L2VMA and LARA (Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft) designs

My own thoughts are that the Grumman Model 134R looks like a cross between a Pucara and a Mohawk and that's how I'd model it, which allows me to use the Pucara engine nacelles for other purposes (starting point for the engine nacelles for an AT-28F).
 
hesham said:
The Hiller project for LARA which was displayed before by
the member Dronte ,was called K16.
index.php

hesham said:
the Kaman K-16A,which later submitted by Hiller for LARA;
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1957/1957%20-%200617.html
index.php

hesham's messages contradict each other here: they proved that this project was in fact by Kaman and NOT Hiller (logical given the "K16" designation).
 
Yeah, I'd noticed. However, this one is plain K-16 while the tilt-wing aircraft is the K-16B. Not much in common, except perhaps the propellers?
 
Mark Nankivil said:
An interesting article from the defunct Air Progress, August 1966 on LARA.

Enjoy the Day! Mark

Sorry Mark, but do you have Page 79 of this article?

Regards
Pioneer
 
I have the magazine and have been meaning to scan the cover for elmayerle - will get page 79 for you too. Stay tuned...

Enjoy the Day! Mark
 
Hi All -

For Elmayerle, the cover shot may be of use. For Pioneer, here's the last section of the article.

Enjoy the Day! Mark
 

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The last complete aircraft to be built by Convair was the Model 48 Charger. The navy had issued a requirement for a new counter-insurgency aircraft, and Convair was already well advanced with a design to meet it. Convair proceeded with the manufacturing of a prototype as a private venture since the navy had not yet decided which of the competing designs to award the contract.

Pescador, Katrina and Aldrich, Mark. Consolidated Aircraft Corporation Arcadia Publishing 2008 pg. 124.
 

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By the time the prototype rolled out of the factory on September 29, 1964, the navy had decided on the North American Aviation design. Convair's calculated risk had failed. However, the army and marines preferred the Charger, so a flight test contract was awarded. Before a scheduled fly off could take place, the Model 48 was destroyed during a test flight by a navy pilot; another example was not built.

Pescador, Katrina and Aldrich, Mark. Consolidated Aircraft Corporation Arcadia Publishing 2008 pg. 124.
 

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Does anyone know the reason(s) why the navy, or Department of Defense, chose the North American NA-300 over the other LARA proposals? Why the army and marines preferred the Convair Model 48 over the North American NA-300?
 
Triton said:
Does anyone know the reason(s) why the navy, or Department of Defense, chose the North American NA-300 over the other LARA proposals? Why the army and marines preferred the Convair Model 48 over the North American NA-300?

Performance-wise, the story goes that the Lockheed entrant actually was the best, but Lockheed gambled that the customer weren't really than concerned with the paradrop and ease of loading requirements. They gambled wrong.

Regarding Model 48 vs. NA-300, in virtually every significant performance measure the Model 48 was better (although while both met the requirement for time for engine change, the NA-300 could do it faster) and would be available sooner. Plus, the pilot could survive a ditching in the Model 48. There was some talk that Convair didn't validate their promises on paper as well as North American did. Convair said, "Wait a minute, we've got the actual plane here and can show you it does what we say it does". DoD seemed to feel having sufficient documentation claiming you could do it carried a higher weight than actually doing it. Since the Charger flying around and having the Marines cast covetous eyes at it was kind of an embarrassment to the bureaucracy (which is the worst crime you can commit), it was fortunate from a bureaucratic point of view that that Navy pilot screwed up and crashed the aircraft.

As far as Army goes, even though it would be an idela aircraft for their needs, USAF never would have let them operate the aircraft.
 
Interesting background. I don't think this was mentioned in Ginter's volume on the '48. Thanks!
 
AeroFranz said:
Interesting background. I don't think this was mentioned in Ginter's volume on the '48. Thanks!

