Biggest mistakes in aviation history? Which projects should have been built?

[Pioneer]

-Northrop N-102 Fang lightweight fighter!
-Northrop keeps control of the F-18 Hornet program [as opposed to McDonnell Douglas] and derives the F/A-18A/B Hornet, with McDonnell Douglas, as well as the land-based F-18L Cobra.
Many of the foreign air forces like RAAF, RCAF and the Spanish air force purchase the cheaper, lighter, more manoeuvrable and simpler F-18L Cobra, instead of the heavier carrier-based F/A-18A/B Hornet.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[McColm]

Hi,
I still think the float plane version of the C-130 or bolt-on-hull should be in production. The C-130J could be the donor aircraft. If the maritime agencies could get their act together then more float plane designs could be built. A fire bomber version that can scoop up the water whilst in-flight would be ideal for forest fires.
Even a passenger charter flights would be up and running for island hopping around the West Indies.
The amphibious version would be ideal for flood disasters or amphibious assault, search and rescue or the Coast Guard.
I'm not sure the world is ready for a float plane version of the C-17, but you could always stretch it to replace the C-5.
The F-23 should have made it into service as the naval equivalent of the F-22.
America should have gone with a wide body version of the Nimrod as a replacement for the P-3 Orion. The Nimrod proved its self in both Gulf Wars and was a favourite with the US armed forces. This new design may have made it as a candidate for the tanker replacement or multipurpose aircraft.
At least one airship design large enough to have fare paying passengers crossing the Atlantic in style.
A carrier deck version of the Tornado for the Royal Navy.
The British Canberra should have in-flight refueling and the American tandem style cockpit.
The Swedish Grippen should have been the follow-on-aircraft after the Hawk for jet training.
The Fairey Delta 2 should have gone on to be the equivalent of the Mirage IVP, thus saving the British tax payer a billion pounds in development costs for the TRS-2.
A British version of the Vigilante offered to the RAF and the RN.
The Fairey Rotodyne should have entered production with the option of jet pods on the rotors or not. The non-podded version would have been the better option.
The Gannet to be replaced by the Viking using British avionics and engines. The Hawkeye to be shared with other NATO members as and when required.
All aircraft entering service with the RAF and RN must be compatible and able to land/take off from a conventional aircraft carrier.

 

[Hammer Birchgrove]

Hammer, I recall reading somewhere that the Sabre started with straight wings (as the naval Fury) and was redesigned when the German swept-wing research became available.

FJ-1 Fury and F-86 Sabre

Thanks.

 

[Stargazer]

I just happened on an artist's impression of what the straight-wing F-86 might have looked like. Incidentally, the source says this was already NA-140 in the early stages.

http://www.thebigbookofwar.50megs.com/DOX/Aircraft/Fighters/North%20American%20NA-140.doc

 

[PMN1]

This looks like a good post for 'Project Cancelled' scenarios

Project cancelled - Derek Wood

1945-1954

Initial cancellation of supersonic aircraft setting back industry by five years.

Abandonment of transonic aircraft.

Too many design offices with limited resources.

Too many civil and military projects initiated of little value and consuming too much time and money.

Duplication of effort in Whitehall and in industry.

Lack of understanding by the RAF of export requirements.



1955-1957

Long-range jet market abandoned. The USA takes over permanently.

British aerodynamics and structural research reaches its peak with excellent designs, followed immediately by the disastrous Sandys White Paper on defence, which wrecks British aircraft development for a decade and stops manned military aircraft for five years.

Too many guided missile projects initiated.


1958-1964

The attempt to rationalise the aircraft industry by means of a shotgun and without a balance of aircraft projects.

Research only for specific purposes – of which there are too few.

Variable geometry know-how frittered away.

Loss of the short- and medium-haul jet airliner export market through BEA ordering the wrong size of aircraft.

Lack of conventional fighter and ground-attack aircraft.

Concentration on the over-complex OR.339/TSR.2 to the detriment off other projects.

Abandonment of Britain’s place in the light- and medium/heavy-lift helicopter market.


1965-1972

Cancellation of the three key British military projects – P.1154, HS.681 and TSR.2. V/STOL transports and supersonic fighters dropped.

Denis Healy’s panic purchases in America going; ‘cap in hand’ to Europe to buy a way into any project, whether or not suitable.

The ill-conceived Plowden report calling for Britain not to produce any more major national aircraft projects.

Britain goes into and retires from the European Airbus.
British Airbus cancelled.

 

[PMN1]

Scenario 1945

Let us turn the clock back to 1945, and see what might have been done. Instead of the Ministry of Supply, a small compact ministry is set up to deal purely with aviation: it has strong and clearly defined ties with the operational requirements and planning branches of the Services and good links with the airlines. The fiat goes out that teams must be strengthened and the number of companies reduced – otherwise no contracts. Hawker Siddeley , in particular is told to stop internal competition among its teams and present one joint design to any particular specification. Firms are urged to specialise and stop trying their hands at everything from bombers to light aircraft. The Services are informed that they must consider the civil market and exports in any transport specification they issue.

 

[PMN1]

Scenario 1952

How does the scene look with a P.1081 type given top priority by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm? The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming. Naval jet experience has been gained with three squadrons of Sea Vampires and the straight wing, tail wheel undercarriage Sea Attacker has been abandoned. An RAF
Squadron is operating alongside F-86’s in the Korean War and the naval squadron is preparing to embark on HMS Eagle for service in Korean waters. The P.1081 proves itself a match for the Mig15 in dog fighting over the Yalu River and with rockets and bombs does useful work in the ground attack role. The Fleet Air Arm cross-operates with US Navy carriers and for a period flies from the land base alongside the RAF.

The results are far-reaching. There is a massive inflow into the Air Ministry of up-to-date data and many young pilots are rotated through the Koran squadron to gain combat experience. Eight RAF squadrons in Britain and Germany are equipped with P.1081s and the type forms the spearhead of Fighter Command until the full advent of the Hunter in 1955-56. The vital decision is to re-equip the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons with P.1081s and, for export, Government finance is made available for the P.1081 to be re-engined with the up-rated Rolls Royce Tay engine with afterburner. Impressed with the P.1081’s performance, the first nation to order the type is Australia. Thereafter a total of 250 are sold abroad.

