ADO-12 to "US-FRG" AVS V/STOL Fighter Programs

[overscan (PaulMM)]

The engine-performance picture has changed radically and unexpectedly for the better. Advanced engine research, sponsored primarily by the USAF, has paid off handsomely. One indication was given to the Price subcommittee by Republic Aviation officials in a brief review of their 1963-1964 ADO-12 (advanced development objective) study for the Air Force. This was to provide guidance for prototype development of subsonic and supersonic V /STOL fighters. Republic reported that the consensus of the engine manufacturers was that the next generation of lift engines could have a thrust-to -weight ratio of 25 to 1, and that lift-cruise engines would reach 8 to 1. The lift-cruise type are basically conventional turbojet or turbofan engines with swiveling nozzles or other relatively heavy devices for diverting the thrust downward during takeoff and landing. Dr. Brown disagreed with these estimates somewhat in his testimony. He said that 18 to 1 thrust-to-weight ratio was more likely for lift engines, with growth potential of 20 to 1 possible before radically new high -temperature materials would be needed.

Air Force Magazine, May 1965

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

The big story now being worked on at Republic is the application of vertical flight capability to multi mission fighter- bomber systems design . The potential breakthrough involves a program now in formulation as a joint undertaking of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to develop and evaluate prototype V/ STOL aircraft in combat configurations. Nearly a million engineering man- hours in V /STOL technology at Republic, and extensive backgrounding in related parametric studies, go far to giving this high -priority advanced program a lift UP . bomber design , operations analysis, maintenance and logistics, Republic was selected to undertake concept- formulation studies for the U.S./West German program to prove out the V/STOL concept in fighter-bomber design. The completed Republic studies comprise a massive 12-volume evaluation of the most advanced V/STOL technology and systems applications, to establish hard parameters for the program. The US/ FRG V/STOL development program may well be a major step in creating a new element of our tactical force structure. The development phase of this V/STOL program will give us the answers we require plus spin -off applications for other than military systems.

Fairchild Hiller Advert in Air Force Magazine April 1966.

Includes this wind tunnel model which looks familiar....

From https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...the-mcdonnell-douglas-f-15.15663/#post-103861

NASA wind tunnel testing of "Republic FX" model in 1965.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Proceedings - Society of Experimental Test Pilots Symposium (Volume 11 1967) contains an article 'US/FRG V/STOL Tactical Fighter Program" by George L. Bright of at least 9 pages which looks like it would be HIGHLY interesting if anyone has access to this.

In 1963 George L. Bright also wrote an article 'Mach 2 V/STOL (VJ 101) Flight Test Program'.

George L. Bright was ex US Navy pilot who became the Chief test pilot for German aircraft company Entwicklungsring Sud, and made the first flight of the German VJ-101 X-1 VTOL supersonic fighter. He died in the early 1990’s.

Nearest copy to me is University of Sydney. Lots of copies in US University libraries. There's a even copy at the British Library @uk 75

Symposium proceedings | WorldCat.org

Symposium proceedings | WorldCat.org

www.worldcat.org

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

EWR Reports

Technical Abstract Bulletin

www.google.co.nz

EWR - E - 29 / 66 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL FIGHTER WEAPON SYSTEM .
FINAL ORAL REPORT. AD - 382 586L 67-17 FLD . 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 1 - VOL 1 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART I. VOLUME I . SUMMARY AD - 382 578L 67-17 FLD . 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 1 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM , PART II . VOLUME I . POINT DESIGN 1 . AD - 382 579L 67-17 FLD . 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 2 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART II . VOLUME II . POINT DESIGN 2 . AD-382 580L 67-17 FLD . 1/3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 4 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM. PART II . VOLUME IV . POINT DESIGN . AD - 382 582L 67-17 FLD . 1/3 A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 5 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V /,STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART II . VOLUME V. RECOMMENDED PROTOTYPE . AD - 382 583L 67-17 FLD . 1/3 A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 6 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM , PART II . VOLUME VI . TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT REQUIREMENTS . AD - 382 685L 67-17 FLD . 1/3 A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 7A DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART II VOLUME VIIA , SEC . 1 TO 3 . COMMON CONSIDERATIONS AND INFORMATION . AD - 382 584L 67-17 FLD . 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT- 2 - VOL 7B DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART II . VOLUME VIIB . SEC . 4 . COMMON CONSIDERATIONS AND INFORMATION . AD - 782 585L 67-17 FLD . 1/3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL 7C DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART II . VOLUME VIIC. SEC . 5 TO 6 7 . COMMON CONSIDERATIONS AND INFORMATION . AD - 382 684L 67-17 FLD . 1/3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 3 - VOL 1 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . VOLUME I . OPERATIONS ANALYSIS . AD - 382 686L 67-17 FLD , 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 3 - VOL 2A DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART III . VOLUME IIA , SEC. 1 TO 3 . LOGISTICS SUPPORT . AD - 382 586L 67-17 FLD , 1 /3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 3 - VOL 2B DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART III, VOLUME IIB , SEC . 4 TO 6 . 7 . LOGISTICS SUPPORT . AD - 382 687L 67-17 FLD , 1 / 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT- 3 - VOL 3 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V / STOL TACTICAL WEAPON SYSTEM . PART III . VOLUME III . PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PLANNING AD - 382 587L 67-17 FLD . 1/ 3A

EWR - E - 170 / 65 - PT - 2 - VOL- 3 DESIGN STUDY FOR ADVANCED V/STOL TACTICAL NEAPON SYSTEM . PART II . VOLUME III . POINT DESIGN AD - 382 581L 67-17 FLD . 1 / 3A

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

We understand the United States and Germany recently decided to cancel a $ 500 million joint project to build and advanced V/STOL fighter plane. What were the details of this agreement, and why the cancellation ?
Answer : On 24 January 1966 we entered into a Design Study ( Phase I ) cotract with four U.S. aircraft firms. Simultaneously, the German Government awarded similar contracts to two German firms. The total U.S. cost was $4.0 million. Both U.S. and German studies were completed on 1 April 1966 and evaluated by a joint project office. In mid -March '67, the U.S. and German Governments jointly awarded a contract to a combined U.S.-German Joint Venture firm for System Definition ( Phase II ) at a U.S. cost of $3.0 million. Prior to entering the Phase II contract it was agreed by both U.S. and German Governments that no further development ( Phase III, prototype acquisition ) would be undertaken unless an operational requirement existed for the aircraft. This requirement was not established .
Question 224 : The testimony continues re V/STOL aircraft : " Indeed we found that, technologically, the pacing item was the engine, and that until we had a suitable engine, none of the approaches were likely to produce a suitable aircraft. Accordingly, beginning in FY 1966, we concentrated our resources on engine development and, through FY 1968 we devoted almost $70 million to this project ; additional funds will be required in FY 1969. Whether this engine will solve the problem is yet to be demonstrated ... How much money will be required in FY 1969, and is the engine ready for testing, or still in the developmental stage ? Answer : There were two different engine programs involved here with a total of $15 million budgeted for both programs. One was a direct lift engine demonstrator program with Allison Division of General Motors and Rolls Royce collaborating. This demonstrator will run for the first time this summer. [ Deleted .] This project is being reviewed and all efforts aimed specifically at the US/FRG project are being stopped. The lift- cruise engine portion of the program involved three contractors : Curtiss-Wright, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. All three contractors have completed demonstrator engine running. With the cancellation of the US/FRG program this engine program was reoriented toward a technology program to support the FX/VFAX program.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had some previous testimony that none of the V /STOL aircraft proved to be either technically or operationally feasible. As I understand it , the United States and Germany recently decided to cancel a $500 million joint project to build an advance V/STOL fighter plane. Do you know the details of that agreement; and if so, will you file them for the record ?

General HOLZAPPLE. Yes, sir. The information referred to follows -
The US / FRG Tactical Fighter Program was divided into three Phases, each requiring governmental agreement prior to initiation of work. These agreements were prepared by the USAF and executed for the U.S. by either the Director or Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, OSD. The Phase I Agreement ( Design Studies ) was signed on 24 January 1966 and the Phase II Agreement ( System Definition ) on 14 March 1967. A Phase III Agreement ( Prototype Development) was not executed because of the program termination .

The Phase I Agreement provided for a joint effort to study and evaluate design combinations applicable to an advanced V / STOL tactical fighter aircraft, with the results to be used as the basis for a possible joint prototype development project. Each country , working from a jointly- approved Statement of Work, obtained a series of proposed design studies from its own contractors. A Joint Study Evaluation Group was formed to review the work and to seek to prepare a common set of performance and design characteristics to be used as a basis for Phase II. Each Government agreed to fund the Phase I work of its own contractors and to select one of them for the conduct of subsequent Phases of the program. Government-owned technical and user rights were made available to each Government.

The Phase II Agreement provided for a system definition effort based upon the common set of design and performance characteristics developed by the Joint Study Evaluation Group. Engines and major avionics components were to be developed separately and procured jointly for the joint project. Costs ( including procurement, but not development, costs of engines and avionics ) were to be shared equally by the two Governments. The Agreement also contained special provisions to equalize the tax revenue of both countries from the joint project.

The Phase II and Phase III efforts were to be managed by a Joint System Program Office established at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The U.S. and German contractors selected for Phase II were required to form a single point of responsibility ( the Project Contractor ) to deal with the System Project Office ; this joint organization was required to possess adequate resources to assure contract performance and the capability of providing both Governments with the required technical information and user rights. The management office of the Project Contractor during Phase II was located in Germany. Under the Phase II Agreement a single contract, using U.S. contracting and pricing procedures, was negotiated with the Project Contractor. All development work was to be performed in the U.S. or Germany, except as otherwise authorized, and would be divided on an approximately equal basis between the two countries. A joint fund was established in a Special U.S. Treasury Account with each country depositing one-half of the Phase II cost ( $ 3,000,000 each ) . The Phase II Agreement also provided that sales of or licenses to manufacture the aircraft or its components developed under the joint project were subject to prior concurrence of both Governments ; recoupment of development costs in the case of such sales or licenses was required. The agreement included an undertaking that each Government would sell to the other, on fair and reasonable terms, components incorporated in the developed aircraft which might be required in their unilateral V / STOL production program . At the conclusion of Phase II, the two Governments were to jointly and unilaterally review the proposed weapons system in order to determine whether to proceed with Phase III, which was to consist of prototype development, acquisition and testing of the V /STOL aircraft developed in accordance with the design and performance characteristics resulting from Phase II. Phase III did not encompass production of the aircraft. If a decision were made to undertake Phase III, the terms of the Phase II Agreement were to be reviewed and an appropriate agreement or supplement for Phase III executed.

1968 Senate Hearings

Hearings

www.google.co.nz

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/1965-REPU...664?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_0&hash=item541abc28b0

Added these posts to what is probably the correct topic. I believe these are VSTOL trade studies by Republic for US/FRG. I have high res originals. The chart attached has a rough outline of Republic's ADO-12 study.

 

[hesham]

So - 4 US contenders were selected from 9 bids for US/FRG in August 1965 as follows:

• Boeing
• McDonnell
• Lockheed & Bell (team)
• Republic

2 German bids were selected from

• VFW
• EWR

By September 1966, EWR had won the German competition.
By December 1966, Republic had won the US competition.

Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology August 23 1965, September 6 1965, September 12 1966, December 5 1966

9 US Bids

Confirmed:

• Boeing
• McDonnell
• Lockheed (& Bell)
• Republic

Intended bidders according to Flying Review June 1965:

• EWR
• General Dynamics
• North American
• Lockheed
• Northrop
• Ryan
• Republic

For Bell,

there was two concepts,D-2181 Phase I & D-2200 Phase II.

 

[alertken]

overscan #165,181: your tenacity in delving into 1960s US/FRG VTOLs is remarkable. I have merely confused myself in:
* lapse of Phase 2, NBMR3 after being "won" 5/62 by both BAC/Boeing/Dassault {Mirage IIIV} and Focke-Wulf/HSAL/Republic {P.1154};
* lapse of Bell D-188A, aka EWR VJ101C;
* US solo work on ADO-12;
* US/FRG MoU, 12/12/64, Advanced Vertical Strike Fighter, then inter-firm collaboration EWR/Boeing, then:
* US/UK/FRG funding 10/65 lightweight liftjet Allison/M.A.N./RR XJ99-RA-1 (alongside much FRG funding, MAN/RR RB145/153/162/193);
* US/FRG Design Studies funded at 4 US, 2 FRG firms, 24/1/66-1/4/66 (Bell teamed with Lockheed), where, I thought, Boeing/EWR put in a single Study Report/Bid, and I don't know what VFW submitted, with whom; then, after a year:
* US/FRG sole-source AVS System Definition contract, 13/3/67, EWR Fairchild Intn'l GmbH/Munich.
My confusion includes wondering how EWR (Messerschmitt) could happily hop from Bell to Boeing to (Republic), while VFW got...nix.

Your #181 has 10/67 "warm" prospects of UK joining AVS. That will now disturb the peaceful rest of those who cancelled P.1154, 2/65 as
“a technological and economic impossibility” SZ,Monkeys and Men,P.383. Solly Zuckerman had by then become Govt. Chief Scientific Adviser
and Denis Healey was still at Defence. No.

The FRG teams - from the firms and officials from Bonn/Koblenz - that worked awhile in US on all this, came away enthused by DoD's SPO notion (Systems Project Office) (pretty much what UK today calls an Integrated Project Team, with "owners" of things). When Healey wrestled his way onto NKF75, 5/68 after France booted themselves off, he found a nascent SPO Meeting Place staffed by the other 5 Nations. He then had great difficulty in gaining Others' acceptance of his and BAC's nominations to fill staff posts...in Systems Engineering, Military Factors, Aerospace Ground Eqpt. Panel, Reliability and Maintainability Panel. UK could read and write English...but not this. And as for Plans & Programs with nodes and paths...Que?

 

[hesham]

So - 4 US contenders were selected from 9 bids for US/FRG in August 1965 as follows:

• Boeing
• McDonnell
• Lockheed & Bell (team)
• Republic

2 German bids were selected from

• VFW
• EWR

By September 1966, EWR had won the German competition.
By December 1966, Republic had won the US competition.

Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology August 23 1965, September 6 1965, September 12 1966, December 5 1966

9 US Bids

Confirmed:

• Boeing
• McDonnell
• Lockheed (& Bell)
• Republic

Intended bidders according to Flying Review June 1965:

• EWR
• General Dynamics
• North American
• Lockheed
• Northrop
• Ryan
• Republic

For Bell,

there was two concepts,D-2181 Phase I & D-2200 Phase II.

I hope that,we will find them in ASP5 book.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

1. Background

In 1961, the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) #3 project was initiated as an attempt to find an alliance-wide solution to a common requirement for a VTOL light strike reconnaissance aircraft for the NATO Air Forces. In January 1962, NBMR 3 ended in an impasse after which each competing nation pursued its national project(s) on its own.[1] The French continued with their VTOL Mirage II [2], the British with their VTOL Hawker P.1127 (which eventually evolved into the Hawker Siddeley AV-8A Harrier and later the McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier), and finally the U.S. and FRG with their respective efforts which will be covered shortly.

2. Organization

Unlike the purely unilateral approach of France and Britain, the U.S. and the FRG decided to establish a working group to study the feasibility of combining their separate V/STOL fighter aircraft projects into one joint development project. This was part of the wider effort to launch joint development projects that would pick up where the existing joint production projects were about to leave off. (The American-German MBT-70 was the other major transatlantic project emendating from this effort. All the successful ones, how ever, were to exclude the U.S.) The study group recommended that the program be undertaken jointly and consist of three distinct phases: Conceptual; Prototype Definition; and Acquisition. At the conclusion of each phase a new joint agreement would be signed prior to proceeding to the next phase. The first phase commenced subsequent to MOD'S dated August 1, 1963 and February 5, 1965. In addition, there was an International Agreement on Cooperation in R&D for V/STOL aircraft signed on November 14, 1964.

Within the NATO Armament Committee (replaced by CNAD in 1966), the U.S. and FRG's Senior National Representative (SNR) coordinated policy for the project. Under them came a joint study group, and later, one for joint evaluation.

Development costs were to be shared on a 50 - 50 basis, but work sharing was expected to be somewhere around a 60 - 40 ratio in consideration of the U.S.- FRG troop offset arrangements. The two nations agreed that English would be the official language for the program and the Anglo-Saxon system of weights [3] and measurements would be used.

The ultimate weapon system was to be a V/STOL tactical fighter aircraft with the following capabilities:

1. All-weather, low-level, high-speed penetration, for delivery of either nuclear or non-nuclear ordnance at medium ranges.
2. Air-to-ground strikes in support of ground combat operations at short range.
3. All-weather, low-level, high-speed penetration reconnaissance and/or strike reconnaissance at medium to long ranges.
4. Air-to-air combat of a self-defensive nature.[4]

The engines for the fighter were covered in an independent parallel program involving the joint funding by the U.K. and the U.S. of the Pegasus engine (later to power the Harrier). The RolIs-Royce / Bristol Siddeley Pegasus was a vectored-thrust vertical-lift engine and had represented a breakthrough in turbojet engine design.

The Pegasus engine dates back to 1957 when the U.S., through its Mutual Weapons Development Program (MWDP), provided funding to Britain's Bristol Siddeley corporation for its development. One estimate put the U.S. contribution through 1965 at $26 million or 56% of the total development cost. On October 20, 1965, the U.S. and U.K. signed an MOU for the development of a 5 direct lift engine for V/STOL aircraft. [5] The U.S. contracted with the Allison Division of General Motors and the U.K. contracted with Rolls-Royce. A joint Project Board and an Industrial Program Manager for the vertical lift engine provided support to the U.S./FRG V/STOL project. [6]
In addition, two other U.S. contractors, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric, were both engaged in a contract definition competition for a lift-cruise engine that would be applicable either for the AVS project or the USAF's FX and the USN's VFAX projects.[7]

3. Design Study Program

There were two German contractors, and eventually two U.S. contractors, submitting proposals during the Design Study phase. Each country was to hold its own source selection with the understanding that its selectee must be able to work with any one of the contractors from the other country. [8] Subsequently, the joint evaluation group was to select the best design characteristics from any or all proposals submitted and come up with a single configuration.

Whereas VTOL activity died down in the U.S. after the NBMR 3 impasse in January 1962, the German aerospace industry (along with the British and French) had continued its.national programs.

The two firms selected by the German Defense Procurement Agency, The Bundesamt fuer Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB), were VFW GmbH and Entwicklungring Sud (EWR) GmbH. Both EWR and VFW were brought under contract in late 1963.

Messerschmitt had previously developed and flown its VTOL VJ-101 prototype, and VFW its VAK-91 prototype. EWR, a jointly owned subsidiary of Messerschmitt, Boelkow and Siebelwerke took over the VJ-101 from Messerschmitt in 1964 [9]

EWR had a staff of about 250 working on the AVS alone, with an additional but smaller staff supporting F-104G reliability and maintainability efforts. Most of the AVS staff was to later reappear in the MRCA Tornado project, providing the core personnel. Representative of this, EWR's AVS Program Manager was Gero Madelung, later the MRCA's third Program Manager, and AVS Deputy Program Manager was Helmut Langfelder, the MRCA's second Program Manager. [10]

In the fall of 1964, Boeing was given the first of three subcontracts by EWR to provide technical support. Manning levels for the Boeing team in Munich working with EWR started out at seven people in October 1964, and increased to 14 the following month with the signing of the intergovernmental MOU. In January 1965 Boeing received its second subcontract and its Munich detachment stabilized at approximately 40 people between May 1965 and January 1967. EWR, for its part, had a small team averaging around a half dozen men in Seattle during this period. [11]

The rationale behind the teaming up of the two firms was relatively simple. Both firms could see the NATO-wide VTOL interest in fighters. On EWR's side, Boeing, as one of the world's leaders in aerospace and as one third owner of Boelkow, was a logical choice for a partner for its first post-war fighter design effort. Boeing for its part, was interested in getting back into the fighter business (the last Boeing fighter to enter series production dated from the 1930's). [12]

As the U.S. side of the project came on stream later than that of the FRG, Republic-Fairchild entered the picture in early 1966. Reflecting a similar but looser teaming relationship between the other two firms, Republic-Fairchild sent a team to VFW (Bremen) in early 1966, be it a smaller one than the Boeing team. VFW also sent a small group over to Republic-Fairchild in the U.S. The tight EWR-Boeing collaboration not surprisingly led to considerable cross fertilization, so that in the end, among the four designs presented in late 1966, the EWR and Boeing designs were virtually identical. The U.S.A.F. took exception to this and at the last minute Boeing was required to revise its proposed design. In the end the EWR design was judged by the two Air Forces [13] to have been the best of the four.

Although this would eventually present the U.S.A.F. with a dilemma, it was cognizant of the close EWR-Boeing relationship throughout, and even encouraged it. Moreover, the USAF SPO requested both U.S. contractors submit, as an element in their proposals, their teaming arrangements. Republic-Fairchild had taken another tact than that of Boeing's, however. Feeling this represented an endorsement of collusion that threatened to bias the competition, they let it be known they would protest on these grounds if the Boeing design was selected. The Source Selection Evaluation Board had trouble dealing with this rather ticklish issue, and opted not to score this part of the proposal, only noting it. Thus Boeing's successful teaming relationship served, in the [14] end, as a penalty in yet a second way.

The January 1967 parallel source selections following a joint evaluation by the SPO, led to the award of a $6 million contract by the USAF's ASD to Republic- Fairchild and a comparable award to EWR by BWB for the prototype definition phase. By the month following source selection Boeing scaled down its 40-man team at EWR to seven (which continued to support EWR under a third subcontract), while Republic-Fairchild built up its team at EWR to about 70 to 80 men. As a residual of the tight EWR-Boeing relationship, and the Boeing content in the EWR design, the Boeing team in Munich gradually tapered off during 1967 and into early 1968. [15]

An agreement had been reached early in this phase allowing each country's representative to have unlimited access to all data generated and submitted to the joint study group. [16] One of the important deficiencies of the project, which appeared during this phase and continued through to cancellation, was to be the lack of a definition [17] of the system's operational role.

4. Prototype Definition Phase

On April 12, 1967, the individual national efforts, i.e., the German Study Group and the U.S. project personnel, were combined into a single group known as the U.S./FRG V/STOL Tactical Fighter SPO (and the SNR established a project steering committee). Also in April 1967, the German and American contractors [18] set up EFJ, headquartered in Munich.

During the Prototype Definition phase EWR and Republic-Fairchild jointly developed a detailed plan for contractor production of the prototype aircraft. This plan called for the assembly of seven prototypes in the U.S. and five in the FRG. The estimated cost of this stage was $500 million.

By June, 1967, interest within the two customer governments seemed to be drifting toward a more limited prototype program, rather than committment to a production program. When the evaluation report of the Prototype Definition phase study was completed in late 1967, it indicated that the contractor had satisfactorily accomplished the objective of defining general system design and performance specification. This was qualified, however, by the statement, "the contractor's Definition phase final report revealed some omissions and treatments in less depth than was expected." Since this was the contractor's initial proposal, it was generally felt however, that these deficiences could have been resolved through negotiation between the SPO and the contractor so as to insure the quality needed by the Acquisition Phase contract. Instead, in January 1968, the Steering Committee decided to cancel the program for an assortment of reasons to be discussed in Section 5 of this sub-chapter.

The principal technical deficiencies of the proposal involved a need for additional analysis in the engineering and technical spheres concerning reliability and maintainability, plus a need to further refine cost estimates. The first two problems of reliability and maintainability were particularly significant for such a V/STOL aircraft since it would be operating from dispersed and unprepared sites, and thus requiring a high degree of self-sufficiency.

Another problem concerning cost estimation involved an apparent unwillingness of the contractor to share cost risk and its use of an inappropriate learning curve. These, however, were not the primary reasons for the project's demise. [19]

5. Cancellation and the Issues

The SPO was in the process of validating the final reports of the Prototype Definition phase submitted by the contractor EWR, when the U.S./FRG Steering Committee decided on January 29, 1968 not to enter the Prototype Acquisition phase. The reasons given by the U.S. for the project's termination were that increasing monetary constraints created by the operational demands of the Vietnam War were limiting R & D projects, and that the USAF had not established an operational requirement for the aircraft. Consequently, the SPO and the program were disbanded by June, 1968.

The lack of a firm USAF operational requirement had haunted the project from the beginning. The Luftwaffe's interest in a VTOL fighter had been stronger than the USAF's, but was conditional on having a NATO partner. The Luftwaffe had no plans to go it alone. Boeing, and later Republic-FairchiId, attempted to integrate the technology into a specific design, and persuade the USAF that such an aircraft was needed. The USAF kept edging up to the line, producing draft Required Operational Capability (ROC) documents, but wouldn't cross over. [20]


a. On the Plus Side

One objective that was stated as applying to the program generally, but was not explicitly stated as such in any one of the phases, was the goal of advancing the technology of both nations. The U.S. advanced its technology through the investigation of V/STOL concepts as applied to fighter aircraft, while the FRG received valuable knowledge in jet engine technology. [21] EWR went on to use the design staff and knowledge to jointly design, develop and produce the Tornado multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) with the U.K. and Italy.

Another accomplishment of the program was its promotion of the on-going exchange of V/STOL technical data between the two countries. When the program terminated, the two countries agreed to a semi-annual conference where researchers from the AFSC V/STOL Technology Branch would exchange data with their counterparts in the Luftwaffe. [22]

The 1976 GRC study cited the AVS project as an example of the valuable intermediary role that SPO can play in improving communications and facilitating the work of industrial firms in a collaborative development project. The SPO was located at Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio, and incorporated about 20 German engineers. One of the bright spots of this ill-fated program was the smooth functioning of government and industry people at the technical level. [23]

Yet another plus for the project according to Baas, was German government and industry having obtained valuable insight from its U.S. partners (first Boeing from 1964-1967 and then Republic-Fairchild from 1967-1968) into the systems approach to the design and development of complex weapon systems. The U.S.Government and its aviation industry had developed sophisticated management and production practices that had been proven in past programs. The German participants were therefore introduced to advanced management concepts, and the knowledge acquired in the U.S. in systems development. [24]

In the words of one Boeing engineer assigned to the EWR technical assistance team, "German government and German industry got out of it 80% of what they wanted in both technology transfer and systems management know-how". [25]

Three additional justifications for pursuing the project were that: it complemented the U.S./U.K. Pegasus engine effort; it would probably have had some net Balance of Payments (BOP) benefits for the U.S.; and it would contribute to the increased standardization of the two countries' equipment. But since the project never advanced beyond the paper studies phase, these obviously came to naught. [26]

b. Reasons for Terminating

One factor contributing to the demise of the U.S./FRG V/STOL fighter program was "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome. As a means of minimizing competition head-on with the highly developed U.S. industrial base, European industries began actively seeking out in the early '60's those special fields wherein the U.S. had expressed little interest. One of these in which a large amount of development work had been accomplished by the Europeans was VTOL aircraft. [27]

Considerable criticism was directed at the U.S. for not taking advantage of this know-how through direct purchase or license agreements, but rather learning what Europe had already learned. In any case, with the decision in the early '70's to directly purchase the AV-8A Harrier from Britain to provide the U.S. Marines with a VTOL fighter, plus obtain a complete data package for further development of that system (the AV-8B), as well as produce the Franco-German Roland II missile system under license, the U.S. attitude belatedly began to show signs of change on this point. One underlying reason for the program's termination was reportedly the reluctance on the part of the Air Force, with some backing in DDR&E, to place the development of a front-line fighter in the hands of another country. This concern involved both considerations of security and the difficulties anticipated in international R&D. [28] Just compare this project, or the MBT-70for that matter, with the successful NATO Seasparrow project, where the DoO was willing to risk joint engineering development and production of an improved version of the USN (Basic) Seasparrow system (with only about 10% European content).

An additional factor, which is probably the most important single factor contributing to the program's demise, was the DoD's budget scrimping on all non-Vietnam-oriented programs. This resulted in the DoD's curtailing of several high-risk research projects, including the V/STOL fighter and an Army competition for a high-speed helicopter. [29] Although less important, the FRG, as well, was experiencing financial problems at the time. The Ministry of Defense was feeling this strain and was reducing its research expenses in favor of operating expenses and the direct purchase of U.S. military equipment (e.g., the F-4 Phantom covered in Chapter 11). Finally, there are the implications of the lack of an operational mission, a point already covered under the Design Study phase. Neither during the Design phase nor the Prototype Definition phase was there any evidence that the USAF had defined an operational mission for a V/STOL fighter aircraft, a condition, which persists to this day. This lack of definition contributed to the complexity of the aircraft which the industry-government team was attempting to design. The engineers had to design an aircraft that would possibly be used in interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance roles. The concept of dispersal with minimal support further increased the need for a complex aircraft.

But this complexity in turn resulted in decreased reliability and maintainability which either increases the quantity required, or increases theneed for logistic support. These alternatives proved to be both expensive and working at cross-purposes with the original concept of concealment and mobility [30]

6. Summary

According to the Baas study the program cannot be considered a complete failure. Part of its objective was to advance technology and promote the exchange of data, both of which were accomplished, though the desirability of the latter point was somewhat debatable as far as the Germans were concerned. The German government, along with Messerschmitt and Boelkow, also obtained valuable insight into the systems approach to design and development of complex weapon systems. This was transferred directly to the subsequent Tornado MRCA effort.

The difficulties of the program, which in any event never had more than luke-warm backing in the U.S. [31] can be classified as financial and technical. Probably the most important single factor contributing to the program's early demise was the U.S. defense budget being stretched in order to support the war\in Vietnam, causing R&D efforts to be curtailed. The cost of the proposed program was highly uncertain with the government and industry differing as to the amount and the sharing of risk. The FRG was also forced to reduce R&D. The technical difficulties stemmed from the USAF's inability to define an operational mission for a V/STOL fighter. The anticipated problems in reliability and maintainability were a result of the complexity of the aircraft design. And finally, there was strong feeling in the U.S. and the DOD towards procuring only weapon systems of U.S. origin. [33]

And as one final point, the teaming of firms from different nations prior to a common source selection surfaced a critical issue for joint design and development projects where the U.S. is one of the participants. The issue emanates from the differing U.S. and European competition policies (generally speaking, structural versus behavioral) and especially as they apply to defense procurement. The USAF's dilemma and the reversal of its position on the Boeing- EWR (i.e., Messerschmitt-Boelkow) teaming relationship in the final days of the competition provides yet another example of the difficulty of finding a good fit when the U.S. is a partner in a joint design and development project.

7. Sequel

As the FRG was depending on the AVS program (at least originally) to provide its next generation fighter, a feasible design and partnership was required to replace it. Fortunately for the Germans, the British as well had found themselves in a similar situation with half a fighter program, after the French had dropped out of the two year old Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) aircraft project in mid-1967. Discussions began in May 1968 between the British and German governments (joined by several others) in Brussels within a NATO working group and led to the signing of an MOD later in the year. The new aircraft was to be Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) Tornado (See Chapter 8).

Meanwhile the intra-German and interallied partnerships established during the AVS project were to have a decisive long-term impact, in parallel with the launching of the MRCA project. Consolidation of the German aerospace industry had proceeded with the owners of joint EWR subsidiary finally making the plunge. Messerschmitt, Boelkow and Siebelwerke merged in mid-1968 to form Messerschmitt-Boelkow which, now compliant with the German government's demands for concentration of the aerospace industry, was designated by the government to be the German partner firm in the new joint project, the MRCA Tornado. Furthermore, MB's selection to be the German industrial participant was the result of its having won the prior AVS competition. This in turn was the fruit of the intense collaborative relationship built up over the 1964 to 1967 period with Boeing. The year following the MB merger and the launching of the MRCA Tornado project, 1969, the consolidation efforts took another step further with MB-Hamburger Flugzeugbau (owned by the Blohm family) merger to form MBB.

The other AVS partner, the U.S. Government, followed its own course which indirectly led to another joint VTOL fighter project involving the U.S. and the U.K. during the 1970's. Though a VTOL mission never did surface in the USAF, another service, the U.S. Marine Corps, did have a requirement for a VTOL ground support fighter. In 1971 the USMC bought into the British AV-8A Harrier program with a purchase of 110 aircraft and the technical data package. The Pegasus engine utilized by the Harrier was the fruit of an earlier joint U.S.-U.K. effort interrelated with the AVS. After a series of joint and unilateral improvement programs the two governments went forward in 1981 with the 400 aircraft AV-8B Harrier program (See Chapter 9).

Notes

[1] See Chapter 5 for a description of the ill-fated NBMR procedures (1959- 66) and a short history of NBMR 3 in particular.
[2] The Mirage II flying test bed/prototype underwent a short history of considerable hover and flight testing prior to its crash in the summer of 1962. Deficiencies centered on the flight control system and engine instability. Following the crash, Dassault built a new and larger VTOL aircraft, the Balzac, which though externally similar to the Mirage II was a completely different aircraft. Back in 1959, Dassault and Boeing had signed a technical exchange agreement on VTOL aircraft. Boeing had been doing considerable wind-tunnel testing on a design similar to Dassault's Mirage II. Over the following three years Boeing provided Dassault with wind-tunnel test data in exchange for Dassault's flight test data. The agreement proved to be a very beneficial one from both firms' viewpoints. (Source: Tom Lollar, one of several Boeing engineers involved in the effort.)
[3] Capt. Melvin T. Baas, United States Involvement in Co-development: An Analysis of the US/FRG V/STOL Fighter Aircraft and NATO Sea Sparrow Project, a thesis presented to the Air Force Institute of Technology, August, 1971, pp. 26 and 32.
[4] Ibid.
[5] This issue resurfaced in the fall of 1971, during negotiations between the U.S. and U.K. Governments, and Rolls-Royce (having since absorbed Bristol Siddeley) and Pratt & Whitney and General Electric, over the licensed production of the Pegasus 11 (powering the AV-8A Harrier) and a joint license-development program based on the Pegasus 11. The U.S. Government claimed it retained limited proprietary patent rights to the Pegasus engine from the previous MWDP funding. This issue took several years of negotiations at the governmental level to resolve. (Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 8, 1971, p. 16).
[6] Baas, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
[7] "Cancellation of U.S./German V/STOL Fighter Won't Hinder Important Lift/Cruise Engine," Aerospace Technology, Feb. 12, 1968, p. 12.
[8] Baas, op. cit., p. 23.
[9] Interviews with Robert E. Kesterson, U.S. Roland Marketing Manager, Boeing Aerospace Company., February 1982, formerly of the Boeing AVS engineering staff in Munich from October 1964 to January 1968.
[10] The first MRCA Program Manager was Ludwig Boelkow himself.
[11] Kesterson, op. cit.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Baas, op. cit., p. 23.
[16] Ibid., p. 24.
[17] Ibid., p. 28.
[18] Ibid., p. 17.
[19] Ibid., pp. 28-30.
[20] Kesterson, op. cit.
[21] Baas, op. cit.
[22] This point was evidently somewhat debatable. A contrary view was expressed in the FRG a year after the project had ended— a view which also is a good example of the sensitivity of the issue of data exchange. At that time the next generation of fighters was expected to be V/STOL. This was a field in which the FRG had done considerable research and operational testing. In the words of the one official, "We exchange all our V/STOL information with the U.S. We are very much afraid that eventually we will be buying back our own know-how." "U.S. Pressure Against European Fighter Seen", Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 13, 1969, p. 20.
[23] GRC op. cit., p. 257.
[24] Baas, op. cit., p. 28.
[25] Kesterson, op. cit.
[26] Ibid., pp. 27-8 and 30-1.
[27] Another such area was all-weather, short-range, low altitude air defense systems, i.e., Roland, Crotale, and Rapier.
[28] Cancellation", op. cit., p. 12.
[29] Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb. 12, 1968, p. 27.
[30] Baas, op. cit., pp. 33-4.
[31] Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 29, 1968, p. 28.
[32] Baas, op. cit., p. 35.
[33] Ibid.

Source: NATO : a business history Vol 3 [Boeing]

 

[uk 75]

Thanks to the contributions to this blog we can now trace four distinct designs as the US FRG AVS evolved.
The earliest drawings of the EWR Republic AVS show a design with F111 style intakes and a swiveling engine pod.
Three changes follow.

 

[uk 75]

The second AVS design moves the main intakes on to the top of the fuselage. The swivelling engines also change.
More to come

 

[uk 75]

The third version of the AVS sees the engine mounting simplified and divided while the swivelling pod evolves and loses its protective panel.

Last part to come

 

[uk 75]

The final AVS design has refined the engine mountings and simplified the swivelling pod. The Germans rename it the A400 before dropping the VSTOL pods and turning it into the NKF.

 

[hesham]

From Aviation magazine 1968.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

US/FRG

UNITED STATES/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TACTICAL FIGHTER’ PROGRAMME

AIRFRAME PRIME CONTRACTORS:
Fairchild Hiller Corporation, Republic Aviation Division, Farmingdale, Long Island, New York 11735, USA
Entwicklungsring Sid GmbH, 8 Miinchen 26, Museumsinsel 1, Germany

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT: EWR/Fairchild International, Munich, Germany

The aim of this bi-national programme is the study, development and construction of a highly flexible advanced weapon system, embodying vertical and/or ultra-short take-off capability, to replace the Starfighter aircraft at present in service with the Luftwaffe and some types of current USAF tactical combat aircraft. The US/FRG project was initiated by a German American Memorandum of December 12, 1964, on the joint development of weapon systems, and the signing of the “Statement of Desired Work for a US/FRG Design Study”, of February 2, 1965. During 1965-66, eighteen US and two German companies put in proposals in answer to a government request. In November 1966, a US/FRG government committee designated EWR of Germany and Fairchild Hiller’s Republic Aviation Division as equal partners to perform initially the Project System Definition Phase (SDP).

EWR and Fairchild Hiller have company EWR/Fairchild for industrial management of the during the seven-month SDP which began on April 24, 1967. After evaluation of the SDP study, the two governments will decide whether or not to proceed with the construction of prototypes. The inter-government agreement provides for the manufacture of twelve prototypes.

Government management of the programme is the responsibility of a joint German American Programme Office at Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio, USA.

US/FRG PROJECT

Detailed specifications of the US/FRG fighter are classified, but the adjacent illustration shows a model of one of the design studies that was.exhibited at the 1967 Paris Air Show. It represents a medium-weight tactical fighter, capable of operating conventionally, from short
airstrips, or vertically.

The fighter will have variable-geometry wings and will be powered by both lift and lift-cruise engines. The lift engines are being developed jointly by Allison in the USA and Rolls-Royce in the UK. Four of them will be fitted, in pairs, on arms which swing out from each side of the fuselage just forward of the wing leading-edges. They will be able to tilt in varying degrees from the horizontal, to provide vertical lift or short take-off capability. In an emergency, they could be used to give the aircraft a ‘“‘return-home”’ capability after failure of the main lift-cruise engines. When not in use they will retract into the fuselage.

The turbofan lift-cruise are being developed by the US government. The competition for their development and production is between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric.

Two of the engines will be mounted side-by-side in the rear fuselage and will be fitted with tilting nozzles so that they can provide deflected thrust during take-off. A crew of two will be carried in tandem, the second man serving as back-up pilot or in any
other role demanded by the specific mission to be flown.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1967-68

 

[hesham]

Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1967-68

Good article my dear PaulMM,and I have in my house,a version of Jane's 1969-1970,when I will back home,I will search for more Info,if it's there.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Original Vintage General Electric GE leaflet GE1/10 US/FRG Turbofan Engine 1967 | eBay

Les meilleures offres pour Original Vintage General Electric GE leaflet GE1/10 US/FRG Turbofan Engine 1967 sont sur eBay ✓ Comparez les prix et les spécificités des produits neufs et d'occasion ✓ Pleins d'articles en livraison gratuite!

www.ebay.fr

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

It must be noted there is ADO-26 (Advanced Development Objective ), a program to study lightweight engines which would be applicable to ADO-12, a VTOL
reconnaissance-strike aircraft. But the contractors are to provide a demonstration engine only ; not, as we understand it , flight hardware.

Boeing also has about 20 engineers in Germany working on a joint development program with EWR ( Entwicklungsring) for a supersonic VTOL variable sweep wing tactical fighter which could replace F- 104s in the German inventory in the early 1970s.

EWR-Süd is also studying a more complex heavy aircraft weapon system which bears the working designation of VJ- 101E. This would be a VTOL with variable-sweep wings. The project is also known as the EWR 360.The EWR 360 program involves study by Boelkow in cooperation with Boeing, and is reported to be a joint U.S.- German program for which the basic requirements will be spelled out in mutual negotiations sometime toward the middle of this year. There are some differences of opinion on the specific concept; the U.S.thinking in terms of a rather lighter aircraft with an operating radius of about 300 miles, while the Germans are looking at a slightly heavier version with an operational radius something over 435 miles.

American Aviation

www.google.co.nz

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

The US-West German AVS attack aircraft programme (Advanced V/ STOL Study) has recently reached a stage at which a slightly clearer picture of this aircraft can be visualised .This is a very long-term project which is to be financed jointly on a 50/50 basis by the two governments with regard to the development cost of the programme and also the purchase of vendor items. The engines are likely to be a combination of direct lift and some form of vectored-thrust unit. Lift engine development will not be shared by the USA with Germany but will be undertaken jointly by Rolls- Royce and Allison and the cruise engines are expected to be American. There have been hints from the United States that the specification of the AVS, as at present visualised, will be of greater value to Germany than to America. Despite this, the VTOL proposal is not at present popular in Germany because of logistic support problems. The range of the AVS, which will be of variable geometry form, is unlikely to appeal much to the US with the operating range of 250-300 miles, now proposed. Nevertheless, despite the differences in requirements between the two countries, a Joint System Programme Office is being set up at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio, to be under the Supervision of an American Director and a German Deputy. The companies chosen to continue this programme are the Republic Division of Fairchild-Hiller Corp. and EWR- Süd. At present the VTOL take-off weight is said to be 40,000 lb. and STOL weight up to 50,000 lb. West German interest in the AVS programme (see above) has to be considered in connection with recently expressed thoughts on the question of extending utilisation of the F- 104Gs currently in service with the GAF. All German Starfighters were recently grounded again following the loss of the 65th aircraft of this type and, incidentally, the death of the 37th pilot. It seems that full and continuing utilisation of the F- 104G, until at least the mid-70s, is envisaged and that there is no question of early procurement of a new weapon system either to replace or to complement the F- 104G. This seems to refute recent suggestions for early introduction of the McDonnell F-4 Phantom in the GAF. Air Force Staff officers consider that procurement of a relatively costly and complicated weapon system such as the F-4 could delay timely introduction of a true F- 104G successor, quite apart from the resulting budgetary problems. The GAF is at present concerned with building up pilot experience with the F- 104G and with possible new procurement of the same type from about 1968-69 to replace aircraft lost in accidents. The current production of a small series of two-seat TF- 104Gs may be extended, as this type could well be used for combat missions without major modification. In this connection, it should be noted that Lockheed is offering the CL-901 to the USAF and has invited the European F- 104G consortium manufacturers to tender for the manufacture of certain components. Paradoxically, one of the basic reasons for the retaining of the Lockheed F- 104G as principal type in the GAF is the current problem of pilot training. Today the GAF has no pilots with more than 1,500 jet flight hours, and only a few have logged over 1,000 hours to date. Some 50-60 % of all GAF pilots have only 300-800 jet flight hours, and have thus not yet passed the critical experience barrier. The principal GAF objective in the coming years will therefore be to intensify flight training and it is clear that this will require an aircraft which is already operational. Germany's original commitment to the F- 104G makes it almost inevitable that further training for the bulk of the pilots will have to be effected with this type. The GAF is now considering the introduction of long service commissions in order to produce a class of experienced career pilots. Even if introduced now, this would only produce a further 35-40 % of the current pilot strength with over 1,000 jet hours, even after two years. It seems clear that the GAF Staff is not at present in a position to make even preliminary decisions on the F- 104G successor, and that the new US-German AVS programme with no operational aircraft envisaged before 1973-74 may fit well into the planning timescale. Whether Germany will continue to be interested in the VTOL version of the AVS at the point when the development programme reaches the prototype stage ( 1968) is a question which will only be resolved in the coming months.

A representative of Entwicklungsring Sud(EWR) said at a recent press conference that a heavy cut in items 308 and 309 of the German defence budget (research and development) , could result in 30 per cent of the 35,000 German aircraft industry workers losing their jobs. VTOL projects including the German-US AVS programme could also be affected. Germany has already spent about DM600 million on these projects and a change of partners in the AVS programme could cause a two-year setback. EWR and Fairchild Hiller Corp's Republic Aviation Division have been nominated as main contractors in the AVScontract definition phase.

Interavia 1967

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Final Design for U.S.-German Joint V/STOL Fighter Expected in Year
By Cecil Brownlow

Washington—Firm design configuration for a proposed advanced V/STOL strike fighter that could be developed jointly by the U. S. and West Germany in a program with a potential value of over $1 billion is scheduled to evolve during the next 12 months.

The design still must overcome a number of technical and political hurdles if it is to advance to the hardware stage. The final configuration also is expected to be a synthesis of a number of proposals to be submitted under terms of four U. S. and two German study contracts now being negotiated with industry (AW&ST Aug. 23, p. 27).

Air Force expects as many as 30 designs to be submitted at the conclusion of the six-month studies, with each contractor supplying up to five paper concepts. U. S. companies selected by USAF from the nine bidding firms are Boeing, McDonnell Aircraft, Lockheed Bell working as a team and Republic Aviation. The West German industry consortiums named by the German Defense Ministry are Vereinigte FlugtechnischeWerks (VFW) and Entwicklungsring Sud (EWR).

USAF officials working on the project hope that the contracts with the American firms can be signed by Oct. 1 at the latest. This would establish an Apr. 1 deadline for the submission of the four studies.

The studies then will be evaluated by a joint U S. —German technical group being formed at Wright- Patterson AFB Ohio for final consideration and determination of a design that best meets the requirements laid down by the two countries. Air Force officials say this should be completed by early next September. For the moment. there is no agreement between the two countries, verbal or otherwise, to progress beyond this stage. Both the Air Force and the German Ministry of Defense, however, look upon the program as one that will provide them with an operational V/STOL strike fighter by the early 1970s.

The government-to-government agreement covering the six-month study contracts arranged verbally by Defense Secretary Robert S McNamara and German Defense Minister Kai- Uwe Von Hassel, also still has to be ratified by a formal signing. This is expected well before the Oct. 1 deadline for the signing of the study contracts and is a necessary prelude, since it will spell out the rights each government will have to the information and technical data the companies will provide and the protection in this regard that the individual firms can expect.

If the agreement is extended beyond the study stage, USAF would select a U. S. prime, probably from among the present contractor designates, and the West German government would name either Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke or Entwicklungsring Sud. The two firms would be expected to form a joint design development team to refine the design and decide upon prototype production.

“We aren't talking about competing [U. S. and German] prototypes," an Air Force official emphasizes. “Speaking of commonality, if this thing works out, we'll have a more ‘common’ aircraft than the [General Dynamics/Grumman] F-111 ."

There has been some confusion in this regard on the part of the participating American firms as to their relationship with the German companies. “They think the Germans are their competition.” according to one USAF spokesman. “They aren't. The four American contractors are competing with one another, and the two Germans are competing with one another. There's no competition at all between an American company and a German company.’

For the study contracts, the Air Force is laying down four specific design points, but generally it is giving the companies a relatively free hand to provide their own solutions to the problems involved. The firms also are being asked to look at each proposal and determine how it could be supported from a maintenance and logistics standpoint. In addition, they will be called upon to evaluate the potential enemy defenses the V/STOL fighter might encounter and how it would overcome them. Value of each contract is slightly less than $1 million.

The type of powerplant to be employed for vertical thrust also is a question that still must be answered. USAF officials concerned with the project say that, for the moment, pure—lift engines seem to provide the best solution. They are showing new interest, however, in the possible use of lift=fan powerplants. The potential of lift-fans for V/STOL aircraft designed to fly at speeds of Mach 0.8 or less are being studied by several U.S. firms (AW&ST Aug. 9. p. 52).

U.S. has a still-unsigned agreement with Great Britain for the joint development of a pure-lift engine that is projected for use in any American-German V/STOL airframe (AW&ST Feb. 22 p. 27). Britain continues to promote the Rolls- Royce Rb.189 paper design as a basis for the development program. U. S. defense officials contend as adamantly that any joint project will be for the development of an essentially new engine, taking advantage of the technologies of both countries.

The British have selected Rolls-Royce as their representative in the development project, but DOD has yet to name the American firm. The British also have evidenced some interest in the U. S.—German program to Defense Dept. officials, and France has made similar inquiries to the West German Defense Ministry.

USAF officers concerned with the program would like to see the aircraft accepted by other countries eventually, possibly on a co-production basis. but not during its development phase.

“We’re having enough trouble getting agreement on a two—nation basis," one official says. “If we brought anyone else in at this stage we'd never get anything done. We've had some sad experiences in the past in trying to get something going on a multi-lateral basis [within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.]” Conceptual differences also remain between the U. S. and West Germany.

The Germans, for instance, are calling for on-the-deck speeds in the Mach 0.9 category and a combat radius that would cover the majority of the targets in East Europe assigned to them by NATO in the event of a Communist attack. U.S. officials believe that the penalties in cost and weight would be prohibitive.

The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, already has established a firm operational requirement for an advanced V/STOL fighter within this category to complement the VAK- 191B lightweight close--support fighter being developed jointly by West Germany and Italy. USAF has yet to define an operational requirement for a V/STOL fighter and now says that it probably will not be able to do so until it has several prototypes on hand.

This follows the general philosophy originally evolved for the Air Force's ADO-12 (Advanced Development Objective) project, under which a V/STOL fighter similar to that envisioned in the U.S.—German program would have been developed. The ADO-12 requirement called for the production of 12 prototypes which would have been evaluated in the field. Data from the evaluation would have been used, in turn, to help in the establishment of an operational requirement for the aircraft.

AWST 6 September 1965

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

V/STOL Studies Awarded to 5 Contractors

Washington—Five American contractors, two of them working as a team, will conduct independent, six-month Air Force airframe design studies as an initial step in the proposed joint U. S.-West German development program for an advanced V/STOL jet support fighter.

The companies, selected from nine bidders who responded to a USAF request for proposals, are Boeing, McDonnell Aircraft, Lockheed—Bell and Republic Aviation.

Separate contracts to study possible propulsion systems for the proposed aircraft are expected to be awarded within the near future.

Each of the four contracts awarded last week has a value of slightly less than $1 million. If the joint V/STOL fighter project should reach the production stage, however, total value of the program could exceed $1 billion (AW&ST Nov. 23, p. 22). In addition to the efforts for USAF, the West German industry is conducting similar studies. At the conclusion of the present six-month program, a joint US-German team will review the study results and decide whether a common system is feasible and a contract definition phase can be initiated on a cooperative basis.

The third phase would be the manufacture of a number of prototypes by the industries of the two countries. The final step would be production contracts awarded either by the U. S. or West Germany, or both. Each nation would produce and finance the aircraft it has on order.

AWST 23 August 1965

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

U. S., Germany Consider Joint V STOL
Advanced fighter would have billion-dollar contract potential; other weapon development pacts studied.
By Cecil Brownlow

Washington—US. and West Germany may jointly develop and produce an advanced V/STOL close-support jet fighter with a contract potential value
in excess of $1 billion.

Dollar volume of the program could reach that of the Main Battle Tank, if the two governments can agree on requirements, configuration and production
splits. The tank will become operational late this decade, and will cost $580-$1000 million to develop, and $2 billion for production vehicles for US. and German armies.
[...]
Plans for the battle tank plus cooperation within the V/STOL area and other fields represent positive results from a drive begun several years ago by the two countries to gain greater equipment standardization for their respective forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
[...]
In the past, the US. has declined overtures to enter into a joint development and production program on a V/STOL fighter, including NATO sponsored
projects, because it felt that the state of the art was well below operational requirements. Defense Dept. now feels that recent progress, particularly
in the powerplant field, may make it possible to move into a joint development effort with the West German government, with an actual production
aircraft as the ultimate goal of the program.

If approved, development costs between the countries would be split 50-50, with the industries of the two nations sharing the workload, although
not necessarily on an equal basis. Any production would be divided along national lines, with each country producing the quantity ordered by its armed
forces.

In addition, the Defense Dept. has ordered the Air Force to work with the German Defense Ministry in an effort to obtain the development objectives for the latter’s VAK-191B Light-weight, close—support fighter, designed as a limited—range replacement for the Fiat G91. U. S. firms also will provide the major avionics packages for the aircraft, which West Germany is develoaing jointly with Italy. Prime contractor is Germany’s Vereinigtc Flugtechnische Werke, and total production orders for the VAK-191B probably wil exceed 200 aircraft, if the program is carried beyond the development stage.

First prototype is schedu;ed to begin its flight test program sometime in 1969. To gain development data and experience for possible inclusion in work on an advanced V/STOL fighter, the two governments also will participate in the joint testing and evaluation of a number of aircraft. These will include
the Ling-Temco-Vought XC-l42 tilt-wing transport and the Curtiss-Wright X-19 tilting-propeller tri-service research aircraft from the U.S., plus Germany’s
Dornier D-031 V/STOL transport design now under development and the Entwicklungsring Sud VJ-1O1C experimental interceptor.

AWST 23 November 1964

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I would like now to introduce Mr. Hill Barrett , who is chief of preliminary
design and development department of our Wright Aeronautical
Division , the Propulsion Division of Curtiss-Wright Corp.
[..]
Mr. BARRETT. On the other hand, there is a study which is being
given out by the Government, several such studies, which the airplane
companies do and the engine companies participate in by providing
them the necessary information to complete their studies. One such
study is called AĎO- 12 , "Advanced Development Objective 12," and
it is a study of VTO aircraft.
We have been participating in this study with all of the airplane
companies ; such as, Boeing, Douglas, and the North American Co. ,
who have been making these studies, and providing them with engines
which they can scale up and down in size and they can make different
arrangements of, and they tell us the results of their work and they
ask us for certain improvements which they feel will help the airplane-
we determine whether we can provide them.

Ours is perhaps different from what is commonly thought. As you
know, there have been many, many studies which have to do with how
much does it cost to go V. We do not feel that there will be a good V
solution if the cost is high, and so our philosophy has been to provide
vertical takeoff in these aircraft for the shorter ranges without a significant
penalty in their use in the normal type of takeoff and landing.
And so following that philosophy we have made innumerable studies,
and most recently have completed for the Air Force the ADO-12 ,
advanced development objective No. 12 program.
This is the occasion for the slides and the briefing being secret. We
could not have presented you with this latest information without the
slides having been made secret . Mr. Richard Bowman, who has been
with the company in the design of fighter aircraft for 30 years and
probably has more continuity in the design of fighter aircraft than
most men in the country, will make the presentation .
[..]
On the next slide I would just like to mention our background. Our
background is extensive fighter experience ; the studies began about
10 years ago ; our largest VTOL effort was a participation in a NATO
competition in which we designed an aircraft suitable for use by the
NATO nations.
Our current effort has been on an extensive study of lift systems.
All in all , in the past 10 years I would judge that we have studied over
100 configurations. Our present effort is the ADO-12 phase 1 study.
ADO- 12 is advanced development objective, and the study is to determine
the optimum V/STOL airplane or V airplane. And this study
is a very intensive exercise, involving various engines, various engine
powers, various airframe configurations to determine the best airplane
design from what is available today. I will speak more about the
ADO- 12 later, but let this suffice for our background .
And what I can say is that we have spent about half a million manhours,
and the general conclusion of our study is that there is no
scientific or technical breakthrough required to produce a satisfactory
VTOL airplane.

I will show you some examples real quickly of our earlier studies .
This is one example of a VTOL airplane weighing about 19,000
pounds. This is an example of the airplane we designed for the NATO
competition, called the D24B ; it weighed about 34,000 pounds and has
variable geometry. The wings are shown both unswept and swept.

