Boeing 737 MAX family

[galgot]

So where are hiding the "criminals"?

Okay, the basics of law around professionals and responsibility. English law, which I'm most familiar with, has the wonderful concept of "the man on the Clapham omnibus", which is just another way of saying the average man or woman on the street. The man on the Clapham omnibus isn't expected to have any special responsibility for the things they produce or work on. But when you become an expert in something, whether being a doctor, fitting a gas boiler, or piloting an aircraft, the law demands a higher standard of responsibility from you. You are expected to be aware of all aspects of your role, to identify risks, and to take actions to address those risks. Not doing so makes you culpable in law, either for civil action or disbarment by your professional body, or, if it is bad enough, to legal sanctions up to and including a manslaughter conviction, the generic term being criminal negligence. It's the kind of thing that regularly sees doctors disbarred, and occasionally jailed, and the same principle applies to engineers and pilots (also to the organisations that employ them, though corporate manslaughter prosecutions are somewhat rare).

Turning to the Mulhouse flight, let's look at the pre-flight planning:
Airshow flypast. Okay
Airshow flypast at high alpha, low speed and low altitude*. Dubious, let's leave that one to the Airbus test pilots*.
Turning off the Alpha-Floor to allow that. Very dubious. Definitely one to leave to the Airbus test pilots (preferably at 10000m in case they need to recover the aircraft).
Doing it with a full load of passengers. Hell no!

At this point in his pre-flight planning the pilot should have refused to carry out the flight with passengers. The crew can volunteer to risk themselves, but they have a professional responsibility to not place their passengers at unnecessary risk, such as by taking them into coffin corner at 100ft**.

Note that I haven't discussed what happened in the air, I believe the pilot was criminally negligent from the moment he agreed to conduct the flight. And yes, prosecutions should have followed up the chain of those who authorised the flight.

* Yes, Asseline had been the Air France rep on the flight test team, but as far as I'm aware he wasn't a qualified test pilot, so professionally he was incapable of assessing the risk of the proposed manouevre, and in either case you treat risk assessment for a passenger flight very differently to a test flight.

** BTW, does anyone know where on the fuselage the A320 measures its altitude from? (Not necessarily the radar altimeter location, I can see a case for subtracting several metres in software to allow for the difference between the radalt sensor and the wheels). I've never been clear whether that planned 100ft/actual 30ft was the actual lowest point on the aircraft, and at 30ft that starts to become very significant.

Ok thanks, So how does that compare to the LionAir/Ethiopian's crew actions ?
And what is the point of bringing this specific Mulhouse case here in the first place, apart from trying to associate LionAir/Ethiopian's crew with the nut Mulhouse pilot (moreover flying a different plane).

 

[steelpillow]

Shouldn't some of this discussion go in the A320 thread?

 

[TomcatViP]

Yes and no. The problem is similar with a combined set of software programming and pilot slight negligence leading to passenger losses (albeit not statically as severe in one case).

@DWG : you should read back the report and start with the wiki page that is well balanced and focused on the fact The pilots that day never intended to pass the 100ft floor, what led to the alternative protecting law mode that their were unaware of. Hence the nugget in last Airbus declaration.

both pilots were also unfamiliar with the airfield when they began their descent from 2,000 feet (610 m) only 6 nautical miles (11 km) from the field. This distance was too short for them to stabilise the aircraft's altitude and speed for the flyover.[3]

Additionally, the captain was expecting from the flight plan to do the pass over runway 02 (3,281 feet (1,000 m) long, paved) and was preparing for that alignment. But as the aircraft approached the field, the flight deck crew noticed that the spectators were gathered beside runway 34R (2,100 feet (640 m) long, grass). This last-minute deviation in the approach further distracted the crew from stabilising the aircraft's altitude and they quickly dropped to 40 feet (12 m).[3]

@steelpillow : see the parallel now?


Last but not least, IMOHO the focus should be on the pitot tube still feeding data to the system after a catastrophic failure. Industry has been using torque limiter for decades. And this could be a problem of an eventual lack of reactive thinking from the regulators.

Torque limiter - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[steelpillow]

@steelpillow : see the parallel now?

No. I see you grossly distorting the MAX incidents and then pushing an irrelevant discussion about another accident in the hope that you can draw a parallel to support your distortion. There is none to draw.

 

[DWG]

Ok thanks, So how does that compare to the LionAir/Ethiopian's crew actions ?
And what is the point of bringing this specific Mulhouse case here in the first place, apart from trying to associate LionAir/Ethiopian's crew with the nut Mulhouse pilot (moreover flying a different plane).

No idea why TomcatViP brought it up, there's absolutely no comparison as far as I can see.

 

[TomcatViP]

Airbus said:
The origin of the “excessive pitch” is associated to a reduction in efficiency of the angle of attack protection in a very remote combination of conditions, these being: The need for the crew to perform a dynamic manoeuver (such as a go around) AND the aircraft being below 100ft AND specific landing configuration AND a very aft CG.

see previous page.

 

[DWG]

@DWG : you should read back the report and start with the wiki page that is well balanced and focused on the fact The pilots that day never intended to pass the 100ft floor, what led to the alternative protecting law mode that their were unaware of. Hence the nugget in last Airbus declaration.

I
both pilots were also unfamiliar with the airfield when they began their descent from 2,000 feet (610 m) only 6 nautical miles (11 km) from the field. This distance was too short for them to stabilise the aircraft's altitude and speed for the flyover.[3]

Additionally, the captain was expecting from the flight plan to do the pass over runway 02 (3,281 feet (1,000 m) long, paved) and was preparing for that alignment. But as the aircraft approached the field, the flight deck crew noticed that the spectators were gathered beside runway 34R (2,100 feet (640 m) long, grass). This last-minute deviation in the approach further distracted the crew from stabilising the aircraft's altitude and they quickly dropped to 40 feet

I've been following the Mulhouse crash since the day it happened. Never intending to descend below 100ft does not absolve the crew of blame, people are regularly convicted of criminal negligence for things they never intended to do, it's an essential element to the prosecution. In fact it further demonstrates the inadequacy of their planning. Equally continuing an unstable descent adds to the pilot's culpability. Examine any airline's operating procedures and you'll find unstable descent past a certain point =mandatory go around. This is something that is regularly reported in crash and incident reports. Attempting the manoeuvre at an airfield they didn't know further adds to the culpability.

 

[TomcatViP]

Apples and Bananas? What then would you then think if your Cessna won't pull away next time you initiate an aborted landing? And re-read the recent Airbus statement: we have here the same case.

Back to the MAX, the first thing that someone should think when facing an abnormal increase in stick effort is to cut speed. It's the basis. In that case, without re-writing the events, an egress from the flight mode where they were experiencing the troubles would have saved them. Here, as we know today, cutting speed and prepping the plane for an immediate landing would have turn down the faulty MCAS (errounous data).

As I wrote much earlier think at the cabin mood, the fear and the screams of the passengers submitted to the frenetic pitch inputs from the pilots. Look at the curves, the time laps...

 

[Jemiba]

Please back to a sensible tone, without too theatric statements, no need to mention
offenses or insults !
And here a clue: If two irreconcilable opinions are coming into conflict, without a sign
of a change on one side or the other, ignoring may be a wise option.
And there's even a button for !
This should be regarded as a warning by all participants !

 

[Grey Havoc]

 

[Fluff]

Just to dip my toe in this polite discussion.....

So we have built a 'new' plane. It flies, carries passengers, economical, makes money for us and operators.

Then marketing come in, and say, well be a lot easier to sell it if we just called it the old name, and old plane pilots could fly it.

So they stuck some bits and bobs on, to control, at the limits, to make it 'feel' like the old plane.

Why - whats the certification cost for an experienced 737 pilot? a few $thousand?

The logic of why escapes, and then the logic of what they fitted escapes me.

And then of course, while im sure they added the pages to the manual, the crews didn't need training, so didn't know what exactly to do in the few seconds they had.

I cant see this chain of decisions being defensible, in law, nor in customer perception, who wants to take their family on one of these?

It really looks like people edging round the rules, rather than following good practice.

And one reason was the bigger engines? So they moved them forward to have some ground clearance - why not redesign the gear? Again a half baked solution, I know they did It before moving from the old -200. All of its an avoidance of reality, design a new aircraft, if you can move some parts or systems over great, but 60 years is enough.

 

[steelpillow]

Just to dip my toe in this polite discussion.....

Hi, welcome. At risk of rehashing old comments, Boeing desperately needed a super-quick answer to the latest Airbus twin, and this overrode everything. Lengthening the u/c legs would have required so much re-engineering of their retraction wells and related bits that it would have to be treated as a new model. Both the redesign and the redesignation would have caused delays while it was re-certified and pilots retrained. It was quicker to move the engines forward, rush in a safety dongle (MCAS) and pretend it was just like the old one. That rush, helped by kneejerk financial cheeseparing, led to a disastrously flawed implementation at multiple levels. The multiple flaws interacted to create a perfect storm on two separate occasions. You are far from alone in questioning the legality of Boeing's actions and various court cases have been kicking off. Whether airline customers have longer memories than goldfish or greater restraint than a monkey offered a banana remains to be seen.

I think the 737 monicker is a bit like the Spitfire, the only thing common to the first and last models was the name.

 

[TomcatViP]

Most people don't differentiate a Boeing from an Airbus. Even more an Embraer, a Mitsubishi, a Bombardier or any Russian and then future Chinese airliner. Those that have bet on branding so loudly the name Max post its double tragic crash to instigate fear among passengers hence making them able to identify the plane they are about to board are simply shooting themselves their own feet (and that of the industry). A fraction only of passengers are identifying their plane reading their boarding pass (when this is still possible) and almost never (scarcely in fact) the plane they are-in.

Max or not Max, we all die at that game.

Poor insight at both (all in fact) ends is the unique signature of that Shakespearean tragedy.

Edited (put Canadian built airliner at their right place).

 

[Fluff]

Just to dip my toe in this polite discussion.....

Hi, welcome. At risk of rehashing old comments, Boeing desperately needed a super-quick answer to the latest Airbus twin, and this overrode everything. Lengthening the u/c legs would have required so much re-engineering of their retraction wells and related bits that it would have to be treated as a new model. Both the redesign and the redesignation would have caused delays while it was re-certified and pilots retrained. It was quicker to move the engines forward, rush in a safety dongle (MCAS) and pretend it was just like the old one. That rush, helped by kneejerk financial cheeseparing, led to a disastrously flawed implementation at multiple levels. The multiple flaws interacted to create a perfect storm on two separate occasions. You are far from alone in questioning the legality of Boeing's actions and various court cases have been kicking off. Whether airline customers have longer memories than goldfish or greater restraint than a monkey offered a banana remains to be seen.

I think the 737 monicker is a bit like the Spitfire, the only thing common to the first and last models was the name.

I'm just thinking of the Comet disasters - my father built some of them, and with black humour claimed to have riveted the window openings....The only operator became the RAF.

Assuming the PR departments of say TUI have a more professional approach than Boeing took, who would sign off on accepting these aircraft. I mean it will come with a letter from Boeing, probably an extra 5 years on the warranty etc, but seriously who is going to say ok. If they are certified, it will be all over the news, there will be protests, cancelled bookings etc. Any incident will be reported, turbulence etc. I cant see a grade 1 airline doing it - sure Africa, South America, better than a 20 year old Airbus, but Europe, North America, and China, they were the first to ground them.

They would be better off salvaging what parts they can, and making some cheap P8 airframes.....

 

[Fluff]

Most people don't differentiate a Boeing from an Airbus. Even more an Embraer, a Mitsubishi, a Canadair or any Russian and then future Chinese airliner. Those that have bet on branding so loudly the name Max post its double tragic crash to instigate fear among passengers hence making them able to identify the plane they are about to board are simply shooting themselves their own feet (and that of the industry). A fraction only of passengers are identifying their plane reading their boarding pass (when this is still possible) and almost never (scarcely in fact) the plane they are-in.

Max or not Max, we all die at that game.

Poor insight at both (all in fact) ends is the unique signature of that Shakespearean tragedy.

I like planes, and I can tell a Boeing from an Airbus, but I do struggle with the Embraer/Bambardier(Now Airbus 220) and I cant understand why the Japanese now want one, just as China starts.

I think 2 major crashes, with the cause being assigned to the Aircraft/producer, may just stick in peoples minds, I'm thinking here of the car crash ratings, the cars that got zero didnt last long in the market. I think a rebranding has been talked about, but I still see it as a very difficult issue for the marketing dept. Just a thought, but arent Boeing going to run out of 7x7 number soon? So time to go all Tesla and announce the all new(nothing to do with the Max) Boeing 1. Or decide you really liked McDonnell Douglas, and have decided to launch the all new MD 1. Others have done it.

 

[steelpillow]

who would sign off on accepting these aircraft. I mean it will come with a letter from Boeing, probably an extra 5 years on the warranty etc, but seriously who is going to say ok.

Airlines who do not wish to be sued by Boeing for breach of contract, that's who. Boeing will have built, modified and delivered them in good faith and the airworthiness authorities given it their blessing, as far as their lawyers are concerned. The client airline has a legal obligation to pay for what has been built and finished to their specification. Boeing will dissect any cancellation or refusal with the most expert, meanest and most money-grubbing eyes available to them. National certification authorities are the airlines' last line of defence and they know that. Many are limbering up to find any and every fault they can with Boeing's latest safety case and implementation. International routes available to the thing will be crippled until all the major authorities have given it the thumbs up. The American FAA face both ways: to Boeing they are one of the national regulators protecting the airlines and public from another disaster, but to the local regulators they are Boieing's original rubber-stamp and part of the problem. Were I a betting man, I would decline to put money on any outcome of this particular flutter.

 

[Fluff]

Sounds like a lot of time, and $$, mainly for the lawyers. Good point on the international routes.

Of course the good old' we wont buy anymore Boeings' comes to mind. I assume there are also 'general' cancelation terms in the contracts somewhere - we changed our minds, our passengers really fancy going on a Comac…..probably Chinese for Comet.

 

[steelpillow]

Contracts do have cancellation clauses. Typically "we changed our minds" is only possible up to a certain point in time unless the buyer prefers to make a penalty payment than receive a lethal weapon. Conversely, and especially if the local regulators pick further holes, "You promised it wouldn't take this long" eventually becomes a valid excuse.
However in the case of the Comet the very excellent Mk.4 came too little and too late to a marketplace already filling with newer, faster and bigger designs such as the 707. (But it would be wrong to suggest that the Mk I was rushed too soon into service, as the engineering knowledge on metal fatigue had not yet reached a point where it could be sensibly factored in to a design. Boeing were darn lucky it happened to the opposition and not to them, or the history of the jet airliner would have followed a very different path).

 

[Foo Fighter]

For my money the max is a dead duck and they should start again. Salvage parts and airframes for P-8 etc.

 

[steelpillow]

For my money the max is a dead duck and they should start again.

There are many hundreds of Maxes laid up, ca 300 plus already in service but grounded around the world, ca 200 plus finished after the grounding and undelivered. No way is that investment going to be written off, by Boeing or the airlines. The Max is not an unsafe design in itself, it can and will be fixed. Unlike say the Comet or TriStar the numbers are too huge to be absorbed by the military. The only questions are when Boeing will be able to convince the regulators, how much rebranding the market will demand, and how many new sales Airbus can syphon off.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Sorry, I disagree, the max is a deeply flawed product and the sooner they get rid and move away from a highly damaging debacle, the better. The fuselages and anciliaries can be absorbed into the spares and repairs system for other 737 types and P-8 etc. THESE aircraft can fly on for decades.

 

[TomcatViP]

how much rebranding the market will demand, and how many new sales Airbus can syphon off.

next to zero. The lassitude among short haul passengers, the emerging trend for alternative way of transportation ("clean" cars, bullet trains) will simply kill a big share of the market... with rival airbus the most exposed, both with its leading product and on its backyard (EU market)...

As I have written already, if exploiting the misery of Boeing was ever contemplated as a successful strategy by some, it was a pitiful choice akin only to this guy:

 

[TomcatViP]

Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes

The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, three people briefed on the matter told the Times.

Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing's business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company's chief engineer in the future.

Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes

The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, according to The New York Times.

www.cnbc.com

 

[steelpillow]

Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing's business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company's chief engineer in the future.

Says it all. I don't think you could ask for a more damning indictment of a passenger vehicle manufacturer.

 

[dan_inbox]

Says it all. I don't think you could ask for a more damning indictment of a passenger vehicle manufacturer.

