So now U.S.'s climate envoy USSen Kerry has waded in, seems "a bit" outside his remit. He does carry a large stockpile of weapons grade boredom though.

I sort of understand the impetus of putting this thing behind both administrations as quickly as possible but I'd vastly prefer any corrective measures to be better thought out than the actions that led to this situation, being clear about the purpose but taking one's time where one can. The French might be happy to put quite a lot of work in considering how co-operation might be improved overall, not just with regard to AUKUS but also EU's common defense angle and beyond. Now Macron sees and opening, is unsure of how long this lasts and it's a bit of bilateral this and that in a bid to position France as the pivotal continental European power.

I have a suspicion that the original mess owes a whole lot to (if not is entirely down to) U.K.'s "Global Britain" effort which really is more of an opportunistic brand in search of substance (trying to construct a half-way coherent whole of admiral Radakin's descriptions, for instance) than a policy governed by principle or measured strategy. Vacillating between "not the EU" and glomming a carrier group-ish on the U.S. Navy sailing the seven seas, the line between performative and truly perfidious pugilism in the haste for "wins" has been crossed and for no good reason as far as everyone else's interests are concerned. The recognition of that, I believe, is behind the French omitting the U.K. from immediate diplomatic measures and demands for explanations; the ramifications must vary according to how responsive or chaotic an agent is.

Perhaps the Shortfin Barracuda deal's impact might've been somewhat lost on Biden considering only the financials: While the deal's overall value was more than half of France's 2021 defense budget, it only came to 1/20th of the U.S.'s (and spread out over many years as well). A POTUS, should she/he feel so inclined, has a lot on her/his plate after all. The core issue, though, is trust - something that undergirds democracy, the fungibility of money and defense agreements - and protecting and enforcing that is no mean feat of which calculations about capabilities are just a constituent part.
Quite a lot of angst, if not butthurt in this.

So Spiffing Boris persuaded Joe, and the aussies, to get into bed with him(he does have some previous on this score) and knocked up a quick nuke boat or 8, in one night?

I think, that maybe, the fact that the aussies couldnt get all the bits they wanted into a diesel boat, no matter how they asked, made them realise they needed a Nuke, and the french nuke needs refuelling, while the US and British boats dont.

Also France is pretty non-interventionist, especially with China, which is exactly the opposite of what Aus was looking for.

Also UK broke free of EU, and is now free to do what it wants, including deals with US and Aus, at the drop of a hat. Sorry about that.
99 percent of the point of this deal for the Australian is the alliance with the US.
The UK will be a welcome fellow traveler from an Australian perspective and I’m sure there was a be considerable amount of technological and officer exchange etc. (especially initially) though probably much less than there will be with the US (the Australians will want and need as much exposure and access to nuclear boats and their operation, and to gain from the UKs experience of having such a close but very much junior partnership with the US in this area). Just as the French ultimately got declined in favour of the US the Australians would have have zero interest in this arrangement if it wasn’t focused on the US; the UK’s involvement is a nice little extra nostalgic bonus from an Australian perspective but is likely of increasingly marginal significance (particularly medium to long term once the Australians have built up their own experience and expertise).
And rest assured the UK’s involvement is likely to have barely registered with and have relatively little impact on China.

And in the context of claims being made here it is important to note that Brexit had virtually zero impact on the UKs ability to enter (or not enter) into this arrangement.
It could have done this if it was still a member of the EU, EU membership was not a same significant impediment to doing such a arrangement.The French did their deal with the Australians while being a member of the EU and could have done a deal for nuclear instead conventional subs irrespective of their EU membership.
Presenting this deal as some kind of Brexit dividend is utterly counter-factual.
 
"very much junior" partnership with the US. Junior certainly but as this book will confirm the "very much" is not so correct.
 

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Interesting piece with some Indian perspective on the situation in the Indian Ocean re AUKUS with some relevant related background.
 