The P1081’s successor, the Hunter, is chosen as the basis for long-term development. After the introduction of the Avon Hunter into RAF service, a prototype of the P.1083 variant, with 50-degree sweep and fully variable afterburning, is flown in the autumn of 1953. It is ordered into production. The P.1083 Hunter enters service in late 1956, and the RAF has its first genuine supersonic aircraft at the same time that the US Air Force introduces the Convair F-102 delta. The P.1083 proves capable of 800mph at sea level and around 780mph at 36,000ft. Export sales boom and a further development is ordered, with a twp per cent thinner wing and equipped with either air-to-air missiles or ground attack weapons. Production of single or two-seat Hunters continues into the 1970’s, mainly for export.

 

[PMN1]

Scenario 1957

Back-tracking once again, the possible right decisions are about to be taken. Clearly not all the projects can be proceeded with; apart from cost, the duplication of types will lead to lack of standardisation and multiplicity of spares. Inevitably, the big high altitude bomber, the Avro 730, has to go but to ensure long-term supersonic know-how; design and research contracts are issued to A V Roe for a Mach 2.5-Mach3.0 experimental aircraft with sufficient fuel tankage for sustained supersonic flight. On the vehicle many of the problems of Concorde are destined to be sorted out. A replacement for the Canberra is essential and obviously it will be wasteful not to use the Blackburn NA.39, which is intended to fulfil a high-speed low-altitude strike role. After much soul searching the RAF agrees to participate in NA39 provided that a digital rather than an analogue system is ultimately employed, and a new Rolls-Royce engine is installed to improve take-off and radius of action in the Mk2 version.

With the supersonic Hunter already available and the P.1B on the production line, the big question remains to sort out the SR.177, the hawker P.1121 and the Fairey FD.2. Operational requirement No.329 for a big twin engined high altitude fighter is abandoned as being too complex. Instead, a requirement is issued for a supersonic single/two-seat fighter/strike aircraft, which is to become a worthy rival to the American Phantom. The contract is placed with Hawkers as Kingston and the Gyron- powered prototype P.1121, hitherto a private venture, is completed under official auspices.

Flight trials are successful and the long-term decision is taken to develop the P.1121 as a two seat all weather aircraft with continuous-wave radar and a semi-active guidance air-to-air missile developed by Fairey. The missile overcomes the serious gap in British technology where concentration has hitherto been only on infra-red fighting weapons, which are unsuitable for low/medium altitude operations in bad weather.

The chosen power plant for the production P.1121 is the Rolls Royce RB140 Medway engine with fully-variable reheat. The Government also persuades BEA, in 1958-59, to keep its proposed Trident airliner as a 111-seater with three Medways rather than scaling it down with a smaller power plant. The Medway is thus established in both military and civil fields, and in the latter becomes a key rival to the P + W JT8D, powering the Trident, the Boeing 707 and a second generation V.1000 airliner with underwing pods in place of buried engines. The Medway begins life at 10,000lb thrust and is steadily developed to 12,000lb, 14,000lb and then 17,000lb – keeping pace with both military and civil demands for increased power. For Rolls Royce there is an additional bonus as the P1121 installation gives the company vital ‘hot back end’ experience, which is read across into the ‘Super Conway’, which eventually emerges as the RB211.

The Mk1 P1121 goes into RAF service in 1962, and sells extremely well abroad. The development cycle is maintained with greatly increased weapons load and range as more thrust become available. A version with completely up –dated avionics, new weapons and short field performance is a standard RAF squadron type in 1976. Sorting out the FD.2 and the SR.177 proves to be a more difficult problem. It is realised that Britain cannot go it alone for ever with rising costs and budget limitations, and that the European industry is re-establishing itself. At top level the Government decided to use both types as the start of ‘collaboration’ and as a means of combating the tremendous sales efforts being made buy the US.

Negations with the federal German Republic (begun in 1956) are completed for the joint development and production of the SR.177 rocket-plus-turbojet interceptor. As Armstrong Whitworth is to be the main UK production centre, the aircraft side of Saunders Roe is taken over by Hawker Siddeley and the de Havilland Engine company. Two variants of the SR.177 are agreed upon: the basic mixed power, rapid-reaction, high altitude interceptor for air force/naval use, and a medium to low altitude strike/fighter variant with turbojet only, rocket fuel tankage being used for kerosene and a four per cent thickness wing being employed. German pressure leads to the adoption of a Rolls Royce turbojet in place of the Gyron Junior. The MoD agrees to three RAF squadrons in Germany being equipped with SR.177’s, while the type becomes the standard FAA fighter. Both the Luftwaffe and the German Navy adopt the SR.177 a standard and the joint production programme becomes the largest in Europe. The Lockheed bid with the F-104 Starfighter comes to nothing.

In the case of the FD.2, Whitehall opens discussions with the French on a collaborative agreement between Fairey and Dassault. Information is pooled and joint airframe development started. A batch of six aircraft is ordered in both France and Britain, the former with the SNECMA Atar engine and the latter with the reheated Avon. The outcome is a basic Mach 2.0 aircraft, which becomes standard in France and in Britain, begins to replace the Hunter in 1962. With steady development, the production lines keep rolling to meet export orders, right through to the seventies.

 

[PMN1]

Scenario 1964

Once again we enter the realms of what might have been. Ignoring all the prophets of doom and the left-wingers who want to turn aircraft works into jam factories, the cabinet thrashes out a workable policy. A team goes to Washington determined on maximum ‘buy back’ for any orders placed. McDonnell Phantoms for the RAF and the RN are ordered as standard, off the line, with General Electric and not Roll-Royce engines. This cuts the ultimate bill by two thirds and allows re-ordering to take place at a later date. In return, the US Government agrees to collaborate on financing supersonic V/STOL development in the UK and to the purchase of an agreed list of electronic and other equipment.

