HSA win OR.339?

[zen]

It occurs to me that this is a blindingly obviously AH Scenario, and yet I don't recall us ever going into it at all.
So how about it?

Say for some reason HSA wins the OR.339 tender with the P.1129.
What happens next?
Do they do any better than BAC?
Or would ut be even worse?

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Well, the best case scenario for this is:

Someone grows a backbone and forces Hawker and Avro to do a combined submission with Avro having design leadership from the beginning. Maybe Camm died earlier, and "Freddie" Page is now in charge of Hawker as the returning 'prodigal son', or Hawker screw up badly on Hunter and get 'merged' early.

It looks something like the joint design submission (bottom). They have an awesome industrial plan. Maybe Lightning's having a few issues since Page left, and EE credibility is reduced. Avro / Hawker get the job.

Still, it's kind of the same aircraft as TSR.2. Is it likely to fare any better?

 

[Hood]

Still, it's kind of the same aircraft as TSR.2. Is it likely to fare any better?

Maybe, maybe not.
Managerial
On the flip side Avro and Hawker might work better together than EE and V-A as there is an existing Hawker Siddeley hierarchy overseeing things.
On the other hand, with the Gibb-Zuckerman procurement system the MoA is still likely to impose the multi-committee management structure with HSA as prime contractor but the MoA holding most of the sub-contractor authority and purse strings which caused terrible delays.
Technical
The Olympus 22R would still need development and there is no reason to suppose the difficulties encountered would be any different.
The nav/attack avionics might be slightly different so different suppliers, maybe a few more off the shelf parts but a lot would still be bespoke to TSR.2 and/or similar or identical to kit selected for the BAC TSR.2.
Were Avro/Hawker any more competent in system integration than EE/V-A? Both the latter did GW and EE had Lightning experience, Avro's Blue Steel was hardly a glowing success in terms of development.
Fewer aerodynamic unknowns in the P.1129 layout?
Would the design have saved any money? Possibly but probably not by much.

Its hard to quantify unknowns, some problems may have been eased and new ones may have taken their place. I can't see them being worse but its also hard to see them overcoming so many technical and financial burdens that got in the way. If HSA was left alone to get on with it they might have a chance but the MoA is never going to allow that.

 

[zen]

It's certainly a good point that irrespective of who wins, the Ministry will insert their capacity to 'committee it to death' by first mission creep, and constant interference.

I agree Avro actually ought to lead this, if anything perhaps this thread ought to change to Avro Wins OR.339?
There is just.....just possibly some chance HSA can get further along. As in essence both Avro and Hawkers designs seem more on the button for multirole.

 

[CJGibson]

Capacity.
Avro were about to be lumbered with the AW.681, developing the Vulcan and probably taking on Skybolt support.

So pretty busy at Avro.

Chris

 

[zen]

A thought....

P1129 was criticised for reliance of large drop tanks to achieve the 1,000nm ROA.
Inboard pylons on each side having 500gal (4,000lb) and outboard pylons having 300gal (2,400lb). A total of 1,600 imperial gallons or 12,800lb.
Intriguingly however this means it ought to be possible to carry two 1,000lb bombs on each outboard pylon and three 1,000lb bombs on each Inboard pylon. Four being a bit impractical.
Combined with ventral carriage of four 1,000lb bombs this makes 14 such bombs possible on short range missions.

This might permit a easier transition to a ADV version.

 

[uk 75]

Assuming a Hawker Siddeley rather than BAC aircraft had become TSR2 its main requirement would have been to avoid becoming unaffordable.
BAC's inability to quote a price for delivering TSR2 was the principal nail in the coffin.
The other factor was the RAF loading too many conflicting requirements leading to a Valiant replacement with rough field capability and Mach 2 performance.
Buccaneer proved to be the "hidden in plain sight" Canberra replacement. The TSR2 whether HS or BAC was too much plane for too much money.
The great shame is that because of the need for international collaboration the otherwise remarkable Tornado was too short-ranged.

 

[CJGibson]

the otherwise remarkable Tornado was too short-ranged.

Adequate for NW Europe

Chris

 

[uk 75]

the otherwise remarkable Tornado was too short-ranged.

