I just hope that NG have enough lobbists to fight their corner. Also I don't see why the company that brings the protest should get away scott free if it fails, they should incur a penalty of some sort.
 
Late February 2016 (approximately 100 days from Nov. 6, 2015) seems real far off but it'll be here in no time. Time really goes fast for this old fart. -SP
 
Boeing Protests Bomber Award

—John A. Tirpak11/9/2015

​Boeing, with its partner Lockheed Martin, officially informed the Air Force on Friday that it would protest the service’s award of the Long-Range Strike Bomber program—potentially worth up to $80 billion—to Northrop Grumman. The Government Accountability Office now has 100 days to evaluate the protest and determine if it has merit. Boeing, in a press statement, suggested it offered a lower price on the program and questioned Northrop Grumman’s technical and financial ability to carry the program out. The selection process was “fundamentally flawed,” Boeing said. “The cost evaluation performed by the government did not properly reward the contractors’ proposals to break the upward-spiraling historical cost curves of defense acquisitions, or properly evaluate the relative or comparative risk of the competitors’ ability to perform, as required by the solicitation.” According to the statement, the award to Northrop Grumman was a mistake, because the Boeing team offers “the best LRS-B at a cost that uniquely defies the prohibitively expensive trends of the nation’s past defense acquisitions.” Boeing has used this tactic before: in 2008, it protested the Air Force’s award of the KC-X tanker program to European Aeronautic Defense Systems (now Airbus), then partnered with Northrop Grumman, and was successful in overturning the award, getting the competition re-opened, and winning the restructured contest in 2011.

The Air Force Responds to Boeing's LRS-B Protest

—John A. Tirpak11/9/2015

​The Air Force on Friday defended its handling of the Long-Range Strike Bomber competition, despite Boeing’s protest of the award. Though “it is every competitor’s right to file a protest, the Air Force is confident that the source selection team followed a deliberate, disciplined, and impartial process to determine the best value for the warfighter and taxpayer,” USAF spokesman Maj. Robert Leese said. “The Air Force will fully support the [Government Accountability Office’s] independent process. Once resolved, we look forward to proceeding with the development and fielding of the LRS-B aircraft.” The GAO has 100 days from today to evaluate Boeing’s claims: that Northrop Grumman underbid the contract, that new technologies and the experience of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin team were not properly credited, and that Northrop Grumman lacks the financial ability to carry the project through. The 100 days is an upper limit; the GAO may determine in a shorter period of time that the protest lacks merit. If the GAO determines there is merit in the protest, remedies could range from clarifying or resubmitting certain aspects of the competitors’ offers all the way up to throwing the competition out and demanding the Air Force start over. That’s what happened in 2008, when Boeing protested the Air Force’s award of the KC-X tanker contract to a team of Northrop Grumman and EADS (now Airbus). When the Air Force established new rules for a recompetition of the contract, Northrop Grumman withdrew, saying the requirements had been written to favor Boeing’s 767-based proposal. Airbus re-bid the KC-45 but lost the contest to what became the Boeing KC-46 tanker.

Northrop's Reaction

—John A. Tirpak11/9/2015

​Northrop Grumman, which won the contract for the Air Force’s Long-Range Strike Bomber, said it was “disappointed ... its former LRS-B competitors have decided to disrupt a program that is so vital to national security” by protesting the award. Randy Belote, a company spokesman, said the Air Force “conducted an exceptionally thorough and disciplined process with multiple layers of review. Their process took into full account the parties’ respective offerings and their relative capabilities to execute their offerings on schedule and on budget.” Northrop offered an approach “that is inherently more affordable and based on demonstrated performance and capabilities. Our record stands in contrast to other manufacturer’s large aircraft programs of the last decade.” He pointed out that Northrop Grumman is “the only company to ever design and build a stealth bomber” and offered “the best solution” in the contest. Under protest rules, Northrop Grumman must stop work on the project until the protest is resolved. The Government Accountability Office has until Feb. 15 to determine the merits of the protest. If it finds no merit in Boeing’s protest, that finding may be announced sooner.