Interesting piece with some Indian perspective on the situation in the Indian Ocean re AUKUS with some relevant related background.
Counterpoint:
 
I don't think we will ever know the background to how Aukus was built up (at least not until the official files are released in 100 years - if then).
We don't know whether the RAN approached Radakin alone or if they had approached his US counterpart at the same time. The feeling from the UK seems to be that Whitehall wants to minimise Radakin's role, but ultimately promoting him CDS as a reward (maybe he'll get a BAE Systems directorship when he retires?). But that seems to imply the government took the idea and ran with it - we know the Johnson government and how it operates, it 100% chimed with the Defence White Paper EoS outlook and enabled a lot of existing collaborations to be hung off the Aukus coathanger. It provides an element of post-Brexit 'boost' for public consumption but its not directly relevant to Brexit, though there is no doubt it has poisoned what are already poor French relations due to Brexit negotiations. The French claim Britain was just being opportunistic and in this they are probably correct.
 

Interesting piece with some Indian perspective on the situation in the Indian Ocean re AUKUS with some relevant related background.
Counterpoint:
The Indian pov vs the Singaporean. Interesting idea that India might approach France for SSNs. They already have experience running nuke boats.
 
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I'll repeat my earlier point, US members, and europeans, seem to know that the UK is merely a bedwarmer for this deal. Exactly how you know this, none of you can explain. Maybe we should all just wait and see. But as a claim to foresight, I'll just point out, that most US companies have a business in CONUS, and then ROW. Aus would clearly belong in the second bit, for which many US companies have very little interest.....So 8 subs would be pocket change to the US sub manufacturer, but mana from heaven for BAE.....just a thought.
 
Truth is we don't know, we'll have to wait for 18 months or more before we know what Australia intends to do, we might not even see much in terms of practical effects clearly linked to Aukus in that time. We could have 800 pages of speculation on this thread by then at this rate. We just need to chill and sit tight.
 
Thread re-openned. Stay on topic or deal with the consequences. Off topic posts will be deleted.
 
Not designed to be in any way exclusive..... so Russia, China, North Korea and Iran can all join? Brilliant. That's world peace sorted then. Does nobody proof-read these releases?

"Not designed to exclude our strategic partners" might be more on message perhaps?
 
Based just on that above article, it's very vague. Canada, New Zealand and Japan mentioned by name but whether these are the only "like-minded" candidates remains open. Am I to understand that HEU reactors/SSNs are offered to all qualifying members?
 
Based just on that above article, it's very vague. Canada, New Zealand and Japan mentioned by name but whether these are the only "like-minded" candidates remains open. Am I to understand that HEU reactors/SSNs are offered to all qualifying members?
SSNs would appear to be tricky - but not an absolute barrier. New Zealand legislation prohibits nuclear powered or armed vessels in its waters (though not land-based power generation - but that's another story, and we're rather prone to earthquakes).

Both the US and Australia will have at least the precedent of the breakdown of ANZUS over this issue to guide them.

However, there are strong and long-lasting military ties with Australia (look up ANZAC) and in fact, as something of an historical artifact, there's a clause in the Australian constitution that allows NZ to become one or two new states. I can't see anything then that would keep us out of AUKUS as it's conceived as being not exclusively military but also, as it is stated to be, economic, political and cultural. SSNs are only something that is made possible by the treaty, not necessary, so if Australian SSNs don't call at NZ ports, it's hardly a deal breaker. Visits by USN warships have not occurred because they have a blanket 'neither confirm nor deny' policy and a visit would be an implicit denial.

The only real problem I see is that if NZ, Canada, India and Japan do join, an attempt to pronounce the resulting acronym might summon Cthulhu. R'lyeh is not that far to the East.
 
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There is some historical precedence, the US offered the Netherlands and Italy SSN technology in the late 1950s, neither took forward their Skate-class clones but it could have become reality. Interestingly Friedman in his Cold War British subs book states that its unclear from surviving sources whether France was also included in the offer.
Since the 50s the options to gain access to US nuclear technology shrank - proliferation fears, political unwillingness, other distractions like Vietnam then détente, and then the end of the cold war plus the sheer costs and realistic assessments that most NATO nations didn't need SSNs.
The original 1957 deal with the UK included fuel, even the Polaris deal supplied enough fuel for the Resolutions until at least 1980.

So there is no reason why the US wouldn't replicate these deals with other long-term allies, with some caveats;
- sufficient excess fuel
- commercial secrecy, if Hyundai/Mitsubishi got their hands on reactor technology would SK and Japan be able to eventually build their own SSNs without any US oversight and maybe even offer such technology on the open market for export?

