Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

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sferrin said:
kaiserd said:
That's a massive generalisation and quite probably a far from unbiased one given your a previous comments on nuclear control advocates.
What you described as a "robust nuclear arms strategy" was an intermediate range deliver system arms race that in retrospect was massively wasteful for both sides. And that was part of an even wider, even more expensive and wasteful arms race.

And what do you think would have happened if the West declined to participate in that arms race in the interest of being nuclear free?
Gee it is not like we have to guess, we witnessed the strategy that brought about the end of the Cold War and ultimately massive disarmament and it was research, develop, build and deploy in potentially massive numbers - originally the US was to deploy close to 17,000 strategic warheads by 1993 (mix SDI in here as well) - until they other side came to the negotiation table, to repeat, the exact opposite of what the arms controllers wanted to do.
 
sferrin said:
kaiserd said:
That's a massive generalisation and quite probably a far from unbiased one given your a previous comments on nuclear control advocates.
What you described as a "robust nuclear arms strategy" was an intermediate range deliver system arms race that in retrospect was massively wasteful for both sides. And that was part of an even wider, even more expensive and wasteful arms race.

And what do you think would have happened if the West declined to participate in that arms race in the interest of being nuclear free?

Why, I would expect that the "other side" would give up as well. Afterall, they would have won "the race" but it would be a hollow victory - they were the only contender. I expect he is proposing that instead of spending squillions on weapons which were never used, a strong, conventional defence would be provided. You and your compatriots of course assume that nuclear weapons are the only things that protect you, when in reality they are the weapons which threaten other nations... Without them the other nations wouldn't need to seek or build their own nuclear weapons.
 
bobbymike said:
Gee it is not like we have to guess, we witnessed the strategy that brought about the end of the Cold War and ultimately massive disarmament and it was research, develop, build and deploy in potentially massive numbers - originally the US was to deploy close to 17,000 strategic warheads by 1993 (mix SDI in here as well) - until they other side came to the negotiation table, to repeat, the exact opposite of what the arms controllers wanted to do.

Without going too deeply into

the minutiae of it all, the strategy (strategic nuclear) wasn't about bringing an end to the CW era but based on containment and (mutual) deterrence.

Certainly the (disorderly, abrupt) fall of the Iron Curtain took western intelligence (and thus policy) by quite a surprise, though it's also hard to argue that such an event even could be effectively planned and managed (incidentally current putinist "hybrid" doctrine does sort of try to interpret their then experience into a strategy of influence and/or conflict in a weird, through a looking glass revanchist manner). Accounts from all contemporaneus sides point to a seat of the pants approach and basically holding tight. Things unraveled to such a degree that food aid (!) had to be promptly sent to the soon to be former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev had been chosen already quite a bit earlier by the politburo to expressly address woes that went way beyond military - let alone nuclear arms - concerns. From a pile one can't simply pick one straw and claim it to have broken the camel's back, however apocalyptic that straw may theoretically be.

It's also a complete disservice to the very human social pressures that came from within the totalitarian communist system to suggest these peoples were somehow merely cowed to change, that they lacked agency. I've met and know a fair amount of people who witnessed those events from within. They faced tanks, complete insecurity and tremendous difficulty. They have been pummeled and their identities repeatedly challenged within a lifetime to a degree you and I can scarcely imagine. Sure, this is a discussion about nuclear weapons but I think it worth a detour or a disclaimer or two to avoid availability bias, i.e. seeing only nails for having a hammer (and/or straw for a sickle, going with the CW theme). We really must do better than "they" being a blanket synonym to the "other side" in discerning who and what we're dealing with at any given point. Quite a number of "them", too, were sufficiently convinced that a nuclear apocalypse was not so probable as to have motivation and determination to organize and act in spite of nuclear deterrence.

