Vought Crusader for F-X (1962) instead of Northrop F-5A

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As said in the tin. The N-156F life was quite precarious until Kennedy revived a LWF program in 1961. On April 23, 1962, Northrop F-5A was the winner. some years later another similar competition, IFA, was (logically) won by the F-5E. Together they sold more than 2000 airframes, then spawned both F-18 and F-20. Overall, Northrop line that goes from the N-156T to the Super Hornet was a major success.
Now, whatif this was derailed by... Vought ?

I can't find F-X / FX anymore (damn it) but I vaguely remember Vought proposed a land-based, simplified Crusader, eventually with a J-79. Whatif that aircraft was picked as a winner instead of the F-5A (and later, F-5E) ?

Would it sell as well as the F-5 did ?

This would butterfly the Hornet and F-20, for a start.

Which bring us to naval fighters, something the F-5 never did because of its wing / stall characteristics. Both France and Great Britain wanted fifferent Crusaders for their navies, in the mid-60's (see the thread).
By 1971 in France, Dassault, Aerospatiale and the French aéronavale all had a love affair with Vought (harcking back to 1939 and the V-156F dive bombers). This could solve the "Crusader conundrum" where the French aircrafts remained in service until Rafale, that is, in 1999...

The F-X Crusader would have kept Vought into the fighter business far better than the A-7, there might have been some synergies between the two aircrafts.
Would a much improved Crusader be a better choice than the troubled Hornet ?

Vietnam might be a little different. The old Crusaders did wonder against the MiG-21. The F-X Crusader would be far better.

As you can see, there is a lot of "whatif" potential.

Possible timeline

- 1961 Vought Crusader is picked as a winner to F-X - with a J-79 in place of the old J-57

- 1963 France announce it picks the J-57 Crusader for its Clemenceau carriers. Yet they are interested by the J-79... or perhaps even by the American Spey developped for the A-7, the TF-41. Great Britain reacts "We want a Spey Crusader, too !" J-79 and TF-41 are close enough in dimensions, weight and thrust the aircraft can fly with both engines. A tri-service Crusader program is setup, between the United States, France, and Great Britain. The later country notes that improved Crusaders could fly out of Centaur-class carriers (not dissimilar to French Clemenceaus) and starts considering that as a cheap alternative to CVA-01, Ark Royal / Eagle upgrades.

- 1964: France initially wanted a cheaper, single-seat J-79 aircraft, but GB is pushing toward a two-seat, AW, TF-41 powered machine. France capitulates, and goes for the second option. They loan some "ordinary" Crusaders from the USN to bridge their naval fighter gap.

- May 1965: the tri-partite agreement. No Jaguar, by the way.

- 1966: the land-based, F-X Crusader proves its worth in Vietnam, decimating NVAF Mig-21s. More and more interest in the type boils up all over the world. Vought proposes, indifferently, single seat / two seat, TF-41 / J-79, naval and land based variants.
 
That is an entirely logical, credible sequence. So, why did it not happen?

Northrop put up PV money for a cheap (expendable) mud-mover scheme, when their competitors were happily spending DoD's money on Century Series et al. From that they won T-38A. From that they evolved low-risk F-5A, of no interest to USAF/DoD but of great interest to State for Aid-to-poor Allies. Large production orders, so on to Hornets. McDonnell evolved a truly multi-role combat a/c in Phantoms: by 1961 USN was very happy with those, Crusader becoming an also-ran, its shrunk A-7A winning USN/USMC mud-mover, not an F-5/T-38 variant - again for low-risk reasons.

Aeronavale took much-modified F-8 because F-4B was seen as incompatible with Foch/Clemenceau, and the pre-mod. package was proven and cheap. So why did RN press for Spey/F-4, fit only for CV/CVA, leaving the Light Fleets with Vixen/Scimitar? I suggest: both to enhance the capability of CVA-01, so dissuading further upgrade of CVs, and to inter-operate with USN, especially East of Suez (and the 2-engine reliability issue, which enabled RN to escape from P.1154(RN). Aeronavale disdained that issue).

A Spey/TSR.2 avionics/F-8K/N could have been assembled in France, more parts from UK than were supplied to F-4K/M, and would have displaced F-4M in RAF. If that had been inherited 10/64 by the new Labour Govt. an AFVG might have survived and led to an EADS-type link up, UK/France, strongly placed to win FRG et al 1968 NKF F-104 replacement. Howzat for a WhatIf!
 
