Alternate Radar System for the M247 Sergeant York?

[Christopher Wang]

Among the many reasons for the failure of the problematic Ford Aerospace M247 Sergeant York was the unreliability of its tracking radar system.


The M247 Sergeant York's tracking radar was a modified version of the Westinghouse AN/APG-66 from the F-16 Fighting Falcon (see below).

Westinghouse AN/APG-66

Unfortunately, the AN/APG-66 derived tracking radar proved to be a troublesome liability for the M247 Sergeant York. During testing, it demonstrated considerable problems with ground clutter and it was unable to distinguish between helicopters and trees. When the guns were pointed upward to fire on high-angle targets, the barrels projected into the radar's line of sight and further confused the system. The radar had problems locking onto its targets and its reaction time was too slow against both hovering helicopters (10 to 11 seconds) and high-speed targets (11 to 19 seconds). The radar's reliability problems were so bad that the testers even had to "cheat" by adding four radar reflectors to the target drone.

According to McNaugher (1989), the Pentagon's Operational Test and Evaluation Office or OT&E concluded that the gun could perform the mission as originally specified, but the tests also showed that the system had considerable reliability problems, many as the result of trying to adapt a radar system developed for aircraft to the ground role (pp. 102-104).

Source: McNaugher, T. (1989). New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle. Brookings Institution Press.

Question: Given the unreliability of the Westinghouse AN/APG-66 derived tracking radar, was any thought given towards providing an alternate radar system for the M247 Sergeant York?

 

[GruntFox]

Part of the problem was that they were working on the problems (i.e. replacing 3k PSI hydraulics with 5k PSI variants due to the 3k PSI units not being up to the task they were saddled with, debugging the FCS system, that sort of thing), but several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name showed up in the newspapers that sank it.

Much like how the AH-56 was killed by changing design philosophies (demanding two turbines instead of one, for example) and the USAF being itself just as the next round of fixes were being implemented.

 

[Christopher Wang]

Part of the problem was that they were working on the problems (i.e. replacing 3k PSI hydraulics with 5k PSI variants due to the 3k PSI units not being up to the task they were saddled with, debugging the FCS system, that sort of thing), but several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name showed up in the newspapers that sank it.

Much like how the AH-56 was killed by changing design philosophies (demanding two turbines instead of one, for example) and the USAF being itself just as the next round of fixes were being implemented.

What do you mean by "several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name"?

Is it possible that with more time to fix the problems, the M247 Sergeant York could have been made workable until a suitable replacement arrives?

 

[Pioneer]

Part of the problem was that they were working on the problems (i.e. replacing 3k PSI hydraulics with 5k PSI variants due to the 3k PSI units not being up to the task they were saddled with, debugging the FCS system, that sort of thing), but several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name showed up in the newspapers that sank it.

Much like how the AH-56 was killed by changing design philosophies (demanding two turbines instead of one, for example) and the USAF being itself just as the next round of fixes were being implemented.

What do you mean by "several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name"?

Is it possible that with more time to fix the problems, the M247 Sergeant York could have been made workable until a suitable replacement arrives?

In all due respect, would you put all that time and money into fixing a adhoc system, only to wait and develop a "suitable replacement"?

One should probably also appreciate that the Sgt York Operational Requirement was supposedly important because of a certainty that war between U.S. and Soviet Union was imminent (going by the generals and the Reagan administration)

Regards
Pioneer

 

[GruntFox]

Part of the problem was that they were working on the problems (i.e. replacing 3k PSI hydraulics with 5k PSI variants due to the 3k PSI units not being up to the task they were saddled with, debugging the FCS system, that sort of thing), but several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name showed up in the newspapers that sank it.

Much like how the AH-56 was killed by changing design philosophies (demanding two turbines instead of one, for example) and the USAF being itself just as the next round of fixes were being implemented.

What do you mean by "several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name"?

Is it possible that with more time to fix the problems, the M247 Sergeant York could have been made workable until a suitable replacement arrives?

Well, there are two pieces that really killed the program, one by The Atlantic Monthly being the biggest one, while The New York Times had a similarly scathing but added the 'its necessary' to its piece.

I mean, the AH-56 was just about fixed when the call came down to kill the program, and from what I've read they were about to implement the changes for the production prototypes when the call came down.

Part of the problem was that they were working on the problems (i.e. replacing 3k PSI hydraulics with 5k PSI variants due to the 3k PSI units not being up to the task they were saddled with, debugging the FCS system, that sort of thing), but several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name showed up in the newspapers that sank it.

Much like how the AH-56 was killed by changing design philosophies (demanding two turbines instead of one, for example) and the USAF being itself just as the next round of fixes were being implemented.

What do you mean by "several hit-pieces-all-but-in-name"?

Is it possible that with more time to fix the problems, the M247 Sergeant York could have been made workable until a suitable replacement arrives?

In all due respect, would you put all that time and money into fixing a adhoc system, only to wait and develop a "suitable replacement"?

One should probably also appreciate that the Sgt York Operational Requirement was supposedly important because of a certainty that war between U.S. and Soviet Union was imminent (going by the generals and the Reagan administration)

Regards
Pioneer

You also forget that outside of the B-17, no US military procurement program was under budget and on time. US procurement is always over budget. Period.

 

[Firefinder]

You also forget that outside of the B-17, no US military procurement program was under budget and on time. US procurement is always over budget. Period

Needs to be noted that even the B17 ended up needing a variety of fixes before it became the Iconic Fly Fortress of WW2.

Like it took them a long time to get the bottom turret to work properly.

So its even argueable that the B17 was on time and under budget.

 

[GruntFox]

You also forget that outside of the B-17, no US military procurement program was under budget and on time. US procurement is always over budget. Period

Needs to be noted that even the B17 ended up needing a variety of fixes before it became the Iconic Fly Fortress of WW2.

Like it took them a long time to get the bottom turret to work properly.

So its even argueable that the B17 was on time and under budget.

Well, for the initial production run, yeah, it was 'on time and under budget', but to get the iconic version that popular history remembers them as... it's over budget and over time. Though, in the B-17's case, it's probably boosted by Bomber Harris types inflating its reputation.

People keep forgetting that procurement isn't straight from paper to reality, more often than not it includes a lot of fixing and changes due to problems of that paper theory being applied to reality causes.

... like 3k PSI units being unable to work with the rapid multi-axial inputs that the Sgt York was designed (from the onset) to be standard procedure.

There are very good reasons that prototyping tends to be concept prototype -> production prototype -> initial production -> intermediate production -> final production...