Yes, absolutely. If you or me did half of it, we'd be done in long ago.
But fear not: boardmembers and top execs at Boeing will continue to walk the streets free, and to spend money on lawyers to deny indemnification to the victims.
That's the great American way.

 

[Fluff]

Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes

The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, three people briefed on the matter told the Times.

Engineers currently report mostly to Boeing's business leaders. The committee will recommend that they report first and foremost to the company's chief engineer in the future.

Boeing board will reportedly call for structural changes after 737 Max crashes

The recommendations include changing corporate reporting structures, creating a new safety group, and changing the cockpits of future planes to accommodate new pilots with less training, according to The New York Times.

www.cnbc.com

Surely too late, this wasn't a near miss, or a coffee spill, hundreds are dead. Creating?? The builder of half the passenger jets in the world doesn't have an effective safety group, or a whistleblower system?

The board should call a meeting, apologise, and resign en masse. 'We got this' does not apply.

 

[TomcatViP]

And at Airbus, do you see that much different? (340, 380, Mako, 350 Mod1, 225 (rotor less marvel), 160, 72-600, A400M and now even the trouble less 125 got grounded (rotor)...

The way those two have been competing has impaired the safety of the business model.
It's not Boeing but Boeing Vs Airbus, Airbus Vs Boeing and the placid attitude of most regulating agencies as well as the constant involvement of EU states to wash clean any management failure.

We haven't seen many sereine development of new airframe since the 1990's (except the 747-8).

Once again, if that pitot had been built fail-safe, this would not have happened.
If those pilots had been selected and mo itored for their abitlities and aeronautical culture, this would not have happened.

Finger pointing (and it's modern form of social media rage) won't solve anything. Pilot will fly the same way, airliner will soar at an ever increased rate and corpses only fall faster.

 

[galgot]

...
If those pilots had been selected and mo itored for their abitlities and aeronautical culture, this would not have happened.
...

And here we go again… C'est obsessionnel ? talk about finger pointing... Not justifiable in that case.
I really prefer when you post leather faces images, it's completely unrelated and OT, but at least it suits you better and it's much funnier…

 

[steelpillow]

Finger pointing (and it's modern form of social media rage) won't solve anything.

Quite. I don't know why you do it so much.

 

[TomcatViP]

It refers to the lack of knowledge that SAS does exist since the jet age (B-47). Not my intend to throw insults at a personal level.

 

[Fluff]

Once again, if that pitot had been built fail-safe, this would not have happened.
If those pilots had been selected and mo itored for their abitlities and aeronautical culture, this would not have happened.

The AOA etc, I agree, a shocking cavalier approach, without regard to what the system needed to do, how to do it, how to avoid errors or component failure.
The pilots, I dont agree with you. were bound by the unwillingness of airlines and Boeing to need a separate certification. I think your suggesting that all pilots reach Test Pilot levels of skill - its not realistic, and I would suggest all parties think thats what they are paying Boeing for so they dont need that.

These were failures of design, function, logic, process, oversite etc. The pilots ended up with all the failures/poor decisions and couldnt pull off a fix in the 30 seconds or so they had. I understand that a fix could have been applied, was documented somewhere in the manual, but its not equal nor reasonable, the odds were very much against them.

 

[TomcatViP]

I really prefer when you post leather faces images, it's completely unrelated and OT, but at least it suits you better and it's much funnier…

Notice that you might not have landed where you expected then.

 

[TomcatViP]

Since we were mentioning EU state subsedies trumping the game b/w Boeing and Airbus and pushing them away in some case from a fully rational and safety based product development, tariffs indeed are coming:

Airbus, French exporters reel as U.S. tariffs loom in subsidy row

Airbus, French exporters reel as U.S. tariffs loom in subsidy row

Shares in Airbus and French luxury goods exporters fell on Monday as the Europea...

www.reuters.com

 

[Jemiba]

Just a reminder:
- The theme here principally is the Boeing 737 MAX, not the Boeing - Airbus competition,
- Irony and sarcasm are old and popular rhetorical devices, but they can lead to misunderstandings quite easily.
- In a discussion, arguments should be adressed, not participants.