It could prove destabilising but presumably China could crank out more SSNs relatively easily if it needed too. Would Russia and China begin offering export SSNs? Probably not likely given their customer base is relatively short of cash and expertise to operate such submarines. But nations like India are going to want a larger slice of the SSN pie to keep up with the Joneses, either that means Russian tech that they know already or going to Washington.
 
I don't think AUKUS* membership is necessarily predicated on a SSN buy, it is far more of a global defence alignment (I was tempted to use axis but that has some worrisome connotations), something of a NATO+ without the geographical strictures. The door has certainly been opened to a broader export of SSNs by the treaty though. Live in interesting times indeed!

*We're gonna need a bigger acronym!
 
Based just on that above article, it's very vague. Canada, New Zealand and Japan mentioned by name but whether these are the only "like-minded" candidates remains open. Am I to understand that HEU reactors/SSNs are offered to all qualifying members?
ROK is likely on the list too.
It’s possible, but I fear the continual sparring between SK and Japan would mitigate against it. Then again, Turkey and Greece are both in the NATO alliance…
 
aaaa
I don't think AUKUS* membership is necessarily predicated on a SSN buy, it is far more of a global defence alignment (I was tempted to use axis but that has some worrisome connotations), something of a NATO+ without the geographical strictures. The door has certainly been opened to a broader export of SSNs by the treaty though. Live in interesting times indeed!

*We're gonna need a bigger acronym!
JAUKUSSK
 
aaaa
I don't think AUKUS* membership is necessarily predicated on a SSN buy, it is far more of a global defence alignment (I was tempted to use axis but that has some worrisome connotations), something of a NATO+ without the geographical strictures. The door has certainly been opened to a broader export of SSNs by the treaty though. Live in interesting times indeed!

*We're gonna need a bigger acronym!
JAUKUSSK
ABC

Anyone but China.....
 
As we say in french "Votre traité, vous pouvez vous le mettre AUKUS." (drats, I had said I was staying out of this... it didn't lasted long.)
 
I don't think AUKUS* membership is necessarily predicated on a SSN buy, it is far more of a global defence alignment (I was tempted to use axis but that has some worrisome connotations), something of a NATO+ without the geographical strictures. The door has certainly been opened to a broader export of SSNs by the treaty though. Live in interesting times indeed!

*We're gonna need a bigger acronym!
Axis of Democracy and Honourable Defence (ADHD)? Rebel Alliance? Pooh's Life Matters. Yellow Umbrella Corporation.

I have some The Walking Dead related suggestions too.
 
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I don't think AUKUS* membership is necessarily predicated on a SSN buy, it is far more of a global defence alignment
Indeed - people need to remember that the SSN deal is under the aegis of AUKUS but is not necessarily a core criteria/condition of.

As for extra members, I am sure the likes of Japan, Sth Korea and even India are possibilities though to be honest I doubt anyone else will join. If one wanted something broader in the region they might as well re-invigorate the old Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). That said though, if one is looking at containing China, it becomes challenging because a lot of countries also have strong economic reliance on China and are also too small to have much impact either way.

And let's give the "silly acronym" game a break.
 
... wikileaks or Snowden ...

Both sources which I'd approach with extreme prejudice, for reasons that are better discussed (at least historically, in depth) elsewhere.

But I'm sure it's universally acknowledged (at least outside the professional disinformation sphere's constant barrage) that both Assange and Snowden can never in a million years claim to have redressed even a significant fraction of the amount of damage they themselves have caused. For a good while now at least (and most likely from the beginning) the veracity and claimed motivation of their actions have been completely undermined and corrupted by their associations.

There's bound to be some material that predates the announcement. If the origin story of AUKUS is to be taken at face value, the whole thing was known only to a handful of people for a relatively short period so likely sources are few and far between - a common safeguard in such a case in a highly classified setting is to make each individual copy of any document (paper or otherwise) identifiable in case any are found in improper hands. Any communication on the issue would be handled personally or by properly secured channels. Whether the track record of some of the original participants exemplifies such care is another matter, in the recent past there have been examples of information security malpractice in elected office so egregious that it can be termed "stochastic leaking". But in this case the intent, in this highly selective group, would have to be to telegraph the leaderships of China and Russia specifically before the announcement. To what end? All the actual operative and capability changes with AUKUS are prospective, there's nothing actually adversarially actionable in the announcement itself, nor a foreknowledge of it. This would be just terrible tradecraft, burning a source at the highest levels basically for nothing.

