Lockheed Martin AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/TeamEglin/status/1367967876917891072


The
@usairforce
prepares for its first booster test flight (BTF-1) of the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), expected in the next 30 days.
Read about it here.

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. --
The Air Force prepares for its first booster test flight (BTF-1) of the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), expected in the next 30 days.

Following delivery of the ARRW test missile to Edwards Air Force Base, California March 1, and loading on a B-52H Stratofortress, immediate work began on pre-flight ground tests and checks to obtain certification for the flight to proceed as scheduled.

“The BTF-1 test vehicle is complete and is progressing through ground testing to verify its readiness for flight. The team has successfully dealt with COVID challenges and resolved technical findings not uncommon in a first-of-a-kind weapon system. We have minimized schedule delays while maintaining a laser focus on engineering rigor. Our first BTF will happen in the next 30 days, followed by several additional booster and all-up-round test flights by the end of the year,” said Brig. Gen. Heath Collins, Air Force Program Executive Officer for Weapons.

The ARRW program is a rapid prototyping project that will leverage cutting edge technologies to deliver a conventional hypersonic weapons capability to the warfighter in the early 2020s. The weapon system provides combatant commanders the capability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive targets. ARRW expands precision-strike weapon systems’ capabilities by enabling survivable rapid response strikes against heavily defended targets.

The Air Force designed the ARRW booster test vehicle to achieve the high speeds necessary to deliver the ARRW glide vehicle and embedded ordnance package to designated targets required by U.S. combatant commanders. The ARRW program followed a rigorous systems engineering process with extensive ground and flight test campaigns to ensure a well-executed BTF event; BTF-1 will be the eighth flight test for the ARRW program, following seven captive carriage flight tests.

To ensure ARRW is mature for a production decision, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin took deliberate steps to achieve a high level of manufacturing readiness. Assembly of the ARRW booster test vehicle on production-representative manufacturing lines is a major step toward this production readiness goal.

The ARRW BTF-1 will demonstrate the booster’s ability to reach operational speeds and collect other important data. In addition to booster performance, the test vehicle will also validate safe separation and controllability of the missile away from the carrier B-52H, through ignition and boost phase, all the way up to separation of a simulated glide vehicle. The simulated glider will not sustain flight, and will safely disintegrate soon after separation. The 412th Test Wing will conduct the ARRW BTF series over the Point Mugu Sea Range in California.

 
The first rocket booster test of the Air Force’s hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon failed when the vehicle did not launch during a April 5 flight.

During tests over Point Mugu Sea Range off the coast of California, a B-52 Stratofortress attempted to launch the ARRW booster vehicle. However, “the test missile was not able to complete its launch sequence” and the bomber returned to Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., with the test vehicle, the Air Force said in a statement.

The service plans on studying the missile to understand why it didn’t launch, make alterations, and then attempt to fire it in a future test, the service said.

“The ARRW program has been pushing boundaries since its inception and taking calculated risks to move this important capability forward,” said Brig. Gen. Heath Collins, the Air Force’s program executive officer for its armaments directorate. “While not launching was disappointing, the recent test provided invaluable information to learn from and continue ahead. This is why we test.”

Aside from demonstrating the safe separation of the ARRW booster from the B-52 during the April 5 test, the Air Force had intended to evaluate the performance of missile at operational speeds through ignition and boost phase, as well as simulate the separation of the booster from the glide vehicle.


third consecutive failure without actually firestart :mad:


 
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This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.
 
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The previous two errors were acknowledged to be human error it test prep, not in the test article. That doesn’t inspire confidence, especially given a third failure of some undetermined type that definitely resulted in the vehicle never even separating (again).
 
This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.
At this point they look almost terrified of trying anything.
 
This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.
At this point they look almost terrified of trying anything.

I don't see that at all. The AGM-183A is fully funded through FY-21. They have detailed a fairly aggressive test plan and are working through range infrastructure limitations. A few failures don't seem to have made any significant dent in the plan and non one is asking them to stop or delay things substantially. The next 6-months will be critical to a number of programs and it appears they are poised to significantly ramp up testing.
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?
 
This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.
At this point they look almost terrified of trying anything.
Maybe they should just throw a bucket of money at SpaceX and ask them if they can build the weapon.

