B-58 Hustler

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A good link to understand the design evolution (structural) of the Hustler and understand why it regained most of its potential only after exiting active service:


While the Hustler was still in service, two major changes to all B-58s were integrated as a result of ‘5664’s loss. The first was a fix to the flight control system resulting in reduced activity gain of the aileron control input in response to yaw heading. Additionally, small trim surfaces found inboard of the elevons of several early B-58s, were deactivated and replaced by fixed trailing edge fairings.

The second change was a physical strengthening of the vertical fin and associated fuselage structure just forward of the tail. New aircraft were built with these modifications integral to the flight control system and structure, respectfully.

A second B-58 was eventually pulled from the production line and modified to the new standard. Just short of a month after ‘5664 and its crew evaporated in the skies over Oklahoma, Beryl Erickson climbed into this modified aircraft, taxied to the end of the main Carswell AFB runway, and headed skyward to complete the test that Fitzgerald and Siedhof had died attempting. Once at altitude and speed, Erickson shut down the right outboard engine. The airplane yawed, quickly stabilized, and moments later, recovered without incident. No ancillary problems were encountered. Within a week of the test the B-58 was officially cleared for Mach 2.0 flight in a high-q, far aft c.g. condition [ending a M1.6 restriction]
 
Apologies if this is the wrong thread and/or old news, and apologies too that I cannot currently (for the life of me) find my original online source for this. It's credited to the Roger Cripliver collection and I am pretty sure I found it on a 'Combat Reform' site on protecting aircraft against attack, but more specific I can't currently be. Anyway, here is a diagram of a proposed hardened shelter specially for a Convair B58.
As drawn, it looks to me like the external pod wouldn't clear the top of the ramp. I haven't checked the dimensions but the drawing seems to be to scale and there's a guide rail where a clearance trench would have to be. Go figure.
 
FB_IMG_1593210046565.jpg

June 26, 1962: The RS-70 crew escape capsule for the XB-70 was successfully ejected from a modified pod carried by a B-58 at 20,000 feet. This marked the first time an escape capsule was flight tested before the plane for which it was intended was flown. The rocket-powered capsule was ejected downward from an inverted position.
 
Cost of B-58 Vs B-52 (Hijacked (without preliminary approval) from the B-21 thread) :

Didn't a B-58 cost three times as much as a B-52 to operate
No, not at all. A Hustler was slightly cheaper to operate, but some "creative accounting" made a powerful talking point that survives to this day.

I don't recall the exact numbers off the top of my head, but the talking point was created by saying the two Hustler wings were as expensive as six BUFF-equipped SAC wings. This ignored the fact that the Hustler wings had three times as many aircraft.
A BUFF wing was typically one bombardment squadron (BS) of 12-15 aircraft, frequently, but not always with an aerial refueling squadron. All 100+ Hustlers produced (minus operational losses) belonged to just two wings. The 63rd, 64th, 65th BS all belonged to one wing (43rd) in Little Rock, for example, as did the KC-135 squadron there.

Acquisition costs for the Hustler were roughly three times as much as a Buff, but that was sunk cost by the time the decision to retire them came about. SAC wanted to keep them, but the decision came down from on high.

Sorry for the delay on this and for a couple of other things I may post on this topic. I've got some numbers on the topic of B-52 vs. B-58.

Each B-52 wing had 15 "Unit Equipped" (Air Force jargon, I don't know what it means), while each B-58 wing had 39 UE aircraft. One time acquisition cost of a B-58 was 2.46 times that of a B-52 in constant dollars. If you threw in planned tanker support for both but didn't count the four GAM-72 decoys usually acquired with each B-52, the ratio was still 2.28 in the B-52's favor. However, the the Annual O&M and personnel costs for each B-52 was 17% higher than the B-58 and those were recurring costs. Put another way, for the cost of operating 66 B-52s you could operate 78 B-58s.

