Aircraft design cycles, and the future of US air dominance

[Sentinel36k]

I've been reading not only on the f-35 but the v-22, f-22, yf-23 etc. and I've ran across a few papers done on the increasing length of time it takes for new aircraft to go from concept to reality and I'd like to see what the forum thinks of this. It could be increasing overall complexity, new technology that isn't mature yet, or just politics. DARPA had a program that attempted to address this and compared the aircraft design cycle to the early computer industry (apples to oranges?) and how a major change in the industry allowed for a quick turn around of new components and how it could be applied to new manufacturing processes. There will be links to the papers in the future.

Sentinel

 

[F-14D]

Hi all! I've been doing some reading not only on the f-35 (and the many opinions of success or failure) but the v-22, f-22, yf-23 etc. and I've also ran across a few papers done on the increasing length of time it takes for new aircraft to go from concept to reality and I'd like to see what the forum thinks of this. I'm not sure what I feel is the cause for the longer time frames. It could be increasing overall complexity, new technology that isn't mature yet, or just politics I have no clue. DARPA had a program that if memory serves me right attempted to address this and compared the aircraft design cycle to the early computer industry (apples to oranges?) and how some major change in the industry allowed for a quick turn around of new components and how it could be applied to new manufacturing processes. Anyway I'd like to see what you think, cheers!

Sentinel
Who now almost regrets mentioning the f-35 :

In the case of the V-22 and F-22, part of the explanation rests in the leadership in Washington during a significant portion of their development. These two systems, along with many other- they just happen to be the most visible, were "triangulated". That is, while developing new weapons wasn't fashionable, it was not politically expedient to come right out and say so or to cancel programs that were the future of our defense (this didn't just apply to aircraft). So, the programs were allowed to proceed, but their development schedules were moved to the right so that the big ramp up in costs would occur after the 2000 election when it would be someone else's problem. As a result so many programs would spike in the early 2000s, instead of the spikes being more spread out as was the usual case, that it was referred to as the "oncoming train wreck". This would have occurred even if 9/11 hadn't occurred.

F-22 and V-22 had problems, definitely, but they also took as long as they did because the gov't wanted them to take as long as they did. Partly for the reasons above and partly simply to pretend it's not going to cost as much as it will by cutting the R&D budget in a given year. In the case of the V-22 there was also the fact that it had been on life support funded by the contractors for a number of years until Cheney stepped down. Unfortunately that has led us to accept these kind of times as normal. I believe that I recently read an article where Sikorsky was saying that if the S-97 was already flying and was ordered into production in 2018, they could deliver operational vehicles in 10 years.

Just my thoughts...

 

[gtg947h]

Government and industry (with very rare exceptions) have become extremely risk-averse, not just to life-safety issues (which is understandable) but to financial, technical, political, and image/PR as well. You wind up with expectations like:

- Costs are expected to be perfectly predicted years in advance.
- New products are expected come off the line in production-ready configuration, with no modification required.
- Everything is expected to work perfectly the very first time it's ever turned on.
- We use computers to design things, so we shouldn't have mistakes.
- Program schedules are defined assuming the above are true.

Programs aren't allowed to really get going until you have all the paperwork to prove the above items. Of course, anyone who has actually worked on programs like these knows better--things aren't going to work the first time, you will have changes, there will be unexpected delays, and so on. But politicians and the general public don't understand that (or willfully ignore it, if it suits their needs).

Of course, this results in everyone panicking over things that (to the knowledgable ones) are minor or expected issues.

Start going over budget? Well, time to cancel the project and start all over on a new one. Obviously that one won't go over budget. And when it does, cancel it and (maybe?) start over on a third. That's what we've been doing with reusable launch vehicle development post-Shuttle; I'm willint to bet that if we'd just committed all the money we've spent on making generation after generation of powerpoint spacecraft to actually building, testing, and debugging a single design, we'd have flying hardware.

Item fails the first time it's ever tried (or even in the first few tries)? Obviously the concept will never work and it was flawed from the beginning. We should cancel it and write it off forever, because if an all-up test doesn't work the first time it's tried, it never will.

Experience a routine or common failure in testing? The engineers are incompetent and the project is irrepairably broken--time to cancel it. Look at the flack Lockheed catches every time they find a crack on the F-35 fatigue test articles. Cracks are found on every fatigue test article ever made. If you don't find any it's time to worry--either you really overdesigned the airplane, or (more likely) you've set your test up wrong or aren't looking hard enough. But these faults are trumpeted in the press as critical flaws that could bring the entire program crashing to a halt.