Adequate for NW Europe

Chris

I read somewhere that one nuclear mission for the UK had been targets in the Kola peninsular but when Vulcans and Buccaneers gave way to Tornado this now required US F111s or flight refueling.
Cant remember where I read it so may be wrong.

 

[zen]

What would the RoA be of the P1129 without drop tanks?
600nm?

This wouldn't be that bad. At reduced fuel load the NMBR.3 mission, bar the V/STOL element can be covered.

Arguably the more I look at the P1129, the more flexible it looks compared to the BAC solution.

 

[alertken]

So let's role-play as the MoS early-58 team around the table staring at the models of the 10 submissions, all from firms giving us grief on simpler things like Scimitar. We are a silo-centric group led by RAE/Aerodynamics, so we think the platform is key. That is why we have dissuaded Sir Fred HP from this prospect, to liberate him to do Mk.2 Victor. Nobody around the table is aware of the joy in AWRE that we are about to access US Mk.28 so we can do a Big Bang in a casing about the size/weight of a drop tank, so dumping rotund Red Beard. Nobody here knows of Texas Instruments/Dallas progress on (to be) silicon chip IC. So we follow RAE's lead and we look for weighty payload and for cube capacity for lots of hot thermionic valves. So we like the V-S bid as it is massive: TSR.2 length would be 89% of Vulcan's. But V-S has failed abysmally on Swift and is dilatory on Scimitar. But we can't go to Avro, as we need Mk.2 Vulcan NOW!; we can't go to Gloster who can't do any Javelin, thin or thick; we can't go to AWA, hobbled by HS Gp MD Sir Frank Spriggs from bidding - 2 internally tense teams are enough; and we can't go to Hawker, who would be our logical player if NATO talks produce real deals (an MR of interest to Avro and a V/STOL FB natural to some HAL schemes): so their P.1129 Proposal would need to be shared around the Group, as Javelin and Hunter are, but now with Systems confusion. What we do know is that our trawls of US GW data include Kearfott INS and (to be) Autonetics Versatile Digital Analyser to give us some chance of fast/low level deep penetration.

We team know that the platform is junior to Bomb and nav/attack kit, so we judge we should take V-S' scheme, to be managed by GR Edwards/Weybridge, and built by GH Nelson/Preston. We also know that RRE will be overloaded on running this systems-intensive project plus all this GW, so we at MoS must in effect be Prime - airframe tinsmiths have no clue about complex avionics.

What we don't know we don't know, is that TI will go public on ICs 12/9/58, just as we settle OR339 (4th draft, 29/12/58) announce the V-A+EE arrangement 1/1/59 and release design ITP 3/6/59. But both RAF and RN DORs knew, issuing VG Joint OR.346, 4/59: Replacement ORs are normally after getting the predecessor prototype onway. The only reason V-A+EE work was not stopped on that day was the politics of industry rationalisation. A carrot was needed to keep HSGp in aviation (they had began their diversification 8/57 with Brush Group) such as to cause others to join that bandwagon - so they kept P.1129 on life support, deluded they had a chance, until DH chose which way to jump, 12/59.

If, mid-58 we team had chosen P.1129 and had hinted that DH/Saro would be good fit, then....woe and dismay would have shot it down on or about 6/4/65 for exactly the reasons the BAC type died. RAF neither needed nor could afford it. Lighter, cheaper (!Ha!) VG rules!

 

[zen]

What we don't know we don't know, is that TI will go public on ICs 12/9/58, just as we settle OR339 (4th draft, 29/12/58) announce the V-A+EE arrangement 1/1/59 and release design ITP 3/6/59. But both RAF and RN DORs knew, issuing VG Joint OR.346, 4/59: Replacement ORs are normally after getting the predecessor prototype onway. The only reason V-A+EE work was not stopped on that day was the politics of industry rationalisation

Hmmm.....
So what ought to have happened then is cancel OR.339 for focus on OR.346. Of which it ought to have settled on a straight out fight between VS VG solutions and DH fixed wing with lift jets.
Intriguingly this could produce 'interim' solutions as per AW.406, and possibly resolved by Spey Buccaneer....or licensed Thunderchief with Olympus.

Intriguing thought experiment lies in what AWA might have come up with.