Lest you think I can't bring this back aroud to nuclear weapons in any meaningful way, then let's reflect on the current predicament vis-à-vis the (end of the) CW. Russia's GDP is (even less than) 1/10th of that of the US, North Korea's less than Vermont's (!) yet overtly confrontational nuclear postures have re-emerged, ranging from frayed to precariously volatile. In certain ways the nuclear risk is more manageable (numbers) is other ways less so (proliferation, "hybrid" percolation, lack of meaningful communication or understanding of intent). Rational "arms control", among other things, is weighing risk against reward. While I (at least) can't quite imagine a feasible path below extinction level stockpiles in any foreseeable situation (and thus those stockpiles should be resourced to be as reliable, modern and safe as possible), there certainly are rational limits to what kinds of amounts of weapons the military can/is at all willing to manage or indeed society can support indefinitely. Symbolic allocation of much greater resources beyond that (the amount of "that" being a more nuanced conversation, not some fixed theoretical combined yield baseline) is almost certainly ineffective, detrimental and self defeating in a multitude of ways.

As was during the CW, arms controllers are not some homogenous group. To lose that nuance e.g. for political expediency or plain convenience is a luxury even the US can't afford (for very long at least). There are elected officials, civilians, academy and career military well and truly steeped in the subject. I myself am sort of grudgingly reading up as far as I think it's my duty as a responsible, otherwise active and engaged person to be aware of these things. I self identify as an "arms controller" insofar as at least not seeing the technology as an end in itself. Predictably and sadly there are also "peace groups" who are basically astroturfed or otherwise unwittingly cajoled from Kremlin just as there were in the olden Soviet Days (which is one of the more traditional, carried over parts of the current putinist "hybrid" doctrine), along with agents provocateurs. The spectacle of Green party presidential candidate Jill Stein and Gen. Flynn attending an event celebrating RT with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, alone, was something else indeed.

We're hopefully just shooting the breeze here and not something more acutely, tangibly intercontinental (nor formulating policy beyond a very granular capacity or capability) so perhaps we can at least recognize that history hasn't ended and while we have the capacity of having it end, we should minimize the reasons to seek or expect that outcome in whatever form (stagnation or conflagration). Arms control agreements and protocols aren't forever either (anymore than, say, the Polaris missile was), nor entirely devoid of cynicism or even deception, but that is not to say they're useless. Just another tool in the box. Idealism is keeping track, keeping perspective, keeping direction and IMHO that's perfectly fine while also being mindful of mundane practicalities as not to be(come) too naïve and/or cynical.
 
I think there are many, myself included, who would love to see a nuclear bomb free world but realize it's a pipe-dream, in which case we want to be strong enough that nobody would even consider trying to start a nuclear war with us. That means cutting edge deployed weapons and an industrial base to support them. Right now we're lacking in many key areas.
 
UpForce said:
bobbymike said:
Gee it is not like we have to guess, we witnessed the strategy that brought about the end of the Cold War and ultimately massive disarmament and it was research, develop, build and deploy in potentially massive numbers - originally the US was to deploy close to 17,000 strategic warheads by 1993 (mix SDI in here as well) - until they other side came to the negotiation table, to repeat, the exact opposite of what the arms controllers wanted to do.

Without going too deeply into

the minutiae of it all, the strategy (strategic nuclear) wasn't about bringing an end to the CW era but based on containment and (mutual) deterrence.

Certainly the (disorderly, abrupt) fall of the Iron Curtain took western intelligence (and thus policy) by quite a surprise, though it's also hard to argue that such an event even could be effectively planned and managed (incidentally current putinist "hybrid" doctrine does sort of try to interpret their then experience into a strategy of influence and/or conflict in a weird, through a looking glass revanchist manner). Accounts from all contemporaneus sides point to a seat of the pants approach and basically holding tight. Things unraveled to such a degree that food aid (!) had to be promptly sent to the soon to be former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev had been chosen already quite a bit earlier by the politburo to expressly address woes that went way beyond military - let alone nuclear arms - concerns. From a pile one can't simply pick one straw and claim it to have broken the camel's back, however apocalyptic that straw may theoretically be.