Behind Boeing’s Protest

11/9/2015

—John A. Tirpak

It would have been tough for Boeing to explain to its shareholders why it didn’t protest losing the Long-Range Strike Bomber contract—potentially an $80 billion chunk of work—especially when there was a reasonable chance that the Government Accountability Office might sustain the complaint, and Boeing captured the $44 billion KC-46 contract after its protest threw that program back open for competition. “We have to take a shot,” an industry official said simply. Those familiar with the particulars behind the protest said Boeing believes the Air Force didn’t give the company and its partner Lockheed Martin sufficient credit for producing large numbers of airliners, F/A-18 fighters,​ and F-35 fighters in recent years, and for technology advances that gave them an edge in large-scale, lower-cost production techniques, and their grand system integration chops. Moreover, Boeing believes Northrop Grumman’s price offer was too good to be true, considering that Northrop Grumman doesn’t have Boeing’s extensive worldwide supplier network and volume benefits. Boeing itself underbid the KC-46, and is now more than $500 billion in the red, after taxes, on that program. But while Boeing is responsible for any overages on the tanker, the bomber contract is cost-plus, meaning that while Northrop Grumman will lose incentive fees if it fails to deliver, the Air Force will have to cover overages. (Read the full report.)
 
Very easy from those statements to see how NG are going to defend themselves & what line of attack they are going to use against Boeing.
 
I would boycott Boeing, but what am I going to do, not buy a new 747? It's very patriotic of Boeing, doing what they are doing, giving a 3 month delay to something that is as important as this aircraft is. I fear the longer the program is delayed, the higher costs are going to rise. Thank you, Boeing.
 
As someone pointed out, nobody's better qualified to recognize an unrealistically low bid when they see one than the folks who brought you the F-35 and KC-46.
 
LowObservable said:
As someone pointed out, nobody's better qualified to recognize an unrealistically low bid when they see one than the folks who brought you the F-35 and KC-46.

Yeah, that was really classy. ::) Something I'd expect from, oh, maybe Entertainment Weekly, but a bit of embarrassment to see in AvWeek. I thought they were more professional than that.
 
Airplane said:
I would boycott Boeing, but what am I going to do, not buy a new 747? It's very patriotic of Boeing, doing what they are doing, giving a 3 month delay to something that is as important as this aircraft is. I fear the longer the program is delayed, the higher costs are going to rise. Thank you, Boeing.

They are well within their right to protest and get themselves heard and large projects have to count the fact that there would be a protest leading to a few months delay. There is no way around that.

Also, if you still want to protest I'd suggest you just don't fly Boeing ;)
 
Flyaway said:
The Air Force has issued the stop work order to NG.

http://insidedefense.com/login-redirect-no-cookie?n=173681&destination=node/173681
I wonder if that particular clause was in the contract NG recieved - I doubt it. -SP
 
The rules require that the service seize all contract activity during the time the GAO hears the protest.

Here's the complete article on the stop work:

The Air Force confirmed Monday it has issued a stop-work order to Northrop Grumman following Boeing and Lockheed Martin's protest of the Long-Range Strike Bomber award.

"The Air Force issued a stop-work order, Nov. 6, 2015, on the LRS-B contract due to the automatic stay of performance imposed by the filing of Boeing's bid protest at the Government Accountability Office," service spokesman Maj. Robert Leese confirmed in an email toInside the Air Force. "The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires an agency suspend performance of a newly awarded contract after the timely filing of a bid protest at the GAO."

The service on Oct. 27 awarded Northrop a contract to develop and produce at least 100 new bombers, shunning a bid from a combined Boeing-Lockheed Martin team. The contractors protested the award Nov. 6, claiming they underbid Northrop and criticizing the Air Force's process for evaluating financial and development risk.

"That flawed evaluation led to the selection of Northrop Grumman over the industry-leading team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, whose proposal offers the government and the warfighter the best possible LRS-B at a cost that uniquely defies the prohibitively expensive trends of the nation's past defense acquisitions," Boeing said in a Nov. 6 statement.

GAO has 100 days to consider Boeing and Lockheed's claims, determine their merit and issue a ruling. Under that time line, the agency is expected to respond by mid-February.
 
Thanks for the literary advice, Sferrin. But it could have been improved by adding a mention of the 787.
 
over the industry-leading team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, whose proposal offers the government and the warfighter the best possible LRS-B at a cost that uniquely defies the prohibitively expensive trends of the nation's past defense acquisitions," Boeing said in a Nov. 6 statement.


Boeing and Lockheed Martin said the above? A study in pitch perfect ironc satire.

As for the Northrop team, well, thebB2 only got screwed because of the government changes every other week.
 
It wasn't just the spec changes (which were the biggest ever seen after contract award). The B-2 was also the biggest composite airplane ever designed, by a huge margin. All the stealth coatings had to be invented (most of the materials they started with had to be replaced). It had the first operational LPI radar. It was one of the first airplanes designed from the ground up with CAD, using a system that had to be invented.
 