And God forbid that your paperwork isn't in order. If you're working a government program, a staggering amount of time and money is spent to comply with non-technical government requirements and audits designed to esnure every penny is accounted for and that all the political mandates are followed to the letter. Certifying anything with the FAA basically requires you to duplicate everything you already do (tests, configuration tracking, etc.) all over again, in a format unique to the FAA. There are some cases where a tremendous amount of paperwork is required to "prove" that a given item or system will function as required and that the design is correct before it can be tested for credit, even when the test itself is low-risk and can easily be conducted to show compliance, because it's the paperwork that matters, not the actual performance.

 

[sferrin]

That post should be put on bronze plaques and hung around the necks of every politician in Washington.

I'd add to your post that in addition, the longer it takes us to take a project from concept to in service the less competent we become and the more likely the following project will take longer still.

 

[TomS]

I think one of the biggest problems in DoD procurement is the loss of in-house design expertise. For example, the Navy no longer does significant ship design work of its own, so it doesn't have a good understanding of the available design space and what the tradoffs actually cost. That's how we ended up with the DDG-1000 mess - the requirements people in OPNAV set their design objectives more or less in a vaccuum, without knowing that their signature requirements (for example) would lead to a certain increase in displacement or cost. And they can't get that info from the contractors until the bid process is underway. so there was a massive shock once the bids came in.

 

[bobbymike]

That post should be put on bronze plaques and hung around the necks of every politician in Washington.

I'd add to your post that in addition, the longer it takes us to take a project from concept to in service the less competent we become and the more likely the following project will take longer still.

And you have to add all the issues mentioned are driven by hysterical anti-military journalists many who don't understand weapon systems complexity and scream 'It will never work, it is a waste of money' followed by the interviews with teachers, social workers and nurses about how desparate things are for the nation's downtrodden.

 

[Sentinel36k]

The Rand corp. has looked into these issues a number of times, the reads are a bit long but it echos what Gtg posted.

Sentinel

 

[GTX]

Government and industry (with very rare exceptions) have become extremely risk-averse, not just to life-safety issues (which is understandable) but to financial, technical, political, and image/PR as well.

l agree fully with everything said in this post, especially this.

Experience a routine or common failure in testing? The engineers are incompetent and the project is irrepairably broken--time to cancel it. Look at the flack Lockheed catches every time they find a crack on the F-35 fatigue test articles. Cracks are found on every fatigue test article ever made. If you don't find any it's time to worry--either you really overdesigned the airplane, or (more likely) you've set your test up wrong or aren't looking hard enough. But these faults are trumpeted in the press as critical flaws that could bring the entire program crashing to a halt.

Almost word for word what Gen Bogdan stated during a meeting last week when referring to some of the testing occurring on both the F-35 and F-135.

 

[Sentinel36k]

Process Over Platforms: A Paradigm Shift in Acquisition Through Advanced Manufacturing (2013)
Found an intriguing paper. It discusses the increasing time required to develop and field
DOD systems, and the effect advanced manufacturing methods might have on programs in the future.

Sentinel

 

[Sentinel36k]

Sentinel

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It discusses the increasing time required to develop and field
DOD systems, and the effect advanced manufacturing methods might have on programs in the future.

Sentinel

What about the Dilbert Effect? Increases in efficiency brought about by technological advances are always exceeded by a simultaneous decrease in management efficiency.

 

[donnage99]

It isn't just all on the government's fault. The fault is mutual. Govt doesn't have full technical understanding of their requirements, set up a competition. Companies, in order to win, has to underbid and make unrealistic promises. The whole program is structured and managed around those optimistic visions, add in with the vast complexity of subcontractors of subcontractors now aday, when you encounter a problem in the design, the ripple effect becomes too great.

As for the f-35 program, I'm glad that it's picking up traction and hopes that the budget wars won't adversely effect its buys, but let's not sacrifice our maturity and intelligence and go down the fanbois route, pretend that it's all in the press fault. The program has the biggest delay and cost overrun in history not just because it's technically challenged, but also badly managed for reasons given in the first paragraph. Were the press igonorant alot of times during their coverage of this program? YES. However, in their defense, the press is critical of the flaws found during f-35 because the govt and contractor had PROMISED that with new developmental process, testing would find minimal flaws. The worst part wasn't that they lied, it's that they believed in it, and set up this concurrency bullshit that the tax payers are paying for today.

