USAF/US NAVY 6G Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

jsport said:
”A new study highlights China’s growing air power, and warns that China is looking to build out its Air Force to the point that the U.S. would not be willing to take it on in direct conflict.

A the risk air force approach...
 
jsport said:
”A new study highlights China’s growing air power, and warns that China is looking to build out its Air Force to the point that the U.S. would not be willing to take it on in direct conflict.

The rand paper itself is not terrible, but it makes a bunch of "no duh" statements like that.

The point of every military is to build a capability that is optimally suited to deter a potential adversary from seeking conflict with you such that political aims can be achieved without the use of lethal force. If a conflict occurs then it is a less than desirable outcome for everyone.
 
Blitzo said:
The point of every military is to build a capability that is optimally suited to deter a potential adversary from seeking conflict with you such that political aims can be achieved without the use of lethal force. If a conflict occurs then it is a less than desirable outcome for everyone.
This may be true in our western democracies. Probably much less so in non-democratic countries.
Think Muammar Ghaddafool, Saddam Hussein, Vlad Putin...
 
dan_inbox said:
Blitzo said:
The point of every military is to build a capability that is optimally suited to deter a potential adversary from seeking conflict with you such that political aims can be achieved without the use of lethal force. If a conflict occurs then it is a less than desirable outcome for everyone.
This may be true in our western democracies. Probably much less so in non-democratic countries.
Think Muammar Ghaddafool, Saddam Hussein, Vlad Putin...

While not looking to downplay the crimes of these tyrannical dictators I could point out that the West democracies and their allies have used plenty of lethal force in the last approx. 30 years.
It's probably our prejudice to think democracies are innately more peaceful or less likely to be involved in state versus state wars than more authoritarian regimes, though dictators hips are clearly more likely to use lethal force against their own people as coercive control.
 
kaiserd said:
dan_inbox said:
Blitzo said:
The point of every military is to build a capability that is optimally suited to deter a potential adversary from seeking conflict with you such that political aims can be achieved without the use of lethal force. If a conflict occurs then it is a less than desirable outcome for everyone.
This may be true in our western democracies. Probably much less so in non-democratic countries.
Think Muammar Ghaddafool, Saddam Hussein, Vlad Putin...

While not looking to downplay the crimes of these tyrannical dictators I could point out that the West democracies and their allies have used plenty of lethal force in the last approx. 30 years.
It's probably our prejudice to think democracies are innately more peaceful or less likely to be involved in state versus state wars than more authoritarian regimes, though dictators hips are clearly more likely to use lethal force against their own people as coercive control.

Generally speaking I think few nations will seek to wage a war against an enemy for the sake of it -- if an objective can be achieved through peacetime signalling (i.e.: deterrence) that would always be preferable to war, regardless of the nation's politics.
 
Blitzo said:
Generally speaking I think few nations will seek to wage a war against an enemy for the sake of it -- if an objective can be achieved through peacetime signalling (i.e.: deterrence) that would always be preferable to war, regardless of the nation's politics.
Generally speaking, maybe, but not always.
Some states want peace and status quo. Others want annexations, or the destruction of other states, or even the destruction of a population.

A few examples:
Do you think that Putin wanted peace and status quo with the Ukraine?
Does Pakistan want peace and status quo with India? (Rather than a general penis contest + Kashmir?)
Do all muslim states want peace and status quo with Israel? Iran, maybe?
How many Sunni muslim states want peace and status quo with the Chi'ite? or vice versa?

The world would be nicer and safer if it was as you describe, but it simply is not. Greed, hatred, religious bigotry, megalomania, etc, all those do exist.
 
dan_inbox said:
Blitzo said:
Generally speaking I think few nations will seek to wage a war against an enemy for the sake of it -- if an objective can be achieved through peacetime signalling (i.e.: deterrence) that would always be preferable to war, regardless of the nation's politics.
Generally speaking, maybe, but not always.
Some states want peace and status quo. Others want annexations, or the destruction of other states, or even the destruction of a population.