To meet the transport requirement a licence agreement is concluded with Lockheed for the manufacture in Britain of the Hercules with improved STOL performance and powered by Rolls-Royce Tyne engines. The licence includes the right to sell military and civil Hercules to specified territories. With the money saved on the Phantom deal and the dollar research cash from the US, the V/STOL programme is initiated. The Harrier Mk1 goes into production while, at the same time, three prototypes P1154’s are built using Pegasus engines with plenum chamber burning. These are followed by a further three modified aircraft equipped with the BS.100 engine. Following extensive trails, the P1154 is ordered as the successor to the Harrier. It is used by the FAF, FAA, the USN and the USMC. A British-designed nav/attack system including volumetric radar is fitted to the P1154.

Finally, the thorny problem of the TSR.2 is resolved. So much money has been spent and so much effort put in, it is obvious that the project must go on. Sixty TSR2s are ordered, but initially with less sophisticated equipment than originally envisaged. The weapons system package is built up gradually, allowing for an easier flight test programme. TSR2 becomes the most potent strike/recce aircraft in the NATO armoury. A further 25 are ordered and Australia, thoroughly disenchanted with delays and price rises on the F-111 cancels its order for that type and turns to TSR2, with major sub-contracts being placed with Australian companies.


In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.

In order not to waste all the variable geometry know-how accumulated in Britain, an experimental TSR2 is flown with VG incorporated and research is kept up. At the same time negotiations are begun with a group of European nations, including West Germany, for a variable-geometry fighter/ground attack aircraft to be the ultimate successor to the F-104.

 

[F-14D]

Might as well put in my 1 1/2 cents worth

F-14D continuation: With the Quickstrike/Block IV enhancements (this is not Super Tomcat 21) and normal technological developments, the USN would have had a better fighter and strike aircraft sooner and at a fraction of the development costs of the Super Hornet, albeit at a slightly higher purchase price and higher maintenance costs (although nowhere near the figures tossed around over the last few years).

A/FX: If we had done the above we could have afforded this aircraft, which was what the Navy really needed. It would have given both USN and USAF (assuming they didn't bug out of buying a Navy plane) greater tactical strike than what they have or are going to get, better fighter capability for the Navy and would have kept Navair at the forefront of capabilities.

F-12B: we may or may not have needed it as an interceptor (although we could have deployed it worldwide), but it would have made a killer MIG/TARCAP asset in Vietnam and elsewhere.

F-20: Could have done very well in the export market if we had allowed Taiwan and the other countries that wanted it to buy it. More importantly, if Northrop had taken a real look at the world, and picked the USN instead of USAF to be their representative for Foreign Military Sales, they would have had a partnered that was not hostile to the success of the aircraft.

A-7X: With this in lieu of the F/A-18A for the attack role, enough money would ha e been saved to re-engine the F-14 probably a decade sooner, funded the AV-8B and led directly to the...

A-7F: I really will get to posting about this aircraft, but USAF could have vastly increased their CAS capability (if they were actually interested in performing that mission) at very low cost.

B-1A: In addition to being part of the nuclear triad, the A was originally to be the F-111 replacement. Although not as stealthy as the B, it was more versatile and had much more tactical capabilities.

TSR.2: Although they never would have met their maintenance promises, it would have been a world beater strike aircraft (possibly reengined?), and would have helped keep the UK aviation industry more independent and competitive for Iyar's.

Convair model 48 Charger: Because it was so much better than the OV-10

DC-X/Y/1: Because we need an economical way to get to LEO.


CJ-610 engined Super Pinto because it was just so damn cool.

 

[SlickDriver]

My 2 cents go to Israel not going forward with the Lavi.

A far superior aircraft to the F-16, and made Israel totally dependent on the US for fighters. The F-16 Mafia bought off the Israeli government not to build the Lavi

 

[Abraham Gubler]

My 2 cents go to Israel not going forward with the Lavi.

A far superior aircraft to the F-16, and made Israel totally dependent on the US for fighters. The F-16 Mafia bought off the Israeli government not to build the Lavi

Everyone has their perspective... The Lavi would have bankrupted Israel and only offered marginal performance advantages over the F-16. The US Congress was giving cart a blanche on Lavi up until the Israeli Government cancelled the project because they realised they could never afford it. No F-16 mafia involved... Having a former head of IAI as a Cabinet Minister and signfiiant book cooking is what kept the project sucking up cash as long as it did. If they never launched Lavi in the first place maybe the Israelis could have co-produced advanced F-16s like the F-16XL with Israeli systems?

In recent years I would have liked to see the FB-111H built in place of the B-1B. If given the B-1B stealth treatment the FB-111H would have been the world's best strike aircraft to date. Being much smaller and cheaper than the B-1B it would be ideal for post Cold War persistent strike missions. A second generation FB-111H would have even made for a great alternative to the F-15E? It would also cement the theatre strike category in the USAF arsenal over the strategic bomber leading to the FB-23B in the 2000s (much nicer looking that the FB-22!).

 

[pathology_doc]

I love Wood's alternate history

So much to do, so little to do it with...

I've thought over the problem again, after having a read of American Secret Projects: Fighters. The marked contrast between the two nations is the number of US designs that got to the flight test stage which didn't progress to production, vs. the number of British projects in which the prototype(s) was/were well advanced when the hammer (whether it be Sandys' or some other decision to cancel) came down.

I got to wondering what might have been if the part-built aircraft had been funded through to completion and allowed to fly, even if only as test beds. I think this would have diluted a lot of the bitterness. From my POV, it seems that there isn't as much anguish/angst over US projects which never made it into the air because so many did, and got their chance to prove themselves (even if it was to prove they didn't satisfy the customer).

I also wonder whether perhaps a no-tender approach might not have worked. For this, one group of companies would have needed to be dedicated to missiles, one to fighters and one to bombers/attack aircraft, with the engine & avionics companies talking freely to all of them and the services taking the optimised product that emerged from each. Divisions could be along lines in which the companies were already demonstrating expertise or had a long history of success/experience - e.g. Hawker, Supermarine (teased away from Vickers), Gloster to fighters; Avro, Vickers, Handley-Page, English Electric to bombers/strike aircraft; DeHavilland and Fairey to missiles; Rolls and Bristol handling the powerplants and GEC and Ferranti providing aircraft radars, fire control computers, and assistance with integrating or perfecting the Missile Company products. (Not a complete list, but you get the idea.) Or is this just crazy?