 

[fredymac]

"However, in their defense, the press is critical of the flaws found during f-35 because the govt and contractor had PROMISED that with new developmental process, testing would find minimal flaws."

Fine, but do you really think bias does not exist in "the press"? Thank Gore for the internet so we at least can go to the source to get the other side of the story with varying shades in-between. At least for those who are interested to expend a little effort.

My own take on the elongated development cycle is the ever growing scale and complexity of software. It permeates everything and they bind it all together so one part influences every other part. And in my own experience, software always finishes last. That's the technical side. The political/bureaucratic side is that "process" has been explosively magnified. I dimly recall reading that the specifications/contract for the Saturn V F-1 engine was just a few sheets of paper. Maybe a myth but how many forests would be cut to write up an equivalent contract today? Finally, as a people we have become intolerant of error. How many planes crashed during the development cycle of the century series fighters? What would happen if the sky was raining F-35's? Even if it meant cutting costs/time by 50%?

 

[sferrin]

It isn't just all on the government's fault. The fault is mutual. Govt doesn't have full technical understanding of their requirements, set up a competition. Companies, in order to win, has to underbid and make unrealistic promises. The whole program is structured and managed around those optimistic visions, add in with the vast complexity of subcontractors of subcontractors now aday, when you encounter a problem in the design, the ripple effect becomes too great.

It's the government that creates the conditions that force companies to believe they HAVE to put forth overly optimistic plans. If one company paints a rosey picture and another says, "we're going to destroy a lot of parts and maybe crash a plane or two but we'll save you a few years and $50 million" guess who will get the contract. Not the guy who had "crash" in his proposal.

 

[DrRansom]

I think that the contractors should bear some of the blame, contractors are very willing to not disclose the extent of a programs difficulties nor do contractors provide reliable estimates of development. For example, the F-35 program did not keep the DoD informed of its current status through the late 2000s. If the DoD knew that the F-35 was going to reach partial IOC in 2017 and require another 5 years to reach full operational status, then I find it likely that the F-22 would have been continued to be built.

If we take some complaints here literally, the DoD needs to get the specifications correct and needs to have the technological expertise to both understand the program and to closely manage it, because the contractors will not do that themselves. In this case, why have contractors at all? If they are not sufficiently competent by themselves (and massive delays are a sign of incompetence), then they seem to add nothing to the defense industry.

As for the complaints about the media, that is a distraction. The program's success or failure exists outside of the media. What is occurring with negative F-35 press is a combination of the F-35's importance (it is the future of the USAF tactical fighters) and it's massive promises and underperformance. Consequently, there should be media investigations into the program, because it is important.

I would say that the problem is primarily the design cycle pace. A program start every 15 puts several major stresses on aircraft development.
1) Low program rate raises the importance of each fighter competition for companies and reduces the flexibility of the USAF. The outstanding example is the F-35, the USAF has no other option but to push the F-35 to completion in spite of the multiyear delays. The contractor could make any promise to win, because it knew that the USAF would stick with the program to completion. This is a recipe for programmatic overreach and expensive delays.

2) The low program rate means that each fighter must contain a decade's worth of technology upgrades to maintain USAF superiority. This exacerbates the complexity of each airframe. If F-XX is the only fighter for 20 years, it will have to carry every last capability imaginable for a fighter. If there is a new fighter every 10 years, then technology can be staggered among aircraft.

If there was a faster cycle of aircraft development, then this would maintain more competing design teams, allow the USAF to bail out on underperforming aircraft, and reduce the complexity of individual fighters. The major issue is design cycle, which drives each fighter to embrace too much technical complexity and drive up costs.

Were there a pot of money, I think it'd be good to try a 5+ generation fighter for the USN, containing the advances of the F-22 and F-35 program but without the more ambitious ideas of 6th gen, DEW, morphing shapes, etc. A 5+ gen fighter gives the USAF something to buy if 6gen is delayed or F-35 doesn't meet it's promise. Constrained technical ambition, enabled by more development cycles, should go a long way to fixing the fighter development problem.

 

[AeroFranz]

Totally agree with the above and in particular with these two points

If we take some complaints here literally, the DoD needs to get the specifications correct and needs to have the technological expertise to both understand the program and to closely manage it, because the contractors will not do that themselves. In this case, why have contractors at all? If they are not sufficiently competent by themselves (and massive delays are a sign of incompetence), then they seem to add nothing to the defense industry.