You're welcome. I believe he does talk about the crash, though and why it happened. Basically, the 48 got its super-STOL performance through a technique and design that while perfectly acceptable for military use would not be allowed in a civilian aircraft. As part of this, when in the super-STOL landing configuration, you could not do a single engine go around and retain controllability. The Navy pilot was flying single engine (I don't remember if there had been an engine failure or if he just decided to fly it single-engined--something that non-program test pilots were not supposed to do), had it in the STOL configuration and decided to go around. The plane did exactly what Convair said it would do in such a case.
 
F-14D said:
Triton said:
Does anyone know the reason(s) why the navy, or Department of Defense, chose the North American NA-300 over the other LARA proposals? Why the army and marines preferred the Convair Model 48 over the North American NA-300?

Performance-wise, the story goes that the Lockheed entrant actually was the best, but Lockheed gambled that the customer weren't really than concerned with the paradrop and ease of loading requirements. They gambled wrong.

Regarding Model 48 vs. NA-300, in virtually every significant performance measure the Model 48 was better (although while both met the requirement for time for engine change, the NA-300 could do it faster) and would be available sooner. Plus, the pilot could survive a ditching in the Model 48. There was some talk that Convair didn't validate their promises on paper as well as North American did. Convair said, "Wait a minute, we've got the actual plane here and can show you it does what we say it does". DoD seemed to feel having sufficient documentation claiming you could do it carried a higher weight than actually doing it. Since the Charger flying around and having the Marines cast covetous eyes at it was kind of an embarrassment to the bureaucracy (which is the worst crime you can commit), it was fortunate from a bureaucratic point of view that that Navy pilot screwed up and crashed the aircraft.

As far as Army goes, even though it would be an idela aircraft for their needs, USAF never would have let them operate the aircraft.

Paifully accurate I believe. Sadly there are even more bureaucrats now. Yet we are puzzled at our inability to develop and field new aircraft.

In the coming revolution I would like to add bureaucrats to the list with lawyers as first to go.
 
What really pisses me off is that the USAF "wouldn't let" the Army have an aircraft that is more capable than what they have on their roster. The Army and Air Force were officially split into two separate entities as of 1947 or 1948, and yet the USAF is still in a position to make the Army's procurement process complicated or impossible if they want to... Makes you wonder if the people in command there realize that the military could not exist without the taxpayer's money and if they truly care to go for what best serves the nation's interests!
 
Stargazer2006 said:
What really pisses me off is that the USAF "wouldn't let" the Army have an aircraft that is more capable than what they have on their roster. The Army and Air Force were officially split into two separate entities as of 1947 or 1948, and yet the USAF is still in a position to make the Army's procurement process complicated or impossible if they want to... Makes you wonder if the people in command there realize that the military could not exist without the taxpayer's money and if they truly care to go for what best serves the nation's interests!

Isn't this situation a result of the "Function of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff", colloquially known as the "Key West Agreement of 1948", the "Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding of 1952", and the "Johnson-McConnell Agreement of 1966"?
 
Triton said:
Stargazer2006 said:
What really pisses me off is that the USAF "wouldn't let" the Army have an aircraft that is more capable than what they have on their roster. The Army and Air Force were officially split into two separate entities as of 1947 or 1948, and yet the USAF is still in a position to make the Army's procurement process complicated or impossible if they want to... Makes you wonder if the people in command there realize that the military could not exist without the taxpayer's money and if they truly care to go for what best serves the nation's interests!

Isn't this situation a result of the "Function of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff", colloquially known as the "Key West Agreement of 1948", the "Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding of 1952", and the "Johnson-McConnell Agreement of 1966"?