It's also a complete disservice to the very human social pressures that came from within the totalitarian communist system to suggest these peoples were somehow merely cowed to change, that they lacked agency. I've met and know a fair amount of people who witnessed those events from within. They faced tanks, complete insecurity and tremendous difficulty. They have been pummeled and their identities repeatedly challenged within a lifetime to a degree you and I can scarcely imagine. Sure, this is a discussion about nuclear weapons but I think it worth a detour or a disclaimer or two to avoid availability bias, i.e. seeing only nails for having a hammer (and/or straw for a sickle, going with the CW theme). We really must do better than "they" being a blanket synonym to the "other side" in discerning who and what we're dealing with at any given point. Quite a number of "them", too, were sufficiently convinced that a nuclear apocalypse was not so probable as to have motivation and determination to organize and act in spite of nuclear deterrence.

Lest you think I can't bring this back aroud to nuclear weapons in any meaningful way, then let's reflect on the current predicament vis-à-vis the (end of the) CW. Russia's GDP is (even less than) 1/10th of that of the US, North Korea's less than Vermont's (!) yet overtly confrontational nuclear postures have re-emerged, ranging from frayed to precariously volatile. In certain ways the nuclear risk is more manageable (numbers) is other ways less so (proliferation, "hybrid" percolation, lack of meaningful communication or understanding of intent). Rational "arms control", among other things, is weighing risk against reward. While I (at least) can't quite imagine a feasible path below extinction level stockpiles in any foreseeable situation (and thus those stockpiles should be resourced to be as reliable, modern and safe as possible), there certainly are rational limits to what kinds of amounts of weapons the military can/is at all willing to manage or indeed society can support indefinitely. Symbolic allocation of much greater resources beyond that (the amount of "that" being a more nuanced conversation, not some fixed theoretical combined yield baseline) is almost certainly ineffective, detrimental and self defeating in a multitude of ways.

As was during the CW, arms controllers are not some homogenous group. To lose that nuance e.g. for political expediency or plain convenience is a luxury even the US can't afford (for very long at least). There are elected officials, civilians, academy and career military well and truly steeped in the subject. I myself am sort of grudgingly reading up as far as I think it's my duty as a responsible, otherwise active and engaged person to be aware of these things. I self identify as an "arms controller" insofar as at least not seeing the technology as an end in itself. Predictably and sadly there are also "peace groups" who are basically astroturfed or otherwise unwittingly cajoled from Kremlin just as there were in the olden Soviet Days (which is one of the more traditional, carried over parts of the current putinist "hybrid" doctrine), along with agents provocateurs. The spectacle of Green party presidential candidate Jill Stein and Gen. Flynn attending an event celebrating RT with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, alone, was something else indeed.

We're hopefully just shooting the breeze here and not something more acutely, tangibly intercontinental (nor formulating policy beyond a very granular capacity or capability) so perhaps we can at least recognize that history hasn't ended and while we have the capacity of having it end, we should minimize the reasons to seek or expect that outcome in whatever form (stagnation or conflagration). Arms control agreements and protocols aren't forever either (anymore than, say, the Polaris missile was), nor entirely devoid of cynicism or even deception, but that is not to say they're useless. Just another tool in the box. Idealism is keeping track, keeping perspective, keeping direction and IMHO that's perfectly fine while also being mindful of mundane practicalities as not to be(come) too naïve and/or cynical.
Two quick point, 1) Under Reagan the strategy did absolutely change to 'winning the Cold War' although through every means short of war and 2) At a time of massive disarmament and the lowest superpower arsenals since the 50's can you name me one nation that has changed its' nuclear ambitions? You could include Libya but that was brought about because Qaddafi saw he might be the next Saddam.
 
sferrin said:
I think there are many, myself included, who would love to see a nuclear bomb free world but realize it's a pipe-dream, in which case we want to be strong enough that nobody would even consider trying to start a nuclear war with us. That means cutting edge deployed weapons and an industrial base to support them. Right now we're lacking in many key areas.
Here, here my thoughts exactly.
 
bobbymike said:
UpForce said:
bobbymike said:
Gee it is not like we have to guess, we witnessed the strategy that brought about the end of the Cold War and ultimately massive disarmament and it was research, develop, build and deploy in potentially massive numbers - originally the US was to deploy close to 17,000 strategic warheads by 1993 (mix SDI in here as well) - until they other side came to the negotiation table, to repeat, the exact opposite of what the arms controllers wanted to do.

