank-3, in a planning document called “Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020,”. Rank-3 navies are considered as “navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them, and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters.”

In a research analysis letter of the RCN, Ken Hansen listed the navy at a Rank-5 level, capable of coastal defence out to a 200 nautical mile limit. Other navies that share this capacity include Bangladesh and Indonesia, which are listed as developing nations, poor enough to be long-term recipients of Canadian aid.
 
"Canada’s F-35: yeah but no but… yeah?"
2 Nov 2015|Andrew Davies

Source:http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/canadas-f-35-yeah-but-no-but-yeah/


For a number of reasons, it wasn’t surprising to see Canada’s incoming government announce its intention of revisiting the former government’s decision to buy the F-35A Joint Strike fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force. It’s not academic for Australia—if Canada decides to pull out, it could cost Australia and other partners about a million dollars extra per aircraft as economies of scale are reduced, or about A$100 million in total for the RAAF’s fleet of 72.

As in Australia, the proposed Canadian F-35 purchase has been controversial and has found itself repeatedly in the papers. Unlike in Australia, the Canadian debate has been cost rather than the capability of the aircraft. And it hasn’t been a debate in the margins: a 2011 Parliamentary Budget Officer report that highlighted the budgetary impacts of both the acquisition and through-life support costs of the F-35 led to a vote of no confidence in the House, and ultimately the dissolution of the then minority conservative government.

It’s no surprise that the cost of the F-35 is problematic for Canada. It’s the world’s second most expensive tactical aircraft after its F-22 stablemate. At a projected flyaway price of US$82 million in 2020, it compares to US$61 million flyaway for a new build Super Hornet (prices in 2015 dollars). Supporters of the F-35 would argue that you get a lot more capability for your money, but that doesn’t help if you’re broke. And when you look at its defence budget, Canada has been heading for the wall for a while now.

As I pointed out in a comparative analysis a few months ago, Canada’s armed forces are uncannily similar to Australia’s in size, while the defence budget is a whopping 40% smaller. Even if our northern mates are doing things smarter than we are, that’s an implausibly large amount of efficiency to find. It’s more likely that they’re expending a much greater proportion of their budget on keeping the extant forces going than we are. That’s OK until it comes time to recapitalise major assets, when you’re faced with the option of letting capabilities go or finding extra money.

Canada may have already made some tacit decisions. I’ve talked with Canadian civilian and military defence folks about the replacement of our Collins and their Upholder class submarines. The timing and requirements of the two countries actually mesh quite nicely (even if Canada extends the life of its boats it could still work), and a collaborative approach would make good sense, giving both sides some economy of scale. The response is usually an uncomfortable silence—the inference I draw being that Canada isn’t planning another generation of submarines.

But in the F-35 case it’s far from clear what options Canada has. It could go the New Zealand path of 0% fast jet force, confident that its border with the US would let it avoid being ‘100% there for the taking‘, but that would abrogate its responsibility for northern air defence and weaken it substantially as a NATO contributor. So eventually it’s going to have to replace its 1980s vintage Hornets with something. The problem is that the something won’t cost that much less than the F-35, will offer less capability and—perhaps worst of all from a Canadian point of view—might require earlier expenditure.

The most likely alternative for Canada is the Super Hornet. European options would require new supply chains and integration of new weapons into the inventory. As Australia found, the transition from Hornet to Super Hornet is easy, with training and logistics being similar enough to significantly reduce overheads. Canada’s also attracted to the Super Hornet because of its twin engines. There was a school of thought in Australia that we need two engines to operate safely over water; the Canadian equivalent is the vast northern expanses. The argument fails to appreciate the reliability of modern American jet engines (it might make sense if you had to use Chinese engines) but it still seems to have some currency up north.

But the Super Hornet production line mightn’t be open much longer, and Canada would have to buy new aircraft now, as opposed to sometime next decade as it currently plans. It would probably pay more for the aircraft than the USN did when production was in full swing. So in net present value terms, a Super Hornet buy mightn’t be the value proposition it first appears.