Regarding why the B-58 went away, originally Robert McNamara wanted it gone by mid 1970 (extended by him in 1966 to mid 1971) partly to crate a need to be filled by his beleoved F-111 (the FB-111 variant). Once, he was gone, though, for operational reasons in early 1969 the date moved out to at least 1974 by DoD. However, in the latter part of 1969 the head of SAC, apparently without input from B-58 experts, briefed the Air Force Chief of Staff that 78 B-58s should be phased out in order to preserve about 60 older B-52s. General Ryan took the recommendation of his SAC Chief to SECDEF. Having earlier in the year extended the B-58 in service per AF input, OSD was now being told it wasn't wanted after all. SECDEF Laird then directed that the B-58 was to be gone by Jan 31, 1970
 
Cost of B-58 Vs B-52 (Hijacked (without preliminary approval) from the B-21 thread) :

Each B-52 wing had 15 "Unit Equipped" (Air Force jargon, I don't know what it means), while each B-58 wing had 39 UE aircraft. One time acquisition cost of a B-58 was 2.46 times that of a B-52 in constant dollars. If you threw in planned tanker support for both but didn't count the four GAM-72 decoys usually acquired with each B-52, the ratio was still 2.28 in the B-52's favor. However, the the Annual O&M and personnel costs for each B-52 was 17% higher than the B-58 and those were recurring costs. Put another way, for the cost of operating 66 B-52s you could operate 78 B-58s.
With a crew of three vs. four in the buff, the B-58 is more expensive on a per-person basis. That is interesting.

Regarding why the B-58 went away, originally Robert McNamara wanted it gone by mid 1970 (extended by him in 1966 to mid 1971) partly to crate a need to be filled by his beleoved F-111 (the FB-111 variant).
Oh, come on.

The B-58 was only supersonic at high altitude, which by the mid-1960s was already suicidal. That left it flying penetration missions at speeds only slightly faster than the buff and with much shorter range when doing so. McNamara didn't kill it because he "loved" the F-111, he killed it because it no longer had a credible mission - a buff blasting its way into the SU with SRAM at M0.85 was far more survivable than a B-58 with a pod doing so at M0.95.

The FB-111 had a significantly higher performance at low altitude, did so from a twin-jet airframe that cost much less to maintain and operate, and could be easily forward deployed. Of course, that is not a direct replacement for a US-based fleet, which is why the B-1 was developed - it was literally defined as an aircraft with the performance of the B-58 at high altitude, the F-111 at low altitude, and the same range as the B-52 at any altitude.

It's not that the mission didn't exist, it was that the B-58 couldn't credibly fulfill it.
 
The FB-111A was also much, much less a crew-killer than the B-58.

It dawned on me the other day that the production run of FB-111A (76) was smaller than the Hustler itself (116) !

Both FB-111A and B-1A initial orders (263 and 240 respectively) were sized to replace all the B-52s "not -G" and "not -H" - that is around 400 C-D-E-F left by 1965 before Vietnam attrited them even further.
Yet the few FB-111A (76) and the none B-1A (0) procured finally left the old BUFFs not replaced by 1970 nor 1975 nor 1980.

How did SAC took that massive loss ? Was it really a major issue ?

I also wonder - did anybody tried to bring back a "min-mod" B-58B in 1962, with only the two basic modifications - stretched fuselage and different J79s found on F-104G or F-4J ?
 
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The FB-111A was also much, much less a crew-killer than the B-58.

It dawned on me the other day that the production run of FB-111A (76) was smaller than the Hustler itself (116) !

Both FB-111A and B-1A initial orders (263 and 240 respectively) were sized to replace all the B-52s

1st point: (stealing from myself elsewhere)

After the B-58 became operational, there were 17 lost over 10 years. One was destroyed in a taxiing incident and two were lost at Paris airshows. Of those, one was while it was performing aerobatic maneuvers at low altitudes and one was lost on approach when the pilot got behind the power curve at low altitude, something critical for all pure deltas. Even including those unique accidents, that works out to a loss rate of 1.7 per year over 10 years (1.4 if we don't count those three). The B-47, for comparison, had 28 fatal accidents in just one operational year.

2nd point: There was a reason for that. Once the decision was made to proceed with the B-1, there was no reason for the FB-111 to remain in production, the former could easily handle the latter's missions. It's no accident that the production program was curtailed the same year the decision to move out on B-1 was made.

No one, even McNamara, considered the FB-111 a B-52 replacement. He saw it serving alongside a fleet of upgraded B-52s as a medium range bomber. That was one of the reasons he wanted the B-58 killed, to create an additional need for the FB-111 to fill.
 