PROPULSION
The next picture is the 995-40 . It also incorporates variable geometry,
and it was a follow-on to our NATO studies. The NATO airplane
involved a foreign engine . After the NATO studies were finished we
laid out a few airplanes designed around American engines. And I
would like to take a moment right now to talk about lift engines and
lift -cruise engines, because this terminology is important.
Would you point to the lift engines ? This airplane has three lift
engines. Now, when I say "lift engines" it means that they are used
only for the vertical part of the flight . They are used simply to lift
the airplane off the ground, when the airplane has made its transition
these engines are shut off and are no longer operating.
The engines in the back of the airplane are called lift- cruise engines,
and these engines provide the cruising power for normal flight. In
takeoff, the cruise power is deflected downwards by means of a
deflector nozzel , so that the engine serves two purposes, lift and cruise.
So the engine terminology is lift engine and lift- cruise engine.
Mr. PRICE. But these engines are on at the time of lift ?
Mr. BOWMAN. Yes ; at the time you take off, you see . They are very
light in weight and very efficient as thrust producers, but they are
somewhat wasteful of fuel . So by using lift engines you get a high
lift , although at some sacrifice of fuel economy. And since this occurs
for only a short period of time , the fuel economy is not so important .
This is another example of a study with an American engine. This
engine is the same as used in the TFX.
It also has variable geometry. I simply give these slides as examples
of our early effort.
[..]
As we proceed to the higher performance airplanes we come to
the next area shown in blue, and here a good many of the airplanes fall
into this classification .
The airplanes shown on here are the airplanes used in the ADO- 12
study.
ADO- 12 STUDY
Now, the ADO-12 study was concerned with high performance
airplanes, and so they do fall in a group ; you would expect them to .
But what is important is that this group is completely composed of
composite-lift systems, that is, the lift system in each one of these
airplanes is a combination of lift engines plus lift ruise engines.
Then there appears to be another class of airplanes to the right and
higher for very high performance airplanes at very high altitude.
The engine becomes very large, and when you bring this engine down
to sea level the horizontal thrust is very great . And usually such
airplanes have enough horizontal thrust to lift the weight of the
airplane without needing a lift engine. And in this case it is only
necessary to rotate the nozzle or deflect the thrust, and these airplanes
we call vectored thrust.

Now, let me go back to the center group again and talk about the
composite lift system. And the reason I would like to point this out
is that the propulsion system is the very heart of the VTOL airplane.
It is the advances in the propulsion system which has made a VTOL
airplane possible . And it is the efficiency of the propulsion system
which determines how much the airplane can do . In other words , the
airplane efficiency is dependent to a large extent on the efficiency of
the propulsion system. And it turns out , according to our studies,
that the composite system is the most efficient powerplant arrangement,
and the reason for this is that lift engines can be made which
have a thrust-to- weight ratio of 25 to 1 , whereas lift- cruise engines are
in the neigborhood of 7 or 8 to 1. So that you can get lift for much
less weight than with lift-cruise engines.
The combination of lift and lift -cruise , therefore , is a very efficient
powerplant.
[..]
Mr. COHELAN. And then what is your position OPT STOL?
Mr. BOWMAN. Optimum STOL, in addition to designing airplanes
in accordance with the rules of ADO- 12 [ deleted ] they said : Now,
modify the rules and tell us what you think is the optimum.
So the optimum V/STOL is what we considered was the optimum
design allowing some modification of the rules.
Mr. COHELAN. About 0.7, and then it is plus mach 2 ?
Mr. BOWMAN. Yes.
Mr. COHELAN. Now, then, getting out of that general area , how do
you distinguish this from your points on your curve, on your vectored
thrust, what does that mean ?
Mr. BOWMAN. Well, in the vectored thrust there are two airplanes,
995-42 and D-24. It turned out that these airplanes had a thrustto-
weight ratio , sea level to horizontal thrust of about 1.2 , and the
engine, therefore, was big enough to lift the airplane off the ground.
So instead of having a lift engine and a lift- cruise engine, we had
simply a powerful engine, and we deflected the thrust, and this is
called vectored thrust.

[...]

Now, these are the ADO- 12 studies. In the preceding slide I said
the next step is to choose a weapon system and an engine propulsion
system and combine them into a weapon system—an airframe I mean .
[Deleted . ]
Mr. PIKE. [ Deleted . ]
Mr. BOWMAN. [ Deleted . ]
Mr. PIKE. The cost - effectiveness studies were all based on a combat
situation ?
Mr. BOWMAN. Yes , sir .
Mr. PIKE. Is that correct ?
Mr. BOWMAN. Yes, sir .
Mr. PIKE. And none of them were based on simple operational
losses ?
Mr. BOWMAN. No ; all combat .
So I would say that the study did not point clearly the way to go
for the next step, and that it narrowed down the field and it gave us
a good feel for what is possible, but it didn't come up with a solution
that stands out clearly as the way to go.

[...]

Here is a chart showing the F-84FV.
[ Deleted . ] Here is where we are today ; if it is our desire to have
first squadron of tactical fighter bombers, we should go [ deleted ]
which is one of the airplanes from the center group, and here we propose
F-84V's ; starting in January, we could produce two airplanes
as shown ; these two airplanes could be then used as test beds for
control system requirements.
If desired, we could produce 10 additional airplanes to run operational
evaluation tests. This could be done and fed into the [ deleted ]
and this, to our way of thinking, is the lowest cost insurance that is
possible to get in the ADO-12 program.
Our proposal mentions something like $6 million for modifying
two airplanes, and $2 million for the engines. For about $3 million
you could produce two research test vehicles which would be extremely
useful in rounding out this area of control system requirements which,
I say, is not a problem area but one that needs more investigation, and
we could then narrow down the requirements and be more certain to
design an optimum system.

Vertical and Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) Aircraft

www.google.co.nz

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I found a description of an "Advanced Development Objective" for the Navy from the 1960s which seems very relevant to this topic.

an experimental development which is not yet assured as to military usefulness, technical feasibility, and financial acceptability. Such a development may be a desirable or necessary step in the transition from Exploratory Development to Engineering Development , or it may be for the express purpose of developing hardware for test and experimentation. The primary function of the Advanced Development Objective is to provide decision making information as to whether to pursue the potential development through Engineering Development toward evaluation for Navy use and thus becomes the logical endpoint of the Advanced Development on the system

So it's wrong to think of ADO-12 as an actual military requirement.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

As presented to Congress last week,
the Defense Dept. budget is about $8
billion below the total submitted by the
three services to McNamara's office on
Oct. 1, with USAF the victim of some
of the major cuts. Projects hit include
AMSS. for which Air Force had wanted
a full-scale development program; a proposal
to increase the Minuteman ICBM
force to a point approximately double
that of the approved buy of 1, 000'
hopcd- for development funding for the
ADO—12 (Advanced Development Ob—
jective) V/STOL close-support fighter,
and a request to purchase additional jet
support aircraft.
More than budget trimming. the
ADO—12 is an at—least temporary victim
of a recent agreement between the U. S.
and \Vest Germany to work toward the
joint development and production of an
advanced V/STOL close—support fighter
if the requirements of the two countries
can be melded into a single aircraft
(AW&ST Nov, 3, p. 22; Dec. 28, p.
12). Air Force proposals for an active
ADO-12 development program, as
evolved within Systems Command, were
submitted to the Defense Dept. to support
the budget requests in October, approximately
one month before the final
U. S.-Gcrman agreement. In-house work
on the project is being continued by
Systems Command, but no further action
is anticipated until a joint U.S.-
German work statement on requirements
and general specifications on a
V/STOL fighter can be drafted and
agreed upon.
[..]
Advanced V/STOL fighter project is
one of several joint programs envisioned
with West Germany.

AWST 1 February 1965

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Air Force is expected to make a decision in the next 60—90 days on a
vectored thrust cruise engine for possible use in an ADO-12 (advanced development
objective) type V/STOL fightcr. Competitive industry design studies
were submitted to USAF earlier this month on the project.

AWST 22 February 1965

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

U.S., U.K. Near Joint Lift Engine Decision
By Cecil Brownlow
Washington—
Basic characteristics and joint development plans for an advanced direct-lift V/STOL powerplant by the U.S. and Great Britain are scheduled to be hammered out between the two governments within the next two months.

Next step, if these can be defined and jointly agreed upon, will be Defense Dept. selection of a U. S. contractor to participate in the program—one that could lead to sizable future production contracts in both countries.

Decision to try to reach agreement on a joint V/STOL powerplant development program, with emphasis on a high thrust—to-weight ratio, was incorporated in a wide-ranging U. S.—British agreement signed earlier this month in which American industry received about $650 million in orders for off-the-shelf military hardware from the United Kingdom (AW&ST Feb. 15, P23).

Engine configuration, as envisioned by Defense Dept. planners, will be essentially new—a combination of the best in U. S. and British technology. Rolls-Royce alreadv has been selected as the British industry participant in the project. and a number of advances designed into the Rolls RB.189, a paper-study follow-on to the RB.162 lift engine, probably will be incorporated into any joint powerplant.

U. S. Developments

Defense Dept. planners emphasize, however, that extensive use also will be made of U.S. developments, such as light-weight generators, in the V/STOL
powerplant field in any final design acceptable to the U.S. While conceding the obvious production edge Britain has in the V/STOL powerplant field, Defense Dept. believes U. S. industry can do more than its share in providing technological inputs for the project primarily developments stemming ,from a series of Air Force advanced ,technology studies.