The list of pros for the F-35 also includes the preference of the RCAF for the highest tech platform it can get (air forces are like that) and Canadian industry involvement in the program—always politically tough to walk away from. Canada will get some work regardless, but future opportunities for construction and support work would be highly constrained. I wouldn’t mind a small wager that Canada eventually settles on the F-35 after all.
 
"At a projected flyaway price of US$82 million in 2020, it compares to US$61 million flyaway for a new build Super Hornet (prices in 2015 dollars). "

Interesting how they couldn't be bothered to calculate like dollars.
 
Triton said:
"Canada’s F-35: yeah but no but… yeah?"
2 Nov 2015|Andrew Davies

Source:http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/canadas-f-35-yeah-but-no-but-yeah/


For a number of reasons, it wasn’t surprising to see Canada’s incoming government announce its intention of revisiting the former government’s decision to buy the F-35A Joint Strike fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force. It’s not academic for Australia—if Canada decides to pull out, it could cost Australia and other partners about a million dollars extra per aircraft as economies of scale are reduced, or about A$100 million in total for the RAAF’s fleet of 72.

As in Australia, the proposed Canadian F-35 purchase has been controversial and has found itself repeatedly in the papers. Unlike in Australia, the Canadian debate has been cost rather than the capability of the aircraft. And it hasn’t been a debate in the margins: a 2011 Parliamentary Budget Officer report that highlighted the budgetary impacts of both the acquisition and through-life support costs of the F-35 led to a vote of no confidence in the House, and ultimately the dissolution of the then minority conservative government.

It’s no surprise that the cost of the F-35 is problematic for Canada. It’s the world’s second most expensive tactical aircraft after its F-22 stablemate. At a projected flyaway price of US$82 million in 2020, it compares to US$61 million flyaway for a new build Super Hornet (prices in 2015 dollars). Supporters of the F-35 would argue that you get a lot more capability for your money, but that doesn’t help if you’re broke. And when you look at its defence budget, Canada has been heading for the wall for a while now.

As I pointed out in a comparative analysis a few months ago, Canada’s armed forces are uncannily similar to Australia’s in size, while the defence budget is a whopping 40% smaller. Even if our northern mates are doing things smarter than we are, that’s an implausibly large amount of efficiency to find. It’s more likely that they’re expending a much greater proportion of their budget on keeping the extant forces going than we are. That’s OK until it comes time to recapitalise major assets, when you’re faced with the option of letting capabilities go or finding extra money.

Canada may have already made some tacit decisions. I’ve talked with Canadian civilian and military defence folks about the replacement of our Collins and their Upholder class submarines. The timing and requirements of the two countries actually mesh quite nicely (even if Canada extends the life of its boats it could still work), and a collaborative approach would make good sense, giving both sides some economy of scale. The response is usually an uncomfortable silence—the inference I draw being that Canada isn’t planning another generation of submarines.

But in the F-35 case it’s far from clear what options Canada has. It could go the New Zealand path of 0% fast jet force, confident that its border with the US would let it avoid being ‘100% there for the taking‘, but that would abrogate its responsibility for northern air defence and weaken it substantially as a NATO contributor. So eventually it’s going to have to replace its 1980s vintage Hornets with something. The problem is that the something won’t cost that much less than the F-35, will offer less capability and—perhaps worst of all from a Canadian point of view—might require earlier expenditure.

The most likely alternative for Canada is the Super Hornet. European options would require new supply chains and integration of new weapons into the inventory. As Australia found, the transition from Hornet to Super Hornet is easy, with training and logistics being similar enough to significantly reduce overheads. Canada’s also attracted to the Super Hornet because of its twin engines. There was a school of thought in Australia that we need two engines to operate safely over water; the Canadian equivalent is the vast northern expanses. The argument fails to appreciate the reliability of modern American jet engines (it might make sense if you had to use Chinese engines) but it still seems to have some currency up north.

