Blue Streak basing outside UK

[uk 75]

Does anyone know if the UK ever planned to base Blue Streak MRBMs outside the UK?
I recall seeing references to looking at deploying in the UK and Near East. I assume this refers to the Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus.
I assume basing the missile in Australia would have served no purpose unless Indonesia became a nuclear power.

 

[Dilandu]

I recall seeing references to looking at deploying in the UK and Near East. I assume this refers to the Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus.

As far as I knew, all serious considerations were given to the bases in UK only. The near-east, even if was considered, was probably only a proposal; such basing would A - made the missiles even more vulnerable, and B - made them dependent on non-predictable course of housing nation politics. Which was one thing British were adamant against. The whole idea of British nuclear arsenal was that it would gave them independent deterrence:

LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (BLUE STREAK) (Hansard, 27 April 1960)

LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (BLUE STREAK) (Hansard, 27 April 1960)

api.parliament.uk

Another reason which, I feel, is of some importance, and, perhaps, a more serious reason, is this. I am not too confident or too certain that the Americans will necessarily remain atomically committed in Europe, because we must remember that as the intercontinental ballistic missile is developed so America becomes more vulnerable and Europe less worth while to the Americans. Suppose, perhaps because of a Communist rising in France—all these things are possible; we cannot eliminate them altogether—we found that the Americans had either withdrawn from Europe, or that they had been prepared to accept defeat in conventional war on the continent of Europe rather than go to the ghastly alternative of atomic destruction which the Russians can now take to them. Supposing that that happens, and that the Russians come to the Channel, the possession of an independent deterrent re-creates the Channel as a strategic barrier.

 

[CNH]

"Vulnerability" always comes up with mention of Blue Streak. If housing missiles in deep underground silos makes them "vulnerable" then why did the United States, the USSR, France and China deploy these missiles?

The snag is that much of the historiography from the 60s and 70s rely simply on a statement by the then Minister of Defence in Parliament. The report that recommended the cancellation of Blue Streak was, of course, highly secret, and it wasn't until the late 1990s that it became available to historians, when it became obvious that its conclusions were very considerably slanted.

If Blue Streak in a silo was vulnerable, what does that say for Minuteman and Titan II? (Note also that the design of the Titan silo owed a great deal to the design of the Blue Streak silo.)

 

[Dilandu]

"Vulnerability" always comes up with mention of Blue Streak. If housing missiles in deep underground silos makes them "vulnerable" then why did the United States, the USSR, France and China deploy these missiles?

Generally because USA, USSR and China have:

* Much more territory to disperse missiles.
* Could place outside of immediate reach of any enemy weapon short of ICBM (SLBM's at this time were not accurate enough to hit hardened bunkers).
* Flight time for ICBM was long enough to make other survivability algorithms - like launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack - possible.

Britain did not have such advantages. All British missile bases would be perfectly in range of Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's, based in Eastern Europe, and thus could be easily saturated with enough warheads to guarantee their destruction. The flight time was so short, that no launch-on-warning was possible - the Soviet missiles would hit British bases BEFORE launch command could be transmitted.

France, essentially, build the small arsenal of land-based missiles mostly as a political measure - to demonstrate French ability to create full nuclear triad - and never relied on them much. Essentially their only war purpose was to force enemy to attack them - thus clearly declaring its intentions.

 

[Archibald]

I once thought LOX ICBMs couldn't be housed in silos because boiloff and took forever to launch. Well seems Atlas-F and Titan 1 did it nonetheless, although their silos were enormous and not very practical. And McNamara screwed them by 1966.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I have a vague recollection of reading about 'Commonwealth' basing for Blue Streak, IF I recall, Canada was mentioned.
I will have to try to hunt down the original material, but at present I have no idea where it was

 

[Yellow Palace]

The flight time was so short, that no launch-on-warning was possible - the Soviet missiles would hit British bases BEFORE launch command could be transmitted.

The specification for the silo assumed that they would ride out the attack before launching up to 24 hours later. Hardness was only about 50psi, so vulnerability would have been an issue, though that could probably have been increased if needed.

The real difficulties would be the cost of doing so, and the political aspect of finding suitable sites for silos.

 

[Dilandu]

The specification for the silo assumed that they would ride out the attack

Problem is, that with small distance & plentful supply of IRBM on Warsaw Pact side, they could launch enough warheads to virtually guarantee the near-destruction of UK retaliation capability.

