Discussion about German WWII Engineering

T. A. Gardner

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Typical German engineering at its worst; instead of improving the autopilot and controls, they invent a massive computing machine to polish hulls perfectly.
To paraphrase Scott Adams (author of the Dilbert comic strip):

If it is reliable and simple, German engineers will immediately want to add complexity until it's unreliable and unrepairable... :D
 
To paraphrase Scott Adams (author of the Dilbert comic strip):

If it is reliable and simple, German engineers will immediately want to add complexity until it's unreliable and unrepairable... :D
The Germans were looking for the perfect weapon, but during the process of perfecting the engineers suffered all kinds of political interference, and when they were finally bothered by the Nazi party guys, the generals came to demand modifications during development, during manufacturing, and during operational tests. On the contrary, the Allies operated with third-quality equipment because the second-quality would only be available in 1950 and the first-quality would never be manufactured.
 
Well, Europeans build quality and the Americans quantity. The war was won by quantity.
 
Well, Europeans build quality and the Americans quantity. The war was won by quantity.
German tank factories refused to implement automatic welding, because it's quality was considered "unsatisfactory". So majority of German armored vehicles were hand-welded by highly trained welders. The quality of welds was high... but it took an awful lot of time.

USA and USSR just introduced automatic welding. The quality was poorer than German - but factories could crunch out tank hulls so fast, that at some point in 1943 USSR really hit the problem of armored hull production exceeding the capabilities of gun and motor factories)

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Well, Europeans build quality and the Americans quantity. The war was won by quantity.
Actually, in most ways, American quality exceeded what the Germans were producing. For example, the US magnafluxed every round of antitank ammunition they produced. US tank transmissions used double helix gear drives that were stronger and more reliable than the single cut gears the Germans were using.

In part, it is because Germany didn't have the tooling to do otherwise, and in part because of the drastic state of industry in Germany as the war progressed, such as the increasing use of foreign and slave labor.
 
Well, Europeans build quality and the Americans quantity. The war was won by quantity.
That's total nonsense, the German and Britsh planes were built with much less perfection than the American ones. There was no shortage of material, machinery and no interruptions by bombing in the US.

Same is true for the tanks, the German and Russian tank quality degraded over the war and more tanks were lost by quality issues than by enemy fire. Later in the wwar, German tanks were mostly/often welded by forced labour, which decreased the quality significantly (for obvious reasons, they didn't really like their jobs....).

The aim for unrealistic production numbers caused servere quality problems in German and Russian production, it would have been wiser, to built less, but more functional tanks instead.

The Me109 design was kept over the war, because it was well suited for mass production and of much lower cost, than e.g. the Italien designs, which partially hav better aerodynamics.

Also note, Germany produced a lot of very simplified designs during the later war, e.g. the quite succsessfull Jagdpanzer 38.
 
The Germans were looking for the perfect weapon, but during the process of perfecting the engineers suffered all kinds of political interference, and when they were finally bothered by the Nazi party guys, the generals came to demand modifications during development, during manufacturing, and during operational tests. On the contrary, the Allies operated with third-quality equipment because the second-quality would only be available in 1950 and the first-quality would never be manufactured.
Oh, industry did it to themselves too. This is one example from later in the war:

70021-b41394c2c6440cfc32e085ab69a269d9.jpg


The LFA was doing research into supersonic flight and controls and the only way they could get more funding was to be developing a weapon system, not doing pure research. So, they submitted proposals for a supersonic SAM that wasn't a SAM at all, but a sounding rocket that met their research needs.

Krupp was allowed to keep their monopoly on tungsten carbide production through their subsidiary Hartzmetallzentral. This meant that no other company had much, if any, access to the alloy, and Krupp only produced 3 grades. That meant as a material for antitank rounds, it wasn't going to happen on a large scale. Machine tools were restricted in availability meaning it often took longer to shape parts using high speed steel and grinding instead.

In the US, the Buick system of 15 grades was adopted as the standard and there were dozens of companies manufacturing tungsten carbide products and cutting tools.
 
