Looking for info on the early VFAX program

danwild6

F-14 Fan
Joined
30 March 2012
Messages
78
Reaction score
32
I'm looking for specs on aircraft like weight and proposed avionics and weapons. I've seen many photos of the contenders but little info on their engines weapons
 
DO you mean the 1960s VFAX that led to VFX / F-14 or the 1970s VFAX that lead to NACF/F-18?

If you mean the 1970s one, I have some information.
 
The 1960's VFAX is what I'm looking for. I'm really interested in Grumman's and Vought's designs I believe they both presented Single and tandem seated twin seat designs.
 
One particular question I have were the designs supposed to carry the AIM-54 Phoenix missile?
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Ok so from what I've been able to find out the VFAX was supposed to be a compliment to the F-111B Fleet Defense Fighter so no Phoenix capability but lighter and more maneuverable to take on enemy fighters still haven't found any info on proposed weight stats so any help would be great
 
Do you have a copy of Fighters over the Fleet by Norman Friedman? It covers VFAX in some significant details including drawings of Boeing, Vought and Grumman designs and specs. Initial designs were not expected to use Phoenix, but it was added as the designs grew.
 
I'm digging into this, presently. I have browsed Google books on that matter, restraining the time boundaries to 1965-1970. Which allows to eliminate the second VFAX, which didn't existed before 1973.
This has brought some interesting results.
Fundamentally (and rather ironically) VFAX-1967 was to be a low-end to the (agonizing) F-111B... much like VFAX-1973 led to the Tomcat low-end, via NACF: Hornet, obviously.

So, why a low-end to the F-111B since it was agonizing, direction cancellation ? and what the heck happened to VFAX-the-first, to be reborn six year later, in 1973 ?

It worked that way.

By 1967 the USN wasn't fully sure the Sea Pig would be cancelled and, crucially, they wanted and needed the Phoenix and the AWG-9. It was just the airframe and to a lesser extent, the engines, around them, that were quite literally rotten.

We all know how it ended: Grumman grasped the above, and created the 303. It took great pain in re-packaging the AWG-9 and Phoenix into a much, much better airframe. But the engines were trickier, so early on the 303, future F-14 Tomcat, kind of split into two phases
- VFX-1 with the old TF30s (hello, F-14A)
- VFX-2 with better, next generation engines (you guess: the F-14B with the doomed F401)

As soon as McNamara left in February 1968, this was a go. In a sense, the need for AWG-9 & Phoenix (303 - VFX-1 VFX-2 - F-14A) flattened the first VFAX into oblivion.

Hence VFAX first life was pretty short: it essentially vanished by spring 1968 and this until 1971 at the earliest: when new SecDef David Packard cut the number of F-14A from 722 to 313 and nixed the F-14B at least temporarily - until the F401 issues killed it for good a few years later.

So, February 1968 VFAX was exactly a multirole fighter
- replace the Phantom as an AIM-7 & AIM-9 medium range ADF
- replace the A-7E SLUFF in the bomb truck role.
- Also USMC Phantoms and... A-4Ms (since they never used the SLUFF, don't ask me why).
- a low end to the (doomed) F-111B
- or perhaps a low end to that repackaging by Grumman, the 303 ?

It wasn't to be
-because VFX-1 and VFX-2 led a drive to an all Tomcat fleet dream (despite USMC recoil at the cost)
-because the USN stuck in Vietnam had its budget cut

Bottom line: VFAX+VFX-1+VFX-2 would have been too much. Something had to give, and since "saving AWG-9 / Phoenix" out of the F-111B misery had absolute priority... VFAX got the axe. Top priority was VFX-1, namely the future F-14A. Even with the shitty TF30s, it couldn't be worse than the Sea Pig.

VFAX was quite literally put on the backburner for an all-Tomcat fleet until 1971 at the earliest, when Packard and the USMC balked at the large cost.

Funny to think something akin to the F-18 could have been started in 1967 rather than 1973...

Fun fact: in the quest for a low-end to either the F-111B or Grumman 303, Vought and the USN learned that such a "baby Tomcat" had been created... in France, of all place. You guess: the Mirage G.
Just think about it
- VG wing ? check
- a TF30 ? check
- better intakes that limited the stalls ? check
- A navy interested by it ? check, the Aéronavale loved it.

It was almost too good to be true. I think a case could be make that a Vought Mirage G came from a hairbreadth snatching VFAX circa 1968.
For the record, the lone Mirage G first flew in November 1967 and crashed in January 1971 after a massive electrical short.