 

[alertken]

Path: specialisation is how things did eventually emerge in UK (BAE/GEC(awhile)/MBDA/RR) but by way first of Nationalisation, yielding any profit to us, the payer. Before Maggie's time, monopoly in private manufacture of arms was seen as neo-fascist, Merchants of Death.

PMN1: all logical. 1957: P.1121 would have been instead of Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 from free, surplus F.6s - so much buck for not much extra bang. 1964: I would query ADV TSR.2: the essence of that 1958 design-concept was the vast equipment bay to house heavy, hot kit, rendered obsolete by hybrid, then digital avionics. 1965's AFVG was preferable. Wet Spey was put in F-4K because it was presented that J79 could not handle the bolter case off Ark/Eagle/Vic; so, to buy for RAF F-4M, mostly same, was easy, if dearer than F-4D.

I dispute the Q, which divides into: i) improper abortions; ii) improper contraceptions: what should not have been terminated; what should have been conceived but was not.
ii) is easiest to address here: we have hindsight; funders did not. We feared the Iron and Bamboo Curtains concealed Threats; we now know the Sovs' locker was empty, that Mao had no clothes, their people no food or love for their despots, their Allies no yen to die for their Occupiers. We know these things because of ISTAR, Open Skies. So, more of that sooner would have been good. Before satellites, SIOP targets were taken from German WW2 maps; dragon-terrain behind the Urals - CIA was right to try for an immortal U-2, then SR-71. If we could have ranged at will we would have defused mythical bomber/missile "gaps", to great benefit.
i) - culpable cancellations: it is facile for armchair warriors to bewail the chop on a favoured type. My position is that not a single one was detrimental to our national health; indeed Ministers should have chopped most sooner, in face of drift, squander, galloping obsolescence, changes in Task. None provoked a Requiror's resignation.

My preferred Thread would be Biggest mistakes...which projects should not have been built. A long list.

 

[zen]

A team goes to Washington determined on maximum ‘buy back’ for any orders placed. McDonnell Phantoms for the RAF and the RN are ordered as standard, off the line, with General Electric and not Roll-Royce engines.

Does'nt work, USN F4s did cross deck onto Ark Royal, but they landed at low weights on fumes and launched with precious little onboard, tanking almost immediately as they'd had to trade fuel for other weights. Unless your having the RN only operate the F4 from CVA-01 and her sisters or possibly the earlier 1952 CV then what are you going to fly your J79 powered F4's from?

TSR.2 is trying to do something like the job of three seperate and different aircraft in one airframe and systems package.
The best resolution is to instead develope a long range low level bomber for the 1000nm mission, a medium strike/attack type for the 600nm mission and leave the high speed high altitude recce mission to something like the F155T winner.

P1154 is rather doomed to be a less than sparkling machine for the RAF, their flexible basing concept will require a much more expensive effort to work with this than the P1127, the RN could find it workable, but not without a TOTAL rethink and rework of just too many entrenched and rationaly decided issues.

P1121 is the most competant concept I feel and in its later tandem seater offerings to GOR.339, quite a potent option to persue. Shift the main gear into Tupalov style pods on the wings and this resolves the maingear door problems and opens up a possible naval variant at the cost of having to rework the length of existing CVs lifts.

HSA's BRough offices NGTA (P141) is a competant offering.

 

[stuanliz]

I believe in the old adage that if it looks right then it normally is and I think one of the best looking planes to come out of the Dassault works was the Mirage4000. A damned pity that it never went beyond prototype. If the quoted performance figures were even half accurate it would still be frontline today nearly 30 years later.

 

[Stargazer]

I believe in the old adage that if it looks right then it normally is and I think one of the best looking planes to come out of the Dassault works was the Mirage4000. A damned pity that it never went beyond prototype. If the quoted performance figures were even half accurate it would still be frontline today nearly 30 years later.

To a large extent I also believe in that saying, which in fact was pronounced by Marcel Dassault himself... However it's not always true. In the case of JAST, sure, the X-35 looked A LOT better than the X-32, and it won... but look at the F-22 and F-23... Obviously it's not the more handsome and sleek design of the two that won... I think it would be safe to say that an aircraft that looks good usually flies well... but some very ugly machines have had extremely good flying qualities, too! I'm not about to give any names because some people can get very touchy about their favorite aircraft, but some very successful combat designs around the world are pretty ugly in my view... (I know it's pretty subjective though... I LOVE the A-10 but HATE the F-4 with all my heart!!)

 

[stuanliz]

yes i agree, it is a generalisation. My counter points would be to compare the Buccaneer against the Intruder or the lightning against the Starfighter (Firelighter in a lot of pilots view) The performance in both cases was more or less equalised when viewed across the spectrum but most people would agree on the best lookers.

 

[CFE]

F-20: Could have done very well in the export market if we had allowed Taiwan and the other countries that wanted it to buy it. More importantly, if Northrop had taken a real look at the world, and picked the USN instead of USAF to be their representative for Foreign Military Sales, they would have had a partnered that was not hostile to the success of the aircraft.

The F-20 owes its very existence, as well as its demise, to the politics of Taiwanese arms sales. Carter admin policy was to prevent Taiwan from getting "our best stuff," so the F-16's that Taiwan wanted were off the table. F-20 was the result, an F-5 upgrade that was capable of carrying BVR missiles like Sparrow. The Reagan administration then shot down the idea of F-20 sales to Taiwan as it tried warming to China, prior to Tienanmen Square. Eventually Taiwan (and just about every country that was remotely friendly with the US) would get the F-16's they wanted.

DC-X/Y/1: Because we need an economical way to get to LEO.