However P.1129 could proceed in elements more rapidly as related parent P.1121 parts are still fresh and littering the factory floor. Essentially P.1121 can prove elements of the system. Though hated for distraction from the main game. Arguably 'as is', HS aerodynamics for P.1129 is based on P.1121. Basic airframe can proceed more rapidly.

Potential irony if P1129 cancelled in '65, but HSA finds custom for P.1121....Potential there for P.1121 as DA for P.1129 and back up solution to NMBR.3.

Hmmm.....DH and Saro merger.....a properly AH scenario.

 

[Hood]

Having read this I'm not sure that Hawker had the capacity for a job like GOR.339.

 

[zen]

Does seem so, DH had a better approach.
Suggests Avro or DH had the setup to do it within HSG.

Edited to insert mote thoughts....

Did AWA have a better setup than Hawkers?

HP seem on the money.
Fairey? Certainly they get the Weapon System concept.
Avro we know.
DH we know.
EE.
Saro? Small team but surprisingly good. Likely very dependent on individuals.
Bristol Certainly, but very slow....
Westlands definitely not.
Folland, too small an dependent on Petters.
Glosters ought to but isn't.
Blackburn probably another tight team, definitely getting a yet more hard lessons in Modern System design.
Vickers itself is huge, but......
Supermarine has gone though a lot of hard knocks. But how Modern are they?
Bolton Paul too small, too old fashioned definitely.

 

[uk 75]

The two companies that were created in the 60s reflected the strengths/weaknesses of their component parts.
British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) keeps up its swing wing VG designs doggedly throughout the decade. It finally gets to build MRCA/Tornado.
Hawker Siddeley (HS) is essentially wedded to single seater simple aircraft from the Camm stable. Hunter gives way to P1127RAF via P1154. By the 70s HS is reduced to Hawk trainers.
Vickers is the big player and size counts.

 

[Hood]

HP seem on the money.
Fairey? Certainly they get the Weapon System concept.
Avro we know.
DH we know.
EE.
Saro? Small team but surprisingly good. Likely very dependent on individuals.
Bristol Certainly, but very slow....
Westlands definitely not.
Folland, too small an dependent on Petters.
Glosters ought to but isn't.
Blackburn probably another tight team, definitely getting a yet more hard lessons in Modern System design.
Vickers itself is huge, but......
Supermarine has gone though a lot of hard knocks. But how Modern are they?
Bolton Paul too small, too old fashioned definitely.

My thoughts on the batting order:
HP - perhaps they had the most practical idea of how to meet GOR.339 but not necessarily how the RAF wants it done, also Sir FHP doesn't like merging.
Fairey - they get the concept but they seem to have stalled development wise post-Delta and never had any opportunity to do anything else (ignoring naval stuff of course)
Saro - again its a mixed bag, a capable team but we don't know enough about how competent they were in all aspects of design, development and production, sure they built a couple of SR.53s but F.177 was cancelled before they could get into their stride and they couldn't have done both 177 and 339, certainly not alone.
Bristol - again we don't know, they had no bites of the military cherry post 1945, they seem to have been cut out entirely by MoS. Perhaps they saw them more as a commercial aviation firm (Bristol 200)?
Folland - no way
Glosters - no way
Blackburn - possibly but not alone, I'd like to have seen an HP-Blackburn team, that could have been very interesting
Supermarine - like Hawker, living off past glories sadly and always in Vickers' shadow
Boulton Paul - they turned out some capable kit, but like Bristol and Fairey ended up as research aircraft builders out on the limb, but they had systems interests
Shorts - no way but if you want slightly more expensive sub-assemblies its a factory...

In reality all of these are bit players to Avro, DH, EE and Vickers and its hard to argue against rationalisation of some kind.
Perhaps the wrong move was trying to merge two A-League teams with all the clashes of ego that brings. What might have been wiser might have been A-League and one or two B-League to provide assistance in certain areas and spread production; e.g. Vickers & Fairey & Bristol.

 

[zen]

I'm tempted into a socking great DH scenario here. As flush with a successful Comet, and a speedier entry of Sea Vixen for RAF and RN, they would be well placed. Especially if they refuse MRBM from Sandys......
EE ought to have been made to take it frankly.
A DH Saro tie up, is quite potent and a Solent competitor for Vickers-Supermaine.