What made the F-5 so cheap, was its J-85 engines. They had been created for a cruise missile, for f**k sake. No surprise they were small and inexpensive ! I often think that pair of J-85s, while lacking power, were far more rugged and cheaper and easy to maintain than one of these big turbojets of the era - J-79, J-57, Atar or Avon. what make the F-5 so cheap was its trainer legacy, from the T-38. Nobody has repeated such a feat so far: to turn a trainer into a MiG-21 capable interceptor. Quite a feat when you think about it. Most modern trainers are subsonic and lack afterburner. Maybe the T-50 will be the F-5 of our times.
 
What if the super tiger if it had betten out the f-104 for Germany and Japan (and from there a lot of other countries), would it have also worked for the N-156F? Seems to me the specs are very similar at least.
 
The Super Tiger seems to be having a renaissance of late but it's export prospects still retain a few deadly flaws, both in general and particularly vs the F-5. Some of this is also true of the F-8.

Firstly, any fighter designed to take a slap from half of a CV-59 and do the same again tomorrow is rather over-engineered for most historical F-5 customers. The F-5 was as successful as it was because it was as simple as you can get with supersonic performance and affordable. I'm loathe to say cheap and cheerful but hopefully you get the idea. A more complex aircraft will drive up training, maintenance and spares costs and generally be unsupportable for straitened air arms even with favourable purchase terms.

The F-8's variable-incidence comes to mind here. It's unnecessary, complex and heavy for any land-based customers but I seriously contest that anybody would fund a lightened, de-navalized variant.

Secondly, the F11F-1F was an orphan. If you select it, you are the launch customer and could very well be the only customer. Without a US-buy, unit prices would be prohibitive for everyone but the most wealthy of nations and they will most likely have indigenous aerospace industries they would rather support! Oh and the F11F-1 is not the F11F-1F. The latter is effectively a new aircraft so that doesn't count! You will be paying for those production differences in the unit price, Grumman isn't a charity (nice try though)! The F-5 becomes an even more attractive proposition, cost-wise.

Thirdly, exportability. The US doesn't want to give it's latest and greatest away (except perhaps to a chosen few). While neither the Super Tiger or Crusader were state-of-the-art, I doubt either would have been on the export list to the same nations as the F-5A, not until later. Indeed, as far as I'm aware, the earliest the F-8 was historically looked at for wider export (outside closer allies such as the UK, Japan etc.) was c1972-3. I've mentioned elsewhere that for much of the 70s, the only supersonic fighter authorized for export to South America was the F-5, mandated by government policy. I understand their reticence to an extent. You could well imagine a scenario where a Crusader-equipped Ethiopia flips to a Soviet-alignment earlier than historical, while US servicemen are still flying effectively identical F-8s in combat. The public outrage would be quite justified! Political re-alignments weren't exactly unheard of.

That isn't to say that an AU exporting either the F-8 or the F-11 is outside the realms of possibility but not to nearly the same extent/success as the F-5 was and it would have a few issues to contend with.
 
The Super Tiger seems to be having a renaissance of late but it's export prospects still retain a few deadly flaws, both in general and particularly vs the F-5. Some of this is also true of the F-8.

Firstly, any fighter designed to take a slap from half of a CV-59 and do the same again tomorrow is rather over-engineered for most historical F-5 customers. The F-5 was as successful as it was because it was as simple as you can get with supersonic performance and affordable. I'm loathe to say cheap and cheerful but hopefully you get the idea. A more complex aircraft will drive up training, maintenance and spares costs and generally be unsupportable for straitened air arms even with favourable purchase terms.

The F-8's variable-incidence comes to mind here. It's unnecessary, complex and heavy for any land-based customers but I seriously contest that anybody would fund a lightened, de-navalized variant.

Secondly, the F11F-1F was an orphan. If you select it, you are the launch customer and could very well be the only customer. Without a US-buy, unit prices would be prohibitive for everyone but the most wealthy of nations and they will most likely have indigenous aerospace industries they would rather support! Oh and the F11F-1 is not the F11F-1F. The latter is effectively a new aircraft so that doesn't count! You will be paying for those production differences in the unit price, Grumman isn't a charity (nice try though)! The F-5 becomes an even more attractive proposition, cost-wise.

Thirdly, exportability. The US doesn't want to give it's latest and greatest away (except perhaps to a chosen few). While neither the Super Tiger or Crusader were state-of-the-art, I doubt either would have been on the export list to the same nations as the F-5A, not until later. Indeed, as far as I'm aware, the earliest the F-8 was historically looked at for wider export (outside closer allies such as the UK, Japan etc.) was c1972-3. I've mentioned elsewhere that for much of the 70s, the only supersonic fighter authorized for export to South America was the F-5, mandated by government policy. I understand their reticence to an extent. You could well imagine a scenario where a Crusader-equipped Ethiopia flips to a Soviet-alignment earlier than historical, while US servicemen are still flying effectively identical F-8s in combat. The public outrage would be quite justified! Political re-alignments weren't exactly unheard of.