That's total nonsense, the German and Britsh planes were built with much less perfection than the American ones. There was no shortage of material, machinery and no interruptions by bombing in the US.

The US was the only country to introduce into production a laminar flow wing. Yes, the British and Germans tried but couldn't get the necessary quality in a mass-produced product. That's just one example. The US was the only country in WW 2 to mass produce turbochargers for aircraft use. Again, other nations tried but couldn't get them to mass production.

In Germany, there were continuous interruptions of production due to air raids. Foreign and slave workers often actively sought to sabotage or do sloppy work because they had no motivation to do quality work for Germany.
Same is true for the tanks, the German and Russian tank quality degraded over the war and more tanks were lost by quality issues than by enemy fire. Later in the wwar, German tanks were mostly/often welded by forced labour, which decreased the quality significantly (for obvious reasons, they didn't really like their jobs....).

The aim for unrealistic production numbers caused servere quality problems in German and Russian production, it would have been wiser, to built less, but more functional tanks instead.

The Me109 design was kept over the war, because it was well suited for mass production and of much lower cost, than e.g. the Italien designs, which partially hav better aerodynamics.

Also note, Germany produced a lot of very simplified designs during the later war, e.g. the quite succsessfull Jagdpanzer 38.
The Jgpz 38 Hetzer is arguably the worst late war German tank destroyer design there was. It made use of an existing hull and was about as well designed as it could be, but that didn't equate to it being an effective weapon in the field.
 
Oh, industry did it to themselves too. This is one example from later in the war:

70021-b41394c2c6440cfc32e085ab69a269d9.jpg


The LFA was doing research into supersonic flight and controls and the only way they could get more funding was to be developing a weapon system, not doing pure research. So, they submitted proposals for a supersonic SAM that wasn't a SAM at all, but a sounding rocket that met their research needs.

Krupp was allowed to keep their monopoly on tungsten carbide production through their subsidiary Hartzmetallzentral. This meant that no other company had much, if any, access to the alloy, and Krupp only produced 3 grades. That meant as a material for antitank rounds, it wasn't going to happen on a large scale. Machine tools were restricted in availability meaning it often took longer to shape parts using high speed steel and grinding instead.

In the US, the Buick system of 15 grades was adopted as the standard and there were dozens of companies manufacturing tungsten carbide products and cutting tools.
  • In early 1941 the LFA institute began a research program for the determination of aerodynamic and stability data in the vicinity of the speed of sound.
  • These results were urgently needed for the development of supersonic aircraft and missiles and were also to be used in comparison with high-speed wind tunnel tests.
  • Professor Busemann and Dr. Gerhard Braun of LFA produced several designs of experimental research rockets with 50, 250 and 550-mm diameters.

  • These rockets were designed as anti-aircraft missiles under the codename Feuerlilie, because it was necessary to give the projects a direct military importance, but its payloads consisted in high-frequency telemetry transmitters and flares for optical tracking by means of three cine-theodolites Askania.

  • All the Feuerlilie rockets were made of cast aluminum alloy at Ardelt Werke-Breslau facilities in connection with LFA-Volkenrode.

  • The automatic flight control was a Kreiselgerät gyro-stabilization system Fischl-Askania or Horn, control of ailerons was obtained by means of electro-magnets, without radio-guidance commands.

  • During the first test conducted in 1941, several 50-mm diameter Feuerlilie F5 prototypes, powered by small powder rockets, were launched from the ground.

  • In 1942, all the development was handed over Rheinmetall-Borsig AG facilities.

  • Early in 1943, the diameter of the rockets was increased to 250-mm, between April and July, six F25 prototypes were launched at Leba-Otsee to obtain trajectory dynamic data. Several air-launched were also performed at Peenemünde-West. About 20 F25 units were built.