A few examples:
Do you think that Putin wanted peace and status quo with the Ukraine?
Does Pakistan want peace and status quo with India? (Rather than a general penis contest + Kashmir?)
Do all muslim states want peace and status quo with Israel? Iran, maybe?
How many Sunni muslim states want peace and status quo with the Chi'ite? or vice versa?

The world would be nicer and safer if it was as you describe, but it simply is not. Greed, hatred, religious bigotry, megalomania, etc, all those do exist.

I think everyone wants peace on terms that are favourable to them. The purposes of military force are to coerce aka deter (if you're on the good side) opposing forces to act in ways that beneficial for your interests. Military force is often first used by a party in instances when the circumstances of peace are no longer acceptable to said party.

There is a different between wanting to achieve political objectives through military force without actively fighting a war (which is what I'm talking about) -- and it is something else entirely to be "satisfied" with a given "status quo".

What I believe, is that nations prefer to change the "status quo" in a way that is more beneficial to their own interests, by using military force in a way that coerces/deters other players to change their behaviours, without resorting to active conflict. That is almost always the first and most preferable way of going about it. If it fails, then the use of actual lethal military force to start an actual conflict may occur, depending on how important said interests are.

This is getting a bit off topic, though feel free to continue the discussion via other means if you wish.
 
Actually, I agree with what you have said. Conflict is just too expensive and with the reduced numbers in terms of ships, aircraft and tanks, any losses are a higher proportion of the military budget/resource stock. We are effectively building/buying our way our way to a position where conflict is LESS likely. Consider that any government will have to justify starting a conflict which will hopefully be harder to do.
 
Foo Fighter said:
Actually, I agree with what you have said. Conflict is just too expensive and with the reduced numbers in terms of ships, aircraft and tanks, any losses are a higher proportion of the military budget/resource stock. We are effectively building/buying our way our way to a position where conflict is LESS likely. Consider that any government will have to justify starting a conflict which will hopefully be harder to do.

"Conflict is just too expensive." That's the quandary, isn't it. To rephrase...

What's it worth to you? What idea, or, for whom are you willing to commit fully your life and all the lives of your friends, neighbors and countrymen? Who will fight and die at your side? Why is it important that we remember the value of what we are paying to defend? It's because who ends up the victor matters.

The League of Nations was the birth of an idea that failed to prevent the aggression of the Axis powers. The US fully committed to ending that aggression and laid the groundwork for over 70 years of the constant improvement of peoples lives around the world. World wide improvement in nutrition, decreases in infant mortality, increases in life expectancy, increases in world wealth and trade. Literally billions of human beings live safe and prosper under the umbrella of U.S. military might and American-influenced global markets.

Would the same have happened if Germany would have won WWII? Would there have been a German version of the Marshall Plan? Would there be a United Nations if the Axis powers had succeeded? And without the UN, what would Korea look like had N. Korea and PRC succeeded in their invasion of S. Korea? Would there have been an Axis version of NATO willing to intervene in Kosovo? The vote, on which, the PRC abstained in the UN. Would the PRC have assembled a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait? A coalition which included Syria by the way. What about the cold war with the USSR? US power projection enabled the world to continue to advance throughout that time period.

The statement was made in an earlier post that "everyone wants peace on terms that are favorable to them." That brings us back to the question.

Peace at what price? Are the terms worth it to you, your grandchildren? Is existence enough? Is religious freedom that important? These are questions many are being asked. It's certainly the question the PRC is pushing to it's neighbors today. The tactic in use is crippling economic terms, violence and force to the level just under what will engage the worlds attention and force action by the United States. Russia, Iran and the PRC, as examples, are making the case to whom ever will listen that the US, UN, NATO and their allies will not be willing or able to intervene on their behalf. Consider Russia and Ukraine. Consider the recent actions of the Philippines. Consider the example of Germany in reinforcing their point.