Whatever the date on the supposedly leaked document is also automatically suspect if it's been posted online only after the announcement. These kinds of actors have routinely altered their documents and sometimes just outright fabricated them, though this kind of a tactic works best only in moderation; the "leaks" of "Guccifer 2" are particularly notorious in this regard but then again the GRU tends to work fast and loose. For the likes of Wikileaks and Snowden to appear useful and relevant (approaching a matter of survival for them) they need at least seem to somehow constantly hover "above the common knowledge"; AUKUS fits the bill and in terms of trying to sow distrust and cause chaos with their fellow travelers' adversaries, if all else fails, "flood the zone with s**t" as one notorious operative has colorfully put it.

So I can't imagine what it would currently take for me to deal with Wikileaks or Snowden associated material voluntarily or directly, here or elsewhere.

-

Edit: I also wouldn't be surprised if the acronym AUKUS, or a similar idea, had come up in some otherwise unrelated instance before.
 
Both Snowden and Wikileaks published information that was leaked (or taken in Snowden's case) from US govt sources prior to 2017. If they were fabrications, the US govt would have dismissed them as such long ago, as such there's no reason to doubt them.

As I said, I'm "pretty sure I've seen an image", I may be mistaken or misremembering though.
 
A critical analysis in french (yes, there is some) denouncing France's lack of clear commitments on the strategic chess board (involves New Caledonia possible drift into the Chinese sphere of influence) :

 
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Based just on that above article, it's very vague. Canada, New Zealand and Japan mentioned by name but whether these are the only "like-minded" candidates remains open. Am I to understand that HEU reactors/SSNs are offered to all qualifying members?
ROK is likely on the list too.
It’s possible, but I fear the continual sparring between SK and Japan would mitigate against it. Then again, Turkey and Greece are both in the NATO alliance…
It's SK causing the problems, especially the current occupant of the Blue House. There won't be an Indo-Pacific version of NATO because the politics of the region won't support such an organisation. ASEAN is the benchmark organisation and its all about negotiation and comprise. There is a defence sub component of ASEAN, and ADMM & ADMM+ groups but again they're not a pact or treaty group. Even the FPDA which comprises of UK, Australia, NZ, Singapore and Malaysia, only states that the members will consult with each other in the event of an attack on Singapore or Malaysia by a third party. That was formed in the 1960s to protect the two nations from the then aggressive Indonesia.

WRT the US passing on its SSN technology to third parties, both the UK and Australia are special cases and any other countries will not be given access to the technology. Not the other two FVEY partners and especially not any non FVEY partners. The politics of it would be horrendous. Claims that in the 1950s the US offered SSN technology to both the Dutch and Italians I find somewhat astounding because when there was severe opposition to them sharing it with the UK despite the special relationship. Don't forget they refused to share the nuclear weapons technology after WW2 despite the very substantial UK investment of treasure, personnel, resources and the fact that without the UK the US wouldn't have had a viable until possibly 1947 or later.

WRT to this ABC article it's interesting but both Canada and NZ are unreliable in their defence spending commitments and NZ governments especially have hollowed out NZDF due to starving it of funding and resources. One major Party (National) because of its ideological aversion to spending money on defence; and the major Party (Labour) other because of its ideological aversion to defence. Labour under Helen Clark is the Party that scrapped the RNZAF Air Combat Force in 2000, tried to defang the P-3K Orions, tried to scrap the RNZN frigates. If NZ is to be included in an expanded AUKUS then it has to sign a binding agreement that it will increase its defence to a minimum of 2% GDP annually and that it will increase its defence depth and capabilities. If they don't Kiwi pollies (politicians) will backslide into bad habits again. I know their stingy habits far to well.

 
Paul Buchanan, a NZ political scientist and consultant (https://36th-parallel.com/), gives a broad summary, starting with a 'for dummies' description of the submarines and then an examination of what it means in terms of a new Cold War with China and why most regional states have either welcomed or muted their criticism of the treaty.