  • LFA Feuerlilie F25 technical data

  • Wingspan: 1,500-mm, length: 2,080-mm, diameter: 250-mm, ceiling: 3,000 m, range: 5 km, weight: 120 kg, speed: 750 km/h, payload: 17 kg, power plant: one solid-propellant rocket motor Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-505 rated at 500 kg peak thrust and 6 seconds life.
  • During the summer of 1943 the F55 transonic rocket was developed in three versions:
  • -The F55 A1 was tested at Leba in May 1944, reaching Mach 1,25. It was powered by four solid-propellant rockets motors Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-515 rated at 4,000 kg peak thrust each.
  • -The F55 A2 was tested at Peenemünde on December 11,1944 powered by one bi-propellant rocket engine Konrad SG 20 rated at 6,400 kg peak thrust and 7 seconds life.
  • -The F55 A3 was launched from Greifswalder Oie on October 21,1944 powered by one Konrad SG 20 and one solid-propellant, belly-mounted booster Pirat H rated at 6,500 kg peak thrust. This prototype was fitted with one Stuttgart telemetry system (12 channels) and radio-control for high-altitude maneuverability tests.

  • About 35 units of F55 A1, two F55 A2 and one F55 A3 were delivered and tested with several stabilizing systems and radio-control equipment.

  • The F55 was launched from an Ardelt Werke-Breslau Startlafette with 20-degrees angle to the vertical.

  • Project cancelled in January 1945.

  • LFA Feuerlilie F55 A1 technical data

  • Wingspan: 2,620-mm, length: 4,800-mm, diameter: 550-mm, height: 800-mm, ceiling: 4,800 m, range: 7.5 km, weight: 665 kg, speed: Mach 1.2, payload: 100 kg, power plant: four solid-propellant rocket motors Rheinmetall-Borsig 109-515 rated at 4,000 kg peak thrust and 6 seconds life.

  • LFA Feuerlilie F55 A2 technical data

  • Wingspan: 2,620-mm, length: 4,800-mm, diameter: 550-mm, height: 800-mm, ceiling: 9,000 m, range: 7.5 km, weight: 473 kg, speed: Mach 0.8, payload: 100 kg, power plant: one bi-propellant rocket engine Konrad SG 20 rated at 6,400 kg peak thrust and 7 seconds life, propellants: Salbei + Tonka + compressed air.


  • LFA Feuerlilie F55 A3 technical data

  • Wingspan: 2,620-mm, length: 4,800-mm, diameter: 550-mm, height: 800-mm, ceiling: 11,000 m, range: 7.5 km, weight: 473 kg, speed: Mach 0.8, payload: 100 kg, power plant: one bi-propellant rocket engine Konrad SG 20 rated at 6,400 kg peak thrust and 7 seconds life, propellants: Salbei + Tonka + compressed air. One belly-mounted booster Pirat H rated at 6,500 kg peak thrust and 2.7 seconds life.
 
Actually, in most ways, American quality exceeded what the Germans were producing. For example, the US magnafluxed every round of antitank ammunition they produced. US tank transmissions used double helix gear drives that were stronger and more reliable than the single cut gears the Germans were using.

In part, it is because Germany didn't have the tooling to do otherwise, and in part because of the drastic state of industry in Germany as the war progressed, such as the increasing use of foreign and slave labor.
And meanwhile, what were the Germans doing?

They had their own problems, of supply, caused by the naval blockade.

German industry was not able to produce the specially heat and stress-resistant

metallic alloys that were required. They lacked metals like the chromium and

molybdenum that were essential to harden the steel. Germany had exhausted their

stocks and could not import them during the war, as also happened with rubber

and oil.

The chemists produced silicones to replace the rubber and made synthetic oil of low

quality from coal, but the ceramic materials for the compressor blades of the turbojets

would not be ready on time and everyone knew it.

The lack of oil suffered by Germany during the last year of the war induced scientists

and engineers to experiment with alternative fuels.

The most refined gasoline was used for conventional piston engines. The BMW 003

turbojets worked with B.4 (87 octane petrol). The J2 and K1 burnt by the Jumo 004 and

Heinkel HeS 011 turbojets were heavy kerosenes. The Argus pulsejet of the V-1 worked

with crude oil. The Peenemünde engineers designed a V-2 that worked with diesel

oil and S-Stoff. Dr Pabst, from the Gas Dynamics section of the Focke Wulf company,

suggested that the ramjets of the future Triebflügel fighter burn even less volatile fuels,

such as pitch oil or lignite tar. To that end, they had to design a compact evaporating

plant that could be installed onboard.