Germany and Japan have similar sized economies at ~45k per person. Yet in 2018, Germany had available about 1/3 of its military; 0 of 6 submarines, 3 of 15 transports, 9 of 15 frigates, 65 of 231 fighters, 95 of 244 tanks etc. The German government tells itself and the world that they are meeting their NATO requirements because there is no requirement made of them at the moment by NATO. Yet what would they bring to the fight tomorrow should it be necessary? It seems, not much. Evidently the German people, as exercised through their government are not willing to pay the price today. Perhaps in three to six months, should the conflict last that long, they will have the forces they committed to engaging. This behavior reinforces the case the PRC is making to its neighbors in SE Asia and others around the world. "We will force you to accept our behavior and the US and her allies are can not and will not assist you."

Some have characterized the US as a hegemon. Perhaps it is. But a benevolent hegemon surely. And it's been the best deal going for the last 70 years. So much so that it's been the place that most immigrants want to end up. The US had about 1/4 the population of the PRC in 2000 and is expected to have half the population of the PRC by 2100. This will be a result of the US constantly increasing in population to 500M and the PRC shrinking to ~1B. But why is that? What does the US offer that so many immigrants want?

With ~4% of the worlds population the US is the dominant exporter of cultural phenomena and technology even today. For example, SpaceX didn't exist in 2000 and now has over 65% of the space launch market. Tesla didn't exist in 2000 and is transforming the worlds understanding of transportation through electric automobiles and the coming Class 8 heavy trucks. Through technological development the US is now the worlds top oil producer. The US continues feed the world and, overall, lead by positive example, speaking plainly to ally, competitor and adversary alike. In spite of all these examples, there are those that hint at a moral equivalency with the use of force by Western democracies. They suggest prejudice as potentially the foundation of our understanding of what necessitates defense of our political differences with our competitors and adversaries and even our value of peace. But that is a foolish notion as is clear by the resulting world advancement this last century under the leadership of western democracies.

Through ingenuity and high production, the US has led the development of the F-35. A 5th gen platform for under US90M where the Eurofighter is over US100M. Many US allies have decided to move forward in flying the F-35 and more will consider the value and choose to also participate. Perhaps that is what gets us back on topic.

What will Penetrating Counter Air actually do, what will it cost, and when will it be available?
Will the US share that capability with her allies? These are things I like to read about going forward.

Perhaps she will, perhaps not share PCA tech. Regardless, the record shows the US shows up for the fight, bleeds and dies with her friends and helps allies and adversaries to pick up the pieces afterwards.

Let's hope that we don't lose sight of the inestimable value of the differences between western democratic ideals and those of our competitors and adversaries. Nor forget the cost others have paid for the prosperity and peace we currently enjoy. That price is never paid in full so the question will constantly be asked.
 
NeilChapman said:
The statement was made in an earlier post that "everyone wants peace on terms that are favorable to them." That brings us back to the question.

Peace at what price? Are the terms worth it to you, your grandchildren? Is existence enough? Is religious freedom that important? These are questions many are being asked. It's certainly the question the PRC is pushing to it's neighbors today. The tactic in use is crippling economic terms, violence and force to the level just under what will engage the worlds attention and force action by the United States. Russia, Iran and the PRC, as examples, are making the case to whom ever will listen that the US, UN, NATO and their allies will not be willing or able to intervene on their behalf. Consider Russia and Ukraine. Consider the recent actions of the Philippines. Consider the example of Germany in reinforcing their point.

You understand the point, kind of.

My statement which started all this was the notion that no one builds a military wanting to fight a war as a primary objective in and of itself, but rather everyone builds a military with the primary goal of using it to deter opponents and shape their behaviours.
War typically occurs if the peacetime use of military force to coerce/deter is insufficient and if that results in unacceptable threats to one's national interests.


This goes for China, Russia, NK, Iran, but also the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, SK, India, and so on, in relation to their national objectives.
 
To get things back on track, there's been a question that's been nagging at the back of my mind for a while now. Is there any consensus in the community as to when PCA/NGAD etc is meant to be introduced?

Many of the new "new gen" fighter programmes like Tempest, FCAS, F-3 seem like they are meant to enter service in the mid 2030s and will offer something that may either be considered "5th gen+," "near 6th gen" or "5.5 gen". The generation of what those fighters will be called, will be dependent on how existing 5th gen aircraft are further developed to introduce capabilities that FCAS, Tempest and F-3 may have when they enter service -- and also what the big mil aviation trailblazers like the US, and potentially Russia, China (by that time) will introduce in terms of "real" 6th gen capability.