The strategy behind AUKUS is simple: make it much harder and far more costly for the PLAN to push its reach beyond the mythical “first island chain” that extends out beyond Japan to the Aleutians in the North and the Philippines and Borneo to the Southeast, encompassing all of the East China and South China Seas and the straits connecting them and the Pacific. The second island chain, which extends from Japan through Guam to Papua New Guinea, has already been mapped by PLAN strategic planners, who have been considering forward basing rights in places like the Solomons, Fiji and, much further to the West, ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, extending to the current PLAN base in Djibouti. The Chinese concern with maintaining a permanent maritime presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean is justified: over 95 percent of its oil imports and 80 percent of its trade with Europe, the Middle East and Africa cross the Indian Ocean and pass through the Strait of Malacca. PLAN power projection to the outermost island chain, extending from the Aleutians through Hawai’i to New Zealand, is at this point an aspirational target superseded by the drive to develop a PLAN Indian Ocean fleet while consolidating dominance over the first two island chains.

The cartographic aspect of China's thinking is interesting. We've heard of the 'nine-dash-line' claimed in the South China Sea. This is placed within the 'three-island-chain' schema.

As an aside, it reminds me of my (long ago) architectural education when I studied traditional Chinese concepts of spatiality. The principle of concentric zones and walls/lines is foundational and is reflected in city design and concepts of empire and why China referred to itself as 'the middle kingdom' ('central' is a better translation).

The first image is of the three island chain. The second shows the growth of (mediaeval on Western time scale) Beijing with concentric city walls about the imperial palace complex - the 'Forbidden City', the second illustrates the metaphysical hierarchy of courts within the Forbidden City with the approach to the throne carefully staged and controlled through gated walls and courts. The third shows modern Beijing where the old schema is still clear.

I remember seeing a cartoon years ago of negotiators leaving a meeting and one says to another, 'The problem is that we think we're playing chess while they think they're playing poker'. Coupled with the Belt and Road Initiative, and China's investment in infrastructure for Pacific Island and African nations (which leaves them deep in debt to China), this seems to suggest that China is thinking in terms of architecture - constructing rigid hierarchical defensive structures.
 

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A critical analysis in french (yes, there is some) denouncing France's lack of clear commitments on the strategic chess board (involves New Caledonia possible drift into the Chinese sphere of influence) :

A very French perspective in that the whole issue of Pacific stability is convoluted with how France is present there; even if New Caledonians favor independence it is doubtful that should automatically signify some sort of involuntary, hapless drift towards Chinese interests as if the islanders lack a will of their own or would be "abandoned to their fate" by their other neighbors.

Paul Buchanan, a NZ political scientist and consultant (https://36th-parallel.com/), gives a broad summary, starting with a 'for dummies' description of the submarines and then an examination of what it means in terms of a new Cold War with China and why most regional states have either welcomed or muted their criticism of the treaty.

Overall a very well considered opinion - I particularly liked the explicit juxtaposition of regional dominance and hegemony - but perhaps a little bit too relaxed for my tastes in how plum a position it views New Zealand as being in. Having witnessed some of the trials and tribulations of political scientist, professor Anne-Marie Brady (the kinds of vicarious acquaintances one makes in following the aspirations of the global reactionaries and authoritarians over the past decade or two), for example, the Chinese (and those merely conscious of their potential influence but not as sure-footed in their interests) haven't exactly limited themselves to soft power means even along the outermost island chain of their envisioned imperial architecture of influence.
 
@UpForce : you are absolutely right and I do not completely share the opinions expressed there. But the way those thoughts are articulated have some grounds for us here as they resonate with French's elite ideologies and the way Chinese influence is at play in the Pacific.
It could be expected for a newly independent New Caledonia to seek for some alliance just like other Pacific nations have done. And China has played that partition rather well so far.
One thing the French gov could have done to counter such risks and weight in the balance for the referendum for example could have been to open a large Naval base, something that could also have put some momentum to the NG offer. Such base would have been an asset in a time of conflicts for France and its allies for a relatively modest investment. Instead, that what the situation is:

 
 
 

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