FY1969 McNamara Budget Document

bobbymike

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While searching for information on the WS 120A advanced ICBM came across this -

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WITH FY 69 BUDGET IMPLICATIONS/6/

/6/McNamara initialed at the bottom of the first page.

A. Strategic Retaliatory Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended maintaining a Minuteman force of [3 lines of source text not declassified] for each Minuteman II. The JCS concurred in the Minuteman force level, but recommended that MK-17s be deployed for Minuteman II and later for Minuteman III. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force recommended slipping the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the MK-17 one year to January, 1970, and retaining MK-11s for Minuteman II in the interim. The Secretary of Defense later recommended canceling MK-17 development and slipping Minuteman III an additional six months.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the previously approved program of buying area penetration aids for all Minuteman missiles and terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III. He also approved deploying an improved version of Minuteman II penetration aids at a cost of $35 million in FY 69. The JCS concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended that no additional Titan II missiles be bought and the Titan force be phased down as missiles were fired in Follow-on-Tests. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring 11 additional Titan II missiles to maintain the force at 54 missiles with a test rate of 6 per year. The JCS recommended retaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles until a new large throw-weight ICBM is available as a replacement. The Secretary of Defense then recommended maintaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles by buying 5 missiles in FY 69 (for $11.3 million) and 4 missiles in FY 70 and reducing the test rate to 4 per year.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended developing a stellar-inertial guidance system for the Poseidon force and deploying an average of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He recommended against developing an option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by end FY 72. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the development of a stellar-inertial guidance system, but recommended retaining the option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The JCS recommended planning on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missile. The Secretary of the Navy proposed to initially procure [1 line of source text not declassified] by 1975 if a review in 1969 does not indicate that higher loading is necessary. The Secretary of Defense then reaffirmed his recommendation to deploy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] throughout the entire period.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended against deploying area and terminal penetration aids for Polaris A-3 at a cost of $200 million in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy agreed to defer the deployment, but recommended retaining the option to deploy these penetration aids at a cost of $9 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense agreed to retain this option.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing Advanced Development of an Advanced ICBM, but recommended against starting Contract Definition in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of Contract Definition in FY 69, and dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development of the missile element of the Advanced ICBM (WS-120A), with the objective of an IOC in FY 73. They also recommended delaying a decision on expenditures unique to a specific deployment mode until study results are available. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended beginning Contract Definition in FY 69 at a cost of $79 million. Subsequently the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force agreed to develop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that are capable of accepting either Minuteman III or the WS-120A missile; the program would support a deployment date of Minuteman in such silos in FY 72 and an Advanced ICBM IOC in FY 74. Of the $207 million total hard silos R&D program, the Secretary of Defense will authorize $40 million in FY 69. This includes $38 million R&D money for the dual-capable silo and $2 million for site surveys. An additional $10 million was authorized for advanced ICBM technology.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended against procuring a prototype Ballistic Missile Ship (BMS) in FY 69. The JCS recommended Concept Formulation and, dependent upon favorable review, construction of one prototype BMS to be available for tests and training in FY 71. This would require $120 million in FY 69 funds. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended retaining the current basing program for the bomber force and deferring a decision on equipping B-52 G/H bombers with SRAMs until there is evidence that the Soviets have a good low-altitude terminal defense. He also decided not to reduce further the number of Hound Dog missiles in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred in the bomber force basing program. The JCS recommended equipping the B-52 G/Hs with SRAMs, beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended modification of B-52 G/Hs beginning in FY 69 at a cost of $68 million and additional SRAM procurement beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of Defense subsequently decided to modify 30 UE B-52s for SRAM in FY 69, at a cost of approximately $45 million, with no increase in the total number of SRAMs to be procured, but retaining an option to buy more in FY 70.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing development of advanced aircraft technology and bomber penetration aids, but recommended against beginning Contract Definition for the Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber (AMSA) in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of AMSA Contract Definition in FY 69, and subject to favorable review, full-scale development to preserve an IOC of FY 76. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended Contract Definition in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

B. Continental Air and Missile Defense

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a Chinese-oriented, system (tentatively with the option of providing for the defense of Minuteman with Sprint missiles following the initial Spartan installation) at an investment cost (including AEC costs) of $4.1 billion in FY 69-73. The Secretary of the Army concurred, but also recommended deploying Nike-X to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The JCS accepted the proposed light Nike-X deployment as a first step, and concurred in the FY 69 part of the plan, but also recommended deploying Nike-X at the "Posture A" level (at about $10 billion) to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. (The investment cost of his recommended plan is now estimated at about $5 billion, including AEC costs.)

2. The JCS recommended production now for deployment of 12 UE F-12 interceptors in FY 72, and initiating Contract Definition now for an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for an IOC in FY 73. The JCS recommended against phasing down of our air defense without modernizing the force. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense later agreed on a new continental air defense plan including deployment of Over-the-Horizon radars; full-scale development of prototype AWACS with a procurement decision based on flight tests; and development and deployment of an improved F-106X aircraft. The plan also includes provisions for augmenting the defense with Tactical Air Command, Navy, and Marine Corps forces in time of emergency, and selective phase-downs of current Century interceptors and portions of the SAGE/BUIC system. An F-12 development program is under review.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing feasibility studies on the sea-based ABM system. The JCS recommended speeding up feasibility and Concept Formulation studies on both the sea-based and airborne missile intercept systems. The Secretary of the Navy recommended acceleration of the sea-based missile intercept system. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the approved program for military survival measures (fallout protection for military personnel) at a cost of $47 million in FY 68-73. The JCS recommended a larger program at a cost of $191 million. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