Without going too deeply into

the minutiae of it all, the strategy (strategic nuclear) wasn't about bringing an end to the CW era but based on containment and (mutual) deterrence.

Certainly the (disorderly, abrupt) fall of the Iron Curtain took western intelligence (and thus policy) by quite a surprise, though it's also hard to argue that such an event even could be effectively planned and managed (incidentally current putinist "hybrid" doctrine does sort of try to interpret their then experience into a strategy of influence and/or conflict in a weird, through a looking glass revanchist manner). Accounts from all contemporaneus sides point to a seat of the pants approach and basically holding tight. Things unraveled to such a degree that food aid (!) had to be promptly sent to the soon to be former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev had been chosen already quite a bit earlier by the politburo to expressly address woes that went way beyond military - let alone nuclear arms - concerns. From a pile one can't simply pick one straw and claim it to have broken the camel's back, however apocalyptic that straw may theoretically be.

It's also a complete disservice to the very human social pressures that came from within the totalitarian communist system to suggest these peoples were somehow merely cowed to change, that they lacked agency. I've met and know a fair amount of people who witnessed those events from within. They faced tanks, complete insecurity and tremendous difficulty. They have been pummeled and their identities repeatedly challenged within a lifetime to a degree you and I can scarcely imagine. Sure, this is a discussion about nuclear weapons but I think it worth a detour or a disclaimer or two to avoid availability bias, i.e. seeing only nails for having a hammer (and/or straw for a sickle, going with the CW theme). We really must do better than "they" being a blanket synonym to the "other side" in discerning who and what we're dealing with at any given point. Quite a number of "them", too, were sufficiently convinced that a nuclear apocalypse was not so probable as to have motivation and determination to organize and act in spite of nuclear deterrence.

Lest you think I can't bring this back aroud to nuclear weapons in any meaningful way, then let's reflect on the current predicament vis-à-vis the (end of the) CW. Russia's GDP is (even less than) 1/10th of that of the US, North Korea's less than Vermont's (!) yet overtly confrontational nuclear postures have re-emerged, ranging from frayed to precariously volatile. In certain ways the nuclear risk is more manageable (numbers) is other ways less so (proliferation, "hybrid" percolation, lack of meaningful communication or understanding of intent). Rational "arms control", among other things, is weighing risk against reward. While I (at least) can't quite imagine a feasible path below extinction level stockpiles in any foreseeable situation (and thus those stockpiles should be resourced to be as reliable, modern and safe as possible), there certainly are rational limits to what kinds of amounts of weapons the military can/is at all willing to manage or indeed society can support indefinitely. Symbolic allocation of much greater resources beyond that (the amount of "that" being a more nuanced conversation, not some fixed theoretical combined yield baseline) is almost certainly ineffective, detrimental and self defeating in a multitude of ways.

As was during the CW, arms controllers are not some homogenous group. To lose that nuance e.g. for political expediency or plain convenience is a luxury even the US can't afford (for very long at least). There are elected officials, civilians, academy and career military well and truly steeped in the subject. I myself am sort of grudgingly reading up as far as I think it's my duty as a responsible, otherwise active and engaged person to be aware of these things. I self identify as an "arms controller" insofar as at least not seeing the technology as an end in itself. Predictably and sadly there are also "peace groups" who are basically astroturfed or otherwise unwittingly cajoled from Kremlin just as there were in the olden Soviet Days (which is one of the more traditional, carried over parts of the current putinist "hybrid" doctrine), along with agents provocateurs. The spectacle of Green party presidential candidate Jill Stein and Gen. Flynn attending an event celebrating RT with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, alone, was something else indeed.