We'll have a dozen test flights before the year is done, and an operational weapon in two.
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

Has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back. There are elements of the AGM-183A like the glide-vehicle, for example, that the USAF has been funding and developing for more than 8 years. Other elements, including the booster and other sub-systems that are part of the rapid prototyping and accelerated development effort that Lockheed secured more recently. You are taking higher risk with trying to get those out faster so things are probably expected to come up that they'll have to sort through.
 
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Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

And has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). The sensationalization in the media is not warranted at all. They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back.
IMO if they can't even get it to come off the rail after MULTIPLE attempts it does not speak very highly of their competence. I guess it's better than doing a HyFly (or was it X-51) in which the thing separated from the pylon and fell into the ocean like an inert bomb.
 
The first delay seemed to have been on account of human factors, and a subsequent discovery that required a couple of months to rectify. This current discovery could be related to the latter or it could be something new. We just don't know yet. But we have the test vehicle, and it wasn't damaged so finding and fixing the fault will be a lot easier compared to a failed test where they would have launched and the booster failed to ignite or some other catastrophic failure. On Hyfly they had low battery voltage cause at least one of the failures, and on the X-51 they failed a test because one of the fins didn't work. Just goes to show the unpredictable nature of testing especially when we don't test these high end systems at the cadence we ought to so that we have experienced government-industry teams. The hypersonics office at the DOD now is putting some guidance and testing best-practices out for government and industry teams to follow, no doubt as a result of some of these early avoidable human factor errors.

Collins said that “earlier this year … we had a slight bump on the road in test,” but the integrated government-industry team “focused, found the flaw, fixed the flaw, [and] got a corrective action in the air in less than 30 days … That just tells you that the team is really tight.”

Lockheed Martin is “part of that open transparency … But getting the right people at the right time on the program, to solve this failure and not miss a beat as we move forward … is a good example of how to get after” hypersonic development.

Sources reported an ARRW failure in late December, chalking it up to “dumb mistakes;” one reported that a technician failed to follow a checklist and another reported an improperly fastened control surface. Michael White, the principal deputy for hypersonics in the Pentagon’s directorate of research and engineering, seemed to confirm these reports in his panel remarks.

“We need to get it right the first time,” White said. “We have this mindset that we want to fail early and often so we can accelerate learning and actually develop quicker. But that’s only valid if your failures are because you’re learning about [technological] discoveries and the ability to do hypersonic flight. If our failures are that we forgot how to do a checklist, and tighten a pin on a fin, and we lose a flight vehicle because a fin falls off, that’s not acceptable failure.”

 
My IMHO, that US military is repeating with hypersonic the sane mistake, as with ballistic missiles until 1957. They are trying to run it as usual weapon developement program, with decentralized, competing efforts. But this time the problem is too big & complex for any service to solve it by itself. Considering that most current US hypersonic problems are relics of bygone Pax America era (when end results weren't a top priority, since military and technological superiority was assumed to be a fact), they just may not be salvageable.
 
Just goes to show the unpredictable nature of testing especially when we don't test these high end systems at the cadence we ought to so that we have experienced government-industry teams.
That's my biggest gripe right there. It's not that I think we should be completely reckless but damn, some people need to get over their pathological fear of risk. Gotta break eggs, etc.
 
My IMHO, that US military is repeating with hypersonic the sane mistake, as with ballistic missiles until 1957. They are trying to run it as usual weapon developement program, with decentralized, competing efforts. But this time the problem is too big & complex for any service to solve it by itself. Considering that most current US hypersonic problems are relics of bygone Pax America era (when end results weren't a top priority, since military and technological superiority was assumed to be a fact), they just may not be salvageable.

I don't see much evidence backing up that assertion at all. The work is being coordinated by a dedicated Hypersonic team that sits at the OSD-R&E office led by Mike White IIRC.

There are three distinct efforts (along with a lot of lower level S&T investment, infrastructure and academia investments) that the DOD is pursuing under its new rapid prototyping authorities. One is the lower risk common glide body and the other are the tactical boost glide, and the scramjet/HAWC efforts. The common glide body was developed and funded centrally and continued to mature as a joint effort that was to be utilized by all three hypersonic customers (Army, Navy, and USAF) each with some modification to the overall weapons system to suite their unique needs. All three matured their designs with the USAF backing away only after completing its design reviews so that it could re-start if it wanted to get back into the HCSW game. So it was ONE effort with each customer leveraging the work for their own weapon system needs. Currently it is a SINGLE effort to develop and test the hypersonic weapon that will be fielded in 2023 and 2025 with the Army and Navy respectively.