It used to be that the government had paid staff of competent aircraft designers who understood the problems and technology drivers and could come up with sensible requirement and smell the BS if someone was trying to blow smoke up their skirt. It's a check and balance that i do not think exists anymore and leads to gold plating requirements and primes overpromising in the competition phase.

As for the complaints about the media, that is a distraction. The program's success or failure exists outside of the media.

In a sense this stems from the previous point. If you overpromise/underestimate risk in the proposal phase and agree to adhere to an unrealistic schedule (in order to win the competition), slippages and cost overruns are inevitable, and that gives media something to attack. More easily said than done, but stay on cost and schedule and the media problem (mostly) goes away. "Nothing to report here".

 

[sferrin]

I would say that the problem is primarily the design cycle pace. A program start every 15 puts several major stresses on aircraft development.
1) Low program rate raises the importance of each fighter competition for companies and reduces the flexibility of the USAF. The outstanding example is the F-35, the USAF has no other option but to push the F-35 to completion in spite of the multiyear delays. The contractor could make any promise to win, because it knew that the USAF would stick with the program to completion. This is a recipe for programmatic overreach and expensive delays.

2) The low program rate means that each fighter must contain a decade's worth of technology upgrades to maintain USAF superiority. This exacerbates the complexity of each airframe. If F-XX is the only fighter for 20 years, it will have to carry every last capability imaginable for a fighter. If there is a new fighter every 10 years, then technology can be staggered among aircraft.

If there was a faster cycle of aircraft development, then this would maintain more competing design teams,

That all costs money. That's why we have the cycles we do. Nickel-and-dime and stretch is the name of the game these days. Every new aircraft has to pay for an R&D phase and the only way those ever higher costs can be amortized is to produce the aircraft longer. (Else you get $2.2 billion B-2s and $375 million F-22s.)

 

[sferrin]

As for the complaints about the media, that is a distraction. The program's success or failure exists outside of the media.

In a sense this stems from the previous point. If you overpromise/underestimate risk in the proposal phase and agree to adhere to an unrealistic schedule (in order to win the competition), slippages and cost overruns are inevitable, and that gives media something to attack. More easily said than done, but stay on cost and schedule and the media problem (mostly) goes away. "Nothing to report here".

IMO the complaints about the media are real. Just look at the mountains made out of the "F-16 dogfighting trials". Or "flammable Bradley armor made from the same material as the Hindenberg", etc. etc. etc. If the media doesn't have a scandal to report they rarely have trouble manufacturing one. All that does is generate an aversion to risk (who wants to be the program manager explaining to a panicking politician, who isn't likely to understand the explanation anyway, why the media is wrong?)

 

[bring_it_on]

There was a specific fast-track lean acquisition system that the acquisition folks wanted to prototype a while back. I think it may have even been called SKUNK WORKS and I believe they were recently considering using the Next Generation Jammer as one of the first underway programs to try it out. There are definitely ways to do but changes require buy in and as the saying goes everyone loves disruption as long as its in someone's else's backyard.

 

[bobbymike]

There was a specific fast-track lean acquisition system that the acquisition folks wanted to prototype a while back. I think it may have even been called SKUNK WORKS and I believe they were recently considering using the Next Generation Jammer as one of the first underway programs to try it out. There are definitely ways to do but changes require buy in and as the saying goes everyone loves disruption as long as its in someone's else's backyard.

Also the Rapid Prototyping Office for the B-3

 

[sferrin]

There was a specific fast-track lean acquisition system that the acquisition folks wanted to prototype a while back. I think it may have even been called SKUNK WORKS and I believe they were recently considering using the Next Generation Jammer as one of the first underway programs to try it out. There are definitely ways to do but changes require buy in and as the saying goes everyone loves disruption as long as its in someone's else's backyard.

The entire culture needs to be changed. Politicians, contractors, and media. Use to be the media was "look what they can do". Now it's "look how bad they suck". Can you imagine the evisceration the Tomcat would have received over the crash on what, it's first or second flight, and being forced into service with "interim" engines? We would still be hearing the echoes of demands for it's cancellation even today.

 

[sferrin]

There was a specific fast-track lean acquisition system that the acquisition folks wanted to prototype a while back. I think it may have even been called SKUNK WORKS and I believe they were recently considering using the Next Generation Jammer as one of the first underway programs to try it out. There are definitely ways to do but changes require buy in and as the saying goes everyone loves disruption as long as its in someone's else's backyard.

Also the Rapid Prototyping Office for the B-3

And boy are the media upset that there is so little to talk about.