But the Super Hornet production line mightn’t be open much longer, and Canada would have to buy new aircraft now, as opposed to sometime next decade as it currently plans. It would probably pay more for the aircraft than the USN did when production was in full swing. So in net present value terms, a Super Hornet buy mightn’t be the value proposition it first appears.

The list of pros for the F-35 also includes the preference of the RCAF for the highest tech platform it can get (air forces are like that) and Canadian industry involvement in the program—always politically tough to walk away from. Canada will get some work regardless, but future opportunities for construction and support work would be highly constrained. I wouldn’t mind a small wager that Canada eventually settles on the F-35 after all.


Thanks Triton, an interesting article that (allowing for the dollar year difference) sums up a lot of the issues at play.
 
The airy dismissal of European alternatives is interesting.

"New supply chains" - What do you call ALIS, then?

"Integration of new weapons" - Canada's not going to keep AIM-120C forever, and certainly not AIM-9M - and Meteor, IRIS-T and (by early 2020s) the updated ASRAAM are not second-rate options.
 
LowObservable said:
and Meteor, IRIS-T and (by early 2020s) the updated ASRAAM are not second-rate options.

Neither are AIM-120D or AIM-9X Block II. 4th gen aircraft in 2020 though. . .
 
sferrin said:
LowObservable said:
and Meteor, IRIS-T and (by early 2020s) the updated ASRAAM are not second-rate options.

Neither are AIM-120D or AIM-9X Block II. 4th gen aircraft in 2020 though. . .

I'd both agree and disagree with sferrin and LowObservable on some of their points above.

- To be honest the current European AAMs are pretty clearly superior to their current American equivalents (specifically haven't seen anything that suggests the AIM120D can be a match for the Meteor); a consequence of the US investment in 5th versus 4th generation fighters and cancelling/ postponing new clean-sheet weapons. Future US developments may readdress this imbalance.

- I would agree that an air-superiority Super Hornet into the 2020's (and 2030's) may be risking being a contradiction in terms. However if the F35 is decidedly off the table than a Meteor armed Typhoon or Rafale would be better than the Super-Bug (which I have a higher opinion of than my comments may suggest).

- To be honest a lot of the talk of commonalty between the (classic) Hornet and Super Hornet sounds like codswallop to me, the sort of basis that makes sense as a justification to those unfamiliar with the details of the now very different aircraft, such as politicians and general members of the public.
For example when the Super Hornet first entered service with the US Navy it shared some avionics and systems with late F18Cs, would have thought little to no such commonality now exists with latest production Super Hornets and Canada's older well worn CF18As.
 
quote kitnuts617 "It's a policy of the Federal parties to dump whatever the other party that is in power favorite project for one of their own when they get back in power, but also we're talking about another Trudeau ---- (a pot head one to boot [come to think about it, I think his dad was one too])" Whats pot gotta do with the f-35? At the price they want for it ,you would have to be high to sign the contract. :p :p :p :p
 
mjinnj said:
quote kitnuts617 "It's a policy of the Federal parties to dump whatever the other party that is in power favorite project for one of their own when they get back in power, but also we're talking about another Trudeau ---- (a pot head one to boot [come to think about it, I think his dad was one too])" Whats pot gotta do with the f-35? At the price they want for it ,you would have to be high to sign the contract. :p :p :p :p

Do you have any actual numbers? (With sources plz. kthxbye.)
 
hey scottee, i was making a remark about the the cannabis statement, i dont think ya gotta be so serious about it, markee
 
Triton said:
"Canada’s F-35: yeah but no but… yeah?"
2 Nov 2015|Andrew Davies

Source:http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/canadas-f-35-yeah-but-no-but-yeah/

I think the $1m is based on other partners or FMS not filling the gaps in those years. I think there are several who would like to take those late LRIP and full production spots.
 
That seems to be what the RAAF believes at least:

Senator WHISH-WILSON: I have a few questions about that Joint Strike Fighter AIR 6,000 program. What is your understanding behind the reasoning of the Canadian government's decision last night?