Cost of B-58 Vs B-52 (Hijacked (without preliminary approval) from the B-21 thread) :

Each B-52 wing had 15 "Unit Equipped" (Air Force jargon, I don't know what it means), while each B-58 wing had 39 UE aircraft. One time acquisition cost of a B-58 was 2.46 times that of a B-52 in constant dollars. If you threw in planned tanker support for both but didn't count the four GAM-72 decoys usually acquired with each B-52, the ratio was still 2.28 in the B-52's favor. However, the the Annual O&M and personnel costs for each B-52 was 17% higher than the B-58 and those were recurring costs. Put another way, for the cost of operating 66 B-52s you could operate 78 B-58s.
With a crew of three vs. four in the buff, the B-58 is more expensive on a per-person basis. That is interesting.

Regarding why the B-58 went away, originally Robert McNamara wanted it gone by mid 1970 (extended by him in 1966 to mid 1971) partly to crate a need to be filled by his beleoved F-111 (the FB-111 variant).
Oh, come on.

The B-58 was only supersonic at high altitude, which by the mid-1960s was already suicidal. That left it flying penetration missions at speeds only slightly faster than the buff and with much shorter range when doing so. McNamara didn't kill it because he "loved" the F-111, he killed it because it no longer had a credible mission - a buff blasting its way into the SU with SRAM at M0.85 was far more survivable than a B-58 with a pod doing so at M0.95.

The FB-111 had a significantly higher performance at low altitude, did so from a twin-jet airframe that cost much less to maintain and operate, and could be easily forward deployed. Of course, that is not a direct replacement for a US-based fleet, which is why the B-1 was developed - it was literally defined as an aircraft with the performance of the B-58 at high altitude, the F-111 at low altitude, and the same range as the B-52 at any altitude.

It's not that the mission didn't exist, it was that the B-58 couldn't credibly fulfill it.
During the time period we're talking about, which is not today, the BUFF had a crew of six, not four. Even today I believe there are still five crew stations. Crew size wasn't the only determinant of the relative cost differential, however. Anyway, we don't pay for bombers on a per person basis, but on a per plane basis. If we stuffed five more people in a B-52 that wouldn't reduce its operational cost by half.

Granted the B-58 was supersonic at high altitudes, but an aircraft that can sustain M2 at altitude is going to less vulnerable than one that peaks @ M .84. The contract for the development of SRAM was not awarded until the year after McNamara announced he was killing the B-58.

But then everyone transitioned to low level operations for some missions. Although I can't find hard numbers for both, most of what I've read was that the B-58 was much faster at low altitude, not slightly. On one particular exercise, a B-58 flew a mission that included two hours of M .92 flight at or below 500 feet. Also, the B-58 handled low altitude turbulence better than the BUFF due to its lower drag and rigid rather than flexible wing. Did the FB-111 have better performance than the B-58 at low altitude? Probably, when just carrying weapons internally. But the question remains was that improvement enough for the nuclear mission to justify the costs of development and procurement relative to an asset in being? One thing learned over the years was that once you hit M .85-.9 on the deck increasing speed to M 1.2 doesn't buy that much more survivability, which is why later operations with the F-111 (and the B-1B for that matter) didn't normally do supersonic on the deck.

Regarding McNamara, he made no bones about wanting more F-111s (remember he even tried to get USAF to buy it as their F-106 replacement) and in 1965 he directed the B-58 be retired in the 2nd half of 1970, the need to fill that gap would be handled by the FB-111 he wanted developed. His vision of the bomber force was hundreds of FB-111s and updated B-52s. He limited AMSA work to studies and component development. He wasn't going to let AMSA (which would eliminate the need for the FB-111) come to fruition. One of his last acts as SECDEF was to block AMSA program funding in 1968. Once the B-1A was authorized, the orders for FB-111 were cut off as the B-1A could fill that role (B-1A would have also retired the B-58, had it remained in service).
 
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Sec defs come and go and the usaf wanted the amsa and not the fb111. The usaf was able to keep amsa alive despite the sec def. Eventually the fb111 was bought as an interim until the b1 was ready... A paltry 76. But of course we all know Jimmy Carter. But the usaf still managed to keep the amsa now the b1 going with additional test flights. I find it interesting that to be an aviation enthusiast means also needing to be a political expert!
 