 

[DrRansom]

That all costs money. That's why we have the cycles we do. Nickel-and-dime and stretch is the name of the game these days. Every new aircraft has to pay for an R&D phase and the only way those ever higher costs can be amortized is to produce the aircraft longer. (Else you get $2.2 billion B-2s and $375 million F-22s.)

But the present situation has the USAF stuck. The long development cycles make the USAF pursue highly multirole fighters, but those cost more money and take longer, which drives up development cycle, ensuring that the next fighter be a highly complex multirole fighter.

A new fighter program has to be designed from the beginning to use existing technology and to accelerate the development, so as to allow the next program to begin very quickly.

 

[sferrin]

That all costs money. That's why we have the cycles we do. Nickel-and-dime and stretch is the name of the game these days. Every new aircraft has to pay for an R&D phase and the only way those ever higher costs can be amortized is to produce the aircraft longer. (Else you get $2.2 billion B-2s and $375 million F-22s.)

But the present situation has the USAF stuck. The long development cycles make the USAF pursue highly multirole fighters, but those cost more money and take longer, which drives up development cycle, ensuring that the next fighter be a highly complex multirole fighter.

A new fighter program has to be designed from the beginning to use existing technology and to accelerate the development, so as to allow the next program to begin very quickly.

Except there is no guarantee there WOULD be a "next program" anytime soon so the USAF must hedge their bets. Look what happened to the USN with their "interim" Super Hornet. They got burned. No NATF or A/FX. They'd need to do something like the F-102/F-106. Start, effectively, TWO aircraft programs with the intent to get the first in service ASAP and buying time to develop technology for the follow on at a reasonable pace. Right now the budgets for hardware are so chaotic the USAF can't believe anything coming out of DC and it's been that way since the end of the Cold War.

 

[marauder2048]

Totally agree with the above and in particular with these two points

If we take some complaints here literally, the DoD needs to get the specifications correct and needs to have the technological expertise to both understand the program and to closely manage it, because the contractors will not do that themselves. In this case, why have contractors at all? If they are not sufficiently competent by themselves (and massive delays are a sign of incompetence), then they seem to add nothing to the defense industry.

It used to be that the government had paid staff of competent aircraft designers who understood the problems and technology drivers and could come up with sensible requirement and smell the BS if someone was trying to blow smoke up their skirt. It's a check and balance that i do not think exists anymore and leads to gold plating requirements and primes overpromising in the competition phase.

Because these aren't your daddy's aircraft. Recruiting and retaining experienced talent who can make informed assessments when aircraft new starts are so infrequent would be extraordinarily difficult.
So you are left with the "old and the bold" e.g .those who leave industry and can't manage the transition to consulting or the talented but inexperienced. There is also no incentivization for the uniformed staff to stay in place on
a program for any substantial amount of time and it's not a great career enabler for the civilian staff either.

As for the complaints about the media, that is a distraction. The program's success or failure exists outside of the media.

In a sense this stems from the previous point. If you overpromise/underestimate risk in the proposal phase and agree to adhere to an unrealistic schedule (in order to win the competition), slippages and cost overruns are inevitable, and that gives media something to attack. More easily said than done, but stay on cost and schedule and the media problem (mostly) goes away. "Nothing to report here".

In which case they would attack the philosophical, programmatic, doctrinal, tactical or strategic aspects of the program.

The more fundamental issue is that the gap between lay understanding and the state-of-the-art grows daily such that the pool of people with the requisitte background and opportunity (i.e. they aren't engaged in actually advancing the state-of-the-art) to provide informed analysis is vanishingly small.

The other point to keep in mind is that media aren't out there as dispassionate, neutral observers. On the contrary, they wanted to be part of the game but didn't (for whatever reason) make the team.

 

[DrRansom]

sferrin - fair point. A two stage procurement sounds great, until the second stage is cancelled outright. Maybe something like the F-102/106 may work in the future? Still, the problem requires a concerted effort from the USAF and DoD to be fixed. Having fighter programs every 15 years will ensure that each fighter plane is practically the first plane for a company, due to people leaving, and that the plane must carry an impossible amount of technology.

Re reporters: there are two sides to this. One, most reporters are out for the news stories and don't have the technical capability to fully understand and comment upon aerospace developments. On the other hand, those reporters who do cover the defense beat generally avoid doing any real muck-racking journalism and restrict themselves to repeating what contractors and program officers say. Those reporters with extensive aerospace experience who do take a contrary line aren't very well received, even when they do have the knowledge to make informed comments.