In July 1969 a request was made to Dassault to provide three Mirage G to an experimental test squadron at Patuxent River (Liébert and Buyck Mirage F1, volume 1). Think of the Harrier tri-nation test squadron earlier in the same decade.
The French did not took the offer seriously - unfortunately. Marcel Dassault was pretty baffled - and if the boss was sceptical, then it would not happen. And it didn't.

I have this sneaking suspicion that some in the USN were still daydreaming about that "VFAX to replace the Phantoms and SLUFFs" and the Mirage G was as tempting as ever. Once again, this is only personal speculation.

So the timing was almost perfect: by late 1967, VFAX was right there, as a low end to the doomed F-111B not cancelled yet (it was, only in spring & summer 1968 AFAIK).

But Grumman's 303 and the USN VFX-1 decided otherwise, and Vought had to follow them or bust. The result were Vought 505 and 507: amusingly enough, Vought-Tomcat-Mirage mixes.

By 1971-73 when VFAX finally returned (only to be wiped out by a naval LWF called NACF) the Mirage G was long gone. It had ended as a smoking hole in the ground in Istres in January 1971, with Jean Coureau saving his life (again !) only through a very well calculated ejection...
 
Last edited:
- Also USMC Phantoms and... A-4Ms (since they never used the SLUFF, don't ask me why).

A great analogy there Archibald.

As for the reason why the USMC renegued and pushed back against operating A-7's, I believe it was about the higher cost of both purchasing, operating and maintenance cost compared to the A-4 Skyhawk.
I've also read that the USMC deemed the A-7 as too complex, when compared to the simplicity of the Skyhawk.

Regards
Pioneer
 
- replace the A-7E SLUFF in the bomb truck role.
- Also USMC Phantoms and... A-4Ms (since they never used the SLUFF, don't ask me why).
.....
Think of the Harrier tri-nation test squadron earlier in the same decade.
A great analogy there Archibald.

As for the reason why the USMC renegued and pushed back against operating A-7's, I believe it was about the higher cost of both purchasing, operating and maintenance cost compared to the A-4 Skyhawk.
I've also read that the USMC deemed the A-7 as too complex, when compared to the simplicity of the Skyhawk.

Regards
Pioneer

The USMC not operating A-7s was a combination of cost/complexity and something different... which Archibald came really close to.

Simply put, by the time the USMC was ready to replace their A-4s in 1968 they were faced with a choice.

They had Douglas working on designing an improved Skyhawk, were re-evaluating the A-7 (having passed once in ~1965)... and were REALLY interested in the new aircraft from the UK... the Harrier!

Starting in 1965, the USAF, USN, USA, & USMC had been examining and flying 6 Hawker-Siddeley Kestrels (US designation XV-6A) - a continuation of work done in 1964-65 in conjunction with the RAF and German Air Force (Tri-partate Squadron).
The USMC had decided that they REALLY wanted the fully-developed version that the UK had been working on since Feb. 1965 for operations from the USN's LPHs (and the just-ordered LHAs) as well as from improvised airfields.

However, Congress was not willing to let the USMC introduce two expensive new types (with overlapping missions) at the same time... they basically were told "you can have improved A-4s and improved Kestrels OR A-7Es... make up your mind."

The USMC chose "Harriers and Skyhawk IIs", and orders were placed in May 1969 for the A-4M and in September 1969 for AV-8Bs..

Note that the A-4M was a significant improvement over the A-4B/C/E/Fs the USMC had been flying.
 
Last edited:
The USMC not operating A-7s was a combination of cost/complexity and something different... which Archibald came really close to.

Simply put, by the time the USMC was ready to replace their A-4s in 1968 they were faced with a choice.

They had Douglas working on designing an improved Skyhawk, were re-evaluating the A-7 (having passed once in ~1965)... and were REALLY interested in the new aircraft from the UK... the Harrier!

Starting in 1965, the USAF, USN, USA, & USMC had been examining and flying 6 Hawker-Siddeley Kestrels (US designation XV-6A) - a continuation of work done in 1964-65 in conjunction with the RAF and German Air Force (Tri-partate Squadron).
The USMC had decided that they REALLY wanted the fully-developed version that the UK had been working on since Feb. 1965 for operations from the USN's LPHs (and the just-ordered LHAs) as well as from improvised airfields.

However, Congress was not willing to let the USMC introduce two expensive new types (with overlapping missions) at the same time... they basically were told "you can have improved A-4s and improved Kestrels OR A-7Es... make up your mind."

The USMC chose "Harriers and Skyhawk IIs", and orders were placed in May 1969 for the A-4M and in September 1969 for AV-8Bs..

Note that the A-4M was a significant improvement over the A-4B/C/E/Fs the USMC had been flying.

Thank you BlackBat242 for your informative reply.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Back
Top Bottom