Sec defs come and go and the usaf wanted the amsa and not the fb111. The usaf was able to keep amsa alive despite the sec def. Eventually the fb111 was bought as an interim until the b1 was ready... A paltry 76. But of course we all know Jimmy Carter. But the usaf still managed to keep the amsa now the b1 going with additional test flights. I find it interesting that to be an aviation enthusiast means also needing to be a political expert!

Basically, once the B-1A program was a go, the need for the FB-111 evaporated. So orders beyond those that were already contacted for were canceled,; that's why the FB-111 total was so low. If Humphrey had won the election, I'd wager you'd see no B-1s, but possibly more FB-111s
 
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Regarding McNamara, he made no bones about wanting more F-111s (remember he even tried to get USAF to buy it as their F-106 replacement) and in 1965 he directed the B-58 be retired in the 2nd half of 1970, the need to fill that gap would be handled by the FB-111 he wanted developed. His vision of the bomber force was hundreds of FB-111s and updated B-52s. He limited AMSA work to studies and component development. He wasn't going to let AMSA (which would eliminate the need for the FB-111) come to fruition. One of his last acts as SECDEF was to block AMSA program funding in 1968. Once the B-1A was authorized, the orders for FB-111 were cut off as the B-1A could fill that role (B-1A would have also retired the B-58, had it remained in service).
Or one can make the argument that a mid rang supersonic is a lot more cost effective then a long range one.
 
This is the B-58 called "Snoopy" which made the transition between the canned F-108 Rapier and the YF-12. It tested the monster radar AN/ASG-18 and the AIM-47 Falcon missile.
 
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110. Memorandum of Conference with the President, and Department of Defense and NSC Leaders.1

Washington, November 28, 1958, 8:45 a.m.

The purpose of this meeting was to brief the President on the status of the Department of Defense budget request for FY 1960. The presentation was delivered by Secretary McElroy.

Manned Bombers—In the manned bomber field, production of the B–52G is being stepped up to five or six planes per month. This is being done because “the B–47 is undergoing fatigue.” One squadron of B–52s replaces two squadrons of B–47s.

Mr. McElroy went on to say that the Department of Defense considered cutting back B–58s and actually is planning to buy only three a month. Some procurement of this aircraft is considered justified since its speed of mach 2 will be a great advantage, and a limited number of these going in against Soviet defenders can open the way for the B–47s and B–52s.

Here the President interposed the question of why we produce B–58s along with more B–52s. He concurs with the policy of introducing a few new high performance aircraft for psychological purposes, but he questions the retention of TITAN, ATLAS, B–52s and B–58s. He voiced the question, “How many times do we have to destroy Russia?” This question, though rhetorical, was partially answered by General Twining when he stated that the total wings in the active Air Force go down. He further specified that the B–58 may be able to replace the F–108.



 
Sec defs come and go and the usaf wanted the amsa and not the fb111. The usaf was able to keep amsa alive despite the sec def. Eventually the fb111 was bought as an interim until the b1 was ready... A paltry 76. But of course we all know Jimmy Carter. But the usaf still managed to keep the amsa now the b1 going with additional test flights. I find it interesting that to be an aviation enthusiast means also needing to be a political expert!
President Carter spent a boatload of Classified money on Nuclear programs and the R and D for the nascent Stealth B-2--****** And money for the development of the F-117 Nighthawk-- PRESIDENT Jimmy Carter was a pro-defense guy who got lost listening to too many DEMS who hated Advanced DOD projects.
 
Now since the B-58A was used as a launch aircraft for the High Virgo air-launched rocket which helped pave the way for the Douglas AGM-48 Skybolt ALBM it made me wonder if the Hustler was considered as a carrier for the Skybolt?
 
I read here and there that the Hustler had dangerous behavior in an engine-out scenario at high speed but here is the correct depiction of it:

With the installation of the “Triple Redundant Yaw Damper” system, crews were once again allowed to fly at Mach 2. Colonel Al Dugard, an Instructor pilot in the B-58 would normally cut an outboard engine at Mach-2 to show the student pilot that it was a safe operation.

Extracted from the link below, as suggested by @sienar here

 
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Now since the B-58A was used as a launch aircraft for the High Virgo air-launched rocket which helped pave the way for the Douglas AGM-48 Skybolt ALBM it made me wonder if the Hustler was considered as a carrier for the Skybolt?
Yes it was - the B-58B at least.
 

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