This situation particularly affected the conventional piston engines. The poor

ratings of the 87 octane B4 fuel and the poor quality of Schmiertoff lubricant, which

obliged engines to be run at high revolutions to deliver the required horsepower, were

the cause of numerous problems, while deficient Kühlsotff (50 per cent glycol, 50 per

cent water) cooling, vibration fractures and disintegration of bearings, due to shortage

of tin during its manufacturing, caused corrosion and piston seizure.

To avoid these deficiencies, some engines were redesigned with bigger cylinders and

twin (three-speed) superchargers, due to the poor performance (just thirty minutes)

of the one-stage superchargers of first generation.

Attempts were also made to improve performance using two new power boost

injection systems, the GM-1 (liquid nitrous oxide) for altitudes over 10,000 metres and

the MW-50 (50 per cent methanol, 49.5 per cent water and 0.5 per cent Schutzöl 39

anticorrosion fluid) for emergency power boost at medium altitude.

In spite of all these issues, the reliability of the new BMW 003 and Jumo 004

turbojets, and the HWK 109 rocket engine was so low that the Oberkommando

der Luftwaffe allowed the development of some piston engines to continue until

February 1945.

As NASA did in the 1960s, the German aeronautical industry was forced to compen-

sate the lack of power of their engines with high technology solutions – in the 1960s it

was microelectronics to save weight, in the 1940s, it was aerodynamics.
 
Despite all the shortcommings, the Hetzer prooved to be very succsessfull, so much, that even the Swiss and Checeslovakia buided new Hetzers after the war and also the Swedish Stridsvagn 103 was inspired by the Hetzer. Keep in mind, that the original Hetzer was a fast and cheap solution based on existing components.
 
Switzerland did not build Jg 38ts. Czechoslovakia built them for the Swiss. And Czechoslovakia built them in the first place because they already had the tooling (and a LOT of unfinished vehicles and abandoned German vehicles) and they could be used for quick rebuild of the army, until better stuff is available. We actually planned to center on T-34-85s until the TVP tank project was ready for production, and some 60 T-34s were delivered in 1946, but then Soviets for some reason refused to sell more* and Jg 38t was an available alternative. As with the S-199 (Bf-109) and S-92 (Schwalbe) it was also an attempt to be selfreliant, to keep the industry running and spending as much money as possible at home instad of buying foreign stuff.

* deliveries were renewed in 1949, followed by licenced production in 1952.
 
The Germans had the best ideas and the worst of all possible technical, industrial and political contexts in which to develop them.

American industry benefited from the dual advantages of economies of scale and complete immunity from either bombing or invasion..

The British had a small number of very good ideas that the Americans were then able to develop to the limit.
 
Like when the German engineers made the sleeve valve engines, and added turret to a 1-engined fighter? ;)
Hey, the British are... creative. :D I think it's a national characteristic that makes them all want to be in a Monty Python skit.
 
The Germans had the best ideas and the worst of all possible technical, industrial and political contexts in which to develop them.

American industry benefited from the dual advantages of economies of scale and complete immunity from either bombing or invasion..

The British had a small number of very good ideas that the Americans were then able to develop to the limit.
It was the open nature of US and British engineering, science, and industrial leadership that made things work. In Germany, industry remained very parochial. There wasn't a lot of cooperation between military services, government agencies, and various industrial leaders.

One big difference was that post 1942, the US and Britian knew pretty much that they'd eventually win. So, they could, and did, take more time thoroughly developing new projects and testing them before putting them into production. The Germans were ever more desperate and had to push their more advanced stuff into production with minimal testing and often still full of serious flaws. To their benefit, the German production methods of batch assembly mostly by craftsmen meant they could implement changes to production quickly, if inefficiently.