 

[marauder2048]

Those reporters with extensive aerospace experience who do take a contrary line aren't very well received, even when they do have the knowledge to make informed comments.

Are there such creatures? Contrarian or not, If they were good enough to make truly informed comments they'd be gainfully employed* in aerospace or a technical field where their
insights would have real utility, command real money and would be valued by their technical peer group.

* I'm leaving aside the big issue of age/gender/ethnicity/national-origin discrimination in technical fields.

 

[sferrin]

sferrin - fair point. A two stage procurement sounds great, until the second stage is cancelled outright. Maybe something like the F-102/106 may work in the future? Still, the problem requires a concerted effort from the USAF and DoD to be fixed. Having fighter programs every 15 years will ensure that each fighter plane is practically the first plane for a company, due to people leaving, and that the plane must carry an impossible amount of technology.

It gets worse than that. Imagine for a moment certain quarters got their way and "concurrency" went away. (They complain about it but it's been used since the 60s if not earlier.) Take aircraft X, that is building a few, testing a few, wait a couple years, build a few more, etc. They have to effectively start over every time they build a few more because the workforce disperses between phases. It is a completely jacked up and inefficient way to do things. You end up with pretty much no progress down the learning curve, you lose talented workers, create tons of rework, and it doesn't guarantee there won't still be issues. Hell, look at the F-15 longeron problem that didn't pop up until well into it's life.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011003411.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-09/boeing-defective-part-caused-f-15-breakup-pentagon-finds

Oh, and without concurrency it will take even longer to get an aircraft into service. Cha-CHING$$$$$

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2034

US Air Dominance at risk CSAF Gen. Welsh

 

[Sundog]

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2034

US Air Dominance at risk CSAF Gen. Welsh

If that's true, then everyone in charge of the USAF right now should resign. I'm sorry, but this is so much BS, but it is cyclical. I heard this crap in the 80's, I heard it in the 90's, I heard it in the oughts, and it's still as much BS now as it was back then.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2034

US Air Dominance at risk CSAF Gen. Welsh

If that's true, then everyone in charge of the USAF right now should resign. I'm sorry, but this is so much BS, but it is cyclical. I heard this crap in the 80's, I heard it in the 90's, I heard it in the oughts, and it's still as much BS now as it was back then.

Well that settles it then: "Bomber Gap: The Next Generation"

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Are there such creatures? Contrarian or not, If they were good enough to make truly informed comments they'd be gainfully employed* in aerospace or a technical field where their
insights would have real utility, command real money and would be valued by their technical peer group.

I used to be a defence journalist and now im gainfully employed in 'aerospace or a technical field'. But I approached this divergence from the direction of journalism first.

But as much as i disliked being a journalist I disagree that there is an inherent incompetence in trade press's ability to report on defence technical issues (even if the I word is an accurate description of the quality mode of reporting). You don't need to be able to understand why or how ro make the F-35 a zillion times more lethal than the Su-27 to accurately communicate this news. You just need to be able to assess which arguments for and against such a debate are the most authorative. The same way a journalist with no idea about the science and engineering behind energy production and global change in climate should be able to accurately inform their readers about such an issue.

That none of this seems to be happening is not just because no one in their right mind who can be an engineer would chose to be a journalist instead but rather that for the past 50 years anyone with a non STEM education has been taught that the world is subjective and all forms of objective authority is pure evil. But don't worry this intellectual divergence is being fixed. The STEM world will soon be under the boot of post-modern subjectivity soon.

 

[marauder2048]

Are there such creatures? Contrarian or not, If they were good enough to make truly informed comments they'd be gainfully employed* in aerospace or a technical field where their
insights would have real utility, command real money and would be valued by their technical peer group.

I used to be a defence journalist and now im gainfully employed in 'aerospace or a technical field'. But I approached this divergence from the direction of journalism first.

But as much as i disliked being a journalist I disagree that there is an inherent incompetence in trade press's ability to report on defence technical issues (even if the I word is an accurate description of the quality mode of reporting). You don't need to be able to understand why or how ro make the F-35 a zillion times more lethal than the Su-27 to accurately communicate this news. You just need to be able to assess which arguments for and against such a debate are the most authorative. The same way a journalist with no idea about the science and engineering behind energy production and global change in climate should be able to accurately inform their readers about such an issue.