Air Chief Marshal Binskin: You would have to put that question to the Canadian government.

Senator WHISH-WILSON: Is there any impact on our procurement from their decision to withdraw from the program?

Air Chief Marshal Binskin: I think, again, that was a policy statement from the incoming Prime Minister. I have not seen a definitive statement that that has now happened. I do not think the Chief of Air Force is in a position to answer that. We will get KSG to talk about that but I do not think so.

Mr Richardson: It will not impact on us.

Air Chief Marshal Binskin: Not with the numbers of air craft that are being produced. To give you an example, there are currently 150 F35s flying today, mainly in the US because the Italian air craft just flew in Italy. So about 150 are already flying. By the time Canada would have been proposed to come in in a couple of years time there would have been upwards of 300-odd, 350 aeroplanes. So I am not sure whether there would be an impact or not in the time line you are talking about. Another customer could jump in and take those slots.

http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/6662254f-7408-419c-b81e-4a2e7981ccea/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2015_10_21_3923.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf
 
Denmark is currently evaluating bids for 24, 30, and 36 combat aircraft with a decision expected by the end of this year. The Lockheed Martin F-35A, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet, and the Eurofighter Typhoon remain in the race for the estimated $4.5 billion contract. Denmark is a Level 3 partner in the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Sources:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/06/07/finland-denmark-fighter-replacement-government-f35-hornet-eurofighter-typhoon-gripen/28421615/

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usn-growler-order-complete-as-boeing-seeks-fa-18-or-418359/
 
"Government's quiet dismantling of PWGSC F-35 secretariat means fighter jet acquisition plan in place: experts"

Industry participants had learned of rumours that, although Stephen Harper’s (Calgary Heritage, Alta.) full Cabinet may not have yet approved any contracts to begin acquiring F-35 planes in 2020, following an initial plan to begin acquiring the aircraft in 2017, the Treasury Board Committee of Cabinet had approved an acquisition plan.
By TIM NAUMETZ |
Published: Tuesday, 11/03/2015 6:04 pm EST

Source:
http://www.hilltimes.com/news/2015/11/03/governments-quiet-dismantling-of-pwgsc-f-35-secretariat-means-fighter-jet-acquisition/44056

The Conservative government quietly disbanded a high-level and key Public Works department secretariat in charge of reviewing the proposed $45.8-billion plan for Canada to acquire a fleet of 65 F-35 stealth warplanes, The Hill Times has learned.

The decision earlier this winter to wind down the secretariat, which the government established in 2012 to implement a multi-faceted “action plan” in response to a raging controversy over a report to Parliament from Auditor General Michael Ferguson on the F-35 acquisition, means the government had by then decided it would go ahead with a plan first announced in 2010 to acquire the U.S. Lockheed Martin fighter jets, says an expert on the F-35 project who was head of procurement at the Department of National Defence during Canada’s initial involvement in development of the aircraft in the late 1990s.

Former procurement chief Alan Williams quoted the secretariat’s mission statement, that it was “primarily responsible for the review, oversight, and coordination of the implementation of the Government's Action Plan, to ensure that the Royal Canadian Air Force acquires the fighter aircraft it needs to complete the missions asked of it by the government, and to restore the confidence of Parliament and the Canadians in the process that will be used to replace the CF-18 fleet.”

“It would therefore appear that if it has been disbanded, then the acquisition decision has been taken,” said Mr. Williams said.

Mr. Williams on Tuesday forwarded The Hill Times copies of a U.S. military briefing for the United States Secretary of the Air Force that suggested the Canadian government had proposed in 2014 to swap its acquisition slot in a 2017 production line of the F-35 in exchange for a later one already reserved for the U.S. Air Force.

In the documents, in the form of a deck of speaking remarks, the general giving the briefing said the U.S. Air Force was amenable, as long as its schedule for initial operating capability of F-35 jets was not affected. The briefing notes indicated Canada would have to deliver an initial letter of intent to acquire its first round of F-35s by November, 2014.