We're hopefully just shooting the breeze here and not something more acutely, tangibly intercontinental (nor formulating policy beyond a very granular capacity or capability) so perhaps we can at least recognize that history hasn't ended and while we have the capacity of having it end, we should minimize the reasons to seek or expect that outcome in whatever form (stagnation or conflagration). Arms control agreements and protocols aren't forever either (anymore than, say, the Polaris missile was), nor entirely devoid of cynicism or even deception, but that is not to say they're useless. Just another tool in the box. Idealism is keeping track, keeping perspective, keeping direction and IMHO that's perfectly fine while also being mindful of mundane practicalities as not to be(come) too naïve and/or cynical.
Two quick point, 1) Under Reagan the strategy did absolutely change to 'winning the Cold War' although through every means short of war

Yep. 100 B-1B bombers in 4 years. Deployment of the Peacekeeper ICBM and beginning of SICBM. AGM-129 stealth cruise missile. Pershing IIs and GLCM in Europe. Beginning of B-2 production. SRAM 2 initiation. Work towards the 600-ship navy, SDI, etc. etc. etc.
 
https://armedservices.house.gov/news/defense-drumbeat/losing-time-nuclear-labs-crumbling

For at least since 2002, I have written, called, emailed, Tweeted politicians, government officials, the Energy Department, the NNSA, etc. calling for a Manhattan Project II to quickly modernize the labs and nuke production facilities.

I fear we may be past the point of no return.
 
Bunch: More money needed up front in new approach to ensure viable LRSO

The Air Force is funneling more money into the early stages of Long-Range Standoff Weapon development to ensure the end product is usable, the service's top uniformed acquisition official said Tuesday.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
UpForce said:
bobbymike said:
Gee it is not like we have to guess, we witnessed the strategy that brought about the end of the Cold War and ultimately massive disarmament and it was research, develop, build and deploy in potentially massive numbers - originally the US was to deploy close to 17,000 strategic warheads by 1993 (mix SDI in here as well) - until they other side came to the negotiation table, to repeat, the exact opposite of what the arms controllers wanted to do.

Without going too deeply into

the minutiae of it all, the strategy (strategic nuclear) wasn't about bringing an end to the CW era but based on containment and (mutual) deterrence.

Certainly the (disorderly, abrupt) fall of the Iron Curtain took western intelligence (and thus policy) by quite a surprise, though it's also hard to argue that such an event even could be effectively planned and managed (incidentally current putinist "hybrid" doctrine does sort of try to interpret their then experience into a strategy of influence and/or conflict in a weird, through a looking glass revanchist manner). Accounts from all contemporaneus sides point to a seat of the pants approach and basically holding tight. Things unraveled to such a degree that food aid (!) had to be promptly sent to the soon to be former Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev had been chosen already quite a bit earlier by the politburo to expressly address woes that went way beyond military - let alone nuclear arms - concerns. From a pile one can't simply pick one straw and claim it to have broken the camel's back, however apocalyptic that straw may theoretically be.

It's also a complete disservice to the very human social pressures that came from within the totalitarian communist system to suggest these peoples were somehow merely cowed to change, that they lacked agency. I've met and know a fair amount of people who witnessed those events from within. They faced tanks, complete insecurity and tremendous difficulty. They have been pummeled and their identities repeatedly challenged within a lifetime to a degree you and I can scarcely imagine. Sure, this is a discussion about nuclear weapons but I think it worth a detour or a disclaimer or two to avoid availability bias, i.e. seeing only nails for having a hammer (and/or straw for a sickle, going with the CW theme). We really must do better than "they" being a blanket synonym to the "other side" in discerning who and what we're dealing with at any given point. Quite a number of "them", too, were sufficiently convinced that a nuclear apocalypse was not so probable as to have motivation and determination to organize and act in spite of nuclear deterrence.

Lest you think I can't bring this back aroud to nuclear weapons in any meaningful way, then let's reflect on the current predicament vis-à-vis the (end of the) CW. Russia's GDP is (even less than) 1/10th of that of the US, North Korea's less than Vermont's (!) yet overtly confrontational nuclear postures have re-emerged, ranging from frayed to precariously volatile. In certain ways the nuclear risk is more manageable (numbers) is other ways less so (proliferation, "hybrid" percolation, lack of meaningful communication or understanding of intent). Rational "arms control", among other things, is weighing risk against reward. While I (at least) can't quite imagine a feasible path below extinction level stockpiles in any foreseeable situation (and thus those stockpiles should be resourced to be as reliable, modern and safe as possible), there certainly are rational limits to what kinds of amounts of weapons the military can/is at all willing to manage or indeed society can support indefinitely. Symbolic allocation of much greater resources beyond that (the amount of "that" being a more nuanced conversation, not some fixed theoretical combined yield baseline) is almost certainly ineffective, detrimental and self defeating in a multitude of ways.