The other programs, Tactical Boost Glide, and the HAWC, are also a joint DARPA-USAF efforts that started back in the 2014 time-frame and as a follow on to the X-51 programs. I think DARPA and USAF split the investment evenly with the USAF being the logical transition partner once the development work was done and the technology mature. As that has progressed, particularly with TBG, DAPRA has already started to think beyond the current scope of the effort - roping in additional vendors (Raytheon) and even beginning to do some preliminary work on a naval application for the TBG vehicle . Meanwhile, the US Army / USMC variant of the TBG effort (demonstration) is also progressing under the OpFires multi-phase effort so that could be a viable late 2020's/early 30s Medium range fires option for either of those services if they think it is what they need.

All these are development, prototyping and demonstration programs that will field a limited number of operational systems. Formal acquisition programs, to acquire the capability will follow. But neither is at that stage yet. These are anything but "usual weapon development programs".
 
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I think there is some confusion in that 'hypersonic' is a general term encompassing completely different efforts. The air breathing effort essentially has nothing in common with boost glide efforts outside perhaps thermal management - the propulsion, manufacturing, flight profile, etc is completely different. There are a couple of efforts for large scale air breathing hypersonic engines for UAVs and other larger aircraft, but those are rather different technical challenges compared to disposable air breathing missiles. The boost efforts are separated into two glider types, with one deemed lower risk which has been tested and is going into production and another still attempting to achieve its first test launch (ARRW). TBG is the DARPA effort that produced the glider for ARRW; OpFires is another DARPA effort that uses the TBG glider but is trying to introduce a novel throttleable solid booster to have more medium range flexibility (possible Medium Range Capability replacement for SM-6/BGM-109). About the only argument that could be made for duplication in my mind is that using two glider types is a bit redundant, but it hardly seems unreasonable considering the disparate Chinese and Russian research efforts (and operational systems).
 
This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.

Hey man, you can't take a realistic, facts based point of view. On this forum, pure emotion and pessimism are the only acceptable points to form a response from.
 
This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.

Hey man, you can't take a realistic, facts based point of view. On this forum, pure emotion and pessimism are the only acceptable points to form a response from.
Sorry "man" but the "facts" in this case don't warrant optimism. :rolleyes: Yeah, stuff happens, but failing the simple stuff, multiple times, is Keystone Cops level performance. Specifically, which shining star should we point to for optimism? Exactly.
 
On Hyfly they had low battery voltage cause at least one of the failures, and on the X-51 they failed a test because one of the fins didn't work

Sources reported an ARRW failure in late December, chalking it up to “dumb mistakes;” one reported that a technician failed to follow a checklist and another reported an improperly fastened control surface. Michael White, the principal deputy for hypersonics in the Pentagon’s directorate of research and engineering, seemed to confirm these reports in his panel remarks.

problem with fins was repeated twice, if they are not competent in assembling - replace them by new people

sounds like they run its every day and that's why they are tired, I can't think of this behavior of ground services for example at the atomic tests
need more personal responsibility and control checks from the high lever officer
 
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This isn't the first time a test was aborted because of some sort of anomaly with the test article or failure to proceed further. This won't be the last time either. Much rather this then some sort of catastrophic failure with a major system. Find the fault, fix and get back on the range. Simple. Additional test vehicles are on order.

Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the next 4-5 years as they go through dozens of tests. I wonder what the headlines will be then.

Hey man, you can't take a realistic, facts based point of view. On this forum, pure emotion and pessimism are the only acceptable points to form a response from.
I wasn't talking about this forum but the media coverage and headlines. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being a minor bump in the road in the road and 10 being a potentially program ending calamity, this is probably, based on what has been released, a 3 - something you work through and get back in the coming weeks and repeat. If we are going to go full "Broken ARRW" (as the TWZ did), I wonder what is in store for when the higher level failures occur which are bound to happen at some point given the technology we're trying to master and field. We have to be realistic here. The program wants to field an operational 1,000 mile ranged hypersonic weapon in about 4 years from contract award. That is a pretty rapid pace given we have exactly ZERO such weapons currently. This is some major acceleration so expect a few bumps along the way (both minor and major).
 
Assuming the AGM-183A goes into production I wonder what it will be called? Anyone else think that Skybolt II would be a good name?
Like JASSM, AMRAAM, THAAD, etc. it'll probably be "ARRW" until the end of time. (If they ever fly the thing.)
A good point however given the similarities between this missile and the Skybolt I can see it happening.
 