Another expert and participant in Canada’s aerospace industry relations with the federal government told The Hill Times on Tuesday industry participants had learned of rumours that, although Stephen Harper’s (Calgary Heritage, Alta.) full Cabinet may not have yet approved any contracts to begin acquiring F-35 planes in 2020, following an initial plan to begin acquiring the aircraft in 2017, the Treasury Board Committee of Cabinet had approved an acquisition plan.

The information suggests that over the past two weeks as Prime Minister-designate Justin Trudeau (Papineau, Que.) and his transition team were being briefed on crucial government information prior to Mr. Trudeau and his Cabinet ministers being sworn into office by Gov. Gen. David Johnson Wednesday, the incoming Liberals learned of F-35 details that could affect the cost of, or manner in which, Mr. Trudeau fulfills his election pledge that a Liberal government would not acquire the stealth jets and would instead hold an open competition to identify a new fighter jet fleet for Canada.

The secretariat was to stay in place until the government had completed its action plan in response to Mr. Ferguson’s report, including annual Department of National Defence updates to Parliament that began in 2012 on the estimated costs for acquiring, operating and maintaining a fleet of F-35s, as well as separate updates on industrial benefits to Canada through aerospace industry subcontracts to supply airframe and other components to the Lockheed Martin production line in Fort Worth, Tx.

After several requests that began last Sept. 22 for information about the status of a 2015 update to Parliament on the F-35 program, which the government has continued to take part in since Mr. Ferguson’s scathing report while also reviewing other options to replace Canada’s aging fleet of 77 CF-18 fighter jets, the Public Works Department disclosed to The Hill Times last Friday that the secretariat had been disbanded early this year because its work was done.

“The secretariat was formed to implement government’s seven-point [action] plan. As the secretariat’s work under the plan has now been completed, there are currently no plans to produce and table a 2015 annual update [on the cost of acquiring and operating a fleet of F-35s over each plane’s 30-year lifecycle],”Pierre-AlainBujold, a spokesperson with the department’s media relations branch, told The Hill Times last Thursday, Oct. 29.

Asked whether the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat still exists, Mr. Bujold provided more information the following day, in the late afternoon.

“The Secretariat was formed to implement government’s seven point plan. As that work has been completed, it was disbanded in Winter 2015,” Mr. Bujold said in his follow-up email. “PWGSC continues to support all defence procurement by providing expert negotiation and contracting services to ensure best value for Canadians.”

When The Hill Times earlier asked the Department of National Defence about a decision last fall to extend the life of the Boeing CF-18 fighter jet fleet to 2025 from an earlier plan to retire the fleet by 2020, which would have been possible under an earlier plan to begin acquiring the Lockheed Martin jets in 2017, a National Defence spokesperson reiterated a longstanding government line that no decision had yet been made on the acquisition.

“No decision has been made on the replacement of Canada’s fighter fleet,” DND spokesperson Daniel Lebouthiller said in an email last Sept. 21, in the midst of the general election campaign. “To ensure that Canada retains a fighter capability during a transition to a new fleet, National Defence has extended the life expectancy of the CF-18s to 20125.

Canada acquired its CF-18 fighter jet fleet between 1982 and 1988. The acquisition came with guaranteed industry participation and maintenance in Canada, unlike the F-35 acquisition, should it go ahead.

Former Defence Minister Peter MacKay announced in July, 2010, that Cabinet had approved a plan to replace the CF-18s, six of which are now taking part in air strikes against ISIS troops, equipment and infrastructure in northern Iraq, with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighters, then still in development and early production stages.

“Expected delivery dates for a replacement fleet will vary depending on the government of Canada’s future fighter capability decision,” Mr. Lebouthillier said.

The secretariat briefed Cabinet in June, 2014, on the results of an intensive review of the cost and risk of acquiring fighter jets being offered by five warplane and defence jet manufacturers, including Lockheed Martin’s F-35.

The secretariat released partial results of the options, but full details of the review were not made public, other than a range of risks unidentified planes posed or did not pose. No costs for each of the options were released.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom