Here's why the F-35 was designated F-35 instead of F-24

Steve Pace

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Why was the F-35A designated as such instead of the F-24A? This was an 11-digit leap and needs an explanation. If the status quo had been adhered to the F-35A would have been designated F-24A since the Northrop/McDonnell Douglas YF-23 ATF prototype was the last USAF fighter produced before it. But it was not designated F-24A. In March 2005 this writer asked Public Affairs in the JSF System Program Office to explain why this happened and its succinct answer was: “We asked HQ USAF early on that only the X prefix be changed to help save changes in all the paperwork. And our request was approved. If the X-32 had won it would have been designated F-32.” -SP
 
"Early on" when? "Early on" after General Hough and Under Secretary Aldrige screwed up at the press conference, I suspect.

If it were truly the case that this was the planned designation all along, you'd think Lockheed would have known in advance. In the actual event, their website said that JSF would be the F-24 for about a day after the selection announcement.

Remember, we have clear documentation that the F-35 designation was not requested until December 2001, nearly two months AFTER the October 2001 selection announcement.

http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nonstandard-mds.html#_MDS_F35
 
I'm only going by what the lady in PA told me and, for the life of me, I cannot remember her name. -SP
 
Yeah but those who heard the announcement know the real reason. ;D "What will it be called now?" "Uhhhhh F-35?" And thus it was.
 
Yep, I agree with sferrin. Making the paper work much easier to change makes a better cover story than we didn't want to embarrass JSF Program Manager Major General Mike Hough who chose the number F-35 out of sequence.

Source:
http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/nonstandard-mds.html#_MDS_F35
 
Steve Pace said:
I'm only going by what the lady in PA told me and, for the life of me, I cannot remember her name. -SP

I don't doubt you. By 2005, they'd had ample time to internalize the idea that this was an intentional choice. The PA people may even have believed it (they're good at that sort of self-deception).

I think the desire not to change documentation was probably at least partially true, but not becasue of old documentation. Rather, the Program Office likely started using F-35 on documents from October, when their bosses misspoke. In December, the Nomenclature Office told them they had got it wrong and needed to change to F-24. By that point, there would be quite a lot of documentation using the wrong term. Changing all the paperwork created over the previous two months would have been a (minor) hardship, so they pushed for HQ USAF to override the Nomenclature Office and assign F-35 officially.
 
Yes, that's the logical conclusion. Now one has to wonder why the leap to F135 (F136 considered as an alternate) for its propulsion system? -SP
 
A transcript excerpt of the press conference was posted here on SPF a while back...

The PAO explanation to Mr. Pace is an excellent example of a flack retconning an explanation for the actions of a superior who was clueless as to the rules of the designation system in which he was working.

As far as the F135 engine designation, well, "in for a penny, in for a pound".
 
I wonder if causing embarrassment to Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics Edward C. "Pete" and JSF Program Manager Major General Mike Hough is/was considered a career limiting move at the Department of Defense and Department of Air Force. Is it really that a big of all deal to lose 11 designators considering that the United States Air Force still uses the Century series?
 
Gen. Hough sure didn't seem to know what he was talking about! "More's the pity." -SP
 
Isn't this a variation of the process in how the SR-71 got its' designation? I seem to recall something about the letters being reversed.
 
fredymac said:
Isn't this a variation of the process in how the SR-71 got its' designation? I seem to recall something about the letters being reversed.
SR was for Strategic Reconnaissance - it was supposed to be RS for Reconnaissance Strike. RS-71 being a follow-on to RS-70 --- the XB-70A Valkyrie derivative that wasn't proceeded with. And yes it was erroneously reversed by President Johnson. -SP
 
The jump to F135 makes it all the more convenient to back up the story that F-35 was picked for practicality. If the X-32 had become the F-32 they most certainly would have called it the F132...

The nuts who are in charge of designating aircraft at the DoD are not only bad at covering up official boo-boos, but they also take the average citizens for fools who will buy their inept explanations. But then why would they care to keep any logic to the system? After all, the public at large has accepted the idea that having a stealth attack aircraft designated with a fighter prefix in a numeral sequence that had been obsolete for 25 years was perfectly normal!

And remember also that it's the same guys who announced quite officially that the Boeing E-6A Hermes was to be renamed as Mercury because it sounded too much like herpes! The same guys who came up with a perfectly official statement that the number "69" was skipped from the helicopter series because of its sexual connotations!! Anyone cared to wonder why the folks who designated the Boeing Bomarc as IM-69, the Lockheed Neptune as RB-69 and the Lockheed Constellation as C-69 never had any qualms about the number? Either this is a cover-up and the H-69 is a secret helo (Stealth Hawk?) or our society has become so screwed up that even the highest military command sees sexual connotations everywhere...
 
.... And yes it was erroneously reversed by President Johnson. -SP

And no, it wasn't (at least by Johnson).

Please refer to Paul Suhler's discussion based on scripts and transcripts of the press conference (located by researcher John Wilson at the LBJ Presidential Library) on pages 240 and 241 in his excellent "From Rainbow to Gusto".
 
This would be a better 'fake' answer, because it was 3rd generation stealth and a 5th generation fighter. So the F-X/F/A-XX will be the F-46. ;D
 
Skyblazer said:
Anyone cared to wonder why the folks who designated the Boeing Bomarc as IM-69, the Lockheed Neptune as RB-69 and the Lockheed Constellation as C-69 never had any qualms about the number? Either this is a cover-up and the H-69 is a secret helo (Stealth Hawk?) or our society has become so screwed up that even the highest military command sees sexual connotations everywhere...

No, I believe them on this. We as a society do see (or at least acknowledge) a lot more sexual innuendo now than we used to.
 
Skyblazer said:
The nuts who are in charge of designating aircraft at the DoD are not only bad at covering up official boo-boos, but they also take the average citizens for fools who will buy their inept explanations. But then why would they care to keep any logic to the system? After all, the public at large has accepted the idea that having a stealth attack aircraft designated with a fighter prefix in a numeral sequence that had been obsolete for 25 years was perfectly normal!
Um, let me inject a thought here. This lack of rigor in the designation system is supremely annoying, but there are probably 250 people in the entire world who care about this, and the vast majority of them seem to be in SPF. The rest are probably in the USAF office responsible for MDS. I could walk out of my office door and quiz the first one hundred people I meet, and maybe about 20% of them would get F-for-fighter and B-for-bomber, because that's what's in the news, but beyond that, no one has a clue. (And, of that 20%, 95% would be males over 40.)
 
George Allegrezza said:
Um, let me inject a thought here. This lack of rigor in the designation system is supremely annoying, but there are probably 250 people in the entire world who care about this, and the vast majority of them seem to be in SPF. The rest are probably in the USAF office responsible for MDS. I could walk out of my office door and quiz the first one hundred people I meet, and maybe about 20% of them would get F-for-fighter and B-for-bomber, because that's what's in the news, but beyond that, no one has a clue. (And, of that 20%, 95% would be males over 40.)

HERESY!! BURN HIM

(I am of course joking, a useful reality check,....and it made me laugh!)
 
Not to hijack this, but any reason for FB-111, A-37 and AV-8 for being incorrect way back in the '60s? AFAIK it should have been BF-111 if that is what they wanted, AT-37, and the Harrier should have been AV-6 or something, or heck, just A-8 or VA-8. I have never seen a suitable answer anywhere.
 
Steve Pace said:
TomS said:
Steve Pace said:
BoMarc was at first F-99 then IM-99 and finally CIM-99 or I am wrong? -SP

CIM-10.
Oops! Yes CIM-10. ::)

To be more precise, the USAF designation was first F-99 (project code MX-1599), then IM-69, then IM-99; IIRC originally it was just the Canadian examples that had the CIM-10 designation, but in 1963 the USAF examples were redesignated CIM-10 as well. Conventionally armed examples had the A suffix while the nuclear armed versions had the B suffix.
 
We all know the real reason. Yf-24 had already flown and then [REDACTED] by the time they were getting a designation for the JSF winner. :)
 
Steve Pace said:
BoMarc was at first F-99 then IM-99 and finally CIM-99 or I am wrong? -SP

Grey Havoc said:
To be more precise, the USAF designation was first F-99 (project code MX-1599), then IM-66, then IM-99

You are BOTH partly wrong... However, I must admit the designation IM-69 (although originally reserved for the Bomarc in the first M- series and supposed to replace F-99), was actually never used, apparently at Boeing's request.

Model 621 Bomarc
XF-99 --> XIM-99

Model 624 Bomarc A
XF-99A --> XIM-99A
YF-99A --> YIM-99A
IM-99A --> CIM-10A / CQM-10A

Model 631 Bomarc B
IM-99B --> CIM-10B / CQM-10B

TomS said:
We as a society do see (or at least acknowledge) a lot more sexual innuendo now than we used to.

Sad but true I guess.

George Allegrezza said:
Um, let me inject a thought here. This lack of rigor in the designation system is supremely annoying, but there are probably 250 people in the entire world who care about this, and the vast majority of them seem to be in SPF. The rest are probably in the USAF office responsible for MDS. I could walk out of my office door and quiz the first one hundred people I meet, and maybe about 20% of them would get F-for-fighter and B-for-bomber, because that's what's in the news, but beyond that, no one has a clue. (And, of that 20%, 95% would be males over 40.)

Soooooo very accurate, unfortunately!! :p

famvburg said:
Not to hijack this, but any reason for FB-111, A-37 and AV-8 for being incorrect way back in the '60s? AFAIK it should have been BF-111 if that is what they wanted, AT-37, and the Harrier should have been AV-6 or something, or heck, just A-8 or VA-8. I have never seen a suitable answer anywhere.

- A-37 initially was the AT-37D. The change to A-37A, although non-sequential, was perfectly kosher (like the remaining Dauntless aircraft becoming F-24 for instance).
- The FB-111 was indeed reversed and ought to have been BF-111, a fighter used in the bomber role. Perhaps someone at the Pentagon thought it sounded too Luftwaffe-ish??
- The Harrier is the worst by far, as it should NEVER have been AV-8A at all... V-8 already was the Ryan Fleep! The P.1127 prototypes were XV-6A, so in all logic it should have been AV-6A or A-8A (and NOT VA-8A either, because "V" did not indicate a mission that would modify the primary attack role).
 
TomS said:
If it were truly the case that this was the planned designation all along, you'd think Lockheed would have known in advance. In the actual event, their website said that JSF would be the F-24 for about a day after the selection announcement.
Did anybody manage to grab a screencap of that?
 
Briefing on the Joint Strike Fighter Contract Announcement
(Contract announcement for the Joint Strike Fighter Program. Also participating were Lord Willy Bach, under secretary of Defence and minister for Defence, United Kingdom; Gordon England, secretary of the Navy; James Roche, secretary of the Air Force; Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Michael Hough, Joint Strike Fighter Program Manager; and Richard McGraw, principal deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. See related news release at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/b10262001_bt543-01.html and contract announcement at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/c10262001_ct544-01.html )


McGraw: Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Have a room full of new faces, so for those of you whom I haven't met, my name is Dick McGraw. I'm the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.


We have an announcement to make today on the Defense Acquisition Board, and to make that announcement is the under secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics.


Sir, you're up.


Aldridge: I'm up? (Laughter.)


Well, good afternoon. We're here today to announce two important decisions on the largest acquisition program in the history of the Department of Defense, the Joint Strike Fighter. The value of the program, depending on the degree of international cooperation and participation, will be -- could be in excess of $200 billion.


I have with me today three key customers of the Joint Strike Fighter: the secretary of the Navy, Gordon England; the secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche; and from the United Kingdom, the minister of Defense Procurement, Lord Willy Bach, and the national armaments director and the chief of Defense Procurement, Sir Robert Walmsley.


Also with me today is the Joint Strike Fighter program manager, Major General Mike Hough, who's over at the side, and the deputy program manager, Brigadier General Jack Hudson.


The Joint Strike Fighter is a family of highly common, lethal, survivable, supportable, and affordable next-generation multi-role strike fighter aircraft. There are three variants: one for conventional takeoff and landing, applied to the Air Force mission; a carrier-deck-compatible variant for the Navy; and a short takeoff and vertical landing -- STOVL -- variant for the Marine Corps and the United Kingdom.


This family of aircraft will replace the aging fleet of Air Force A-10s and F-16s, the early model Navy F/A-18s, and the Marine Corps AV-8Bs.


The United Kingdom is a major partner in the development, and there is additional strong international interest in the program.


Two contractor teams, one led by Lockheed Martin and the other led by Boeing, have just completed a concept development phase that demonstrated the design validity and the flight performance of the three aircraft variants. Both contractor teams met or exceeded the performance objective established for the aircraft and have met the established criteria and technical maturity for entering the next phase of the program, systems development and demonstration.


Advanced aircraft design knowledge, improved engine performance, lighter-weight materials, and computer-aided design capability have permitted both contractors to build and fly a highly common airframe that meets the multiple needs of the military and potential international partners.


The Joint Strike Fighter will be the world's premier strike platform beginning in 2008, and lasting through 2040. It will provide an air-to-air capability second only to the F-22 Air Superiority Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter would allow for migration by U.S. forces to an almost all-stealth fighter force by 2025. For the Navy and Marine Corps, the Joint Strike Fighter represents their first deployment of an all-aspect stealth platform.


There will be a package of information available describing the JSF -- available to you, describing its capabilities and variants we tend to develop, and I will not go over that detail this afternoon.


This week, on Wednesday, October 24, 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board met to review the status of the Joint Strike Fighter and to determine whether the aircraft is ready to enter this next phase. We reviewed the technical performance relative to the exit criteria for the SDD phase; the funding profiles projected over the next 10 years; and the unit-cost estimates. We also reviewed an independent technology maturity report by the director of Defense Research and Engineering. Based on the information received, we have concluded that the Joint Strike Fighter is ready to enter the next phase of development. This is not a decision to enter into production or a decision on how many aircraft to produce, but it is a commitment to continue the development leading to those decisions in the future.


The DAB has made the decision to enter into SDD, and that decision has been reviewed and concurred in by the secretary and deputy secretary of Defense. I have signed the documentation that implements this decision.


With the decision to proceed now made, it is now appropriate to announce the winner of the Joint Strike Fighter competition, and the prime contractor team for the remaining phases of the program. The source-selection process is very rigorous, comprehensive, balanced, and strict, leading to a decision on the best offer by the source- selection authority, in this case the secretary of the Air Force.


I would now like to turn the podium over to the Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche, to announce the winner of the competition.


Jim?


Roche: Thank you very much, Pete.


The process involved -- in the end, it was about 250 people, Source Selection Advisory Council. In addition, my colleague, Gordon England, the secretary of the Navy, and I had a chance to discuss the selection process with each of the subcommittees of this. We also had a chance to read everything. We separately met with the companies so that we heard from the companies, and both proposals were very good; both demo programs were very good.


But on the basis of strengths, weaknesses and degrees of risk of the program, it is our conclusion, joined in by our colleagues from the United Kingdom, that the Lockheed Martin team is the winner of the Joint Strike Fighter program on a best-value basis.


On that basis, I'll turn it over to my colleague, Gordon England.


England: Jim, thanks very much.


I just want to thank Secretary Roche, one, for his leadership at this phase of the program. I also want to thank General Mike Hough, who did a terrific job the last couple of years on this program. This is a program very, very important to the Navy; very, very important to our Marines. It has my personal full support, and I concur fully in this decision. Jim and I worked as a team in this decision.


I also want to thank the contractor teams, the management, the engineers on both the teams who because they worked very, very hard. I know a lot of dedication, a lot of energy, a lot of talent went into the program. I want to thank them for their efforts, and I do look forward going -- as we go forward on this program into the future.


Thank you all very much.


Q: Mr. Secretary?


Aldridge: Just a second. We'll have one more --


I'd like to turn it over to our U.K. partners, and Lord Willy Bach has a few words to say.


Thank you, Willy.


Bach: Thank you very much, Pete.


Today, ladies and gentlemen, United Kingdom and United States forces stand shoulder to shoulder at the forefront of the worldwide coalition battle against terrorism. I am, therefore, delighted to be here to demonstrate our partnership.


The United Kingdom government, as a full partner in the collaborative Joint Strike Fighter program, is very happy to endorse the decision to move the JSF program forward into the next phase and to pursue the Lockheed Martin contractual path.


May I briefly congratulate Pete Aldridge, Secretary Roche and Secretary England and the Joint Project Office, under the leadership of Major General Mike Hough, for the exemplary manner in which the program and this competition has been run to date. The United Kingdom is proud to be a partner in such a program.


Aldridge: Thank you, Willy.


Well, my congratulations to Lockheed Martin and their teammates for providing an exceptional product for our military and our nation. And while the Boeing team was not selected, they did a terrific job during the concept-development phase, and my congratulations to them during that process.


Now we'll respond to any questions you may have.


Q: I'd like to ask you whether you're encouraging Lockheed Martin to share the work with Boeing, either as co-prime or in any other way.


Aldridge: The source selection did not have that in the process. Once the team has now been selected to proceed on, if Lockheed Martin wishes to use the unique talents of Boeing, they have -- they are free to do so.


We're not forcing them to do it, but we're not -- if they would like to do that, that's up to them.


Q: Would you encourage them though to do so, from the standpoint of maintaining the industrial base and ensuring that Boeing remains as a tactical aircraft maker?


Aldridge: We would not discourage it, let's put it that way. They have a team. They put a team together to win this competition. They have a great team. How they proceed at this point obtaining other talent is really up to them.


Q: Secretary Aldridge?


Aldridge: Yes.


Q: Mr. Aldridge, can you expound a little bit on the value of the program and the phase you're going into today or next week? There's been a lot of stories that today you were going to announce the $225 billion production contract, the largest ever. Clarify this for the public please.


Aldridge: Okay. The phase that we're entering in is called System Development and Demonstration phase. It is the phase of the program that will prove out the validity and design and capability of the aircraft prior to entering production. It is not a decision to enter production at this point in time, it is a decision to enter the next phase. The contract that's been awarded to Lockheed Martin I think is about $19 billion for this, and there's another contract to Pratt and Whitney, which will be the engine producer at this phase in the program, of about 4 billion, 4.8, I believe is the number.


So it is not a production decision. It is a decision to enter in the development phase, SDD we call it.


Q: What is the --


Aldridge: Let me go to -- yes.


Q: What were the strengths of the Lockheed Martin design? Was this a close call, or was this a no-brainer?


Aldridge: That's for Jim Roche.


Roche: It was very clear as we went through the process that while both were very, very strong, and they both had very good teammates, that the Lockheed Martin proposal, the Lockheed Martin team, which had Northrop and British Aerospace on it, emerged continuously as the clear winner based on strengths that they had, few weaknesses and the risks involved in the proposals of both sides.


With respect to the details of that, we'll be debriefing each of the companies over the next week, and we'd rather speak to them about these first before we speak to anybody else.


Q: Mr. Aldridge.


Q: Mr. Aldridge.


Aldridge: Yes, sir.


Q: You said that you were -- I think you said you weren't going to encourage a split of the contract, but some members of Congress, particularly from Missouri, are planning, I think to offer legislation that would at least mandate the Pentagon to study that. Would you resist that?


Aldridge: I have been asked that question on several occasions about the strategy of the winner-take-all. We looked at that question very, very seriously. We understand the problems of this -- of the winner-take-all strategy in terms of long-range competition.


We looked at that quite thoroughly. Secretary Roche, Secretary England and I spent some time talking about this issue. We concluded that the winner-take-all strategy was the right approach. There are continuing production of fighter aircraft in the defense budget through the year 2012. The F-22 will continue in production with both Lockheed as a prime and Boeing as a subcontractor, building part of the airplane. And there's the continued production of the F-18 E and F. So, there's continued aircraft productions through the next eleven years, and after that point, there's still design work going on on unmanned aircraft and unmanned combat aircraft.