That none of this seems to be happening is not just because no one in their right mind who can be an engineer would chose to be a journalist instead but rather that for the past 50 years anyone with a non STEM education has been taught that the world is subjective and all forms of objective authority is pure evil. But don't worry this intellectual divergence is being fixed. The STEM world will soon be under the boot of post-modern subjectivity soon.

There are challenges even in grasping nuanced arguments and informed analysis coming from practitioners
working in a different (or sometimes the same) sub-field of the same technical discipline.

A middleman trying to condense and convey this (while in the process adjudging an authoritative argument) to the general or even technically inclined public hasn't a hope in hell.

Perhaps in the past it was possible; some of the defense debates of the 80's were covered, analyzed and presented well
or maybe it was just the golden age of porn. It's all a little hazy.

But now there is also no need for middlemen, gatekeepers or arbiters of authoritative arguments; recording, auto-transcription, transmission, distribution and publishing electronically is very cheap and easy which lets the actual domain experts and practitioners weigh-in using a kind of double blind peer-review style like this forum.

Fundamentally, forums like this make journalism obsolescent if not obsolete; the average post from some of the more learned members here is worth more than a dozen paywall'ed articles.

 

[LowObservable]

Really?

This discussion started with a reference to an interesting and novel paper by one of our more innovative defense thinkers. The experts from the industry promptly sidetracked it into an extended and content-free whinge about the evil incompetent media, supported by someone who at least is in an excellent position to identify media incompetence when he sees it, and with the usual passive-aggressive asides about diversity practices. So forgive me if I don't think those posts are worth ten, twenty or even three paywalled stories.

Obviously, there are new channels for information to reach the public (like the CNAS website where we started) but let me break the painful truth to you: there is no more "free" content than Bernie Sanders' free college education. It all costs money, so someone is paying for it, likely to advance their agenda. In the media, this process is transparent and open: any company can advertise anywhere, and if it's paywalled it means you're in control too. That's not always the case with think-tank content.

 

[DrRansom]

Really?

This discussion started with a reference to an interesting and novel paper by one of our more innovative defense thinkers. The experts from the industry promptly sidetracked it into an extended and content-free whinge about the evil incompetent media, supported by someone who at least is in an excellent position to identify media incompetence when he sees it, and with the usual passive-aggressive asides about diversity practices. So forgive me if I don't think those posts are worth ten, twenty or even three paywalled stories.

What was the article which was implicitly referenced in the beginning?

As for the media angle, Marauder's position, taken to it's logical conclusion, is that only those who are in the program are qualified to comment on it, as everybody else is either: jealous they aren't included; or, not smart enough to be concluded. I can see how certain people like that position, but it is slightly ridiculous.

 

[riggerrob]

May I reply from a Canadian perspective?

The Canadian Armed Forces have a long history of bungling defense purchases during peacetime. There is enough blame for everyone. Part of the blame goes to generals who insist on the fanciest weapons, without understanding how much taxpayers are willing to pay. Part of the blame can be laid on politicians who are more interested in playing "party politics" than running the country efficiently.

I can cite four CAF fighter purchases that have been bungled: Banshee, Avro Arrow, CF-5 and F-35 fighter.
The Banshee purchase negotiations dragged out so long that McDonnell-Douglas completed their contract with the United States Navy and shut down the Banshee production line before the Royal Canadian Navy was able to secure the funds from Ottawa. The RCN was forced to buy second-hand Banshees from USN stocks. Banshees son beat themselves to death flying from the short deck of HMCS Bonaventure. RCN technicians plundered Banshee spare parts from USN scrap yards every time they visited Florida. By 1960, the RCN decided that it could only afford the anti-submarine role, so the last few times HMCS Bonaventure sailed, her flight deck was so crowded with ASW aircraft, that there was no room remaining for fighters. By the mid-1960s, the RCN decided they could not afford even one carrier and scrapped HMCS Bonaventure.

The Avro Arrow was the Royal Canadian Air Force's big disappointment of the 1950s. The Arrow's problems started with RCAF generals demanding way more than Canadian taxpayers could afford and way more than Avro Canada (Toronto, Ontario) engineers could deliver: new airframe, new engines, new missiles and new fire control system. Any single innovation would have taxed the best Canadian engineers, but 4 or 5 simultaneous innovations overwhelmed designers. The first Arrow prototype flew with interim, American-made engines. Its 5,000 psi hydraulic system leaked every time they towed it out of the hangar, etc. Eventually, Ottawa decided they could not afford the Arrow and scrapped in in the late 1950s.