For example, by 1963 - when Blue Streak could realistically be made combat-ready - USSR have nearly 650 deployed IRBM, of them more than 550 of R-12 variety. With 2,3 megaton warhead, they provided overpressure more than 50 psi in 2 km range with airburst. Yes, their CEP wasn't exactly excellent - about 1-2,4 km (depend on range & model), but still enough to reliably overlap the Blue Streak positions. Considering that number of Blue Streak wasn't supposed to be high - if I recall correctly, about 50 was planned to be deployed - USSR could very efficiently use 150 R-12 to annihilate most of UK deterrence force (and probably enough of UK population, so the deterrence would become moot anyway)

 

[CNH]

The report on the vulnerability of the Blue Streak silos estimated that it would take between 300 and 400 3 megaton warheads with a CEP of 0.55 miles to take out the Blue Streak silos. That corresponds to around 1000 megatons of nuclear warheads.

Is this a reasonable scenario?

 

[Dilandu]

The report on the vulnerability of the Blue Streak silos estimated that it would take between 300 and 400 3 megaton warheads with a CEP of 0.55 miles to take out the Blue Streak silos. That corresponds to around 1000 megatons of nuclear warheads.

Is this a reasonable scenario?

Its underestimation of guidance system evolution.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The report on the vulnerability of the Blue Streak silos estimated that it would take between 300 and 400 3 megaton warheads with a CEP of 0.55 miles to take out the Blue Streak silos. That corresponds to around 1000 megatons of nuclear warheads.

Is this a reasonable scenario?

Its underestimation of guidance system evolution.

It's considerably better than the R-12, which you credit with a larger CEP and a smaller warhead. Based on the British figures, then, it was more survivable, not less, than expected.

As with most things, the engineering questions are irrelevant, though. The decisions to start, then terminate, the project were inherently political; engineering or military considerations weren't the whole picture.

 

[Dilandu]

As with most things, the engineering questions are irrelevant, though. The decisions to start, then terminate, the project were inherently political; engineering or military considerations weren't the whole picture.

Actually the military consideration was the most important. Britain needed deterrence. The old V-bomber fleet could not provide it in foreseeable future. Blue Streak was supposed to replace them, but A - it suffered delays, and B - it could not be made survivable enough in Britain's condition.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I once thought LOX ICBMs couldn't be housed in silos because boiloff and took forever to launch. Well seems Atlas-F and Titan 1 did it nonetheless, although their silos were enormous and not very practical. And McNamara screwed them by 1966.

Yes and no;- the cryo oxygen wasn’t stored in the missile, it was stored in a stainless steel dewer next to the silo. The boil off was reliquified and squirted back into the dewer. Upon the launch command, they pumped the liquid oxygen into the missile while raising the missile out of the silo on a massive elevator. This took about 20mins and was frought with danger. In just five years, no fewer than seven missile and silos were destroyed in launch preparation exercise.
Here’s a great real time audio recording of one of these incidents;-

http://www.atlasmissilesilo.com/Accidents_577thSMS_Site6.htm

With a Titan 1 accident they just got the fully fuelled missile out of the silo when the elevator latch failed. The fragile thin walled missile descended rapidly back into the silo followed by a massive conflagration.

McNamara killed the concept because it was just a matter of time before something really nasty happened.

Although not fully known at the time of Blue Streak cancellation these were a good reason for not proceeding with it.

 

[CNH]

"while raising the missile out of the silo on a massive elevator."

Ah, no. That was an early version of the launcher. By 1960 it was 'fire in the hole'.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

No - Alert Cryo Oxygen Atlas F and Titan 1, the mainstay of the US force up until 1965 could not be fired from within the silo. The operational silo’s were never exhaust ported as per those of the Titan 2. Early Atlas were stored horizontally without LO2 and it was pumped in after raising to vertical.

 

[uk 75]

The vulnerability of Blue Streak launchers in the UK to SS4/5 strikes would lend force to putting them somewhere else like Canada or Cyprus where they might be more effective.

 

[kaiserd]

Apart from needing to ignore the self-evident cost/ survivability inferiority versus SSBNs was it intended that potential “host” nations for these silo based missiles would get a say?
What happens if they said no, or a change in government in these host nations thanks t lead to an instruction to “shift them”?

 

[uk 75]

There is so far no evidence of any proposed deployments outside the UK apart from vague references in some reports about the Near East, which I am trying to follow up. Australia might have taken some if Indonesia had gone nuclear. Proliferation was a major fear in the late 50s.
Canada has been suggested as a possible, but I have found nothing to back this up.
Nuclear equipped V bombers were stationed on the UK bases on Cyprus into the 70s. I dont know if Cyprus had any say over that. Back in 1958 Cyprus was still just about under UK control so putting Blue Streak on the bases might have been considered. I have so far found nothing to support this having been done.