That isn't to say that an AU exporting either the F-8 or the F-11 is outside the realms of possibility but not to nearly the same extent/success as the F-5 was and it would have a few issues to contend with.
The F-5 really was exquisitely tailored to the market, but for giggles lets look at a "super legere" version of the Tiger. You could probably shave about 1500 pounds for a land based only version. Use a non reheated 200 series Avon and slap a couple of additional cannon in the nose since you aren't going to be putting an AI radar in it...giving you a total of 6 20mm's. and 7 hard points with a speed of about M 1.3/1.4. Could leave the J-65 in it as well but we all know she is a dog...

Don't know how big a market there would be if any for it... but that is a lot of "Dakka-Dakka" used in a CAS role so giggle worthy to think about for a minute.
 
The Super Tiger seems to be having a renaissance of late but it's export prospects still retain a few deadly flaws, both in general and particularly vs the F-5. Some of this is also true of the F-8.

Firstly, any fighter designed to take a slap from half of a CV-59 and do the same again tomorrow is rather over-engineered for most historical F-5 customers. The F-5 was as successful as it was because it was as simple as you can get with supersonic performance and affordable. I'm loathe to say cheap and cheerful but hopefully you get the idea. A more complex aircraft will drive up training, maintenance and spares costs and generally be unsupportable for straitened air arms even with favourable purchase terms.

The F-8's variable-incidence comes to mind here. It's unnecessary, complex and heavy for any land-based customers but I seriously contest that anybody would fund a lightened, de-navalized variant.

Secondly, the F11F-1F was an orphan. If you select it, you are the launch customer and could very well be the only customer. Without a US-buy, unit prices would be prohibitive for everyone but the most wealthy of nations and they will most likely have indigenous aerospace industries they would rather support! Oh and the F11F-1 is not the F11F-1F. The latter is effectively a new aircraft so that doesn't count! You will be paying for those production differences in the unit price, Grumman isn't a charity (nice try though)! The F-5 becomes an even more attractive proposition, cost-wise.

Thirdly, exportability. The US doesn't want to give it's latest and greatest away (except perhaps to a chosen few). While neither the Super Tiger or Crusader were state-of-the-art, I doubt either would have been on the export list to the same nations as the F-5A, not until later. Indeed, as far as I'm aware, the earliest the F-8 was historically looked at for wider export (outside closer allies such as the UK, Japan etc.) was c1972-3. I've mentioned elsewhere that for much of the 70s, the only supersonic fighter authorized for export to South America was the F-5, mandated by government policy. I understand their reticence to an extent. You could well imagine a scenario where a Crusader-equipped Ethiopia flips to a Soviet-alignment earlier than historical, while US servicemen are still flying effectively identical F-8s in combat. The public outrage would be quite justified! Political re-alignments weren't exactly unheard of.

That isn't to say that an AU exporting either the F-8 or the F-11 is outside the realms of possibility but not to nearly the same extent/success as the F-5 was and it would have a few issues to contend with.
The F-5 really was exquisitely tailored to the market, but for giggles lets look at a "super legere" version of the Tiger. You could probably shave about 1500 pounds for a land based only version. Use a non reheated 200 series Avon and slap a couple of additional cannon in the nose since you aren't going to be putting an AI radar in it...giving you a total of 6 20mm's. and 7 hard points with a speed of about M 1.3/1.4. Could leave the J-65 in it as well but we all know she is a dog...

Don't know how big a market there would be if any for it... but that is a lot of "Dakka-Dakka" used in a CAS role so giggle worthy to think about for a minute.
Some good points but I have a quibble with some of them, for one I was thinking a small batch for the navy for cvs carriers like how the f-104 only had a small and short carrier for the usaf but even then, both Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to use it even without the usn, until of corse lockheed bribes got involved.

Second the short launch and landings (especially sense for the tiger it was all wing shape, unlike the f-8) can be a advantage, after all it means you don't have to extend your run ways, a bonus for poor countrys gust getting into the fighter bizness (it was also one of the reasons the luffwaffa liked the super tiger over the Starfighter)

And lastly the super tiger wasn't anywhere near the best the us had, its good but not any better the the f-5 was historically, thats way i felt it would have been a good fit, the specs are practically identical.
 
The Super Tiger seems to be having a renaissance of late but it's export prospects still retain a few deadly flaws, both in general and particularly vs the F-5. Some of this is also true of the F-8.