LowObservable said:
It wasn't just the spec changes (which were the biggest ever seen after contract award). The B-2 was also the biggest composite airplane ever designed, by a huge margin. All the stealth coatings had to be invented (most of the materials they started with had to be replaced). It had the first operational LPI radar. It was one of the first airplanes designed from the ground up with CAD, using a system that had to be invented.

Indeed, but, had it (The B2) not had the mother of all re-designs (I was told that it was internally almost an entirely new airframe, with in excess of over 75 per cent if redrawn from scratch.)

That right there is where the costs ballooned, and it was NOT Northrops team who held the guilt.
 
As someone who's spent some time around AF Acquisitions, sometimes losers protest just to see how badly they lost. It wouldn't be surprising if that is at least one motive so they know where to invest their IRAD for the next competition...
 
mkellytx said:
As someone who's spent some time around AF Acquisitions, sometimes losers protest just to see how badly they lost. It wouldn't be surprising if that is at least one motive so they know where to invest their IRAD for the next competition...

Do you mean because it unveils specifics about the state of technology of their competitors that they otherwise wouldn't have access to until the air vehicle itself was in production and flying? Of course, also about how they manage the program etc.?
 
sferrin said:
marauder2048 said:
I really don't understand the vitriol and outrage over the protest given that it was widely expected to occur no matter who won.

Because Boeing had the time and ability to address all of this before the decision was made. All of these questions they are supposedly asking for the first time now could have been asked before. Why didn't they?

You can pose all the questions you'd like during the revision process; the government ain't obligated to answer them to any great extent.

Consider that, legally, the RFP doesn't have to disclose the relative weights to be used for the evaluation criteria just an ordering of
criteria from most-to-least important. So if you have something like this (very simple example) for the cost criteria evaluation:

1. past cost performance
2. current cost performance
3. projected cost performance (i.e. new cost reductions due to technology)

You can have any weightings from 97-2-1 to 35-33-32 and many points in-between.
Whatever transpired in discussions during the revision process could drastically shape an offeror's impression
of the relative weightings and inform the final cost proposal e.g. cost of data rights/tooling for your cosmic manufacturing technology.
 
Selling LRS-B will Be Tough

—John A. Tirpak11/12/2015

The Air Force has its work cut out for it in getting Congress to fund the Long-Range Strike Bomber, according to panelists at a Tuesday AFA Mitchell Institute discussion about the new jet in Arlington, Va. Mackenzie Eaglen, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said for one thing, “Congress doesn’t perceive it and doesn’t believe it” when the Air Force touts the proliferation of anti-access, area denial threats as driving the need for the new bomber. Members of Congress see only that the US has confronted enemies with anemic or no air defenses for 20 years, and believe that US airpower remains unrivaled. For another, the Air Force’s stated need for 80-100 LRS-Bs comes off as “squishy,” she said; the range indicating the number is soft and that no hard analysis has been done on the requirement. Congress will automatically fund to the lower number, when the real requirement is likely to be around 174, she predicted. Setting a cost cap on the bomber also is like the Air Force “tying one hand behind its back” if the aircraft needs a dramatic increase in capability. Moreover, such caps invariably get broken, undermining the credibility of the service. “The Air Force budget is not equipped to handle this program,” Eaglen asserted, predicting the LRS-B “will be in competition with the F-35 forever” for procurement dollars, and, given the secrecy of the program—which so far has ruled out naming subcontractors or affected congressional districts—it will lose against better-mobilized constituencies.

https://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchi...mber 12 2015/Selling-LRS-B-will-Be-Tough.aspx [URL not working - Admin]

LRS-B Versus Standoff Missiles

—John A. Tirpak11/12/2015

The Long-Range Strike Bomber will be a difficult sell to Congress because of short-sighted math, said retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute. Congress will only be able to see the LRS-B as yet another expensive stealth bomber, comparing poorly with the cost of long-range standoff missiles or potential hypersonic missiles mounted on the ancient B-52, he said. In a short campaign, standoff weapons may have the edge in cost per aimpoint, but “in a major theater war—and does anybody think we’re done with those?”—the LRS-B’s ability to drop cheap munitions over and over makes it clearly “the most cost effective approach,” he said. In a major theater war, like Desert Storm, there were “40,000-50,000 aimpoints,” which would be prohibitive with standoff missiles. The LRS-B shouldn’t even be called a bomber, Deptula said, but a “long-range sensor-shooter,” capable not only of attacking deep behind well-defended lines, but serving as an information collection and transfer node once it’s there. The “true value” of the system will be lost unless the Air Force takes the time to shape the discussion and explain what the aircraft can really do, Deptula said. Otherwise, it will be viewed “as the latest version of the P-47.”

