www.defensenews.com
So this thread correctly guessed that the problem lies with the silos. And also is Garamendi a fool.Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost
The Sentinel nuclear missile's costs have spiked 37%, largely due to the complexity of its command and launch segment, and triggered a review process.
Sentinel ICBM's first flight test slips to 2026: Air Force - Breaking Defense
An official with prime contractor Northrop Grumman defended the beleaguered program, and said, "looking for that blame, I think, is hard because it really was just an immense challenge."breakingdefense.com
Which implies that they're confident enough in the booster stack to skip testing it without a production-representative guidance system.
The only thing I can think of is the guidance system being egregiously classified, to the point that they can't get someone cleared for the controls specifications for a non-representative guidance stack.
There's a story from I believe early Minuteman days, about how they assigned each missile stage to a separate company due to not wanting any given company to know everything about the missile. Each stage ended up long by a bit. So did the interstages. So the final missile was something like 10% longer than planned, all because of classification.
Never heard, story was all about the size growth.
Please tell me they were able to simplify things for D5LE...
They were not. The Navy was unwilling to change anything that was working on the system. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Besides, each stage needs to be cast separately, so there is not that much efficiency to be gained standardizing the propellants since the production flow is already locked down. Case manufacturing was standardized to an extent, so that the flow is nominally the same between stages. Or at least as much as could be given the different lengths between the stages and the diameter of the third stage.
The vproblem could not be attributed to any single factor. The problem is complex and multilateral. It's both the lack of determination from politicians, lack of cocherent ideas from the USAF (they aren't exactly much interested in the program as whole), lack of competence from industry (which designed exactly zero new ICBM since 1980s)... Basically it's a perfect storm of mistakes.
Or they are NOT confident enough, and use guidance system delay as excuse to delay testing at all.
Usually you want to test as much as possible. I mean, the USN even does a few test-launches every year to burn up some rockets and allow new production, keeping the average age of the rockets in the fleet more or less steady.
Arguably, the 50 Peacekeeper missiles should have stayed in service while Minuteman III was phased out in favor of Midgetman on 1:1 ratio. After all, we’ve been limited to single warheads anyway? At very least, the mobile Midgetman would have allowed the abandonment of a massive, obsolete silo infrastructure. Moreover, Midgetman, reduced to 1 or 2 stages, would have been an excellent platform for hypersonics and a return to intermediate range missiles. At it is Sentinel is absolutely safe from cancellation, regardless of cost escalation in this era of inflation. There is absolutely no public grassroots public debate on this system, unlike Peacekeeper/MX in the 1980. Zero real world controversy. Much like the F-35, it’s totally uncancellable. Most big ticket procurements are today. Aside from those of the US Army.When the Cold War ended, the production of Peacekeeper was canceled. This left the nation with a force of only 50 Peacekeepers. This newest ICBM was retired in 2002, leaving the much older and less capable Minuteman III as the nation’s only ICBM.The Sentinel ICBM remains affordable – because context matters - Breaking Defense
Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin argue in this op-ed that added context is needed before deciding that the Sentinel ICBM is too expensive.breakingdefense-com.cdn.ampproject.org
In short, the United States kept its oldest intercontinental ballistic missiles in the field and took a three-decade-long holiday from building new ones. This robbed industry of a generation of engineers, scientists, and program managers with experience building ICBMs and their supporting infrastructure. It also ensured that no Air Force acquisition officer had any experience with ICBMs.
Everything I hear about the program is terrible. Military officers are turning over two years, so the customer doesn't even understand what they themselves asked for. On the contractor side, NG tried to move everyone to Hill, and lots of people aren't loving the life out there. Tons of jobs applications from people on the program, which when you call them, indicate that they're "looking for something different".
Such misplaced optimism. This is called a "cost savings" on a "success based schedule".
To quote a retired US Air Force general who agrees with you: "The institutional air force would never do anything the Navy way, purely as a point of pride".
It is normal. And dysfunction is normal. Solve (part of) the retention/acquisition crisis by giving personnel a four year tour.