Assuming the AGM-183A goes into production I wonder what it will be called? Anyone else think that Skybolt II would be a good name?
Like JASSM, AMRAAM, THAAD, etc. it'll probably be "ARRW" until the end of time. (If they ever fly the thing.)
A good point however given the similarities between this missile and the Skybolt I can see it happening.
They have pointy front ends and fins on the back. That's the end of their similarities. Could just as easily call it Bullpup.
 
Assuming the AGM-183A goes into production I wonder what it will be called? Anyone else think that Skybolt II would be a good name?
Like JASSM, AMRAAM, THAAD, etc. it'll probably be "ARRW" until the end of time. (If they ever fly the thing.)
A good point however given the similarities between this missile and the Skybolt I can see it happening.
They have pointy front ends and fins on the back. That's the end of their similarities. Could just as easily call it Bullpup.
Now eventually using retired Minuteman IIIs when they eventually (hopefully) get replaced by the GBSD would be a nice Skybolt II :D
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

And has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). The sensationalization in the media is not warranted at all. They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back.
IMO if they can't even get it to come off the rail after MULTIPLE attempts it does not speak very highly of their competence. I guess it's better than doing a HyFly (or was it X-51) in which the thing separated from the pylon and fell into the ocean like an inert bomb.
This was actually the first attempt to release an ARRW. All previous tests were captive carries. On the other hand, HAWC and TBG have been released and failed to operate as expected.
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

And has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). The sensationalization in the media is not warranted at all. They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back.
IMO if they can't even get it to come off the rail after MULTIPLE attempts it does not speak very highly of their competence. I guess it's better than doing a HyFly (or was it X-51) in which the thing separated from the pylon and fell into the ocean like an inert bomb.
This was actually the first attempt to release an ARRW. All previous tests were captive carries. On the other hand, HAWC and TBG have been released and failed to operate as expected.

I haven't heard anything about TBG release. Could you point to your source on that? Lockheed's HAWC test flight failure has been written about and is linked on the previous page. If I recall correctly, TBG kind of got rolled into ARRW so that they could test the glider along with the ARRW AUR since it had an aggressive timeline. AUR testing for it (ARRW) that includes glider separation and flight is/was scheduled for early FY22 (October/November 2021) with additional testing to happen in early to mid 2022.
 
On Hyfly they had low battery voltage cause at least one of the failures, and on the X-51 they failed a test because one of the fins didn't work

Sources reported an ARRW failure in late December, chalking it up to “dumb mistakes;” one reported that a technician failed to follow a checklist and another reported an improperly fastened control surface. Michael White, the principal deputy for hypersonics in the Pentagon’s directorate of research and engineering, seemed to confirm these reports in his panel remarks.

problem with fins was repeated twice, if they are not competent in assembling - replace them by new people

Yes, I'm sure someone with no experience in the technical assembly of a hypersonic missile is going to be better than someone with mild amounts of experience who got something wrong once.

Zero-tolerance (or three strikes, or what-have-you) for minor failings is never a bad management practice, after all.
 
You know sometime ppl try to go fast in their design by bypassing properly drafted product assembly documentation and user notice.
Some even think that having a completed 3D model is enough to go...
We shouldn't go hard on the crew without further elements, especially when repeated failures at launch could point toward a systemic event.
 
You know sometime ppl try to go fast in their design by bypassing properly drafted product assembly documentation and user notice.
Some even think that having a completed 3D model is enough to go...
We shouldn't go hard on the crew without further elements, especially when repeated failures at launch could point toward a systemic event.
Some people actually work in the biz and understand what it takes to put an aircraft together. It isn't THAT difficult. Factor in the importance and expense of these tests and failures as basic as this are a complete joke.

Signed "Someone who spent the morning working MRB"
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

And has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). The sensationalization in the media is not warranted at all. They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back.
IMO if they can't even get it to come off the rail after MULTIPLE attempts it does not speak very highly of their competence. I guess it's better than doing a HyFly (or was it X-51) in which the thing separated from the pylon and fell into the ocean like an inert bomb.
This was actually the first attempt to release an ARRW. All previous tests were captive carries. On the other hand, HAWC and TBG have been released and failed to operate as expected.