A Fairey-Avro tie up could produce a solid series of Delta wing designs.

 

[alertken]

Because we here have more interest in aeroplanes than in phallii we under-estimate the political/industrial place of Lectronics/GW. Boeing and Lockheed are where they are today as much due to Minuteman and Polaris, as to any one of their winged products. Raytheon has muscled into Aero (they began in domestic appliances), rocket-powered. The amalgamations leading to EuroAerospace of today have been Systems-led. High risk business, bringing power/influence rewards to champions.

But it is almost wholly riskless...commercially. A site can shut/be sold if its prime product fails...but it doesn't make an accounting loss. Its R&D is almost always reimbursed - if not upfront (Polaris recorded an R&D loss), then in overheads in production; unit prices are not fixed until everybody is ready to do so. But what GW can do is drain management attention, because so many chattering, conflicting teams end up in one small tube. See (ex-DH/HSD) and (ex-Marconi Space & Defence): Skyflash.

That, I think, is why EE/Nelson in 1954 thanked Sandys nicely for his Thunderbird business and its nice new Luton and Stevenage sites, but briskly declined the MRBM: Thunderbird would be hard enough to deliver from EE's near-one-stop-shop (EE owned Marconi and Napier): herding aggressive felines on structure+guidance+propulsion+controls++: too hard.

So when MoS Aubrey Jones (no Aero career history) was persuaded by his Permanent Secretary Sir Cyril Musgrave to use OR339 as the long-sought means to rationalise, he was advised not only by Controller Aircraft, but by Controller Lectronics & GW, D (and DD)/RAE and by D/RRE. The only senior with cross-silo experience was DD/RAE, Morien Morgan, who had created UK GW,1949 and specifically had assigned it to aeronauts (others chose ordnance folk).

The root of all our problems was silo: prorities for manned v. unmanned. All made worse by the by-passing of MoS by AWRE who answered notionally to a designated Minister, who was Science/Education-centric. Secrecy meant that they answered to nobody, attended such meetings as they saw fit and circulated little paper to anybody.

Musgrave/Jones (and the heftier figure of Sandys at Defence) could not direct any marrriages. So: little Hunting-Percival (12/57: Hunting A/c) could not simply be told to crawl off to a care home, because at Ampthill (to be Hunting Engineering) was doing good things atomically. HSGrp. could not be invited to delete AWA because the Navy relied on Seaslug. So the coupling was...erratic.

 

[zen]

Hmmm...

AWA could be deleted if EE Thunderbird mkII a.k.a Green Flax, had been adopted for RN, then Sea Slug remains just a development programme lingering on from '49. Decision during Country DDG.
AWA Sea Slug ought to have stick with liquid and smaller design. As intended prior to solid fuel.
Mote ought to have been made of EE Luton Thunderbird.


Curious suspicions over DH Saro....elements of DH.117 very reminiscent of elements of Saro P.177...almost as if they had close contact.....?
Certainly in transport and rockets a good tie up.
DH GW is a natural for props technical focus. But not so for MRBM. Stick to guidance system as a supplier there.
Saro might ironically be the better choice for MRBM...

 

[alertken]

Close contact. Timelines don't gell. Design bosses Brennan (Saro), Bishop (DH) would have met at Committees (MoS/ARC/RAe.S) where novelty/RAE thoughts were disseminated, but were alert to competitive advantage and would not reveal their schemes before tenders were safely in. Saro won F.124T (DH no bid) with SR.177, R&D ITP 4/9/55. They competed on F.155T, tenders in 12/10/55: Saro P.187 instantly rejected, DH.117 in 3/56.

DH bought effective control of Saro with 33% stake, 9/56: SR.177 was then still very live and DH's motives were, in part, to protect their Gyron Jr./Spectre position on it, but also to ensure that Saro/Black Knight supported Blue Streak, no more, no less. However they did muscle onto SR.177, which needed production/industrial heft to be credible, especially for export. It was to have been managed from Cowes, assembled at DH (ex-Airspeed) Christchurch and delivered from Hurn (DH site to be obtained - maybe they anticipated the Airwork FRU moving to Yeovilton).

The Saro Divn. of DH Group was sold to Westland 14/7/59, Brennan having decamped to V-A. It had become a confusion in merger discussions, DH Enterprise (already muddled with overseas/props/engines...) with HS Group and (to be) BAC.