 

[Dilandu]

The vulnerability of Blue Streak launchers in the UK to SS4/5 strikes would lend force to putting them somewhere else like Canada or Cyprus where they might be more effective.

Two problems:

* What could they hit from the Canada?
* How exactly Cyprus is less vulnerable to Soviet first strike?

 

[Yellow Palace]

Blue Streak was supposed to replace them, but A - it suffered delays, and B - it could not be made survivable enough in Britain's condition.

And therefore the even more vulnerable V bombers continued in service for another 8 years as the UK's main deterrent force. That was a militarily unsound decision.

Vulnerability may have been used as a justification for a decision made on other, less concrete, grounds. But it can't have been the sole justification, because Blue Streak wasn't horrendously vulnerable at the time.

I think that it may have been a figleaf for the difficulty of finding acceptable launching sites that met geological requirements and were tolerably distant from population centres and other key areas.

 

[Hood]

I suspect any mentions of Cyprus would have only been musings to explore potential future uses. US IRBMs had been deployed to Turkey and the UK so the concept of forward basing missiles was not alien. As events later showed, Thor and Jupiter were highly vulnerable and even more flawed both politically and technically (at least Blue Streak had a silo, Thor had a tool shed) and of course the events of October 1962 would have stopped any attempts to base Blue Streak anywhere else even if the programme had gone ahead.

There probably would have been interest in a split UK/Cyprus deployment to hit targets across the USSR, especially the industrial areas of the southern USSR. I don't think Canada or Australia would have ever been considered given the limited range of the missile.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Downloaded an article THE BLUE STREAK WEAPON by Roy Dommett, and it contains the following...

“The Air Ministry Requirement that appeared was for a maximum range initially of 1,000 to 1,500nm, then for 1,750 to 2,000nm, but finally with a need for a stretch potential to 2,500nm. An early version of the RAF Requirement also considered deployment of Blue Streak in North Africa. The Australians even considered that it
could defend them because, before the 1958 Anglo-American Agreement for Cooperation on the Use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, there were signs of the UK's nuclear force becoming a Commonwealth one in conjunction with Canada and Australia.”

The reference footnote shows the origin of this ‘quote’ as being from:
See Wayne Reynolds, ‘Whatever happened to the Fourth British Empire? The Cold War, Empire Defence and the USA, 1943-57’ in Michael F. Hopkins, Michael D. Kandiah and Gillian Staerck (eds) Cold War Britain 1945-64: New Perspectives (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp.127-140.

The Hopkins et al book is showing as available on AmaCon....

 

[Yellow Palace]

I don't think Canada or Australia would have ever been considered given the limited range of the missile.

Bases on Ellesmere Island could achieve some interesting coverage, but only if the 2,500nm range figure was achieved. Given that range was a a stretch target, and that Ellesmere Island is probably the least practical place I can think of to establish missile bases - at least in the northern hemisphere - I think it can really be ruled out. If there was ever any consideration of Canadian missiles, it must surely have been in the context of Canadian-owned and operated missiles based somewhere else.

Missiles on Australian soil make a little more sense, but could only really reach Indonesia of the likely opponents. They'd make more sense as Australian missiles based in Malaysia to deter China, effectively replacing V Bombers in the SEATO role, but I think this is rather unlikely. Such schemes may have been discussed, but I'd be very surprised if they survived contact with political realities.

Ironically, a Commonwealth nuclear force would probably make more sense as a bomber-based one. You could easily imagine Australia and Canada contributing a few squadrons each, with the Australian bombers based in Malaysia and the Canadian bombers based in the UK or Cyprus - at least during 'high tension' periods. That kind of bomber deployment seems like it would be much more politically acceptable to the host countries than a similar one relying on IRBMs in silos.

 

[JFC Fuller]

It is public knowledge that the UK built storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Singapore (48 Red Beards at Tengah) and Cyprus (32 Red Beards at Akrotiri) to arm bomber squadrons (Canberras then Vulcans) for SEATO and CENTO missions respectively. CNH probably knows better than me though I do recall OR.1139 (missile) and OR.1142 (warhead) stating in 1955 that they had to be suitable for deployment in the Middle East as well as the UK, most would probably assume that the Middle East referred to Cyprus. This would have predated the decision to house Blue Streak in silos and I have never seen any further reference to a deploying Blue Streak as a weapons system outside of the UK, there would have been obvious attraction to deploying it to Cyprus though. There was press speculation (Aviation Week, 1959) that Blue streak could be deployed on Malta.