And that's the problem, nobody yet knows what kind of capability or CONOPs a "6th gen" fighter will look like. But in terms of timeline, simplistically speaking I can't help but wonder if we may see a further "staggering" approach to 5th and 6th gen in the same way that 4th and 5th gen was done:

"First wave" of 4th gens, introduced in 1970s-1980s: F-15, F-16, F-18, Su-27, Mig-29, Mirage, among others
"Second wave" of 4th gens/4.5 gens, introduced in late 1990s and early 2000s: Typhoon, Rafale, Gripen, F-2, Super hornet, J-10 (to an extent), and various upgraded iterations of existing "first wave" 4th gens

Notably, the "second wave" of 4th gens were introduced at the starting period of where the "first wave" of subsequent 5th gens would begin to enter service or reach advanced development.

"First wave" of 5th gens, introduced in 2000s-2010s: F-22 (which remained the only 5th gen for quite a few years), F-35, J-20, Su-57 (maybe a PLA medium weight fighter will also enter service by the mid 2020s which will be a bit of an outlier between the first and second waves;
"Second wave" of 5th gens/5.5th gens, which look like many of which will start to be introduced in the 2030s: FCAS, Tempest, F-3, but also potentially TFX, KFX, AMCA (the latter three of which seem like they are a little less ambitious than the first three). And of course I expect many "first wave" 5th gens to receive new variants or MLUs to introduce "5.5th gen" capability to them in the same way that many "first wave" 4th gens received upgrades to keep them up to date with second wave "4.5th gen" capability.

So, I wonder how likely that when the "second wave" 5th gen/5.5th gen fighters begin to enter service in the mid 2030s, if we can expect the first 6th gens to begin to enter service as well, likely with the US first. But that means we'll have to see some kind of demonstrator fly within the next few years, or at least for a prototype to fly some time around 2027-2028 -- assuming a similar timescale of development to F-22 (7-8 years).

Given that, I think it is a bit strange that the US has yet to lay out a clear programme name and a set of requirements for a new fighter project, if it is intended to enter service by the mid 2030s, considering how early we're hearing about European and Japanese and other nation's efforts to build new fighter aircraft/concepts. There are a few explanations in my mind:
1. It is definitely possible that 6th gen ends up being something different such that development may be more dispersed among different, less ambitious/shorter timescale projects, but it seems to me that a central manned aircraft will still be part of the equation, even if it is only as a key battle manager/data node for future unmanned elements.
2. The US simply does not expect to field a wholly "new" 6th gen capability by the mid 2030s, maybe delaying it till the late 2030s/2040
3. Many elements of the programme (or perhaps even the whole programme) is being clandestinely developed in great secrecy and only to be unveiled much later when it is closer to its first flight.
 
Deferring expense and introducing a 5.5 gen aircraft has the benefit of keeping research and production going while allowing a longer lead time for development of new tech and is probably the only way to go. Leaving long spells between generations harms everyone as expertise cannot be left on the shelf like navy crews in the 18th century between wars.
 
Blitzo said:
3. Many elements of the programme (or perhaps even the whole programme) is being clandestinely developed in great secrecy and only to be unveiled much later when it is closer to its first flight.

This seems quite unlikely to me. In this day and age it is VERY hard to keep such complex and expensive programs secret. Stuff like smaller programes, like spy drones (RQ-180 or whatever it's really called) may somehow slip through, but even a strategic asset like the B-21 is not secret. Sure, technical details about it are, but US couldn't have managed the whole program to be developed in secrecy, in the way that B-2 was decades ago.

That being said, various parties within US MIC and DoD have been talking it up how protracted development cycles must be broken and how they hope to achieve that with the new fighter. So it MAY not be impossible that we suddenly get a very speedy development going on. Like 2020 program definition, 2021 competition start, 2025 winner chosen (among flying demonstrators) and 5-6 years to get the actual plane to some sort of IOC, even if it's rushed into service, despite many initial shortcomings to be solved later on. All the milestones are purely illustrative. I've no info that the program requirements will indeed get defined in 2020.
 