This is the old "roles and missions" game. USAF historically has been very possessive regarding missions it considers its own even if it actually has little interest in performing the mission itself. By the mid '60s armed fixed wing aircraft and fixed wing transport were deemed USAF's exclusive province. McNamara's DoD backed this position. This is why the highly effective armed Mohawks were defanged and why the Army's Caribou and Buffalo aircraft were transferred to USAF. You can see another instance in the case of the AH-56 Cheyenne. As long as it was strictly for "helicopter escort", the a/c was OK. However, when Army felt it could also be used for Close Air Support and attack, that crossed the line and USAF stated an intense lobbying campaign against it, to the point that a number of aviation authorities credit the AH-56 as being one of USAF's main motivations behind the AX program which resulted in the A-10.

Relating to this topic and in light of the missions LARA was intended to perform, there's no way USAF would have let the Army operate such an aircraft.
 
Thanks for detailing this sad situation. It is ironical that the Marine Corps, although more organically related to the Navy, doesn't seem to suffer from this kind of undermining and struggle for territory. The Army is not in any way under control of, or accountable to the USAF, yet the Air Force seems to be pretty much in a domineering position.
 
Stargazer2006 said:
Thanks for detailing this sad situation. It is ironical that the Marine Corps, although more organically related to the Navy, doesn't seem to suffer from this kind of undermining and struggle for territory. The Army is not in any way under control of, or accountable to the USAF, yet the Air Force seems to be pretty much in a domineering position.

USMC is actually part of the USN (although traditionally both try not to admit it except in bar fights with Army and AF personnel). They generally don't have turf fights over aviation roles, although Navy will sometimes try and divert Marine funding to shore up its own roles--part of the reason USMC fighter squadrons started getting permanently based on CVs. It is worthy of note that every so often USAF proponents have opined that USAF should be performing the aviation functions of the Marine Corps, but so far that hasn't gone anywhere.
 
The Key West Agreement has been a bane to the Army since the late fifties. F-14D is correct that it was used and continues to be used by the Air Force when convenient. Ironically they will refuse to change how they want to do missions then turn around and stiff arm the Army when they attempt to achieve the new capability that intrudes on Air Force perceived turf. Two recent examples of this are the C-27J and the Army Warrior UAS programs, both designed to fill real needs for the Army not being filled by the Air Force. It most likely follows the same historic pattern. The Army agreed to give the USAF the C-27J mission (the acquisition of which was IMMEDIATLEY cut in half and the Air Force is "continuing to investigate" if they really do need to do that mission)[like they did the Caribou] in order to keep the reconnaissance asset, the "Warrior" UAS [like the attack helicopter AH-1].

Watch this space if the Army ever elects to acquire a tilt rotor to replace the Apache for the attack mission.
 
Why can't the Army lobby to have the Key West Agreement repealed and then cite all of the times the USAF has screwed them over and what it's cost, both monetarily and operationally? Is it just that the USAF wields more political pull than the Army? Or is it just that, as much as it's a PITA to the Army, it's not high on their list of battles to be fought?
 
yasotay said:
<snip>
The Army agreed to give the USAF the C-27J mission (the acquisition of which was IMMEDIATLEY cut in half and the Air Force is "continuing to investigate" if they really do need to do that mission)[like they did the Caribou] in order to keep the reconnaissance asset, the "Warrior" UAS [like the attack helicopter AH-1].

Watch this space if the Army ever elects to acquire a tilt rotor to replace the Apache for the attack mission.

Getting a bit off-topic, but originally the Army wanted a version of the V-22 that could cruise at 30,000 feet with a pressurized section for their Special Equipment Missions Aircraft program. You can imagine how well that went over with the boys in blue, and under pressure that entire role was dropped, leading to Army's eventual withdrawl from the program.
 
Sundog said:
Why can't the Army lobby to have the Key West Agreement repealed and then cite all of the times the USAF has screwed them over and what it's cost, both monetarily and operationally? Is it just that the USAF wields more political pull than the Army? Or is it just that, as much as it's a PITA to the Army, it's not high on their list of battles to be fought?

To answer your last two questions:

Until recently, Yes

At the present time, yes.
 