This video shows how the US changed making a 40mm Bofors from Swedish / European production methods and standards into ones that the US used for mass production.

 
I seem to remember a story about a German roller coaster car…no access panels.

It had to be cut open, where workers pulled out a double handful of shavings.

I don’t remember the provenance…that and old tales of workers caught in the couplers of two rail-cars who lasted long enough to say goodbye to family members…I heard it happened at the L&N Boyles yard…my mind wanders.
 
Switzerland did not build Jg 38ts. Czechoslovakia built them for the Swiss. And Czechoslovakia built them in the first place because they already had the tooling (and a LOT of unfinished vehicles and abandoned German vehicles) and they could be used for quick rebuild of the army, until better stuff is available. We actually planned to center on T-34-85s until the TVP tank project was ready for production, and some 60 T-34s were delivered in 1946, but then Soviets for some reason refused to sell more* and Jg 38t was an available alternative. As with the S-199 (Bf-109) and S-92 (Schwalbe) it was also an attempt to be selfreliant, to keep the industry running and spending as much money as possible at home instad of buying foreign stuff.

* deliveries were renewed in 1949, followed by licenced production in 1952.
The Swiss kept than in service untis the mid 70 th. Unlike its name might suggest, the Jagdpanzer (hunting tank) was a purly defensive weapon and served very well in this role. Usualle it sat in a ambush and waited for the enemy tanks to come. With it's very low profile, reasonable front amour and a powerfull gun it prooved to be very effective.

The role of the T34 and the Jagdpanzer was very different and the Jagdpanzer wasn't really a replacement for an offensive weapon.

Keep in mind, it was developed within 3 month and costed only half a much as the Panzer 4!
 
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Germans: look at our Bf 110, de best in de world among de 2-engined jagdflugzeuge
Bell: hold my beeer

Germans: look at our Fw 190, de best in de world among de 1-engined jagdflugzeuge
Republic: hold my beer
 
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The Swiss kept than in service untis the mid 70 th. Unlike its name might suggest, the Jagdpanzer (hunting tank) was a purly defensive weapon and served very well in this role. Usualle it sat in a ambush and waited for the enemy tanks to come. With it's very low profile, reasonable front amour and a powerfull gun it prooved to be very effective.

The role of the T34 and the Jagdpanzer was very different and the Jagdpanzer wasn't really a replacement for an offensive weapon.

Keep in mind, it was developed within 3 month and costed only half a much as the Panzer 4!
The Swiss had a specific niche to fill and Jg 38t fit in it well. That's all. Small ambush vehicle for small roads, small valleys and the dwarwish nature of the Swiss.

Yeah, I noticed. Anyway, Czechoslovak Army DID try to standardize on T-34s (until TVP was ready), and they DID have to use German machines instead. The ministry of defence together with the army tested JG 38t in the July of 1934 and - rejected it. Only at the end of the year the army decided to take over 200 machines, and in the next year it was aproved for service as a intermediate type. Simply because there was nothing better in usable numbers, not because it was so great. We had few T-34/85s, some 200 Cromwells IV and VI, 38 Stuarts VI, 22 Challengers, 102 Pz IV (mostly A and J, later in the decade some 80 more were put together from various wreckages), and around 150 StuG III and IV. Most of the Geran stuff was not service ready and had to be thoroughly refurbished first. We tried and failed to get more T-34s, we couldn't get more Cromwells nor Pz IVs, but we could build more Jg 38ts. So we did. Including purely training vehicles, engineering vehicles, and prototypes of flame throwing vehicles. And we got rid of them as soon as better tanks were available.If Škoda built Pz IV during the war, we would build those instead of Jg 38t. Hell, if Škoda built Pz III we would build those after the war! A crappy vehicle developed in three weeks is better than no vehicle.
 
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There have been many small roads and mountenous regions in the Czecheslovakia too, I would even claim that almost all roads in Europe have been small in that time. Sweden even smuggeled a Hetzer out of Danmark after the war to investigate it and it surly inspired the Swedish Stridsvagn 103, which had a very similar concept.