To get things back on track, there's been a question that's been nagging at the back of my mind for a while now. Is there any consensus in the community as to when PCA/NGAD etc is meant to be introduced?

Ha. Anyone who knows the answer to that one is not going to give it away for free.

I'm not sure that there is an answer. There are aspirations, plans and some programs but not a lot of indications that the people who matter agree on what should happen to them.
 
LowObservable said:
To get things back on track, there's been a question that's been nagging at the back of my mind for a while now. Is there any consensus in the community as to when PCA/NGAD etc is meant to be introduced?

Ha. Anyone who knows the answer to that one is not going to give it away for free.

I'm not sure that there is an answer. There are aspirations, plans and some programs but not a lot of indications that the people who matter agree on what should happen to them.

Oh yeah, I wasn't necessarily fishing for any kind of "official" date, but rather if the community so far had an "agreed upon" period from what we know publicly.
 
ynm said:
I remember reading a paper of RAND about low observable aircraft designs, but can only google this
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA314256

The paper I referred to is similar, but contains more designs. And it is not only about fighter but bomber (IIRC). It also compares trade off between low observable and agility. But I can not google it. Does anyone have a clue about it?

From the same source.
 

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Sundog said:
Isn't that last one one of Raymer's designs for a JSF study?
This is Raymer's design for notional Next Generation Attack Fighter (NGAF) study of Rand Corp. (1993-1996)
 
flateric said:
Sundog said:
Isn't that last one one of Raymer's designs for a JSF study?
This is Raymer's design for notional Next Generation Attack Fighter (NGAF) study of Rand Corp. (1993-1996)

Ahh, yes, NGAF, I forgot about that program. There were so many leading up to the JSF. ;)
 
NGAF wasn't a 'program'. This was an internal RAND study.
That's clearly explained in document posted above.
 
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/12/14/budget-watchdogs-warn-of-expensive-price-tag-for-next-air-force-fighter/?utm_campaign=Socialflow+DFN&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&fbclid=IwAR1eWH7AkjDosCbJXhhj_1LSKY_0n_faTZ7D192Evv-WFd22grMhFyex4x4

WASHINGTON — A next-generation air superiority jet for the U.S. Air Force, known by the service as Penetrating Counter Air, could cost about $300 million in 2018 dollars per plane, the Congressional Budget Office states in a new study.

At that price, PCA would be more than three times that of the average F-35A jet, which is set at about $94 million to capture both the expense of early production lots and the decline in cost as the production rate increases, according the report, which predicts the cost of replacing the Air Force’s aircraft inventory from now until 2050.

This sum, while not an official cost estimate from the Pentagon, represents the first time a government entity has weighed in on the potential price tag for PCA.
 
LowObservable said:
To get things back on track, there's been a question that's been nagging at the back of my mind for a while now. Is there any consensus in the community as to when PCA/NGAD etc is meant to be introduced?

They Navy is sticking to its "2030/31" time frame though based on the FY19 budget, the funding does not really line up with that although they could be getting ready to ramp up spending plans starting FY20. The CNO again reiterated 2030 as the in service entry point..

It is also interesting that the Navy is now calling the FA-XX NGAD as well.

By the end of 2019, identify requirements across the family of systems to replace the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G by 2030.

https://news.usni.org/2018/12/17/cno-richardson-calls-aggressive-timelines-new-weapons-operational-concepts-updated-navy-design
 

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USAF Acquisition Head Urges Radical Shift For Next-Gen Fighter Program
Mar 5, 2019 Steve Trimble | Aviation Week & Space Technology

As presented by the aerospace industry’s concept artists, the so-called sixth-generation fighter for the U.S. Air Force is often shown as a step beyond the Lockheed Martin F-22: a futuristic, tailless, super-dogfighter.

But that vision of NGAD may never come into existence.