So, it was our view that this winner-take-all strategy was not going to interfere with a long-term competitive role for the fighter aircraft.


Q: What about -- are you -- are you --


Aldridge: I'm opposed to the legislation, and we have written a letter to Congress making that statement that we are opposed to forcing the contractors into the merged plan. Our decision today is basically to continue with the winner-take-all strategy and the down select has been done.


Q: In that letter that you refer to, you made the point that you would be interested in maintaining competition much with engines you have you have, but also on the avionics side. Have you made any decision with regard to that issue?


Aldridge: No, let me -- Jim Roche could address that.


Roche: In case of the primes, we felt there's plenty of work. For instance the UCAV program, which is very much like tactical fighter. Boeing just had its first autonomous taxi with UCAV here very recently. In terms of the fire control radar, we want to take a good look at what it might mean for both the two houses that are left in the United States who produce these, and we will be working with Lockheed on that. So, we've left that open, just as we have the engines. The engines will be for two, so we are at the subsystem level. We will work with the prime to worry about some of the major subsystems.


Q: Yes, but how would you set that up contractually for the next phase?


Roche: No, we'll work with the winner, once we had a winner to worry about that issue.


Q: Mr. Secretary, even though this is just one phase of the whole program, it's pretty likely though that whoever has this phase is going to get the whole deal. Is that right?


Aldridge: That's the plan. But we have to address this in phases because there's a -- we have to worry about making sure that we're going to deliver the proper designed aircraft at the proper cost, and it is a commitment to head down the path to build this airplane. This is a first step in that process.


Yes, right here.


Q: If I understand right, the Russians still maintain two jet fighter centers. We may, most analysts think, be down to one by decade's end. Could you say a little more about why you think -- the thinking that went into the idea, the conclusion that it's worth saving a little money now, having one production line instead of two, at those possible lack of competition and national security risks later?


Aldridge: Well, the production lines for the tactical fighters will continue to the year 2012, for the F-18 E and F and the F-22. It is likely those lines will continue even after that because of the possibility of foreign military sales. In addition, if we are going to continue to look at unmanned combat air vehicles and other unmanned air vehicles, the design teams would be very, very appropriate to work those problems as well.


We also, in the 19 -- FY '02 budget, we put $30 million to look into a new long-range strike platform that could have capabilities far out into the future. And when you get to the period of 2025 or 2040, it's not clear that manned aircraft competition will exist at all. So if we look out in the future, we have to think about what might be possible technology.


Q: Can you say a bit more about on this end right now what made it so important to keep it at a single winner? That's the advantage of it?


Aldridge: The two teams formed under the assumption that they were out to win the contract. They worked very, very hard. They put a tremendous amount of investment into their team activities and they went out to win the contract. And one of them did. It seemed to be somewhat unfair to tell the winner, "You now must absorb the loser after you formed your team." And so the idea that we see a long-range production run for tactical fighters and the fact the teams did their job the way they were -- planned to do it, it would seem unfair to make a decision to do anything other than we did.


Q: Could I ask Lord Bach what the position of the U.K. is on choosing between the CV [compatible variant for carrier landing] version and the STOVL version? And secondly, what will be the value of the U.K. contribution to the SDD phase?


Bach: Yes. A pleasure to answer you. The two STOVL designs that were put up are very different ones. And after today's decision, we're in a position to examine the preferred design and all its implications. And in due course, we will make our -- will make our decision.


Your second question, I think, related to what we were putting in to the system development demonstration, the SDD stage, the one we're about to reach. It's 2 billion pounds. And --


Roche: It's dollars. Dollars. (Laughter.)


Bach: Forgive me. (Laughter.)


Roche: Thank you. We thank you very much. (Laughter.)


Bach: May I start that again? (Laughter.) Two billion dollars. And as far as spending of the United Kingdom itself is concerned, $840 million.


Q: Mr. Aldridge?


Aldridge: Yes, right here.


Q: What's going to be the nomenclature for these airplanes? What's the designation?


Aldridge: Very good question. It's going to be called -- the Lockheed version was the X-35 --


MR.: Mike knows. Mike knows the answer.


Mike, the answer is?


Hough: F-35.


Aldridge: F-35. Thank you, I knew -- X-35 was the Lockheed --


Q: How did you decide on that? Where does that come from, the F-35?


Hough: It's a list of the different variants, different companies, different --


Aldridge: The Boeing version was X-32.


Okay.


Q: Can you give us an idea of what you consider the unit costs to be at this point, what you anticipate them being for each version?


Aldridge: The unit cost -- it varies with each variant. The STOVL version is more expensive than the carrier version. And the number I remember -- and, Jim, you might be able to help me -- I remember a number, but I'm not sure it's right.


Roche: We've been digesting lots and lots of paper.


Aldridge: And what fiscal year is also --


Roche: If the planes happened to be available today, we were buying them today, and we were to buy the CTOL [conventional take off and landing], the Air Force version, which, of course, was the most interest to me, then the number would be -- a fly-away cost -- in other words, if we go buy the airplane, would be roughly $40 million a copy.