One of the replacements for the Arrow was the CF-r Freedom Fighter, built under license by Canadair in Montreal. The CF-5 was a great fighter trainer (similar to its USAF T-38 Talon look-alike) but could barley carry enough fuel to deliver a full bomb-load to the end of its own runway. The CF-5 succeeded in a different way because it (and dozens of other federal purchasing programs) bought enough votes in the Province of Quebec to defeat the (separatist) Parti Quebecois.

Finally, we get to the most recent defense spending debate: F-35 fighters. During the recent federal election, the Liberal Party promised to re-open bidding for replacements for the RCAF's 30-year-old CF-18B fighters. This was more about party politics than merits of any airplane design. The Liberals wanted to embarrass the party in power. Canadian politics are rife with plots to embarrass "the other party."

Sadly, it looks like the RCAF may not buy F-35 fighters because politicians are too busy "spinning" all the F-35's problems. What RCAF pilots need to do their (Parliamentary assigned) duty is often the last priority in Canadian defense spending.

 

[Void]

Because these aren't your daddy's aircraft. Recruiting and retaining experienced talent who can make informed assessments when aircraft new starts are so infrequent would be extraordinarily difficult.
So you are left with the "old and the bold" e.g .those who leave industry and can't manage the transition to consulting or the talented but inexperienced. There is also no incentivization for the uniformed staff to stay in place on a program for any substantial amount of time and it's not a great career enabler for the civilian staff either.

Well why can't government labs build prototypes?

This would seem to solve the dilemma of where will a trained workforce of government technical experts come from, but would also logically reduce the technical risk for other programs, as well as the financial risk for contractors as the technology developed there could be made available to every bidder in a contract.

 

[marauder2048]

Really?

This discussion started with a reference to an interesting and novel paper by one of our more innovative defense thinkers.

Ah..the old arbiter of authoritative viewpoints strikes again. It's an okay position paper but not particularly rigorous.

The experts from the industry promptly sidetracked it into an extended and content-free whinge about the evil incompetent media, supported by someone who at least is in an excellent position to identify media incompetence when he sees it, and with the usual passive-aggressive asides about diversity practices.

Evil and incompetent? More like agenda driven and technically shallow. Sadly, they can still do real damage with those
afflictions and at best can do a neutral retelling of what their selection of sources told them.


Passive-aggressive? If it's amateur psychology time, Dunning–Kruger seems to be rampant amongst the media and its defenders. My point was that age discrimination (in particular amongst other push factors) in technical fields results in highly competent people being forced into other, less desirable lines of work.

Obviously, there are new channels for information to reach the public (like the CNAS website where we started) but let me break the painful truth to you: there is no more "free" content than Bernie Sanders' free college education. It all costs money, so someone is paying for it, likely to advance their agenda. In the media, this process is transparent and open: any company can advertise anywhere, and if it's paywalled it means you're in control too. That's not always the case with think-tank content.

It's not transparent and open in the media since journalists, unlike 401(c) think tanks like CNAS, don't have to legally disclose sources of funding or other commercial/consulting or advisory interests.

More to the point, think tanks have to go out and compete against their highly technically qualified peers for government and private funding. That's a lot different than competing for advertising money and institutional subscriptions.

 

[marauder2048]

What was the article which was implicitly referenced in the beginning?

As for the media angle, Marauder's position, taken to it's logical conclusion, is that only those who are in the program are qualified to comment on it, as everybody else is either: jealous they aren't included; or, not smart enough to be concluded. I can see how certain people like that position, but it is slightly ridiculous.

I don't follow your conclusions. I mentioned peer review repeatedly. Only your peers, the other working practitioners in your field, are qualified to make truly informed technical judgements. They don't necessarily have to work on the program; they may work for the rival firm that lost. Heck, they may have pushed, in vain, for your winning solution and know as much about it as you do.

Even a peer who is jealous or hostile will tend to provide a meaningful (if blunt) analysis of the tradeoffs or weaknesses.
Of course, the better ones will tend to say: "I don't really have enough data" but that don't sell magazines.

 

[marauder2048]

Well why can't government labs build prototypes?

This would seem to solve the dilemma of where will a trained workforce of government technical experts come from, but would also logically reduce the technical risk for other programs, as well as the financial risk for contractors as the technology developed there could be made available to every bidder in a contract.

This is already done but typically at a small scale and not typically with the requisite "design for manufacturability, durability, usability and maintainability." AM might change some of that.