A new concept for the project emerged from the Air Force’s top acquisition official at the Air Warfare Symposium on Feb. 28, and it calls for a radical break from conventional aircraft development programs.

Rather than spend the next decade developing a singular new air combat platform, the NGAD program may be shaped to establish a pipeline for acquiring, developing and fielding a host of new aircraft types, with a new design entering service perhaps as quickly as every two years. Instead of pinning all hopes on a single model, the alternative, if it works, would allow Air Force leaders to hedge against the risk of technology breakthroughs and to surprise enemies with unexpected new capabilities.
 
Halle-bleeping-lujah. Does this mean it will happen?????
 
Foo Fighter said:
Halle-bleeping-lujah. Does this mean it will happen?????

No.

But, with rapid manufacturing getting so much better and 3D printed parts becoming more robust and our understanding of how to make them getting better, I could see it happening maybe every five years. The exception being powerplants and certain systems would be on a much greater time line. So I could see them saying, "Here's this family of powerplants and systems. Now plug them into different airframes for the following mission sets."
 
Sundog said:
Foo Fighter said:
Halle-bleeping-lujah. Does this mean it will happen?????

No.

But, with rapid manufacturing getting so much better and 3D printed parts becoming more robust and our understanding of how to make them getting better, I could see it happening maybe every five years. The exception being powerplants and certain systems would be on a much greater time line. So I could see them saying, "Here's this family of powerplants and systems. Now plug them into different airframes for the following mission sets."

"Here's a J79 and J75. Go to town."
 
One issue with this would potentially be the logistics support costs of having a multitude of new platforms in service.
 
Digital design tools may allow a diverse fleet of aircraft to share enough similarities that the sustainment cost is roughly comparable with that for a common fleet

Oh really? Just ask ALIS!
 
Whilst i can certainly applaud the USAF's aims, I'm not sure whether it's met reality yet.

I don't really see realistic ideas on how to compress the 2-3 year detailed design and 2-5 year development test/qualification/certification phases without doing small changes to a common base airframe. Other parts of the design cycle yes, but not those bits

Its taken Airbus and Boeing about 5 years and a billion $ each to put a new engine on a wing.... Aerospace is expensive
 
GTX said:
One issue with this would potentially be the logistics support costs of having a multitude of new platforms in service.

If the airframes are being manufactured using low cost manufacturing, that shouldn't be too much of an issue and as long as they are all using the same systems, or subsets of components from those systems, I don't think that should be that big of a problem. That's another reason why I said they would recommend a family of powerplants with various bypass ratios, etc, but the cores would essentially be the same. For instance, just look at the F404 and F414 and all of the different variants developed from those. So, similar to what SFerrin said, you could have a basic core F414 type, a basic core F135 type, and something off the shelf/commercial for the high bypass turbofans. In a sense, the USAF/DOD become the contractors for the systems and let the airframers have a catalog of approved systems to choose from; which I think could also help to lower costs, in the way the rapid prototypes office does, because, IMHO, the systems should already be proven.

This allows long development cycle systems to be in continuous development, separate from actual aircraft programs, in the same manner that physical PC's are separate from the OS development cycle. Also, as much of it should be "plug and play," which I know they've been working towards, as possible. I mean right now, look at all of the modifications that have to be done to airframes to upgrade radar systems. It would be nice to have a standard attachment/connection/power system, so they could be rapidly changed out based on new developments. It seems to me, this is what they are working towards.
 
SWAP-C considerations for modern avionics, jammers, DEWs, engines (particularly third-stream) and the ensuing requirement
for tight coupling really preclude the above from being a reality.

No one is brave enough to use a 3d printed part extensively in load bearing structures on a fighter.
And no one is going to dive into a new alloy (e.g. al 7085 on F-35) without a very long soak on a fighter (vs. the A380 for al 7085).

Roper has no control over DOT&E and LFT&E which the MDA largely gets around and the century series didn't have.

And the commercial aerospace example is instructive: even the universal pylon on the 787 isn't.
 
Actually, an alternative interpretation is Size, Weight, Power and Cost, see https://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/SWAP-C (although neither really explains the superfluous "A" in the wrong location).
 