DC-X was a good program in many ways but its potential for growth was limited. A two-stage rocket will always beat a single-stage one in putting a bigger fraction of its liftoff mass into orbit. Still, it would have been nice to see DC-XA fly out its test series instead of crashing and burning. It was similar in size to a V-2 and carried much more energetic propellants than the V-2, so you can estimate what it was capable of.

 

[F-14D]

F-20: Could have done very well in the export market if we had allowed Taiwan and the other countries that wanted it to buy it. More importantly, if Northrop had taken a real look at the world, and picked the USN instead of USAF to be their representative for Foreign Military Sales, they would have had a partnered that was not hostile to the success of the aircraft.

The F-20 owes its very existence, as well as its demise, to the politics of Taiwanese arms sales. Carter admin policy was to prevent Taiwan from getting "our best stuff," so the F-16's that Taiwan wanted were off the table. F-20 was the result, an F-5 upgrade that was capable of carrying BVR missiles like Sparrow. The Reagan administration then shot down the idea of F-20 sales to Taiwan as it tried warming to China, prior to Tienanmen Square. Eventually Taiwan (and just about every country that was remotely friendly with the US) would get the F-16's they wanted.

DC-X/Y/1: Because we need an economical way to get to LEO.

DC-X was a good program in many ways but its potential for growth was limited. A two-stage rocket will always beat a single-stage one in putting a bigger fraction of its liftoff mass into orbit. Still, it would have been nice to see DC-XA fly out its test series instead of crashing and burning. It was similar in size to a V-2 and carried much more energetic propellants than the V-2, so you can estimate what it was capable of.

Basically agree in principle. Couple of differences...

F-20 was more than just an F-5 upgrade. Although it used the basic aerodynamic shape (and in the A model would have unfortunately ported over most of the wing design) of the F-5, it was actually a almost totally new aircraft masquerading as a modification. It was originally called the "F-5G" because that made Carter's people happy, they being the originators of the "International Export Fighter", which also spawned the F-16/79, which generated zero interest. For the most part, excepting medium to high altitude payload/range, the F-20 was better than the F-16A/B and capabilty-wise pretty much was the equal of the F-16C/D, except that it cost less and was far easier to maintain. Your points about Taiwan are spot-on as Northrop made no secret that the plane was based on Taiwanese needs, although they expected to sell it elsewhere. When that market was closed to them, they went elsewhere, but they still had the problem that sales to some other countries were blocked or discouraged and their FMS sponsor had a vested interest in the other guy getting the sales, which is why I opined that they should have asked the Navy to be their sponsor. The Navy would have been a better choice because

1. It used a variant of a Navy engine, which helped reduce the cost of the engine to the Navy, and the naval supply system could have been used to support it.

2. The F-20 threatened no Navy program, whereas each F-20 sold meant at least one F-16 wouldn't be, so that represented less cost reduction for USAF,

3. The Navy would have loved to "tweak" USAF.

Regarding DC-X, you are absolutely right about the payload fraction. However, its proponents always conceded that point. What they were emphasizing was that fuel is cheap; their concept offered a vehicle that was totally reusable and required far less ground crew/facilities or mission control personnel than the multi-stage concepts, so it could be turned around faster, launched more often and overall cost much less to operate (assuming EMD results would have met their hopes). NASA never really warmed to the program, after all it was Not Invented Here, and once it came under their wing did not support it all that well. FWIW, the crash resulted due to the actions of overworked NAS support personnel, not because of the vehicle or concept.

 

[CFE]

The fact that DC-X actually produced a powered flight demonstration while so many other recent NASA projects didn't (X-33, X-34 and OSP being the most egregious examples) is very telling. DC-X was a lean project conceived under SDIO and didn't meet its demise until NASA took it over. Perhaps some new agency in the mold of SDIO is better suited than NASA to develop a reusable launch vehicle.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Might as well put in my 1 1/2 cents worth

Some cool ideals so I thought I might wade in on them.

F-14D continuation: With the Quickstrike/Block IV enhancements (this is not Super Tomcat 21) and normal technological developments, the USN would have had a better fighter and strike aircraft sooner and at a fraction of the development costs of the Super Hornet, albeit at a slightly higher purchase price and higher maintenance costs (although nowhere near the figures tossed around over the last few years).

A/FX: If we had done the above we could have afforded this aircraft, which was what the Navy really needed. It would have given both USN and USAF (assuming they didn't bug out of buying a Navy plane) greater tactical strike than what they have or are going to get, better fighter capability for the Navy and would have kept Navair at the forefront of capabilities.

How about wind the clock back further to the early days of the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) and have this specification written into a more of an A/FX (outer air battle and deep strike) as a single replacement for the heavy elements of the carrier air wing. Have Grumman motivated from the early 1980s, late 1970s to produce a new generation replacement for the F-14/A-6 rather than A-6F/ST-21 so they are developing their own stealth capability early on.

In the mid to late 1980s the big projects are the USAF Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) and the USN's Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) both of which are Congressionally mandated to share mission systems and airframe technology and the Advanced Tactical Fighter Engine (ATFE). Originally starting with a similar specification - strike fighter - with the differences each service need (USAF: one seat, medium length runway, USN: two seat, Phoenix replacement and carrier compatibility). Of course USAF changes to all fighter thanks to the FLANKER/FLUCRUM scare. The main difference is the carrier aircraft is design as such form ground up.

Winning bids are Grumman teamed with Lockheed for the ATA with a swing wing stealthy aircraft and Northrop teamed with McDonnell Douglas with the ATF (thus keeping four out of five fighter builders in work). You could even change things a bit more here and have USAF keep the ATF as a strike fighter (they still wanted a single seat strike aircraft to replace the F-4 and F-111) and have the FLANKER/FLUCRUM fighter gap filled by more air to air capability in the Enhanced Tactical Fighter (ETF) project. So the later is won by GDFW with the F-16XL (that can super cruise in an air to air configuration) rather than McAir with the F-15E. This keeps GDFW working through the 1990s and obviously those F-16XLs would have sold like hot cakes internationally.