 

[zen]

Does raise the AH issue of F.177 going ahead.
Could this have shifted DH position?
A F.177 'success' (getting to FAA and RAF service, maybe a license with Heinkel and Mitsubishi), would exert pull on teams, potentially DH Christchurch too busy for OR.339.
Possibly no submission to OR.346.
Only later to AW.406.....although why would you run that if you have F.177?

DH continuing funding of Gyron Junior for cooled Compressor blades (aiming for 10,000lb static dry thrust) and general attendance, makes Bristol T.188 more useful (rumours of lack of interest compound T.188 failure) and mkII Buccaneer using upgraded Gyron Junior instead of Spey. RR even more doomed prior to '64/ to '65.

 

[alertken]

rumours of lack of interest compound T.188 failure

Alert! Error by zen!
No rumour.

12/53 ITP, (1 static+2) with Avon RA.24R, to RAE's preferred M2.25 Bomber layout. No benefit to Bristol when Avro 730 was chosen 11/55.
MoS imposed extensive structure fabrication by AWA.
9/55 3 more T.188 ordered.
3/56 ASM P.176 chosen for Avro 730, displacing Avon in T.188s.
4/4/57 Avro 730+3xT.188 deleted. 2 retained at request of MoS/DGSR(A), Aircraft Research budget holder: DG Eng (R&D) needed an FTB for DH Gyron Jr, selected for NA.39, 2/6/55; RAE needed some stainless steel/Mach>2.2 competence, post-Avro 730, for SST discussions.

Time effluxes. Bristol's Sir A.Russell (to be Chairman,Filton Div,BAC) and RAE recoil from >M.2.2. MoS Study contracts 7/59 were for Avro to look at thick-wing. V-A was clearly best qualified (VC10/Vanguard/Viscount) to do civil thin: MoS gave it to Bristol, in part for Russell's personal stature, more to give the owners something to value Filton into coalescence with somebody* (V-A had won TSR.2, 3/6/59).

Soon T.188 morphed into a soak - not thermal, but bookings: the default Job No. at the photo-copier. First flight 14/4/62. 8.5yrs. Shocking.

(* T.221 was much the same. RAE discussion with Fairey identified FD.2 conversion as ogee proof-vehicle. Fairey, then in Airco with DH and Hunting, defining (to be DH.121 Trident), acquiesced in work-sharing which gave the job to Hunting, who were bought by BAC 9/60, who assigned it to Filton (bought 18/12/59), ignorant of FD.2. So this too, drifted to first flight, 1/5/64, by when Concorde metal was being cut).

 

[zen]

Alert! Error by zen!
No rumour.

Perfect recall and access to materials Ken?
For us mortals, mere memory and time limited for post.
One day I may have that time and my books again.....
....
One day.

 

[zen]

4/4/57 Avro 730+3xT.188 deleted. 2 retained at request of MoS/DGSR(A), Aircraft Research budget holder: DG Eng (R&D) needed an FTB for DH Gyron Jr, selected for NA.39, 2/6/55; RAE needed some stainless steel/Mach>2.2 competence, post-Avro 730, for SST discussions.

Needed also for F.177. Reheated Gyron Junior needed experience.
T.188 testbed.
F.177 ISD about 1960.
Also several competitors in F.155 used Gyron Junior.
Including favoured AWA
Expert DH

Also last minute bid refused had Saro option for twin Gyron Junior.

Also 'interim' OR.339 Buccaneer variant using developed Gyron Junior.

 

[Hood]

12/53 ITP, (1 static+2) with Avon RA.24R, to RAE's preferred M2.25 Bomber layout. No benefit to Bristol when Avro 730 was chosen 11/55.

The layout was also RAE's preferred M2 Interceptor layout too for OR.329/F.155 which built on work done to ER.134T.
AWA had been runner up in 8/53 for ER.134 too with the AW.66 (2x Sapphire Sa.7, 1st Proto all light alloy, 2nd proto with steel wing), losing out to Bristol due to their Javelin commitments but picking up sub-contract work on Type 188.
The three additional 188s were linked to OR.329 and OR.330, but the latter OR seems to have overtaken the design requirements for Type 188. Ironically AWA came runner up again with the AW.169 for F.155, which of course had 4x Gyron Juniors but was cancelled in 11/56 (reluctance by MoS to let AWA build a fighter development team there). AW.69 was designed for M2.0 but AWA felt M2.7 could be reached and that M3.0 was possible with stainless steel construction and higher-thrust engines.