 

[DWG]

Picking up on the idea that operators will turn away from their Max orders, that concept ignores one teensy little problem. If you don't take Max, you're facing one of three options:
1) A years long wait for an A321 Neo order slot, because all the Airbus operators got there first.
2) Taking second hand 737-800s or A320/321s, if you can find them, and absorbing the extra operating costs of their old generation engines.
3) Cancelling your fleet expansion or fleet replacement plans.
Most airline boards won't find those options any more palatable than taking Max. On top of which the 787 experience says the public's memory for groundings is short-lived. A few airlines/lessors have cancelled or switched Max orders, but they're primarily the ones large enough to have flexibility around orders and fleets. All 737 airlines such as Ryanair don't have that flexibility.

 

[Fluff]

Picking up on the idea that operators will turn away from their Max orders, that concept ignores one teensy little problem. If you don't take Max, you're facing one of three options:
1) A years long wait for an A321 Neo order slot, because all the Airbus operators got there first.
2) Taking second hand 737-800s or A320/321s, if you can find them, and absorbing the extra operating costs of their old generation engines.
3) Cancelling your fleet expansion or fleet replacement plans.
Most airline boards won't find those options any more palatable than taking Max. On top of which the 787 experience says the public's memory for groundings is short-lived. A few airlines/lessors have cancelled or switched Max orders, but they're primarily the ones large enough to have flexibility around orders and fleets. All 737 airlines such as Ryanair don't have that flexibility.

A good point.

I would suggest it depends on what Boeing offer.

If they accept the Max is dead, and develop a full replacement, just maybe Boeing will offer support on the airlines existing old 737 - help with fuel, servicing costs etc. to keep the customers sweet.
I imagine the flow of second hand aircraft would dry up etc. Not an insignificant expense, but set against giving the whole world to airbus - who cant cope with that level of build.....Wait....how about Boeing license the A321......Kudos for Airbus, and a solution for Boeing.....Let the nay sayers commence.

 

[Desertfox]

If Boeing decides to develop a full replacement Airbus will be forced to do the same and will have to drop A320 development. It's what happened with the 787 -> A350 and to a lesser extent the A380 -> 747-800.

 

[TomcatViP]

Some take their dreams for realities.
Latest Indonesian disclosed information (crash report) are clear about pilot responsabilites and the relative failure of regulating agencies.
Boeing own declaration includes taking into account pilot's decreased proficiency.

There are no winner here. Especially from makers of a plane that can't be flown without automated assist.

FAA has been clear pointing as much as sensor design than Boeing shortcuts.

This mad forray into exploiting the Max tragedy by some in Europe will prove only to be their latest (uncommitted) suicidal run.

 

[DWG]

I would suggest it depends on what Boeing offer.

If they accept the Max is dead, and develop a full replacement, just maybe Boeing will offer support on the airlines existing old 737 - help with fuel, servicing costs etc. to keep the customers sweet.
I imagine the flow of second hand aircraft would dry up etc. Not an insignificant expense, but set against giving the whole world to airbus - who cant cope with that level of build.....Wait....how about Boeing license the A321......Kudos for Airbus, and a solution for Boeing.....Let the nay sayers commence.

No nay saying in talking commercial realities.

Boeing can't afford to be without a competitor for the A321 Neo for the likely five to eight years it will take to create an ab initio design. Nor could it license the A321 Neo; beyond being market suicide, it would take years (and a huge financial and engineering investment) to retool the 737 production facilities and the Airbus supply chain could not cope with a doubling of orders (both the 737 Max and A321 Neo supply chains have been struggling to meet their existing order volume).

 

[steelpillow]

Boeing can't afford to be without a competitor for the A321 Neo for the likely five to eight years it will take to create an ab initio design. Nor could it license the A321 Neo; beyond being market suicide, it would take years (and a huge financial and engineering investment) to retool the 737 production facilities and the Airbus supply chain could not cope with a doubling of orders (both the 737 Max and A321 Neo supply chains have been struggling to meet their existing order volume).

Yes, absolutely. Boeing cannot afford to accept the Max is dead, they have invested too much of their future in it for that. They may rebrand it, but they have no commercial option other than to fix it up and get it re-certified. Airbus and their other competitors know that only too well, and will prefer to twist the knife in the wound than to help out. Boeing know they must do whatever it takes, and I'll bet Trump's trade wars will not make it any easier for them.