[URL not working - Admin]
 
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Flyaway said:
Selling LRS-B will Be Tough

—John A. Tirpak11/12/2015

The Air Force has its work cut out for it in getting Congress to fund the Long-Range Strike Bomber, according to panelists at a Tuesday AFA Mitchell Institute discussion about the new jet in Arlington, Va. Mackenzie Eaglen, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said for one thing, “Congress doesn’t perceive it and doesn’t believe it” when the Air Force touts the proliferation of anti-access, area denial threats as driving the need for the new bomber. Members of Congress see only that the US has confronted enemies with anemic or no air defenses for 20 years, and believe that US airpower remains unrivaled. For another, the Air Force’s stated need for 80-100 LRS-Bs comes off as “squishy,” she said; the range indicating the number is soft and that no hard analysis has been done on the requirement. Congress will automatically fund to the lower number, when the real requirement is likely to be around 174, she predicted. Setting a cost cap on the bomber also is like the Air Force “tying one hand behind its back” if the aircraft needs a dramatic increase in capability. Moreover, such caps invariably get broken, undermining the credibility of the service. “The Air Force budget is not equipped to handle this program,” Eaglen asserted, predicting the LRS-B “will be in competition with the F-35 forever” for procurement dollars, and, given the secrecy of the program—which so far has ruled out naming subcontractors or affected congressional districts—it will lose against better-mobilized constituencies.

 
Mr London 24/7 said:
Flyaway said:
Selling LRS-B will Be Tough

—John A. Tirpak11/12/2015

The Air Force has its work cut out for it in getting Congress to fund the Long-Range Strike Bomber, according to panelists at a Tuesday AFA Mitchell Institute discussion about the new jet in Arlington, Va. Mackenzie Eaglen, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said for one thing, “Congress doesn’t perceive it and doesn’t believe it” when the Air Force touts the proliferation of anti-access, area denial threats as driving the need for the new bomber. Members of Congress see only that the US has confronted enemies with anemic or no air defenses for 20 years, and believe that US airpower remains unrivaled. For another, the Air Force’s stated need for 80-100 LRS-Bs comes off as “squishy,” she said; the range indicating the number is soft and that no hard analysis has been done on the requirement. Congress will automatically fund to the lower number, when the real requirement is likely to be around 174, she predicted. Setting a cost cap on the bomber also is like the Air Force “tying one hand behind its back” if the aircraft needs a dramatic increase in capability. Moreover, such caps invariably get broken, undermining the credibility of the service. “The Air Force budget is not equipped to handle this program,” Eaglen asserted, predicting the LRS-B “will be in competition with the F-35 forever” for procurement dollars, and, given the secrecy of the program—which so far has ruled out naming subcontractors or affected congressional districts—it will lose against better-mobilized constituencies.

http://secure.afa.org/Mitchell/Presentations/Mitchell-11-10-15-LRSB.mp3

Hard to believe that the case cannot be made and won that the US needs a new long range bomber; if not the B52 will have to prove to be literally immortal.
 
Hard to believe that given the political scenarios that could play out over the next 3-4 years that any number being thrown around now is set in stone when it comes to the upper limit. There are a few GOP candidates that will look to substantially increase defense spending, while there are others that will look to maintain the current levels with slight growth. Yet these decisions on force strength are unlikely to be made this decade especially when the President and Congress are confronted with a choice between a new bomber program down the line and extending a mature, fully developed system. For all this to occur the Program needs to deliver, if it does I think there is enough 'need' to justify an increase in quantity and I don't think the Air Force will find that case hard to make in the late 2020's, early 2030's .
 
F35

The airframe that destroyed the US air dominance for the next 50 to 100 years, that's if it can ever recover, and real soon, China will step onto the stage and say 'We own the skies and the seas. Thank you Lockheed Martin for making this possible. The Lockheed Martin project for a 'New Chinese Century.'
 
mkellytx said:
As someone who's spent some time around AF Acquisitions, sometimes losers protest just to see how badly they lost. It wouldn't be surprising if that is at least one motive so they know where to invest their IRAD for the next competition...

Expensive way to find out what can be usually gained through a simple debrief...
 
Actually there's much to be said for a strategic truck as a complement to LRS-B. COTS engines and commercial airframe technology. Off-the-shelf sensor suite. Some missions:

- Bulk LRSO/hypersonic missile carrier
- Maritime strike with LRASM
- Launcher for expendable (or even midair recoverable) stand-in AEA vehicles
- Defensive HEL carrier
- Tanker/airlift escort

The biggest problem is that one side of the LRSB debate sees it as an alternative and the other sees it as a competitor.
 