So some further questions:
1) Did ER.134 have any purpose beyond supporting OR.330 given the F.155 interceptors mostly replicated ER.134 in terms of performance, beyond the obvious differences in stainless steel construction?
2) Had AW.66 gone ahead would this have clinched the AW.69 for F.155?
3) If AW.69 had gone ahead and F.155 still fallen to Sandys axe, would the prototypes have been saved to serve as Gyron Junior testbeds?
4) If the answer to 3 is yes, would that mean the end for Type 188 given the Avro 730 and its P.176 engines were dead? Maybe AWA is told to go ahead and build a stainless steel M3.0 AW.69...

I can't help feeling ER.134 was always a programme looking for rationales to exist, giving minor players like Bristol and AWA some work to do while the big firms got on with the real ORs like 329 and 330 which ER.134 played some minor role in the initial design stages but which as flying hardware could have barely given any practical support given those ORs were only 1-2 years behind ER.134. As Ken points out the dithering cost 8 years, certainly had F.155 gone ahead it would have been entering service by 1962 and the Avro 730 would certainly have been flying in prototype form by then.

 

[zen]

12/53 ITP, (1 static+2) with Avon RA.24R, to RAE's preferred M2.25 Bomber layout. No benefit to Bristol when Avro 730 was chosen 11/55.

The layout was also RAE's preferred M2 Interceptor layout too for OR.329/F.155 which built on work done to ER.134T.
AWA had been runner up in 8/53 for ER.134 too with the AW.66 (2x Sapphire Sa.7, 1st Proto all light alloy, 2nd proto with steel wing), losing out to Bristol due to their Javelin commitments but picking up sub-contract work on Type 188.
The three additional 188s were linked to OR.329 and OR.330, but the latter OR seems to have overtaken the design requirements for Type 188. Ironically AWA came runner up again with the AW.169 for F.155, which of course had 4x Gyron Juniors but was cancelled in 11/56 (reluctance by MoS to let AWA build a fighter development team there). AW.69 was designed for M2.0 but AWA felt M2.7 could be reached and that M3.0 was possible with stainless steel construction and higher-thrust engines.

So some further questions:
1) Did ER.134 have any purpose beyond supporting OR.330 given the F.155 interceptors mostly replicated ER.134 in terms of performance, beyond the obvious differences in stainless steel construction?
2) Had AW.66 gone ahead would this have clinched the AW.69 for F.155?
3) If AW.69 had gone ahead and F.155 still fallen to Sandys axe, would the prototypes have been saved to serve as Gyron Junior testbeds?
4) If the answer to 3 is yes, would that mean the end for Type 188 given the Avro 730 and its P.176 engines were dead? Maybe AWA is told to go ahead and build a stainless steel M3.0 AW.69...

I can't help feeling ER.134 was always a programme looking for rationales to exist, giving minor players like Bristol and AWA some work to do while the big firms got on with the real ORs like 329 and 330 which ER.134 played some minor role in the initial design stages but which as flying hardware could have barely given any practical support given those ORs were only 1-2 years behind ER.134. As Ken points out the dithering cost 8 years, certainly had F.155 gone ahead it would have been entering service by 1962 and the Avro 730 would certainly have been flying in prototype form by then.

Hmmmm....

1. Logic suggests the switch to Gyron Junior is part and parcel of support for the engine's use.
1a. Or 2.....AWA 166 climb superlative = superior to EE P.1.
Nose better for AI with illuminator + wingpit AAM clear field of view.
1b. a listed variant for naval use matches the logical limitations of carrier aircraft.
1c since mid-50's call for new light turbojets had Gyron Junior as the winner.

2. Possibly yes or possibly a pre-prototype for technology proof. Derisking things and a backup.

3 logically yes, as suspicion is T.188 was.

4. Logically yes.

I did raise the scenario.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/awa-166-instead-of-bristol-188.35633/