War time production is different to peace time production, during peacetime, quality is much more important quantity and you better invest in turret tanks despite the much higher complexity and cost. During the later years of the war the Hetzer was very well suited to do the job. it slowed down the retreat of the Wehmacht in the East and it costed only half as much as the Panzer IV. Its lower weight enabled it, to be built at Skoda. At the time, Skoda didn't have a crane which would have been stron enough to built a tank like Panzer IV or T34. So there was no real choise between a Hetzer and Pz IV, it was only Hetzer or somthing totally different.(take a look at Tank museum in Youtube)
 
Not to forgett, the good old Jerrycans, og "Wehrmachtseinheitskanister":


The German Einheitskanisters was an important contribution for the Blitzkrieg in France. French tanks had to cue to fuel up at special "tank tanks" wheras the German tanks simply transported there fuel in those canisters which were dumped when empty and later on collected by trucks. A much simpler and more efficient solution which was adopted all over.
 
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I have to ask. Is this a serious thread...
To paraphrase Scott Adams (author of the Dilbert comic strip):

If it is reliable and simple, German engineers will immediately want to add complexity until it's unreliable and unrepairable... :D
... or just trolling?
 
There have been many small roads and mountenous regions in the Czecheslovakia too, I would even claim that almost all roads in Europe have been small in that time. Sweden even smuggeled a Hetzer out of Danmark after the war to investigate it and it surly inspired the Swedish Stridsvagn 103, which had a very similar concept.

War time production is different to peace time production, during peacetime, quality is much more important quantity and you better invest in turret tanks despite the much higher complexity and cost. During the later years of the war the Hetzer was very well suited to do the job. it slowed down the retreat of the Wehmacht in the East and it costed only half as much as the Panzer IV. Its lower weight enabled it, to be built at Skoda. At the time, Skoda didn't have a crane which would have been stron enough to built a tank like Panzer IV or T34. So there was no real choise between a Hetzer and Pz IV, it was only Hetzer or somthing totally different.(take a look at Tank museum in Youtube)
According to Duncan Crow in Modern Battle Tanks, the AMX 13 was the inspiration for the S-Tank. Designer Sven Berge thought the oscillating turret on the AMX 13 was a good idea and took that to its extreme in designing a system that would allow the entire tank to rotate and oscillate in a similar manner.
As the plan Berge had in mind had the gun fixed in position in the tank, smooth traverse and elevation or depression of the entire vehicle would be necessary. The Swedes had examined several German wartime self-propelled guns, most notably the StuG III. These traversed the vehicle but the final lay of the weapon and fine aiming was done by moving the gun in elevation and limited traverse. The only previous example of a tank with a fixed gun aimed by traverse of the vehicle available to Berge was the Char B1.
Berge started experimenting with what he called a "crowbar" steering system in 1957 fitting a prototype system to an IKV 103, followed by fitting a second design internally to an M4 Sherman in 1959.
The resulting production vehicle is nothing like any German WW 2 panzerjäger or StuG. The gun is fixed in position and auto-loading. The entire tank can pivot turn and elevate or depress to aim the gun.

The IKV 103, a variant of the IKV 72, was intended as an infantry support weapon using primarily HE in the direct fire support role. It too is not particularly based on anything wartime Germany produced, although similar to say, the StuG 42 with 10.5cm gun.
 
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There have been many small roads and mountenous regions in the Czecheslovakia too, I would even claim that almost all roads in Europe have been small in that time. Sweden even smuggeled a Hetzer out of Danmark after the war to investigate it and it surly inspired the Swedish Stridsvagn 103, which had a very similar concept.