Q: What's the unit acquisition cost, though?


Roche: It depends on what you're throwing into that.


Q: Well, everything. What's the taxpayer going to pay for your version?


Roche: Well, right now we're only going to pay for the SDD part of the program.


Q: How much is the carrier and the STOVL version?


Q: Yeah, the other version?


Roche: It would run between -- let's see, 40 would be cheapest. It would be less than 50.


Q: Fifty million dollars?


Aldridge: Let me go this way, right here.


Sir?


Q: The Department of Defense now owns the X-32 and all of the associated technologies that Boeing provided to the Program Office. Can you address the utility that you see remaining in that technology in that demonstrator aircraft, and how that might factor in to what Lockheed does in the SDD phase?


Aldridge: To tell you honestly, we haven't addressed that, because up until now, we couldn't determine which one was going to be excess and which one was not. So I'm sure there'll be some design --


Q: Such as direct lift -- does that have any utility anymore, now that you've chosen the lift fan concept, or not?


Aldridge: I think that's subject to review now by the Program Office as they now can proceed with a specific design that they now know, and a specific design that's not going to be part of the program, they can look at the configurations and look at the technologies that exist and determine what they're going to do.


Yeah, right here in the middle.


Q: What exactly does the $19 billion commit Lockheed to do? How many airplanes, starting when, and for who first?


Aldridge: For who first? Let's see.


Mike, can you help me on that one?


Hough: Yes, sir. Lockheed, will, in the course of this phase, build 14 fliers and seven ground-test vehicles, plus develop all the software ready for production delivery to the war-fighter, starting in 2008, and that's six airplanes to the Air Force, four airplanes to the Navy, throughout 2012, when this phase ends.


That's a total of 465 airplanes in this phase.


Aldridge: Yes, right here.


Q: Does OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] -- is there any planning or discussion about accelerating or decelerating any variants of JSF?


Aldridge: We haven't talked about that yet, because we have just started this -- getting the decisions to proceed with this phase of the program. We would like to get this airplane sooner, but we also want to make sure we're delivering the right airplane with the right reliability and the right performance.


Q: What is sooner?


Aldridge: Well, we all like to have this -- we'd love to have this airplane today, as you would expect. But the first delivery will be 2008. That's the plan we're on right now. If we could find some way to accelerate that during the period, we'd love to do so. But we're going to make sure we do it right with the development phase --


Q: That's acceleration. Normally --


Aldridge: Even that was acceleration, because we are -- this airplane is unique because it's -- it does have a spiral development characteristic to it. We're not going for the 100 percent airplane on the very first deployment. It will have blocks that will improve its capability over time, with software and performance improvements.


Yeah, right here.


Q: Follow up on that. During the transformation briefing a couple months back, there was talk about accelerating the Navy variants. And somehow that seems to connect to rumors that maybe the STOVL variant may kind of fall off on the wayside. And to ask our British friends as well, being that that variant --


Roche: Well, it's -- we are -- we have now have a decision to proceed, and exactly what the program's going to look like and which airplane's going to come first and in what variant I think is subject to review at this particular point in time and further downstream. We can now -- we now have the flexibility to do it. We know the configuration that we will have. We know what risks there will be in the development program. And we can now decide exactly how to lay out a lot more details of the program that we could not do until this decision was made.


Q: Mr. Secretary.


Aldridge: Yeah, you right here.


Q: You -- I believe the three main criteria for choosing the winner were management, cost and the design. Could you say --


Aldridge: Many more factors than that.


Q: Well, but weren't those the three broadest categories?


Aldridge: Well, I'll let the source-selection authority -- (laughter.)


Roche: The subcategories are basically the airplane design, and then there was a whole logistics section, and then there was management. There was also past performance. Under the airplane design, there are many subcategories. And in all of those, there were strengths, weaknesses, evaluated, and then risks associate with either A or B proceeding. And we, as I say, will be debriefing the companies on that this next week.


Q: Well, I was just wondering if the Lockheed proposal was the winner in each category, or --


Roche: I would rather that the companies be debriefed. It was a best value. So that means we take a look at strengths, weaknesses, strong weaknesses, strong strengths, middle/little risks, large risks, and we bring it together.


But as we did so, it became a very, very clear point that the Lockheed team had the better -- best value.


Q: There's been a lot of commentary about the ungainly appearance f the Boeing design. Could you comment on that?


Roche: Coming from a company that built the batwing B-2 bomber -- no, there was -- that was just never an issue. We looked at performance. There was no aesthetics, there was no beauty contest.


Q: Sir, did the White House in any way weigh in on this or express a preference or offer guidance in the decision?


Aldridge: Not to my knowledge.


Roche: I can say it. Not in any way, shape, or fashion -- (laughing) -- and in fact the White House just recently was informed of the specific decision, although they knew that Pete had made a decision to proceed.


(Cross talk.)


McGraw: We have time for a couple more questions, please.


Q: Mr. Roche, was it actually the difference between the X-32 and the preferred weapons systems -- (inaudible) -- the delta wing versus -- the Boeing redesign, was that a factor in your -- against -- weighing against Boeing?