I haven't heard anything about TBG release. Could you point to your source on that? Lockheed's HAWC test flight failure has been written about and is linked on the previous page. If I recall correctly, TBG kind of got rolled into ARRW so that they could test the glider along with the ARRW AUR since it had an aggressive timeline. AUR testing for it (ARRW) that includes glider separation and flight is/was scheduled for early FY22 (October/November 2021) with additional testing to happen in early to mid 2022.
TBG #1 flew in early Dec 2020. First stage lit and it headed down-range as planned...
HAWC #1 flew in Jun 2020. Unable to attempt release (see the comments on the AvWeek article site)
HAWC #2 was released around 1 Mar 2021. Did not function as planned
 
Pointing this as some sort of major failure ("Broken ARRW" clickbait headlines :rolleyes:) shows a complete lack of seriousness. Those type of failures will come (part and parcel of cutting edge development and testing) over the

I would agree with you, if problem arises during hypersonic flight. But booster not even igniting?

And has this occurred previously over decades of weapons/prototype development and testing? Will this occur in this future? Things go wrong in testing. That will always remain true. It could be minor, "dumb mistakes", non-serious issues, or it could be serious design faults that lead to catastrophic failures that put some major strain on the viability of the project. A "No test" is nothing like the latter unless it is due to some major oversight in design (which we don't know about). The sensationalization in the media is not warranted at all. They went up, things didn't go as planned and they came back without testing. They didn't destroy the vehicle that will make fault finding harder. Now find and fix the errors and get back.
IMO if they can't even get it to come off the rail after MULTIPLE attempts it does not speak very highly of their competence. I guess it's better than doing a HyFly (or was it X-51) in which the thing separated from the pylon and fell into the ocean like an inert bomb.
This was actually the first attempt to release an ARRW. All previous tests were captive carries. On the other hand, HAWC and TBG have been released and failed to operate as expected.

I haven't heard anything about TBG release. Could you point to your source on that? Lockheed's HAWC test flight failure has been written about and is linked on the previous page. If I recall correctly, TBG kind of got rolled into ARRW so that they could test the glider along with the ARRW AUR since it had an aggressive timeline. AUR testing for it (ARRW) that includes glider separation and flight is/was scheduled for early FY22 (October/November 2021) with additional testing to happen in early to mid 2022.
TBG #1 flew in early Dec 2020. First stage lit and it headed down-range as planned...
HAWC #1 flew in Jun 2020. Unable to attempt release (see the comments on the AvWeek article site)
HAWC #2 was released around 1 Mar 2021. Did not function as planned

Is there a source for #1 and #3?
 
You know sometime ppl try to go fast in their design by bypassing properly drafted product assembly documentation and user notice.

Yes, but this is nothing new. You have to rush if you want to have a new thing done on a tighter-than-normal schedule. I'm sure the Apollo guys felt the same pressure.

OTOH people here are saying that two test flights, a decade apart from each other, with fin failures on launch are somehow related is a bit reaching. After all, the people involved in X-51 and AGM-183 assembly and flight line are not the same people. Might as well suggest that the four inch flight is related to this "string" of failures, since it involved tail fins, bypassing proper assembly documentation, user notice, and a launch failure.

If the men who went to the Moon can commit the great sin of fin-related test flight failures from something as basic as "connecting a cable that was noticeably longer than it should be" because "they had a Army Redstone cable instead of a Mercury-Redstone cable", I think it's possible to cut today's generation a bit of slack. Even the legendary greats committed the same mistakes.

Whether or not HAWC and AGM-183's failures are related remains to be seen, but it's possible there's some sort of common failure in the designs I guess. Lockheed-Martin is involved in both, and AFAIK the provides the booster for AGM-183. Perhaps there's some common mechanical component that is failing, that usually is the case with these sorts of minor failures.

What's bizarre is that people are allowed to openly publish articles and op ed's on this stuff instead of it being kept quiet and internal IMO, but that's whatever.

The very fact that the test flights are proceeding is inherently good, because it means that faults will be ironed out.

Arguably there's an open question where there might be less time scheduled than is needed, perhaps, if AGM-183 runs into something really genuinely bad like the booster needs to be entirely redesigned. But the USA has good, powerful rockets and knows what all the good fuels are, so it's more a matter of looking at a list of rocket fuels than any real experimentation; all of which was done 60 years ago. It's also why AGM-183 is a boost-glide rocket carrying a relatively low tech glider and why HAWC is a tech demonstrator instead of a weapons program.
 
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