War time production is different to peace time production, during peacetime, quality is much more important quantity and you better invest in turret tanks despite the much higher complexity and cost. During the later years of the war the Hetzer was very well suited to do the job. it slowed down the retreat of the Wehmacht in the East and it costed only half as much as the Panzer IV. Its lower weight enabled it, to be built at Skoda. At the time, Skoda didn't have a crane which would have been stron enough to built a tank like Panzer IV or T34. So there was no real choise between a Hetzer and Pz IV, it was only Hetzer or somthing totally different.(take a look at Tank museum in Youtube)
Given that I live in Czechia, and right under the mountains to boot, I noticed. Again, Czechoslovak army REFUSED Jg 38t, originally. Again, we did not built it after the war because it was so good, we built it because it was the only thing we could build. The postwar use is a proof of our desperation, not of its quality. That's all from me.
 
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Like when the German engineers made the sleeve valve engines, and added turret to a 1-engined fighter? ;)
The design of the Defiant fighter was perfectly justified at a time when German bombers were not expected to take off from French bases escorted by fighters. Defiant was an unescorted bomber destroyer based on the experience of World War I against zeppelins and the COW developments of the interwar period.
 
- After the Battle of France, the Germans, believing the war was over, neglected the manufacture of airplanes and the training of pilots. On the other hand, the British in their desperate isolation, doubled the production of previous year by building 15,000 aircraft in 1940.

They also strove to improve the performance of the fighters in combat operations by introducing numerous modifications on existing models. New self-sealing fuel tanks, armoured windscreens, constant speed airscrews, special carburettors for the Merlin engines to not lose power in inverted flight and IFF equipment were installed. The harmonisation of guns was reduced to 200 m to increase the hitting power and the Brownings Mk.II machine guns were hurried into service with Ball and de Wilde incendiary and tracer rounds. Hundred octane gasoline was also imported from the USA.

France had only the Maginot Line for its defence, but the British Islands were protected by eight barriers that the Germans did not manage to cross. The English Channel, the Royal Navy, the ‘Chain Home’ with 21 radar stations, the Anti-Aircraft Command with 350,000 personnel, 1,340 heavy guns and 370 low level guns, the Balloon Command with 40,000 personnel and 1,400 balloons, the Royal Observer Corps with 30,000 personnel, the Fighter Control System force multiplier and the Hurricanes, Spitfires, Defiants and Blenheims of the Fighter Command.
 
The design of the Defiant fighter was perfectly justified at a time when German bombers were not expected to take off from French bases escorted by fighters. Defiant was an unescorted bomber destroyer based on the experience of World War I against zeppelins and the COW developments of the interwar period.

If we're to base something on the ww1, that is that Germany had no problems invading and counquering neutral countries. In that war, best part of Belgium was conquered, and Germany was free to base their aircraft 100 km from the British coastline.

- After the Battle of France, the Germans, believing the war was over, neglected the manufacture of airplanes and the training of pilots. On the other hand, the British in their desperate isolation, doubled the production of previous year by building 15,000 aircraft in 1940.

During the winter of 1940/41, Germany was already in bad situation with materials to make aircraft, as well as with fuel needed, among other things, to train the new pilots. Hence the pressure towards Soviet Union and Romania to provide stuff.
British have had a far easier time to import the same thing that Germany was lacking, despite the U-boat threat.

France had only the Maginot Line for its defence, but the British Islands were protected by eight barriers that the Germans did not manage to cross.
Rumor has it that France also had it's military forces.
 
Whilst there is always SOME truth in all such "sayings", generally I think there is plenty of evidence to the contrary in WW2.

1) Most produced fighter in history Bf 109, designed specifically to be simple and easy to make, churned out in tens of thousands by forced labour.

2) Possibly the greatest ever machine gun, the MG-42 (still being used today in barely altered form) employed heavy use of
simple Sheetmetal stampings rather than complex and time consuming billet machined parts. It is known for being very simple,
extremely reliable and highly effective.

3) The V1 flying bomb, despite the "Wunderwaffen" being generally laughed at, in fact it was very effective, and was causing
a huge amount of political panic and genuine devastation, despite being considerably hindered by very poor intelligence
on the range setting. It was extremely simple. very cheap, very fast and had a devastating warhead.

... there are many more examples.

I would say that whilst there is certainly a national proclivity for not shying away from difficult designs, many of them
which did not work well should be ascribed to bad management and terrible political leadership than some sort of
mad desire by Germans to do things in an overly complex fashion.