They used to just talk about "space, weight, and power" (SWaP).
 
Ok, thanks for the description.

The challenge I see is that if you don’t design fighters frequently enough than you don’t learn how to design fighters. A new fighter every 15 years means your are practically learning from scratch how to design and build them. A faster design cycle leads to an actual learning curve that makes future fighters easier.

Based on the Breaking Defense story about the US losing salvo competition war games, a small elite fighter force is not competitive for the precision strike future.
 
A 1000mile gun for SEAD is needed.

AWST apr 22 may 5 2019
USAF Fleet is structured for the wrong war

"Not only are they too small, by one-third, to fight a near-simultaneous war with Russia and China in 2030, the U.S. Air Force’s four newest frontline combat aircraft today—the B-2, F-35A, F-22 and KC-46—will be limited to stand-off distance from future highly contested airspace.
In 2030, a new crop of Russian and Chinese very-long-range air-to-air missiles will keep Boeing’s newly delivered KC-46 tankers at least 500-1,000 nm away from defended airspace, flanked by a protective shield of aging F-16s. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin F-35As will still slip through an enemy’s long-range fighter screens but will now stay safely outside an enemy’s borders, lobbing Stand-in Attack Weapons (SiAW)—the Air Force’s future version of the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER)—at targets from hundreds of miles away.
The long-range penetration mission—a mainstay of U.S. offensive strategy since World War II—will now rely on a new family of frontline aircraft designed to avoid detection by low-frequency tracking radars. Led by Northrop Grumman B-21s, a still undefined next-generation fighter and a mysterious new penetrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (P-ISR) aircraft, this sixth-generation strike package penetrates deep inside enemy airspace from multiple directions and lingers there as long as possible.
As the successors of the Northrop Grumman B-2 and Lockheed Martin’s F-22 and F-35A, these aircraft find the most elusive or dangerous targets then nullify them using electronic or kinetic effects or by sending the target information to distant F-35s with SiAWs or Boeing B-52s loaded with long-range weapons, including hypersonic missiles.
That sobering scenario, presented in an April 11 report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), describes not a distant vision of aerial warfare but a near-term wake-up call for the airpower community and Congress, according to the authors. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) released by the Pentagon in 2018 calls for the military to be prepared to win a war with China and Russia within a decade, but today’s Air Force is woefully short of the aircraft and capabilities needed for the task, the CSBA concludes in the congressionally mandated report.
“We have a force that is not well-suited to these kinds of conflicts because we haven’t invested in the force in the last 25 years the way we should have,” CSBA Senior Fellow and report co-author Mark Gunzinger tells Aviation Week. “Now we’re playing catch-up. We really, really are.”
Indeed, the CSBA report echoes the eight-month-old, unclassified summary of the Air Force’s own analysis, “The Air Force We Need.” In late 2017, Congress commissioned the reports by the CSBA and the Air Force—along with another unreleased, classified analysis by Mitre Corp. The objective was to gather insight for shaping resource decisions in the absence of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The latter was replaced in 2018 by the Defense Department’s less detailed NDS.
Of the three assessments, the CSBA offers the only independent and unclassified analysis of a force structure for the Air Force and one that is unconstrained by the Trump administration’s budget and policy agenda.
“What the QDRs gave [Congress] was, ‘Here is our strategy, and here is the force that we can afford to best support the strategy.’ But that is not what Congress wanted. They said, ‘We come up with what the nation can afford. We want to know what’s needed,'” says Gunzinger, one of the report’s five co-authors and a contributor to five QDRs.
According to both reports, the Air Force needs more and different aircraft. The service’s “Air Force We Need” analysis concluded that the requirements laid out by the NDS, which include fighting rogue states and lightly armed insurgents, call for a total of 386 squadrons, including units devoted to nonaviation missions such as cyberwarfare and space. The CSBA analyzed requirements only for aviation units and came up with similar overall results. Today, the Air Force operates a total of 169 squadrons flying bombers, fighters, tankers, command-and-control (C2) and ISR missions. Whereas the Air Force calls for adding 50 squadrons to raise that to 219, the CSBA analysis proposes raising the inventory by 54 squadrons.