As was during the CW, arms controllers are not some homogenous group. To lose that nuance e.g. for political expediency or plain convenience is a luxury even the US can't afford (for very long at least). There are elected officials, civilians, academy and career military well and truly steeped in the subject. I myself am sort of grudgingly reading up as far as I think it's my duty as a responsible, otherwise active and engaged person to be aware of these things. I self identify as an "arms controller" insofar as at least not seeing the technology as an end in itself. Predictably and sadly there are also "peace groups" who are basically astroturfed or otherwise unwittingly cajoled from Kremlin just as there were in the olden Soviet Days (which is one of the more traditional, carried over parts of the current putinist "hybrid" doctrine), along with agents provocateurs. The spectacle of Green party presidential candidate Jill Stein and Gen. Flynn attending an event celebrating RT with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, alone, was something else indeed.

We're hopefully just shooting the breeze here and not something more acutely, tangibly intercontinental (nor formulating policy beyond a very granular capacity or capability) so perhaps we can at least recognize that history hasn't ended and while we have the capacity of having it end, we should minimize the reasons to seek or expect that outcome in whatever form (stagnation or conflagration). Arms control agreements and protocols aren't forever either (anymore than, say, the Polaris missile was), nor entirely devoid of cynicism or even deception, but that is not to say they're useless. Just another tool in the box. Idealism is keeping track, keeping perspective, keeping direction and IMHO that's perfectly fine while also being mindful of mundane practicalities as not to be(come) too naïve and/or cynical.
Two quick point, 1) Under Reagan the strategy did absolutely change to 'winning the Cold War' although through every means short of war

Yep. 100 B-1B bombers in 4 years. Deployment of the Peacekeeper ICBM and beginning of SICBM. AGM-129 stealth cruise missile. Pershing IIs and GLCM in Europe. Beginning of B-2 production. SRAM 2 initiation. Work towards the 600-ship navy, SDI, etc. etc. etc.

That was before we lost our ability to walk and chew gum at the same time. Now we are going to build something like 7 Raiders a year. We retired the AGM-129 for the older more vulnerable ALCM from the 70s. Today you get called a lunatic for proposing building 2 different fighters simultaneously.
 
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-10/why-triad
 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-worst-fear-what-if-its-nuclear-weapons-dont-22790

When I came of age so to speak in the 80's all the stories were the US could produce too many weapons, the nuke enterprise was too big, the weapons were too big, the assembly line was too effective.

Now we get stories like this, :'(
 
bobbymike said:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-worst-fear-what-if-its-nuclear-weapons-dont-22790

When I came of age so to speak in the 80's all the stories were the US could produce too many weapons, the nuke enterprise was too big, the weapons were too big, the assembly line was too effective.

Now we get stories like this, :'(

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests

For those looking for some facts around various nuclear powers nuclear weapon testing.
None of the established nuclear powers have undertaken an actual nuclear weapons tests in decades, and none of these powers have undertaken an end-to-end deliver system and nuclear weapon test for even longer.
Hence either all the nuclear powers are equally likely to be sitting on damp-squibs or they have alternative methods for testing.

For the record I do think that the underlying US nuclear weapon infrastructure has been neglected and needs more money and resources. However that’s barely if at all mentioned in the article. The article is inferring that the US needs to again undertake nuclear tests.

Taking the lack of such tests by the other established nuclear powers into account there is no apparent evidence that this is actually required and it appears such calls are more intended to pander to the target readers nostalgia for such nuclear tests, as well as pandering to the view that “something must be done”.
In reality such tests would probably be an expensive distraction from putting money back into modernizing and sustaining the US’s underlying nuclear weapon infrastructure (people, labs, systems etc.).
 
kaiserd said:
bobbymike said:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-worst-fear-what-if-its-nuclear-weapons-dont-22790

When I came of age so to speak in the 80's all the stories were the US could produce too many weapons, the nuke enterprise was too big, the weapons were too big, the assembly line was too effective.