Similarly if I were to cherry pick from Britain, you could argue the British made heavy use of mad designs which were totally unnecessarily
complex, on which huge effort was expended for very little gain.

-Napier Sabre
-Bristol Centaurus
-Rolls-Royce Crecy
....
 

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James Mills -The transfer and exploitation of German air-to-air rocket and guided missile technology by the Western Allies after World War II - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17581206.2020.1797446 - https://www.researchgate.net/public...logy_by_the_Western_Allies_after_World_War_II
I have a copy of Mill's book. The research is solid, particularly on the British, but his conclusions are for crap. If you are looking for good sources and base information on the subject, Mills' is a good source. If you are looking for an analysis of that information, go somewhere else.
 
If we're to base something on the ww1, that is that Germany had no problems invading and counquering neutral countries. In that war, best part of Belgium was conquered, and Germany was free to base their aircraft 100 km from the British coastline.



During the winter of 1940/41, Germany was already in bad situation with materials to make aircraft, as well as with fuel needed, among other things, to train the new pilots. Hence the pressure towards Soviet Union and Romania to provide stuff.
British have had a far easier time to import the same thing that Germany was lacking, despite the U-boat threat.


Rumor has it that France also had it's military forces.
“Rumor has it that France also had it's military forces.”

If you want to start a debate on the actions of the French army in 1940, it would be better to do so in another specific thread and deal with the matter in a strictly technical way to avoid that our French colleagues in the forum may feel aggrieved.
 
Given that I live in Czechia, and right under the mountains to boot, I noticed. Again, Czechoslovak army REFUSED Jg 38t, originally. Again, we did not built it after the war because it was so good, we built it because it was the only thing we could build. The postwar use is a proof of our desperation, not of its quality. That's all from me.
Same is true for the Wehrmacht, they simply couldn't built as many tanks as before, after the Ambi Budd factury was bombed. Skoda offered an intact production facility but with weak cranes which were onyl suitable for lightweight vehicles, so they went on with the jg 38. it is reasonable to believe, that the cranes haven't changed much after the war.
 
As a Canadian software engineer explained it to me: an American software engineer will write a program - with plenty of bugs - and deliver it next year. Meanwhile the German engineer will take 5 years to deliver the perfect software.
 
I guess, that's one of the typical clichees, like the German trains allways run on time (no, they never did, and it nowadays it is a nightmare!)
 
Uttley, Matthew. Operation ‘Surgeon’ and Britain's post-war exploitation of Nazi German aeronautics.- Intelligence and National Security,- Volume 17, Issue 2, 1–26. (2002) - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/02684520412331306470 - Andrew Nahum. (2003). 'I believe the Americans have not yet taken them all' - Operation Surgeon and the exploitation of German aeronautical science in postwar Britain -'Tackling Transport, Artefacts series, 2013, 99-138, - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/02684520412331306470 - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347002927.
 
An interesting read on German engineering compared to the Western Allies, in particular, is O'Reagan's Taking Nazi Technology.

CAJ_20.2_BR_3_Taking_Nazi_Tech_Cover.jpg


The US was very thorough in looking at what Germany was doing technologically across the board. They had the resources to do that and took advantage of it. On the whole, German technological levels weren't much different from other nations, and in many areas the war caused them to fall behind.

The book looks at the way the British, French, and Russians approached this too.

There are things big and small mentioned throughout the book. I found it interesting that US tool and die makers and machinists discovered that German industry didn't grind their machine tooling with chip breakers, something apparently unknown to German machinists of the era. That's a small thing, but it shows how German technology was uneven, something that can apply to most nations.
What gave the US and Britain an advantage was having open societies and a relatively free exchange of ideas. Germany was isolated during the war from that and suffered for it.
 
We’re there cultural differences in approaches towards how items are serviced?

I seem to remember how in Iraq, oil drilling equipment was run until it broke down, with folks having to travel to show how you have to take things apart now and then.
 

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