Firstly, any fighter designed to take a slap from half of a CV-59 and do the same again tomorrow is rather over-engineered for most historical F-5 customers. The F-5 was as successful as it was because it was as simple as you can get with supersonic performance and affordable. I'm loathe to say cheap and cheerful but hopefully you get the idea. A more complex aircraft will drive up training, maintenance and spares costs and generally be unsupportable for straitened air arms even with favourable purchase terms.

The F-8's variable-incidence comes to mind here. It's unnecessary, complex and heavy for any land-based customers but I seriously contest that anybody would fund a lightened, de-navalized variant.

Secondly, the F11F-1F was an orphan. If you select it, you are the launch customer and could very well be the only customer. Without a US-buy, unit prices would be prohibitive for everyone but the most wealthy of nations and they will most likely have indigenous aerospace industries they would rather support! Oh and the F11F-1 is not the F11F-1F. The latter is effectively a new aircraft so that doesn't count! You will be paying for those production differences in the unit price, Grumman isn't a charity (nice try though)! The F-5 becomes an even more attractive proposition, cost-wise.

Thirdly, exportability. The US doesn't want to give it's latest and greatest away (except perhaps to a chosen few). While neither the Super Tiger or Crusader were state-of-the-art, I doubt either would have been on the export list to the same nations as the F-5A, not until later. Indeed, as far as I'm aware, the earliest the F-8 was historically looked at for wider export (outside closer allies such as the UK, Japan etc.) was c1972-3. I've mentioned elsewhere that for much of the 70s, the only supersonic fighter authorized for export to South America was the F-5, mandated by government policy. I understand their reticence to an extent. You could well imagine a scenario where a Crusader-equipped Ethiopia flips to a Soviet-alignment earlier than historical, while US servicemen are still flying effectively identical F-8s in combat. The public outrage would be quite justified! Political re-alignments weren't exactly unheard of.

That isn't to say that an AU exporting either the F-8 or the F-11 is outside the realms of possibility but not to nearly the same extent/success as the F-5 was and it would have a few issues to contend with.
The F-5 really was exquisitely tailored to the market, but for giggles lets look at a "super legere" version of the Tiger. You could probably shave about 1500 pounds for a land based only version. Use a non reheated 200 series Avon and slap a couple of additional cannon in the nose since you aren't going to be putting an AI radar in it...giving you a total of 6 20mm's. and 7 hard points with a speed of about M 1.3/1.4. Could leave the J-65 in it as well but we all know she is a dog...

Don't know how big a market there would be if any for it... but that is a lot of "Dakka-Dakka" used in a CAS role so giggle worthy to think about for a minute.
Some good points but I have a quibble with some of them, for one I was thinking a small batch for the navy for cvs carriers like how the f-104 only had a small and short carrier for the usaf but even then, both Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to use it even without the usn, until of corse lockheed bribes got involved.

Second the short launch and landings (especially sense for the tiger it was all wing shape, unlike the f-8) can be a advantage, after all it means you don't have to extend your run ways, a bonus for poor countrys gust getting into the fighter bizness (it was also one of the reasons the luffwaffa liked the super tiger over the Starfighter)

And lastly the super tiger wasn't anywhere near the best the us had, its good but not any better the the f-5 was historically, thats way i felt it would have been a good fit, the specs are practically identical.

I have a familiarity with the aircraft
 
Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
 
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Also happened to the Mirage 4000, in passing. Fantastic flying machine, but if the "parent country air force" don't buy it first - nobody will.
 
Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
 
With it being just so simple, one wonders why the sky wasn't filled with F11Fs. :rolleyes:

Edited: OK, so the USN are buying "a few" then. How many? Too few and Grumman cannot build the order. It just wouldn't be economically viable for them. Combat aircraft production isn't a cottage industry. Too many and why are they buying F-8s again?? They might as well have just procured the F11F-1F in numbers from the outset. Yet they weren't inclined to do so.

As for Germany, was there an actual MoU? My impression is that events didn't get taken that far but I may be mistaken. Without an actual MoU, they were not "going to buy it". Simple proclamations of intent are merely that and no more. The ink is the thing.

I'm all for alternate history but you seem to be re-writing history, which isn't the same thing.
 
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Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
The problem is that Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
 
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The problem is that the Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
Found the book through pure luck on the Internet, red that, and it blew my mind too.
Corky makes clear Lockheed taught Grumman a lesson in armement sales back in 1958. And that Grumman certainly looked a bit amateurish there.
 
Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
The problem is that the Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
Yes, and that right there rather proves my point, it was grumman that declined the order, inorder to protect its other navy orders, not Germany despite the plane never had been ordered by the navy. (im pretty sure grumman would have gotten more money from all the super tiger orders then the usn trainer, E-2, and A-6 orders combined but thats gust hindsight)
 
Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
The problem is that the Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
Yes, and that right there rather proves my point, it was grumman that declined the order, inorder to protect its other navy orders, not Germany despite the plane never had been ordered by the navy. (im pretty sure grumman would have gotten more money from all the super tiger orders then the usn trainer, E-2, and A-6 orders combined but thats gust hindsight)
except Grumman did NOT turn down the order... they did not get the chance to. Lockheed could have saved the bribes.

EDIT: The reason we know that Grumman did not turn down the deal is it would be widely available public knowledge. The turning down of a deal of that size would have had a major effect on Grumman's stock price and harmed the company's reputation globally. No such records exist.
 
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Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
The problem is that the Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
Yes, and that right there rather proves my point, it was grumman that declined the order, inorder to protect its other navy orders, not Germany despite the plane never had been ordered by the navy. (im pretty sure grumman would have gotten more money from all the super tiger orders then the usn trainer, E-2, and A-6 orders combined but thats gust hindsight)
except Grumman did NOT turn down the order... they did not get the chance to. Lockheed could have saved the bribes.

EDIT: The reason we know that Grumman did not turn down the deal is it would be widely available public knowledge. The turning down of a deal of that size would have had a major effect on Grumman's stock price and harmed the company's reputation globally. No such records exist.
Its right there in the book, you may not believe it but shit like that happens all the time in the defense industry, wink and a nudge from your prime buyer leads to orders mysteriously disopering and nobody, especially sock owners know any better, especially in the late 50's erly 60's when stock owners often had far less information to work on.
 
Germany and Japan were perfectly ready to shortlist it. That isn't quite the same thing as "perfectly ready to use it". They clearly weren't perfectly willing to pay for it. Which is the important bit. High unit price might have had something to do with that. The Lockheed Scandal is part of the story, no doubt but not all of it. I have and respect the Corky book as much as the next guy but it is a bit ....weighted in places perhaps.

The simple fact of the matter is that a US non-buy of the F11F-1F would have killed it for any would-be operators if Lockheed didn't. Sometimes it just comes down to simple sticker price. The exact same thing happened to the YF-17, F-18L and F-20 (and probably the A-9 too) so Northrop have waaay more to feel aggrieved about than Grumman on that front! Makes the B-2 and B-21 almost poetic....
The super tiger was less then a million a pop, was the f-104 less expensive because i doubt it. and grumman litterly got a letter from the german government saying they were going to buy it despite the fact the navy wasn't going to, before "changeing their mind" im not sure how much more blatant you can get. Besides I even suggested the navy could by a few for cvs defense like the airforce bought a few f-104 it never planned to keep around long.
The problem is that the Mr. Grumman promised the navy he would not take the German order... it is right there in Corky's book.

I missed it the first couple of times I read it but it is there.. check the thread on "what if Germany had not gone F-104" lower down this page or on the next.
Yes, and that right there rather proves my point, it was grumman that declined the order, inorder to protect its other navy orders, not Germany despite the plane never had been ordered by the navy. (im pretty sure grumman would have gotten more money from all the super tiger orders then the usn trainer, E-2, and A-6 orders combined but thats gust hindsight)
except Grumman did NOT turn down the order... they did not get the chance to. Lockheed could have saved the bribes.

EDIT: The reason we know that Grumman did not turn down the deal is it would be widely available public knowledge. The turning down of a deal of that size would have had a major effect on Grumman's stock price and harmed the company's reputation globally. No such records exist.
Its right there in the book, you may not believe it but shit like that happens all the time in the defense industry, wink and a nudge from your prime buyer leads to orders mysteriously disopering and nobody, especially sock owners know any better, especially in the late 50's erly 60's when stock owners often had far less information to work on.
I have read the book. Mr Grumman stated that he had promised the navy that he would turn down the offer, but they never got the chance to actually do it: Check your timeline carefully, Lockheed had lured them away before Grumman had a chance to turn them down.

And no that kind of stuff is almost impossible to hide from share holders, SEC filing requirements particularly during the pre Reagan era were intense. There is no record of Grumman turning down the order in the press or in quarterly reports and plenty of records of them not getting the order in both.
 
I can't find F-X / FX anymore (damn it) but I vaguely remember Vought proposed a land-based, simplified Crusader, eventually with a J-79.

Would that be the Vought V-1000 Archibald ?

Regards
Pioneer
 
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