Now we get stories like this, :'(

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests

For those looking for some facts around various nuclear powers nuclear weapon testing.
None of the established nuclear powers have undertaken an actual nuclear weapons tests in decades, and none of these powers have undertaken an end-to-end deliver system and nuclear weapon test for even longer.
Hence either all the nuclear powers are equally likely to be sitting on damp-squibs or they have alternative methods for testing. Which leaves this article just being an exercise in poking at and pandering to the underlying nuclear weapon focused apprehensions and insecurities of a sub-set of right-wing Americans.

For the record I do think that the underlying US nuclear weapon infrastructure has been neglected and needs more money and resources. However that’s barely if at all mentioned in the article. The article is inferring that the US needs to again undertake nuclear tests.

Taking the lack of such tests by the other established nuclear powers into account there is no apparent evidence that this is actually required and it appears such calls are more intended to pander to the target readers nostalgia for such nuclear tests, as well as pandering to the view that “something must be done”.
In reality such tests would probably be an expensive distraction from putting money back into modernizing and sustaining the US’s underlying nuclear weapon infrastructure (people, labs, systems etc.).
https://armedservices.house.gov/news/defense-drumbeat/losing-time-nuclear-labs-crumbling

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/6/13/solidfuel-rocket-engine-industrial-base-in-danger-navy-official-says

https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-domestic-solid-rocket-motor-industrial-base-fragile-atrophying

http://aviationweek.com/defense/can-us-match-new-chinese-and-russian-nuclear-weapon-technology

https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/23/us-must-consider-building-new-nuclear-weapons-amid-aging-arsenal-russian-aggression-says-hasc-chairman

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/u-s-deal-decaying-nuclear-infrastructure

http://theweek.com/articles/533721/dangers-ouraging-nuclear-arsenal
 
bobbymike said:
kaiserd said:
bobbymike said:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-worst-fear-what-if-its-nuclear-weapons-dont-22790

When I came of age so to speak in the 80's all the stories were the US could produce too many weapons, the nuke enterprise was too big, the weapons were too big, the assembly line was too effective.

Now we get stories like this, :'(

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests

For those looking for some facts around various nuclear powers nuclear weapon testing.
None of the established nuclear powers have undertaken an actual nuclear weapons tests in decades, and none of these powers have undertaken an end-to-end deliver system and nuclear weapon test for even longer.
Hence either all the nuclear powers are equally likely to be sitting on damp-squibs or they have alternative methods for testing. Which leaves this article just being an exercise in poking at and pandering to the underlying nuclear weapon focused apprehensions and insecurities of a sub-set of right-wing Americans.

For the record I do think that the underlying US nuclear weapon infrastructure has been neglected and needs more money and resources. However that’s barely if at all mentioned in the article. The article is inferring that the US needs to again undertake nuclear tests.

Taking the lack of such tests by the other established nuclear powers into account there is no apparent evidence that this is actually required and it appears such calls are more intended to pander to the target readers nostalgia for such nuclear tests, as well as pandering to the view that “something must be done”.
In reality such tests would probably be an expensive distraction from putting money back into modernizing and sustaining the US’s underlying nuclear weapon infrastructure (people, labs, systems etc.).
https://armedservices.house.gov/news/defense-drumbeat/losing-time-nuclear-labs-crumbling

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/6/13/solidfuel-rocket-engine-industrial-base-in-danger-navy-official-says

https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-domestic-solid-rocket-motor-industrial-base-fragile-atrophying

http://aviationweek.com/defense/can-us-match-new-chinese-and-russian-nuclear-weapon-technology

https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/23/us-must-consider-building-new-nuclear-weapons-amid-aging-arsenal-russian-aggression-says-hasc-chairman