The decision to cancel Blue Streak was discussed twice at the Cabinet Defence Committee in early 1960 and to me it is obvious from the minutes and the associated papers that the main reason it was cancelled was financial. The Treasury was quoting £500 million to deploy 60 missiles, at the time this was additional to a stand-off weapon for the V-bombers. Lots of rather vague comments were made about the V-bombers and Skybolt offering 'flexibility' and 'mobility' but the Minister of Defence continued to point out that they were more vulnerable to a 'surprise saturation attack' than Blue Streak.

It is particularly ironic that at the first meeting in 1960 that considered cancelling Blue Streak there was also a request from SACEUR for medium range ballistic missiles discussed. A memo was written by the Chief of Defence Staff that pointed out having cancelled Blue Streak on the grounds of it not being mobile 'it would be very difficult to explain to public opinion why static NATO MRBMs can be deployed here, probably in the very locations planned for Blue Streak'.

 

[Dilandu]

And therefore the even more vulnerable V bombers continued in service for another 8 years as the UK's main deterrent force. That was a militarily unsound decision.

Yes, but it was assumed that Skybolt would be ready by mid-1960s at very least.

 

[Hood]

And therefore the even more vulnerable V bombers continued in service for another 8 years as the UK's main deterrent force. That was a militarily unsound decision.

Yes, but it was assumed that Skybolt would be ready by mid-1960s at very least.

Skybolt was useless if you couldn't get off the ground in time.

You had to believe that at least some of the V-bombers on QRA could get airborne and far enough away to avoid the fireball and blast of the incoming megaton warheads landing on its home airfield. Good luck to those bombers dispersed along the western coast trying to fly east across the UK getting scorched by multiple nuclear weapons or flying the long way around the British Isles with the consequent loss of range. You also have to hope that the pilots' four eyes don't get burned out before getting near the Skybolt drop position.
You then had to assume that out of how many bombers that made it to the launch positions, that all their Skybolt missiles are 100% operative and then suffer no launch or boost-phase failures. Some will fail. Some of the warheads might fail on the terminal dive. The odds were getting smaller and smaller.

A Blue Streak silo has more chance of surviving blast, depends how many warheads the Soviets feel they can spare and how accurate they were in reality.
The big problem is how to get the launch codes to the site in time before the communications net is destroyed and/or the command chain is severed or knocked out. Also the hatch mechanism might have posed some problems if the rails or door were damaged.
Then you have the uncertainty of how the silo crew will react. A bomber crew knew it was a one-way trip and rationalised that and if the worst came to the worst only had a few hours to dwell on it and had the flight to keep them busy. A Blue Streak silo crew were expected to remain inside for up to 24 hours after the UK had been wiped out and potentially without any contact with the outside world. They knew their families were dead or dying up above and had no idea what they were meant to do after launching the missile. Would they obey an instruction to launch within that 24 hour window? Would they desert their post? It was a psychological gamble that there would be an nuclear force left as much as physical risk assessment if the siloes could survive.

In these senses the submarine deterrent is far superior; its hard to find, hard to destroy and even if they linger in a post-apocalyptic world they are still sufficiently detached from it to continue to psychological function and as a larger crew can easier maintain discipline.

 

[Archibald]

Blue Streak limited range is not dissimilar to Mirage IVAs. There were plans to penetrate Soviet airspace from the south - Mediterranean and Black Sea - to allow slightly less suicidal C-135FR refuelings there. And from there - one way to Moscow...

 

[Yellow Palace]

It is public knowledge that the UK built storage facilities for tactical nuclear weapons in Singapore (48 Red Beards at Tengah) and Cyprus (32 Red Beards at Akrotiri) to arm bomber squadrons (Canberras then Vulcans) for SEATO and CENTO missions respectively. CNH probably knows better than me though I do recall OR.1139 (missile) and OR.1142 (warhead) stating in 1955 that they had to be suitable for deployment in the Middle East as well as the UK, most would probably assume that the Middle East referred to Cyprus.

I think that if a non-UK-based Blue Streak was ever considered, it must have been as a replacement for this capability - which would surely mean very early on in the programme, before it was fully realised what Blue Streak would entail

The big problem is how to get the launch codes to the site in time before the communications net is destroyed and/or the command chain is severed or knocked out.