Neither country has firm. definite requirements for such an advanced powerplant, although they undoubtedly will occur if the program is carried through
to the hardware stage, On the U. S. side, prime consideration is being given to the incorporation of the powerplant into any airframe resulting from current
US / West German studies directed towards the possible joint development and production of an advanced V/ STOL close—support fighter (AW&ST Nov. 23. P22).
U.S. Air Force is acting as the Defense Dept. agency in drafting requirements and configurations for both the joint powerplant and airframe programs and, as such, will be responsible for assuring that the two projects can be combined into a single system. It also will attempt to guide configuration along the lines originally conceived for USAF Systems Commands proposed ADO- 12 (Advanced Development Objective) V/STOL tactical fighter. As finally evolved, the ADO-12 design calls for the use of direct—lift engines coupled with a cruise powerplant on which thrust could be vectored to provide additional lift in the vertical flight regimes.

Industry proposals for such a cruise engine now are under study bv the Air Force with contractor selection scheduled for the near future (see p. 19).
Final hardware probably will be incorporated into any joint U. S.—German strike fighter program. Defense Dept. also foresees the possible use of the lift engine in future military, and possibly commercial, transport configurations. In addition, the British reportedly are considering thepossible use of the powerplant in future V/STOL fighter and transport designs as well as in purely STOL aircraft.

Thinking behind the tentative joint development agreement, while neither country has a firm national airframe program to house it, revolved primarily
around the fact that its characteristics can be defined sufficiently well to fit it into any ultimate airframe configurations. Since engine development lead times as such are substantially longer than those required for airframes, the decision could cut significantly the dates of the introduction of production
V/STOL aircraft into the military inventories of the two nations.

The West German and British agreements, if carried through to completion, also could serve to Virtually guarantee the Air Force an advanced V/STOL
strike fighter, something it has wanted. It has had no assurance of obtaining its objective under the original ADO—12 concept because there has been substantial Defense Dept. opposition to the proposal. If the joint programs evolve into realities, there is little likelihood that the U.S. would back out of either project unilaterally, at least not until it had met its development—phase commitments.

Success of the British project, including the ability of the two countries to work together in the design field as well as resolve such sticky issues as export
sales rights, is expected to set the pace for other joint development projects under consideration by the U. S. and the United Kingdom. These include hardware for anti-submarine warfare plus army anti- aircraft systems, ordnance and field communications—areas in which the U. K. industry is particularly strong.

Pilot Project

In essence, the lift engine will serve as a pilot project similar to the Main Battle Tank in the development of West German- U. S. joint programs. Success in the planning phases for the tank led to confidence that such projects could succeed. and other programs, including the V/STOL airframe, followed.

Particularly promising as a U. S.—British follow-on is a possible major joint development effort in the ASW field. While the Defense Dept. effort to combat the continuing “Gold Flow” from the U. S. through the active promotion of export sales of American military hardware has been singularly successful
(AW&ST Feb. 1, 21), a number of officials believe the days of straight. off-the-shelf hardware orders from other major countries may be on the wane, with a resultant increase in demands for joint development and production efforts.

These officials believe that such joint development efforts largely will offset the losses in off— the- shelf orders, possibly providing the U. S. industry with a significant share of its over-all business by the early 1970s. Choice of a U.S. contractor for the lift—engine project will be a difficult one, particularly in establishing the parameters for selection. Just how this will be done and whether or not the bid requests should call for each firm to provide a state-of the—art statement on its particular technological competence in this area or for the design of a complete engine proposal as such still is under Defense Dept. consideration.

AWST 22 Feb 1965

 

[MadRat]

So, no Boeing-EWR 360 drawing still. However, there are some nice drawings of various EWR VJ-101 studies more-or-less forming the pre-history of this design and the relation of the US/FRG to VJ-101.

Source: http://www.klassiker-der-luftfahrt.de/geschichte/flugzeuge/ewr-vj-101-alle-varianten-teil-1/523608

The not-seen 'VJ-101E' seems likely to be the same design as the Boeing-EWR 360. '360' is clearly the EWR type number. Its possible the A400 falls into this sequence too.

Proceeding to the Republic/EWR design, the information presented in Aviation Week says that 4 US companies presented studies for US_FRG along with EWR, and Republic's design was selected partly for its similarity to the EWR proposal, differing mainly in engine intake location with the EWR design using dorsal intakes and the Republic design using intakes on the fuselage sides. It also shows photos of the side intake version captioned specifically as "Republic" not Republic/EWR while the separate dorsal intakes version is captioned specifically as EWR.

I believe based on AWST information that the dorsal intake design with separate intakes is the EWR proposal and the side intake design the Republic proposal, leading to the later joint A400 design. The single dorsal intake design has been stated as an earlier revision to the separate intakes one, so perhaps thats an earlier EWR design?

Thoughts?

EWR Types 310-1/2 reminds me of XB-51. Probably made better economic sense if the rear was a single and all of them used tilting exhaust rather than articulating the whole engines.

 

[hesham]

For Bell,

there was two concepts,D-2181 Phase I & D-2200 Phase II.

We must notice,they were a two Phases.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

we must notice,they were a two Phases.

Where are these designations (D-2181, D-2200) from?

 

[hesham]

Where are these designations (D-2181, D-2200) from?

From Bell's list of D-2000s.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

From Bell's list of D-2000s.

Right - here (uploaded by Steve Pace)

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/bell-aircraft-bell-aerospace-d-designations.21303/

 

[hesham]

Right - here (uploaded by Steve Pace)

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/bell-aircraft-bell-aerospace-d-designations.21303/

OK my dear PaulMM,

and I think it's hard to know the competitors in each Phase separately ?.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

U.S., Germany to Cooperate on Weapons
Washington—Closer cooperation between the U. S. and West Germany on government and industry levels in the joint development and production of future weapon systems, possibly including an advanced V/STOL strike fighter, is under discussion this week by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel.

Plans to contract with private American aerospace firms to acquaint their West German counterparts with the systems engineering approach towards weapons development already are being implemented at a government—-to government basis. In addition, McNamara and von Hassel will discuss the possibility of a proposed joint development effort for a manned tactical aircraft as a follow—on to the German VAK- 191 subsonic close--support fighter now under development. Present designation of the new aircraft is the VAK-191B. While the U. S. is willing to lend research and development support to the project, it was not known late last week whether it also would be willing to agree to a joint buy of the end product.

Such a decision, however, would fit into current plans to expand co-production efforts between the two countries to permit each to provide common, interchangeable equipment to its forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO as such is another major item on the McNamara-van Hassel agenda, particularly plans for implementation of a multilateral nuclear force and France’s, adamance towards the concept as a whole (see p. 25).

Upon his arrival here last week, von Hassel stated flatly that France “has not torpedoed” the multilateral plan. He added that the de Gaulle government has advised West Germany that it understands that West Germany, with no nuclear force of its own, is in a different position than France, which is building towards one.

V/STOL fighter, a program still embroiled in an Air Force—Army roles and missions battle, and one whose fate ultimately may depend upon bilateral development efforts with West (see box). Air Force would like Fiscal 1966 funding for development and production of a prototype embodying its ADO-12 concept for a supersonic, low—level close-support fighter

AWST 16 November 1964

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Boeing, German Firm Study V/STOL Fighter
The Boeing Co. and the West German industry consortium of Entwicklungsring Sud (EWR) have teamed in a joint preliminary design study for a supersonic, variable— sweep V/STOL close-support fighter under German government contract.

Although not formally aligned with any bilateral program or planning on a government- to—govemment level, the design could form a basis for any U. S-German project for joint development of an advanced V/STOL fighter. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and German Defense Minister Kai—Uwe von Hassel recently agreed upon the desirability of a joint development and production program in this area if the two governments can agree on requirements and performance needs (AW&ST Nov. 23. p. 22).

The three—month design study by Boeing and EWR was completed in August and now is under study by West German defense officials. Variable-sweep data reportedly was supplied by Boeing, with EWR concentrating upon the V/STOL aspects, including powerplant installation and general design requirements. EWR members at the time of the contract were Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugbau, Boelkow Entwicklungen, Messerschmitt and Siebelwerke. Heinkel, however, recently elected to merge with the North German consortium of Vereinigte Flugeugtechnische Werke (AW&ST Dec. 7, p. 27).

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Box 178, Folder 4 Fairchild Hiller Republic Aircraft Division, US and Federal Republic of Germany(West Germany) joint program to produce V/STOL tactical fighter, correspondenceand draft papers, government memoranda and Air Force Regulations, AFR 80-14,80-14A and 55-31 and press kit
Box 178, Folder 5 Fairchild Hiller Republic Aircraft Division, US and Federal Republic of Germany(West Germany) joint program to produce V/STOL tactical fighter, internal newsletter, press releases, brochures, advertisements, articles and photograph

Smithsonian Fairchild Archive https://sova.si.edu/record/NASM.1989.0060?s=0&n=10&t=K&q=*&i=0#list_of_artifacts

Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center
14390 Air & Space Museum Parkway
Chantilly, VA 20151

If any forum members are in the area, I'd happily help fund a visit

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Source: Data 1966-10: Vol 11 Iss 10

 

[TomS]

Smithsonian Fairchild Archive https://sova.si.edu/record/NASM.1989.0060?s=0&n=10&t=K&q=*&i=0#list_of_artifacts

Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center
14390 Air & Space Museum Parkway
Chantilly, VA 20151

If any forum members are in the area, I'd happily help fund a visit

I'm 30 minutes away...

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Another Republic VTOL fighter design with VG wings :
(from Aviation Week 1965 10-17)

Finally tracked this down to April 26 1965 AWST.