Since the USN's need for air worthy aircraft drives the ATA schedule they are in service by the end of 1990s to replace the F-14A, A-6Es. Which means the schedule doesn't slip for the joint ATA/ATF systems and the ATFE so the ATF (F-23A) can also enter service almost 10 years before the F-22A does. Northrop's AGM-127 TASSM enters service 10 years before its replacement the JASSM would and the two stage GD/Westinghouse AIM-152 AAAM is also kept alive to maintain the outer air battle, all courtesy of the efficient joint services approach of ATA/ATF.

End result is a USAF in 2001 based on F-16E/F Super Falcon and F-23A Rattlesnake strike fighters replacing the F-15C/F-16C mix (F-4/F-111s having been replaced by the first F-16Fs) and the USN Carrier Wing with the F/A-24 Avenger II heavy fighter attack and F/A-18C/D light fighter attack. USMC would have its ATFE powered ASTOVL program (the McDonnell Douglas/BAE F-25A Wraith); CALF would never be born because USAF had the F-16E/F and JAST/JSF never conceived.

F-12B: we may or may not have needed it as an interceptor (although we could have deployed it worldwide), but it would have made a killer MIG/TARCAP asset in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Why not just go for the original - the North American F-108. It can sit up high, dropping AIM-47s on the head of MiGs in Vietnam and keep NAA in the aircraft business. With money coming in from F-108 work in the 60s they won't need to be sold to Rockwell. The money could also help them test and prove their advanced wing designs that NASA were sceptical of for the F-14 and F-15 competitions.

 

[CFE]

A common theme in many of these alternative histories are different scenarios with ATA / A-12 Avenger II. Some say it was a bad idea to begin with, some would have stuck with the GD/McDD design, and others would have gone with Northrop.

What are the arguments against a subsonic, long-range carrier strike plane? Assuming that it wasn't necessary to duplicate the A-6's range, a supersonic strike-fighter in the mold of A/F-X might have been a better value.

I'd personally have liked to see a dedicated subsonic replacement for the A-6, with potential sales to the USAF (instead of the F-15E which largely replaced the F-111 in the interdiction role.) The GD design had its flaws, and I'd have trusted Northrop to deliver the goods. The Northrop plane might have come in over-budget, but the extra development costs would be offset to some degree with a USAF buy.

In hindsight, it may have been wiser to replace the F-22 with the F-22-derived A/F-X in the early 90's. While the F-22 would have been a better air superiority fighter, A/F-X would have been "good enough" in the current threat environment. Hence you get one plane that effectively replaces the F-14, F-15, A-6 and F-111.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There is also potential to explore the benefit of a very stealthy, active array equipped, subsonic platform as an air superioty aircraft. Though strongly opposed by many this is in many ways a limitation of the current crop of missiles. Add a two stage lightweight missile like the GD design for the AIM-152 competition and you have something with the kind of accleration to enable a M 0.6-0.9 launch to match an AMRAAM launched at M 1.2-1.6. Now what are the comparitive benefits in DCA/OCA of something like a Boeing 988-123 being able to fly for five hours at ~M 0.8 carrying 16-20 two stage missiles with a maximum range of 100 NM compared to an F-22A able to fly for 20 minutes at ~M1.6 carrying six single stage missiles with a maximum range of 100 NM?

 

[CFE]

There is also potential to explore the benefit of a very stealthy, active array equipped, subsonic platform as an air superioty aircraft. Though strongly opposed by many this is in many ways a limitation of the current crop of missiles. Add a two stage lightweight missile like the GD design for the AIM-152 competition and you have something with the kind of accleration to enable a M 0.6-0.9 launch to match an AMRAAM launched at M 1.2-1.6. Now what are the comparitive benefits in DCA/OCA of something like a Boeing 988-123 being able to fly for five hours at ~M 0.8 carrying 16-20 two stage missiles with a maximum range of 100 NM compared to an F-22A able to fly for 20 minutes at ~M1.6 carrying six single stage missiles with a maximum range of 100 NM?

Warning: Slightly OT

I definitely like this creative approach to the problem of air superiority. Unfortunately, real-world rules-of-engagement would probably hamper a subsonic "arsenal aircraft." While the Phoenix-armed Tomcat was the only American fighter that the Soviet pilots truly feared, the Tomcat was never allowed to fire the Phoenix in anger. During Operation Desert Storm the fear of friendly fire was so great that the Tomcats took a backseat to the F-15's, even though the Tomcat was a better interceptor thanks to its radar set and Phoenix missiles.

 

[robunos]

a very stealthy, active array equipped, subsonic platform as an air superioty aircraft

Sounds like a LO version of the Douglas Missileer. Trouble is, it's a single-role weapons system, and these seem to be out-of-favour at the moment, at least on financial grounds, as with the F-22 vs F-35 siuation.

cheers,
Robin.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

CFE this is the 'Biggest mistakes in aviation? Which projects should have been built?" thread, I don't think its possible to go off topic!

Now I really hate historical comparisions of aircraft (looking at you Robunos ;-). Because they tend to leave out very important differences in capability and just focus on rough alignment. A stealthy, high field of regard, long range radar, rapid accleration missile armed subsonic aircraft is NOT a Douglas Missileer. The Missileer did not have the kind of situational awareness and LO surviability you would expect in a contemporary fighter, fast or slow. The Missileer was not built with 21st century technology and no one is going to build an aircraft today with 1960s technology (except Iran).

It is also not a single-role weapon system. The aircraft we are talking about using as a fighter are strike platforms like the A-12, Boeing 988-123, Northrop ATA offer, etc. To give them a name these ATA/F (Advanced Tactical Aircraft/Fighter) are around ~70,000lb aircraft with 0.3 fuel fraction, -30 to -40 dB RCS, 0.3 TW for a >1,000 NM radius with 8,000 lbs of weapons crusing at Mach 0.8-0.9. The concept for making them fighters is to use a two or more stage high accleration missile (for example the General Dynamics A3M or AIM-152 offer) combined with AESA radars for long range and potentially 360 deg. field of regard.