Given that the UK's nuclear command and control system doesn't involve launch codes, I suspect that some variation on the theme of 'letters of last resort' would have been used by a deployed Blue Streak force. Although the silo crews would surely be in no doubt whatsoever that an attack had taken place, removing some of the uncertainty from the system.

 

[P-STICKNEY]

I once thought LOX ICBMs couldn't be housed in silos because boiloff and took forever to launch. Well seems Atlas-F and Titan 1 did it nonetheless, although their silos were enormous and not very practical. And McNamara screwed them by 1966.

The Cryogenic ICBMs were raised to the surface by elevators before they were fueled and fired. This made them quite vulnerable at about the same time that incoming missiles would be arriving. While a Titan I was fired from within a silo once, it was done as a test of the silo itself, to determine the level of damage to the silo.
Blue Streak would have shared those limitations.

 

[Archibald]

Many thanks for this precisions !

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The Cryogenic ICBMs were raised to the surface by elevators before they were fueled and fired. This made them quite vulnerable at about the same time that incoming missiles would be arriving. While a Titan I was fired from within a silo once, it was done as a test of the silo itself, to determine the level of damage to the silo.
Blue Streak would have shared those limitations.

The audio recording attached to post 13 has them loading prior to lifting. I understand load during lifting was possible on the Titan 1.

The one off Titan1 test was fired from a prototype Titan 2 silo with a “W” exhaust port.

Blue Streak K11 silo had “U” exhaust port and was designed to be fired from within the silo. The cryogenic oxygen was stored in an underground Dewer next to the missile. Hence it had to be pumped into the missile prior to launch, a process which may exceed the available warning time. Hence the system had to survive the first strike or was itself, primarily a first strike system.

 

[PMN1]

What would be the point of a W exhaust rather than a U?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

U vs W, I honestly don’t know why you would choose one or the other.

 

[SeaslugMk2]

Blue Streak K11 silo had “U” exhaust port and was designed to be fired from within the silo. The cryogenic oxygen was stored in an underground Dewer next to the missile. Hence it had to be pumped into the missile prior to launch, a process which may exceed the available warning time. Hence the system had to survive the first strike or was itself, primarily a first strike system.

I thought that Blue Streak used HTP rather than LOX...or am I mistaken? HTP is easier to store than LOX.

SRJ.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Note the frost on the upper LOX tank section:-

 

[SeaslugMk2]

Yep, I was mistaken.

SRJ.

 

[Archibald]

But your mistake is interesting. Because HTP as you say is far easier to store - in fact like kerosene it is liquid at room temperature, not -180°C.

RP1/H2O2 is next best thing for liquid-fuel ICBM after storable propellants N2O4/N2H4 (Titan II, R-36).

And the British had an entire HTP/RP-1 rocket industry, Blue Steel / Stentor included, right from 1955.

Yet they picked a LOX/RP-1 Atlas half-brother from Uncle Sam's. Which proved unviable as responsive IRBM.

Had they bet on their own RP1/H2O2 rocket engines, they could have scored a perfect bull's eyes
- IRBM / ICBM, silo-based
- SLBM, so no need for Polaris
- civilian rocketry, closer from Ariane and its storable propellants.

Great britain could have had a R-36 / Titan II liquid-fueled missile, burning RP1/H2O2.

A "keroxide Blue Streak" would have changed the face of European spaceflight.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I’ve thought that a few times. Ultimately the U.K. had a “just buy the high tech in from the US” mentality, not dissimilar to the longer term H bomb development. The early enforced isolation, combined with ambition got the job done (up to the ability for a real solution) .... Necessity being the mother of invention. Easy technology access is the enemy of an independent ambition;- cheap in the short term but very expensive in the long run. The “special relationship” making a mess but not in the normal interpretation, far more co-created, haphazard and unplanned.

 

[PMN1]

Had they bet on their own RP1/H2O2 rocket engines, they could have scored a perfect bull's eyes
- IRBM / ICBM, silo-based
- SLBM, so no need for Polaris
- civilian rocketry, closer from Ariane and its storable propellants.

There is still the issue of where to put those silos, though would the smaller missile increase the potential sites?

Cant say i'd be too keen on those two fuels in a sub.

 

[zen]

Had they bet on their own RP1/H2O2 rocket engines, they could have scored a perfect bull's eyes
- IRBM / ICBM, silo-based
- SLBM, so no need for Polaris
- civilian rocketry, closer from Ariane and its storable propellants.

There is still the issue of where to put those silos, though would the smaller missile increase the potential sites?

Cant say i'd be too keen on those two fuels in a sub.

And yet the Swedes made HTP torpedoes work fine.....