CVA01 problems

I've read that the CVA01 was cramped, poorly designed, lightly built, vulnerable, and that it's chief designer said it's cancellation was the happiest day of his life. Anyone care to add details? How efficient a ship would it have been?

Do you have a source for these statements?
It's hard to qualify personal statements without a source. Is it the designers talking or an author's interpretation?

The quote you mention was Professor Louis Rydill, the CVA-01 project leader 1962-67, not a chief designer. His remark referred to the fact that the design incorporated so many innovations that could potentially lead to delays and cost overruns while having an under-resourced and short staffed team to deal with all the issues.

Since size and cost were critical factors it is not surprising that compromises had to be made.
Compared to previous carriers CVA-01 traded armour weight for structure weight for increased volume. Ratio of volume to displacement was 4.1, Centaur/Eagle were around 3.2 and the later Invincible 4.6. Yet by contrast CVA-01s structure weight was greater than Eagles. The use of QT35 steel (developed for the SSN programme) was cut from 9,000 tons to 3,000 tons to reduce the costs by £2.5mil and ease the problems of too few trained welders in the industry. The QT35 mainly remained in the armoured and high stress areas and older QT28 and B quality steel substituted. It was estimated this reduced the splinter protection resistance by 7%.
For an in-depth coverage of CVA-01s construction and the various steels used I would recommend Ian Sturton's article in Wrship 2014

The hangar was 96% of Eagle's by area so was quite tight but probably the biggest possible given the restraints on the hull size. Crew accomodation was to the standards of the time with space for additional personnel over that required for the war complement with air conditioning to tropical standards.

Armour was splinter protection only, generally provided by the structure of the ship (1.0-1.25in thickness) which protected against splinters from 500lb MC bombs and shells up to 4.5in calibre with some reinforcements in certain areas. The operations compartments had 1.5in top and side plating to keep out 6in shells. The weapon magazines were protected against splinters from 1,000-2,000lb Soviet ASM warheads exploding outside and 6in AP shells, 1,000lb MC bombs and 60lb SAP rockets. A large missile could penetrate the magazines and topsides penetration could not be prevented but sub-division, fire-fighting gear and shock protection would lesser the effects. Nuclear blast pressure of 10psi could be withstood to enable the ship still to be able to steam. The flight deck could withstand 3.5psi to remain operational with her airgroup.
The 19ft thick torpedo defense system was quite effective, defeating a 1,800lb warhead with protection up to 1,500lb at the ends. The then biggest known torpedo warhead was 1,200lb.

how about this, for a start ? http://archive.is/moSv

it was pretty damning for CVA-01. Then again, I don't know whether the author had an axe to grin or not.

Taken in context:

In the aftermath of the cancellation it was often reported that the final revised CVA-01 design had so many potential problems - and had been so badly affected by political pressures, constraints and the arbitrary displacement limit - that many people involved in the project felt that too many risks were being taken and that the final design was probably unworkable. It was also reported that upon the Project's cancellation the ships Chief Designer from 1962, L. J. Lydell, commented that it was the happiest day of his life! However an examination of original project documents shows that while there were many debates and issues, there was no suggestion of a feeling of doom and gloom about the actual design itself prior to cancellation. A degree of political convenience (for both sides of the House of Commons) may well have crept in to the story, and been repeated ever since.

Click to expand...

Getting his name wrong doesn't inspire bundles of confidence.

The Treasury's view on expenditure [never underestimate the power of the Treasury in UK government] on the carriers can be seen from a quote from a senior Treasury official at the time of the Skybolt cancellation and the subsequent purchase of Polaris:


"We may therefore have to look at an alternative which will be equally unpopular, though in the Navy's quarter this time. We are in fact given a lead by a point the Admiralty made on the POLARIS build up. It is this.
The Admiralty say that one of the limiting factors on the build-up will be design staff; they will need, they say, freedom to recruit these in large numbers and at fancy rates. The obvious suggestion for the Chancellor to make, at a suitable early moment, would be that the first step on the design side is to switch the staff employed at Bath on the aircraft carrier successors [ie, CVA01] from this work to work on the POLARIS submarines. This ought to have the effect of putting back the carrier successors by several years and thus giving us useful relief in the late 'sixties. The Admiralty, of course, will fight this tooth and nail."