The two reports agree roughly on the size of the force but disagree on the fleet mix. The CSBA report calls for 24 bomber squadrons in 2030, a 71% increase over the 14 squadrons recommended by the Air Force. But the Air Force report proposes 89 squadrons made up of ISR and C2 aircraft, versus 76 called for by the CSBA. The numbers of fighters and tankers are roughly equal between both reports, with the CSBA suggesting three more fighter units and four more tanker units than the Air Force’s vision for 2030.
The classification of the Air Force’s report makes the mix of aircraft types within those top-line fleet numbers unknown. But that is also what makes the CSBA version of the report so interesting. Unconstrained by the obstacle of secrecy, the CSBA project was free to speculate on the specific types of aircraft the Air Force will need after 2030. Moreover, two of the report’s authors—Gunzinger and Carl Rehberg—performed such analyses within the Pentagon until retiring from government employment within the last decade.
As an aircraft that entered the development stage 3.5 years ago, the B-21 presents a special case. Though nearly all schedule and performance details are classified, the authors make intriguing projections about the bomber’s current and potential production capacity over the next decade. Based on limited information provided by the Defense Department’s selected acquisition reports, the CSBA report estimates that Northrop Grumman will deliver 38 B-21s by 2030. But even that pace is not fast enough. The CSBA authors recommend accelerating the production ramp-up to complete 55 B-21 deliveries by 2030, starting with the first in 2024.
The Air Force needs B-21s because they form the heart of the CSBA’s projected stand-in strike package. The next-generation fighter and existing F-35As and F-22s are useful, but alone they lack the range and payload for the task.
“What if your tanker has to stand off 500 mi.? What if close-in air bases are under threat?” Gunzinger asks. “You don’t want to do that with something that requires a lot of refueling and carrying that [smaller] payload.”
Although larger than a fighter, the B-21 is considered survivable against the next generation of airborne and ground-based threats, in CSBA’s analysis. The Air Force has not released the size of the B-21, but Rehberg—a former B-1B pilot—considers it smaller than a B-52 or B-2, which helps its stealth signature.
“It’s also the outer mold line, and it’s the material you use that’s determinate,” Gunzinger says. “You design something with a couple tails that stick up, and your exhaust is hanging out in the breeze—OK, that’s going to be pretty easy to find.”
The same analysis also consigned the F-35A to a standoff role in the CSBA’s 2030 study. “I think you need a new outer mold line for a highly contested environment,” Gunzinger says. “You need something that’s all-aspect, broadband [and stealthy].”
But the F-35A still has much to offer for a next-generation fighter, which the CSBA identifies as a dual-mission Penetrating Counter Air/Penetrating Electronic Attack (PCA/P-EA) aircraft. The report calls on the Air Force to accelerate the first delivery to 2026, even though the Next-Generation Air Dominance acquisition program has not yet opened for bids. The faster time line would require the Air Force to leverage mature technology as much as possible, Gunzinger says. One possibility is to combine the F-35’s existing avionics and mission system with a new airframe optimized for broadband stealth. That suggests a tailless, supersonic aircraft.
“That would drive you to a different kind of [outer mold line] and a different kind of concept for operating that,” Gunzinger says. “You’ll not necessarily be pulling high-Gs and so forth. It’d be more of a [beyond-visual-range] type platform.”
The authors provide less detail on the projected requirement for a P-ISR aircraft, due to the sensitivity of the mission area and their backgrounds in recent government service.
“It could be manned or unmanned, and there’s probably nothing more I can say about it, and neither can Carl because we were in that world not too long ago,” Gunzinger says. “Everything that penetrates ought to be able to contribute to operations in the [electromagnetic spectrum] to include communications, sensing, jamming and creating other effects.”"
 
What technologies do they think we be introduced that will limit the F-35 and F-22 to utilizing stand-off weapons? From the references to broadband stealth it sounds like they are thinking about VHF radars but those have huge limitations when it comes to any task beyond getting a rough idea of where an object is.
 

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