Roche: We took the proposal. There was information that was learned from the demonstrators, but it was the proposal that was evaluated. The demonstrator provided confidence in various aspects, but it was the proposal. So it was the redesign that was evaluated, but it was across many, many, many things. And Boeing's team performed quite nicely in the demonstrators. But Lockheed just had strengths in certain areas that outweighed fewer weaknesses, and when we looked at risk, the Lockheed Martin team was the better value. (Cross talk.) You want to share that with the companies first.


Q: Dr. Roche, can you characterize it as a squeaker, or did Lockheed win by a mile?


Roche: I would not characterize as it as a squeaker at all, nor would I say by a mile. It became clear, as we went through this process, that the case built more and more strongly that the Lockheed Martin team was a clear winner from the point of view of best value for the government.


Q: Lockheed Martin had touted a test in which it was able -- its plane was able to take off, reach supersonic speed, return, and then do a vertical landing. They said that was the key test; that's what really did it for them. Would you say the same thing --


Roche: No, ma'am.


Q: And do you think that was very important?


Roche: No, ma'am. And Gordon, I think, can comment as well. We follow the criteria as set up a long time ago, and any particular extra test made no difference.


Gordon, any --


(Cross talk.)


Q: In the overall affordability question, today is going to jump-start the debate --


Aldridge: Start over again.


Q: The overall affordability question on TAC (Tactical] Air --


Aldridge: Yes?


Q: -- today will jump-start again the debate. You've had three lines going, a finite amount of dollars, and a $225 billion program out there sometime. Give us a sense of the funding priority problems and dilemmas now you're going to have to hash out in the next two years --


Aldridge: That was one of the questions that we looked at very carefully. Is this airplane affordable in the Defense budget? The average tacair budget for the Department of Defense for the last 20 years has been about 18 percent of the DoD budget. That's on the average. It has climbed as high as 25 percent of the DoD budget back in the mid-80s, during the Reagan buildup period. During this next FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan], even with the Joint Strike Fighter, we will not get to the average level of TAC Air budget until the FY '07. And even after the FY '07, the peak of the spending for TAC Air will not reach but 22 percent of the DoD budget, less than what we did in the mid-80s.


McGraw: I'm sorry, Secretary. We're out of time. Thank you.


"THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., WASHINGTON DC. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE IS A PRIVATE COMPANY. FOR OTHER DEFENSE RELATED TRANSCRIPTS NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS SITE, CONTACT FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE AT (202) 347-1400."
 
The Wayback Machine captured the homepage for Lockheed Martin website but apparently not the JSF contract win page.
 
First DOD press release did not include any designation and was clearly prepared before the press conference.

JSF CONTRACTOR AWARD

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr. announced this afternoon the decision to proceed with the Joint Strike Fighter program. This approval will move the program to the next phase, the System Development and Demonstration phase. The Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche announced the selection of Lockheed Martin teamed with Northrop Grumman and BAE to develop and then produce the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft. The contract, for $18,981,928,201, will produce aircraft to be used by the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force and Navy.

Also, Pratt and Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Conn., has been awarded a contract for more than $4 billion to develop the F135 propulsion system. This contract will cover ground and flight testing and production qualification of the Pratt & Whitney propulsion system.

The Joint Strike Fighter acquisition strategy also calls for the development of two propulsion systems. The Pratt & Whitney system will compete, in production, with one developed by the team of General Electric and Rolls Royce. GE/RR are expected to receive a contract for the next phase of development of that system in the next few weeks. The P&W and GE/RR engines will be physically and functionally interchangeable in both the aircraft and support systems. All JSF aircraft variants will be able to use either engine. The competition starts in fiscal 2011 and continues through the life of the program to reduce risks.

The Joint Strike Fighter is a multi-Service/international cooperation warplane. The cornerstone of the program is affordability based on a next-generation, multi-role strike fighter aircraft that will have a 70 to 90 percent commonality factor for all the variants, significantly reducing manufacturing, support and training costs. First delivery of operational aircraft is anticipated in fiscal 2008.

During this Systems Development and Demonstration phase, the program will focus on developing a family of strike aircraft that significantly reduces life-cycle cost, while meeting the operational requirements for the Services. The requirements represent a balanced approach to affordability, lethality, survivability and supportability. The program will use a phased block approach that addresses aircraft and weapons integration and provides a validated and verified air system for the Service Initial Operational Capability requirements. Also during this phase of the contract Lockheed Martin teamed with Northrop Grumman and BAE will implement innovative management and business practices focusing on achieving affordable unit flyaway costs and reduced life-cycle cost for future production of the Joint Strike Fighter.

The source selection culminates a highly successful joint process with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. A number of agreements between the U.S. and foreign governments are in place for this phase of the program.

The United Kingdom became a full collaborative partner in the program in 1995. Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Canada and Italy subsequently joined the program as cooperative partners. Singapore, Turkey and Israel are foreign military sales participants for this phase. The United Kingdom has signed an agreement to participate in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of the program. Agreements with additional countries for SDD participation are in progress.