F-14D said:
To answer your last two questions:

Until recently, Yes

At the present time, yes.

Thanks. Also thanks for the info on the Mohawk. All of the info I have on it shows it performing ground attack, in testing, and talks about how excellent it was at that role. I had always wondered why it never performed it operationally. Now I know.
 
Sundog said:
F-14D said:
To answer your last two questions:

Until recently, Yes

At the present time, yes.

Thanks. Also thanks for the info on the Mohawk. All of the info I have on it shows it performing ground attack, in testing, and talks about how excellent it was at that role. I had always wondered why it never performed it operationally. Now I know.


Actually, it did perform it operationally in Vietnam with the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment and others. Potential armament capability was built in with provisions for six weapons capable pylons because the OV-1 was originally a joint Army-Marines program and AF couldn't stop the Marines from having armed aircraft. The Marines pulled out because they determined that with all the sensors the Army wanted, the a/c would be too expensive for their needs. Even though it worked well as an armed CAS vehicle, since it was the Army operating it AF went into full "roles and missions mode" even to the point of demanding that Grumman delete from company brochures any reference to the Mohawk's armament capabilities. AF prevailed, and in 1965 Army was ordered to remove all armament capabilities from Mohawks in Vietnam and in the US.

On occasions during the war, some local commanders made field modifications that re-enabled the armament, because often the Mohawks would find threats that would be gone before AF fixed wings would show up. However, as soon as AF got wind of such aircraft, orders came down to cease and desist and neuter them again.
 
Mark Nankivil said:
Hi All -

For Elmayerle, the cover shot may be of use. For Pioneer, here's the last section of the article.

Enjoy the Day! Mark
Thanks for posting the Air Progress cover, Mark. Great painting! I really love these classic aviation magazine cover paintings as well as "what ifs", and this is a particularly nice one.
 
[link no longer active]
 

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364 pictures at the SDASM Archives.

Link: http://www.flickr.com/search/?ss=2&w=49487266%40N07&q=Model+48&m=text
 
Better photos of the Kaman K-16 design posted earlier in this thread:
 

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Vought V-458 Low Speed Wind Tunnel Model Drawings

I am pretty sure this design was considered for the LARA,
as the drawing is from 2/63 and in the title block of some
of the detail drawings has "COIN aircraft".

Source: Vought History Collection

bill
 

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hesham said:
Hi,

I think the Vought V.458 and V.472 were submitted to this tender.


As I expected before.

Also here is NA-300;

http://books.google.com.eg/books?id=WCYDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA45&dq=COIN+aircraft&hl=ar&ei=qoMwTMpgxuA47frAkwI&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=COIN%20aircraft&f=true
 

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Tophe said:
The North American Bronco was NA-300, 301, 302 according to my files.

Not so. ::)

NA-300 applied only to the seven YOV-10A prototypes.
NA-301 applied to a cancelled transport version.
NA-302 applied to a cancelled reconnaissance version.
NA-305 applied to the actual OV-10A production version, with 109 examples for the U.S. Army and 114 for the U.S. Marine Corps.
NA-311 applied to training and services for the OV-10A.
NA-312 applied to spares and repair parts for the OV-10A.
NA-313 applied to special support equipment for the OV-10A.
NA-317 applied to twenty OV-10A aircraft modified for flight forward control program
NA-321 applied to the U.S. Army's second OV-10A order for 48 more examples.
NA-338 applied to the six OV-10B and twelve OV-10B(Z) aircraft for Germany.
NA-342 applied to six OV-10C for the U.S. Army, several being sent to Thailand.
NA-348 applied to a projected U.S. Navy variant of the OV-10.
NA-354 applied to eight OV-10E aircraft for Venezuela.
NA-360 applied to sixteen OV-10C aircraft for Thailand.
NA-397 applied to sixteen OV-10F aircraft for Indonesia.
NA-404 applied to eight more OV-10E aircraft for Venezuela.
 

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