LowObservable said:
Actually there's much to be said for a strategic truck as a complement to LRS-B. COTS engines and commercial airframe technology. Off-the-shelf sensor suite. Some missions:

- Bulk LRSO/hypersonic missile carrier
- Maritime strike with LRASM
- Launcher for expendable (or even midair recoverable) stand-in AEA vehicles
- Defensive HEL carrier
- Tanker/airlift escort

Except that as Boeing's new tanker is showing, even a "simple" aircraft can get very expensive quickly.

LowObservable said:
The biggest problem is that one side of the LRSB debate sees it as an alternative and the other sees it as a competitor.

Because it would be one. They'd both be fighting for the same limited pool of funds and your average politician wouldn't understand the differences aside from the sticker price.
 
LowObservable said:
Actually there's much to be said for a strategic truck as a complement to LRS-B. COTS engines and commercial airframe technology. Off-the-shelf sensor suite. Some missions:

- Bulk LRSO/hypersonic missile carrier
- Maritime strike with LRASM
- Launcher for expendable (or even midair recoverable) stand-in AEA vehicles
- Defensive HEL carrier
- Tanker/airlift escort

The biggest problem is that one side of the LRSB debate sees it as an alternative and the other sees it as a competitor.

A strategic truck based on the Boeing KC-46A Pegasus?
 

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Sundog said:
Do you mean because it unveils specifics about the state of technology of their competitors that they otherwise wouldn't have access to until the air vehicle itself was in production and flying? Of course, also about how they manage the program etc.?

Not necessarily, but you do get to see the scoring in colors which does give you a pretty good idea of your ball park versus theirs. You know what you did versus the requirements to earn a yellow and they get a blue, then you can back out the ROM of where you need to go.
 
Regardless of how this protest turns out, what the GAO declares, I just hope that the final LRSB can do everything asked of it including an ability to "sing and dance." -SP
 
LowObservable said:
Actually there's much to be said for a strategic truck as a complement to LRS-B. COTS engines and commercial airframe technology. Off-the-shelf sensor suite. Some missions:

- Bulk LRSO/hypersonic missile carrier
- Maritime strike with LRASM
- Launcher for expendable (or even midair recoverable) stand-in AEA vehicles
- Defensive HEL carrier
- Tanker/airlift escort

The biggest problem is that one side of the LRSB debate sees it as an alternative and the other sees it as a competitor.

How do you target all those stand-off weapons from a strategic truck? In the future congested, cluttered, contested, connected, constrained environment, ISR is going to be the key. Now maybe your "RQ-180" can be part of the killchain for all those stand-off weapons... but I'd suggest that arming the stand-in ISR platform would give more military capability and be more cost effective.
 
DARPA "Mission Truck" that appears to be a unmanned C-130 powered by eight Pratt & Whitney TF33s.
 

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Triton,
that's a strawman configuration created just for illustrative purposes. I don't think they seriously think about re-engining the C-130 with B-52 pods ;) . It is however indicative of a concept DARPA believes in.
(BTW, the C-130 ramp cannot open that far down in flight.)
I believe this figure is from the SOSITE program. There is currently another ongoing BAA for a similar concept, GREMLINS. The trick there is that the UAVs are recovered in flight.
 
Perhaps this Northrop Grumman J-UCAS concept could the be basis for a "mission truck" or "mule."

The main reason for J-UCAS’s cancellation in late 2005 was the divergence in requirements. The Navy wanted a carrier-based aircraft, which led to the X-47B program. The Air Force sought a larger, longer-range “global strike enabler” that would be much more capable than the RQ-170, which was then being developed.

A fiscal 2007 Navy budget document disclosed that the J-UCAS program had been split in December 2005 into a Navy demonstration effort (which led to the X-47B) and “an Air Force classified program.” At the same time, Northrop openly discussed a range of longer-winged X-47C configurations, the largest being a 172-ft.-span design with two engines derived from General Electric’s CF34 and capable of carrying a 10,000-lb. weapon load.

Source:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/secret-new-uas-shows-stealth-efficiency-advances
 

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Triton said:
A fiscal 2007 Navy budget document disclosed that the J-UCAS program had been split in December 2005 into a Navy demonstration effort (which led to the X-47B) and “an Air Force classified program.”

The Air Force did not end up getting any of the J-UCAS money from the "split".
USAF and USN goals were very different, and USAF kept piling on needs until J-UCAS started to look a lot like LRS.

The Air Force classified program was a joint effort with DARPA called "Churchill".
 

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