Back to the topic, OT or not. Rules of engagement may hamper long range missile engagement but they would equally hamper the ATA/F and the high speed fighter (eg F-22). The high accleration missile launched by the ATA/F would not outrange the Mach 1.6/AIM-120 combination just enable it to be equaled from a Mach 0.6-0.9 launch. Because the ATA/F has big and deep bays with the weight margins it can carry up to 16 x 500lb missiles internally (GD A3M was only 380lb).

The real capability sacrifice is the high speed dash to engagement for DCA and use of high speed for surviability in other areas. While a ATA/F is very much a work of alternate history at the moment this kind of capability argument is very relevant to the use of F-35 and UCAS as air to air platforms in place of supercruisers. With massive increases in data linking and situational awareness capability since ODS in '91 we should be less constrained by visual idenfication for ROE. Or even worse visual identification awaiting upon AWACS approval the failure of which lead directly to the loss of L.Cdr. Scott Speicher.

 

[robunos]

Now I really hate historical comparisions of aircraft (looking at you Robunos ;-).

Here's looking a you, kid! ;D

subsonic platform as an air superioty aircraft

Sounds like a Missileer to me!

Now I'm aware that the technology has moved on greatly since the days of the F6D,
and I've no doubt that such an aircraft would be far superior in capabilities to the F6D, rather I was talking in terms of role,
standing off from the disputed airspace, letting the long-range missiles do the work, rather than, as you say, using
'the high speed dash to engagement', with the consequent possibilty of WVR combat, ie, a dogfight.

It is also not a single-role weapon system.

In your original description, see above, no mention was made of a strike capability,(a search for 'Boeing 988-123' yields nothing.
Is this a strike platform project?)

Indeed, these were the points of my post, the 'fighter jocks' won't go for it, 'cause it's not dogfighter, and the Pentagon won't fund it,
because it's not multi-role, or indeed 'joint'.

Hope this helps to clear the confusion,

cheers,
Robin.

 

[F-14D]

Let me dive back in with points at random to some posts.


The F6D was designed for a different world. Not just in terms of LO, but in terms of the threat it was intended to face and the environment it was intended to operate. Its sole function was to sit up there for hours at a time and fling its long range missiles at hordes of incoming Soviet bombers and cruise missiles (yes, even in the '50s Navy was at least thinking about that threat). It was never meant to engage fighters in combat, that would be left to the F-4s and F-8s, since it wouldn't survive if another fighter got close. It was also designed with the assumption that the Navy would continue to have the large numbers of carriers it had in the late '50s. While AIM-152 could perform the mission the Eagle missiles were intended to perform, it, and the platform that would carry it would be more versatile, out of necessity.

The Navy ATA was not a program to replace both the F-14A and the A-6E. The program to do replace both planes was called VFMX. The money for that program was later zeroed, and the F-14D then approved. ATA was part of a mandated joint development effort. Navy would develop a super (some say ridiculously) stealthy tactical strike aircraft, versions of which were to be operated by both Navy and USAF, while USAF developed the next fighter, ATF, versions of which would be operated by both service. Or at least that was the plan. There was no requirement for the ATA to be supersonic, in fact Navy considered that a liability, for its strike mission. ATA would have self defense air-to-air capability, but it would not seek to engage enemy aircraft. ATF had minimal requirement for strike capability (which was one of, but not the only, reason Navy pulled out), which is one of the reasons the F-22's bay is so small.

It's important to remember the A-12/ATA debacle that the GD/MDD design was not selected over the Northrop/Grumman design. What happened was that when DoD mandated who would team with who, they created a team that had lots of stealth and carrier experience. Partly into the competition, they basically said, "This is silly; we're outta here". The GD/MDD proposal was the only one left. Who knows if it would have been selected had there been a competition all the way to Source Selection?

One of the significant difference between ATA and A/FX was that there was littel Fleet input to it, everyone so enamored of magical invulnerability through stealth, while the latter extensively worked with the user community.


In Desert Storm, the concern of Blue on Blue kills was a consideration in the use of the F-14/Phoenix, despite the fact that AWG-9 had demonstrated "non-cooperative" identification for years, but I doubt if it was the main one. The big one was that USAF wanted all air-to-air kills to be done by USAF or at least by USAF-trained types flying USAF type a/c. F-14s, AIM-54 equipped or not, were not allowed to go after enemy aircraft.

Among the reasons the F-15E was selected over the F-16XL (which would have been designated the F-16E/F, I believe) was that it would be available sooner, be easier to develop plus cost less to develop and procure under the constraints of the time, so I'm not sure the money ever would have been there for the XL.

It wasn't the loss of the F-108 that took NAA out of the aircraft business as an independent company, it was Jimmy Carter's arbitrary cancellation of the B-1A that did.


FWIW, in my original post on this topic my choice was to restrict myself to aircraft that had actually flown and could have continued on to production without going too far into a parallel universe (the exception being the A-7X/-7F because they were so easy to do). Others might be wiling to take "a step farther out".

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Hope this helps to clear the confusion,

The point I was trying to make is there is a huge difference between the ATA/F and the 1960s Missilier. While they are both subsonic and armed with big missiles and long range radars there is a massive difference in their contemporary survival capability.

For the Missilier it lacks the speed and manoeuvrability to engage in close range air to air combat in the 1960s. So after the enemy has penetrated its missile engagement zone it is very vulnerable and unable to maintain air superiorty (especially compared to its contemporaries: F8U-3s, F4H and F-14As).

On the other hand the ATA/F has a very high level of stealth and situational awareness. So unlike the Missilier it is very survivable without the speed ability to run away because it can plan ahead thanks to its view of the battlefield and keep its distance without a speed advantage thanks to its small zone of visibility to the enemy. The ATA/F could also be like the Boeing 988-123 very manoeuvrable. So if engaged in close range air combat like the FRS.1 Sea Harrier it could be very lethal without being supersonic.

The Boeing 988-123 is detailed in a NASA report linked to in this thread. You will find it is designed to be a highly manoeuvrable strike aircraft designed for a joint force customer (USAF and USN).

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2121.0/

If you need to find an aircraft, don’t Google, use the search function at www.secretprojects.co.uk!

