Lockheed Martin AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

Anything in ATKs/NGs SRM catalogue?

It wouldn't surprise me, I have a PDF copy of it but it's a few years out of date and I strongly suspect that not all of their rocket-motor products are present on it.
 
I thought I remember seeing a few lists of SRMs in this forum somewhere, included some info like the size of the motors, filament wind casing, etc .....
 
I don't know if NG still has its' rocket-motor catalogue online (I suspect it's not comprehensive either as it doesn't have the Mk-136 TSRM listed for example) also I suspect that the AGM-183's rocket-motor is something new and not present on the catalogue.
 
Weren't the issues primarily related to the boosters?

The first main failure that was publicized was in 2021, where ARRW refused to release itself from the shackle:


Ultimately it doesn't matter particularly what the failures were, just that ARRW was extremely tightly budgeted around a very narrow timeline, because it was supposed to fill in a perceived gap between the HAWC finishing its test program in 2022. With the arrival of HACM into service in 2027, with ARRW entering service sometime in FY23, there would have been a gap of about 4-6 years where HACM inventory would be considered "too small" and ARRW fills this gap with a few dozen rounds. They probably would have been disposed of when the HACM inventory got big enough, at least if DOD managed to dodge the next Pacific War.

It seems this may simply have been manufacturing problems with the prototypes, or quality control issues at Lockheed (or anything else, really, perhaps some voltage regulators on the missile were out of spec who knows), since the low rate production AURs appear to work. However, they would be unreliable at best without further testing, which requires more money and more time, and this is now a threat to HACM as that weapon begins to enter its flight tests and development now in FY25.

I'm mostly just annoyed by the implied "missed opportunity" of ARRW in sferrin's post though. It's like being the Skybolt's biggest defender in 1970. It's such a weird weapon to worship, because it was never important in the first place, and especially since HACM's engine has already flown almost five times successfully and without issue!


America can literally have the most reliable and consistent scramjet motors in human history built on decades of experience and some people on this forum would be like "yeah but it's not a ROCKET that FALLS" like are you for real come on.

The real takeaway from ARRW is that Lockheed should stick to building C-130s and stop trying to step outside its wheelhouse.
 
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Ultimately it doesn't matter particularly what the failures were

Relative to your criticisms of Lockheed's ability to engineer a hypersonic vehicle, I would think the point of failure would matter if it wasn't the hypersonic vehicle that caused the test failure. ARRW isn't the only hypersonic program that's experienced setbacks due to the unreliability of the booster stack.
 
Relative to your criticisms of Lockheed's ability to engineer a hypersonic vehicle, I would think the point of failure would matter if it wasn't the hypersonic vehicle that caused the test failure. ARRW isn't the only hypersonic program that's experienced setbacks due to the unreliability of the booster stack.

It's not, but it's the most notable one recently, given the other DOD hypersonics programs are proceeding fine for now.

Given how the Army's LRHW program shook out, Lockheed should have been able to do ARRW in the time set out, and ARRW probably "just" needed another 12-18 months in the oven. Middle Tier Acquisition would have been able to snag it if it had been legally mandated at eight years instead of seven. Seven makes any program under it vulnerable to early stage problems like ERCA and the couple of genuinely bizarre launch failures ARRW had that pushed it back by a year. C'est la vie.


This all may have been similar due to some half-forgotten integration problem with B-52's software or something, that got discerned after the initial test failures, which once solved resulted in ARRW passing all tests until issues with shroud deployment occurred. On the other hand, engineers who are experienced in these things shouldn't really forget those early integration problems with ostensibly understood platforms in the first place, especially when under such sensitive timetables.

It may very well have been a new team headed up by an out of practice oldhead or something. The good news is that ARRW ultimately worked, so whatever issues existed were solved, and the engineers behind the program can contribute to successful weapons like LRHW and (presumably) CPS.
 
Defense Updates has just put out a video about the latest ARRW test:


The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it executed its last scheduled end-to-end trial launch of a live AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missile earlier this week. The missile was launched from a B-52H bomber operating from the strategically significant U.S. Pacific island territory of Guam.Viewers may note that a few days ago images of the weapon in Guam appeared on the Internet and there was widespread speculation about an impending test.
This development comes amidst uncertainty surrounding the future of ARRW, with indications suggesting the possibility of a subsequent program that might already be underway.
In this video, Defense Updates analyzes why US military test firing ARRW from Guam is a big message for China?
Chapters:
00:11 INTRODUCTION
01:53 US AIR FORCE STATEMENT
02:56 AGM-183A ARRW
 

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