C. Theater Nuclear Forces

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out 18 Mace in Europe and 36 Mace [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended against the phaseout. The Secretary of Defense affirmed the Mace phase-out in Europe, but deferred the Mace phase-out in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] until FY 70.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out one Pershing battalion now in CONUS in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended against the phase-out. The Secretary of Defense then recommended deferring phase-out until FY 70.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended against developing a MIRV missile for Pershing. The JCS (less the Air Force Chief of Staff) and the Secretary of the Army recommended development and deployment of Pershing MIRV at a cost of $43 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile [number not declassified]. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended increasing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile to [number not declassified]. The Secretary of the Navy contended that [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs would be insufficient. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a stockpile of [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs in FY 69 and [number not declassified] bombs in FY 70 and thereafter.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing down the tactical Nike Hercules nuclear warhead stockpile to [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. and allied battery. The JCS recommended retaining [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. battery and [number not declassified] warheads per allied battery. The Secretary of the Amy recommended deferring decision pending further study. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to defer decision.

6. The JCS recommended the following tactical nuclear warhead stockpiles, compared to the program recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

[list (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

These recommendations are now under review.

[/list]
 

Skybolt

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Interesting document, expecially for the clarification of the sparring and compromises. Consider though that the FY69 strategic forces budget was under heavy pressure for cuts to allow money for Vietnam (it will see even more later, under Nixon). The postponement and phase downs proposed by McNamara must be read in this sense (retaining Mace in ETO during the 70s wouldn't have made much sense anyway, I hope you concur). The Titan affair was of the same sort, and clearly make sense only with WS-120 on track. Actually, it was Nixon that indefinitely postponed WS-120 and retained Titans. And naturally, the all ABM affair was more political than military (the same is true now for the European segment of the US National Missile Defense), and the 10 billion dollars price-tag on a Nike-X type deployment was mere wishful thinking on JCS part: double that sum and you'll probably be near the truth (and than consider what would happen in an inflation economy).
 

bobbymike

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Skybolt - On another thread you mentioned having diagrams (in an old AW&ST) on nominal WS 120A missile configurations of which the future MX was one of the smaller designs. I always wondered why the US did not deploy a solid rocket Titan II, SS-9/18 sized missile. Then I read Inventing Accuracy. Miniaturization was the way of the future and by deploying a larger number of missiles lead to stability. Was this the right decision I'm not smart enough to answer that but arguments could be made it worked in the long run.
 

Skybolt

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If you think from a MAD point of view, like the first Nixon admin and key Congressmen, a big solid ICBM with a great number of heavy highly accurate MIRV RVs (with terminal homing MaRVs in the pipeline: a MaRV is less efficient from a payload/weight point of view than a normal cone-shaped MIRV, so it makes better sense with a heavy ICBM) has FIRST STRIKE WEAPON witten in red capitals all over it. And don't forget that any new ICBM project since even earlier than Strat-X had a question attached: which basing mode is less vulnerable ? Already in 1959 (I'll post on it, one day or another) the Air Force had started to ask industry for really mobile (cross-country) ICBMs (and I don't even mention the studies on air-mobile and air-launch ICBMs). The Rail Based Minuteman was seen as stop-gap measure and its demise coincided with renewed extensive studies both in the industry and in consulting firms (Aerospace Corp, that was managing contractor selection for MMRBM, too) for "secure basing" for ICBM (1963-64).
on nominal WS 120A missile configurations of which the future MX was one of the smaller designs.
You conflate two things: the WS-120A possible configurations from 1966-1969, AND the early configuration work for MX (mid-70s), to which the diagram was drew and in which the configuration finally chosen was one of the smaller (the land-Trident was still pretty much on the table and disappeared only in the late Carter admin, to be briefly resurrected before the Scowcroft Committee decisions in early '80s).
 

bobbymike

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Skybolt - sorry my wording was confusing. I meant to say the WS 120a designs were larger than the future MX. My post reads like I meant the MX was one of the WS 120a designs, oops. As you can tell I am interested in US large/heavy ICBMs even if they were only studied. If it were up to me I would build a Titan II sized solid fueled ICBM with a very large payload for conventional prompt global strike. Then if the world ever changed you could replace the MMIII with it, although as you mentioned in other threads there might be a silo fit problem. I am curious as to the maximum size that would fit in a MMIII silo. Some pictures looking down into the silo with a MMIII nose cone and part of the first and second stage in sight gives the impression that you could fit three MMIII diameters into the silo. I believe the second stage of the MMIII is 52" so this would infer a maximum diameter missile in excess of 156" although I don't now the depth of the silo.
 

Skybolt

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The MM silo is so large compared to the missile itself because the MM is hot-launched. Since the silo doesn't have the V-shaped exhaust like in the Titan's ones (the less holes in the ground you have, the better), there must be space to allow the gases to escape, lest the missile itself would be damaged. The MX is could-launched, not for fitting in the MM silo but precisely to allow a large basing mode choice AND because the structure could be lightnened somewhat, expecially in the first stages where dead weight in the case is a throw-away. MM silos was just one possibility that came free with cold-launch. During the early MX phases it was assumed that maximum size of an MM silo fitting missile would be, with cold launch, 120" (so called "silo stuffer"). And this imposed modifying the silo itself (removing some equipment located on the walls).
 

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