 

[robunos]

The point I was trying to make is there is a huge difference between the ATA/F and the 1960s Missilier. While they are both subsonic and armed with big missiles and long range radars there is a massive difference in their contemporary survival capability.

Understood.

If you need to find an aircraft, don’t Google, use the search function at www.secretprojects.co.uk!

I did!, but nothing came back! ???

cheers,
Robin.

 

[elmayerle]

My 2 cents go to Israel not going forward with the Lavi.

A far superior aircraft to the F-16, and made Israel totally dependent on the US for fighters. The F-16 Mafia bought off the Israeli government not to build the Lavi

Actually, if IAI had lacked the hubris of going it alone, Northrop had worked with them on combined designs that combined their original F404-powered Lavi concept with the F-20 (well, F-5G as it was called then) to produce an affordable design; there were two variants, depending on just how much of the F-5/F-20 was desired to carry-over and it would have taken advantage of some of the adapability features of the Northrop family.

 

[F-14D]

My 2 cents go to Israel not going forward with the Lavi.

A far superior aircraft to the F-16, and made Israel totally dependent on the US for fighters. The F-16 Mafia bought off the Israeli government not to build the Lavi

Actually, if IAI had lacked the hubris of going it alone, Northrop had worked with them on combined designs that combined their original F404-powered Lavi concept with the F-20 (well, F-5G as it was called then) to produce an affordable design; there were two variants, depending on just how much of the F-5/F-20 was desired to carry-over and it would have taken advantage of some of the adapability features of the Northrop family.

Interstingly, Northrop was also one of the companies that started campaigning against the PW1120 powered Lavi. They, and members of Congress, started asking why, if the US Government appears to be working against sales of the F-20 (topic for elsewhere), is it using taxpayer dollars to help finance development of a foreign aircraft that would compete with it in the marketplace?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Honestly I loved the plan the USAF and USN had in the 1980s. So if that had all worked out this is what I envision.

Hundreds of ATFs for the USAF, and a full run of B-2s. For the Navy a full force of NATFs and A-12s. These programs would be followed by a single-engined fighter to replace the F-16 and possibly a naval variant to supplement carrier air wings. I picture the end result being something like the F-35, but lighter, including a stealthier 2D thrust vectoring nozzle, and other improvements due to the lack of a STOVL requirement.

Eventually I envision a stealthy, supersonic fighter-bomber to replace the F-111, and the development of a STOVL fighter to replace the Harrier II, using the engine, avionics, and other components from existing designs.

In in the 2020s we would be working on mach 3 stealth bombers, hypersonic cruise missiles, and 6th generation fighters among other things.

 

[McColm]

The four engined Br1150 Atlantic/Atlantique to replace the Shackleton as a medium to long range ASW and Anti-Ship Attack. This could have challenged the likes of the P-3 Orion. With the Royal Air Force placing orders or even building their own version under licence. I'm not saying that it would have cancelled the Nimrod, but in the fishery, coastal and SAR duties. As the Lancasters had carried heavy guns so to could the Atlantic in its forward gun turret in the nose section for close support or anti-drug roles.
As the years have past no doubt the search radar would have been moved to the nose section, may be an AWACS version, or a command and control.

The F-117N should have been built, even as a demonstrator or a two seater downgraded version.

 

[merlin]

Seeing as there isn't any year from or two linked to the question, I'll go further back than most.
Gloster F.5/34 - especially if Gloster got their finger out, and rolled the prototype out earlier, - useful insurance instead of relying on the Merlin.
Boulton Paul P.88A - perhaps replacement for the Gloster, armed with 4 x 20mm canon, powered by Hercules radial, originally prototype ordered but Treasury wouldn't pay!
Gloster F.9/37 - based on an earlier design for a turret fighter, with the need for a canon armed aircraft could have been designed, thus built and in service earlier - 330 mph better than 260 mph of Blenheim 1F.
Pusher attack aircraft - would love to have seen what impact either the Armstrong Whitworth AW 49, Boulton Paul P.99 or P.100, would have made.

 

[bobbymike]

From Nuclear Weapons Archive - Alternate warheads for the MX Missile - Two higher yield warheads -- the 500-600 Kt CALMENDRO warhead (developed at LANL but transferred to LLNL), and the 800 Kt MUNSTER.

Although not "Aerospace" per say they would have to have been mated to an RV, so to complete the aerospace part, MaRV with these warheads would have been a devastating combination.

 

[Caravellarella]

As I'm not an expert on combat aircraft; herewith my suggestions......

Boeing YC-14 - a fabulous concept and SO odd-looking......

De Havilland DH121 - original sized design with Medway engines. Provision for Pratt & Whitney JT8s as alternate engines and better high-lift devices would be a bonus......

Fairey/Westland Rotodyne Z - developed version with silencers......

Dassault/Bréguet Mystère/Falcon 30 - the first feasible regional jet in the current sense......

Sud Caravelle 20 - would have given the Boeing 727-200 a challenge......

Airbus A310-400 - combination of the A310-300 wing with the A300-600 fuselage; could still be in production today......


SEPECAT Jaguar M - looks fabulous (why didn't this enter service? I don't know)......

Mirage F2, Mirage G8 and Mirage III V - because they are Mirages and look wonderful?

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[Byeman]

I don't know this for certain. When a book on the Navaho came out some time back, I bought it and was discussing the missile with someone quite familiar with NAA's activities during that period. When I mentioned that the basic vehicle seemed ideal for this purpose, he just smiled and mentioned what I said earlier. I can neither confirm nor deny it, but I find it difficult to believe the only use for the built-up airframes, once the program was apparently cancelled, was as targets for Bomarc trials (and I gather the Bomarc was distinctly unsuccessful in these).

Sorry to dredge up this old thread, this is totally not credible because of the boosters are needed to launch the vehicle. It was not (and it is still not) possible to hide a launch at CCAFS or VAFB for that matter. Any other launch site would have been hard to hide. The amount of support required (the mobile launcher concept was never validated) would be a indicator. Not to mention the disposal of the boosters in flight.

 

[Johnbr]

They should have made the F-14b with the PW-401-400.