For the U.S. Navy, the JSF will be used in a "first day" of war, as a survivable strike fighter aircraft to complement F/A-18E/F. The U.S. Air Force will employ it as a multirole aircraft, primary-air-to-ground, which will replace the F-16 and A-10 and to complement the F-22. The Marine Corps will use the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the aircraft to replace the AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/D. The United Kingdom's Royal Navy and Royal Air Force multirole aircraft will replace the Sea Harrier and GR7.
 
Another press release same day after the press conference.

Lockheed-Martin Team Wins Joint Strike Fighter Competition
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26, 2001 -- Lockheed-Martin has won the largest military contract ever, a possible $200 billion competition to build the Joint Strike Fighter.

Air Force Secretary Jim Roche said on the basis of strengths, weaknesses and degrees of risk of the program that the Lockheed-Martin team was the winner on a "best- value" basis. He said Lockheed-Martin was a clear winner over the team led by Boeing.

Lockheed-Martin Joint Strike Fighter (Photo by Tom Reynolds) (Click photo for screen-resolution image; high-resolution image available.) (More photos)

Total cost of the contract to enter the systems development and demonstration phase is $19 billion. Pratt and Whitney has a $4 billion contract to design and build propulsion systems for the craft. The British will contribute $2 billion to the program.

Lockheed-Martin teamed with Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace on the project. Pete Aldridge, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, said that both teams "met or exceeded the performance objectives established for the aircraft and have met the established criteria and technical maturity for entering the next phase of the program."

The first operational Joint Strike Fighter, now enumerated as the F-35, is scheduled for delivery in fiscal 2008.

The F-35 is actually a family of three aircraft designed to replace aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and the British military. Other nations interested in participating in the program include the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway.

Plans call for the F-35 to be the world's premier strike aircraft through 2040, Aldridge said. "It will provide air- to-air capability second only to the F-22 air superiority fighter," he said. The plane will allow the Air Force forces to field an almost all-stealth fighter force by 2025. The Navy and Marine variants will be the first deployment of an "all-aspect" stealth airplane.

The Air Force's F-35A version of the craft is a conventional takeoff and landing airplane to replace the F- 16 Falcon and A-10 Thunderbolt II. It will partner with the F-22 Raptor. The Air Force plans to buy 1,763 of the aircraft.

The Navy's F-35B version of the plane is a carrier-based strike fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. It will replace earlier versions of the F/A-18 as well as the A-6 Intruder, which already has left the inventory. The Navy plans to purchase 480 JSF aircraft.

The Marine Corps, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force need and want a short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft, dubbed the F-35C. The Marines want 609 of the new aircraft to replace their AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18 Hornets. The British want 150 to replace Sea Harriers and GR.7 Tornado fighters.

Roche said that if the military could buy the planes today the Air Force version would cost $40 million per copy. Navy and Marine Corps versions would be "under $50 million."
 
Some very interesting read here, although not quite related to the core subject of this topic for the most part.

I know I've shared this image before but since I couldn't trace it in the hundred-plus page F-35 topic allow me to repost it here. It is a slide taken from an undated presentation by Dr. Paul Bevilacqua from LM Skunk Works entitled JSF - Inventing the Joint Strike Fighter. This 60-page presentation recapitulates the entire X-35/F-35 development program (including the Boeing competitor) and some of its contest suggests it was produced a little after LM won the JSF competition.

Interesting bit about this 36th slide is the fact that the presentation ALREADY features the designation "F-35A/B/C" all over but the name Lightning II is now here to be found, and only this one page shows the company-proposed "Musketeer" monicker. I believe that once the DoD settled on F-35 they probably also allocated the name Lightning II along with it, so this is some bizarre intermediary stage which leads me to wonder if the idea to call the plane "F-35" wasn't simply a Lockheed Martin suggestion that the DoD eventually went for, albeit requesting a different name for the aircraft.
 

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I think Lightning II was actually Lockheed's preferred name. (Musketeer was never likely, IMO, thanks to the Beech connection.) But there are sources that say LM had been using F-24 internally before the selection, so the number was likely not their idea.
 
TomS said:
Lightning II was definitely Lockheed's preferred name.

And yet this is from a completely official Lockheed presentation approved for public release.
Do you have any substantial proof to back up your claim?

If the name Musketeer was not the company's choice name, why include it in a public document released AFTER the JSF contract was approved?
Doesn't make much sense to me.

Also, don't forget that the name "Musketeer" supposedly refered to F-35's triple identity as CTOL/STOVL/CAT, like the "three musketeers" of U.S. air power.
 
Yeah, I went back to revise that. I believe Lightning II was the company management's preferred choice. But there may have been some internal debate about it.
 
TomS said:
I think Lightning II was actually Lockheed's preferred name. (Musketeer was never likely, IMO, thanks to the Beech connection.) But there are sources that say LM had been using F-24 internally before the selection, so the number was likely not their idea.


10 years ago they* were talking about the name "Fury" under the similar approach to "Musketeer". In that there were three furies. But Fury was more PC because the Furies were female. Lightning II was IMHO the USAF name suggestion. They would have kyboshed Fury for being too navy.


* VP TB
 

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