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/u-s-deal-decaying-nuclear-infrastructure

http://theweek.com/articles/533721/dangers-ouraging-nuclear-arsenal

As mentioned above I support the need for the modernization of and reinvestment in the underlying US nuclear weapon infrastructure; I am largely agreeing with you.
For the record in relation to delivery systems I would also support the continuation of the triad with a the necessary new missile subs, tridents, the B-21 (still a stupid designation) and the next generation cruise missile and the Minuteman replacement ICBM.
However this will be all be extremely expensive and there will clearly be a need to cut ones cloth accordingly in terms of numbers and pitching requirements (for example there is an argument for having the new cruise missile as close as possible to bring a nuclear armed JASSM-ER to keep costs down).
And in that context there is a need to avoid unnecessary expenditure of financial, political and diplomatic capital on fools errands such as new nuclear tests (which the likes of China, Russia and France don’t appear to require) or unrealistic fantasies of large increases in warhead and delivery system numbers.
 
kaiserd said:
And in that context there is a need to avoid unnecessary expenditure of financial, political and diplomatic capital on fools errands such as new nuclear tests

Given past history, and unpleasant surprises with things like the W76 and W80, why is it a "fools errand" to want to know the thing the continued existence of your country DEPENDS ON works?
 
sferrin said:
kaiserd said:
And in that context there is a need to avoid unnecessary expenditure of financial, political and diplomatic capital on fools errands such as new nuclear tests

Given past history, and unpleasant surprises with things like the W76 and W80, why is it a "fools errand" to want to know the thing the continued existence of your country DEPENDS ON works?

It’s a fools errand if the US and all its contemporary nuclear don’t need to under take actual nuclear tests for decades (happy with alternative methods of testing and simulation) but is pushed to do so for no obvious technical reasons. Thereby sending funding to these tests instead of more productive investment in the actual nuclear weapon infrastructure, while kicking up an unnecessary political and diplomatic fuss.
All so the US is seen to “do something” by a small subset of its population.
 
After some discussion, this thread is unlocked again in the hope that some points will be respected from now on :

- No personal attacks or insults
This should be clear principally, but ...
... speculations about physical or mental capabilities or problems are often regarded as insulting !
.... emojis, like the one with the rolling eyes can have a similar meaning and are often regarded as insulting, too.
.... snide remarks about groups of people often are regarded as insulting, by people who are members of those groups
or are at least close to that group. And such groups may be whole nations.

You aren't only posting for the one, who has a different opinion from yours, but for those, who are reading the thread. Quite
probably you won't change your opponents opnion anyway, but maybe you'll damage the reputation of your ideas, if you
are rude.
 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2017/December%202017/The-Neutron-Bomb.aspx
 
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/trident-and-the-nuclear-future/

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/11/3/nuclear-triad-pentagon-taking-steps-to-modernize-global-strike-weapons
 
http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-nuclear-modernization-worth-12-trillion#comment-941361
 
http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/358574-us-nuclear-modernization-is-not-only-affordable-but-necessary
 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/reagan-and-the-case-for-tactical-nukes-in-south-korea/
 
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/06/columbia-class-ballistic-missile-sub-schedule-7-2-billion-apiece
 
bobbymike said:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-nuclear-modernization-worth-12-trillion#comment-941361

Ugh. The whole, "we don't need ICBMs" argument makes my head hurt. There are so many flaws in that view that one scarcely knows where to begin. Almost like somebody saying, "oxygen is bad for the environment because it makes metal rust". To use current slang, "I can't even. . ." The most obvious, of course, is that the ICBM considerably raises the threshold of a nuclear strike. Where one might be tempted to sink an SSBN, thinking the blowback might be minimal with the proper threats, nuking an ICBM silo on a country's territory is something else entirely, and would be certain to draw a response. ICBMs make it less likely we'd be attacked. Furthermore, and people seem to forget this, it's a virtual certainty we could visually verify an attack is under way and launch before the warheads arrived. It's one thing for a computer to have a "glitch" and say, "you're under attack". It's quite another when you can SEE the missile in flight with sensors.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-nuclear-modernization-worth-12-trillion#comment-941361

Ugh. The whole, "we don't need ICBMs" argument makes my head hurt. There are so many flaws in that view that one scarcely knows where to begin. Almost like somebody saying, "oxygen is bad for the environment because it makes metal rust". To use current slang, "I can't even. . ." The most obvious, of course, is that the ICBM considerably raises the threshold of a nuclear strike. Where one might be tempted to sink an SSBN, thinking the blowback might be minimal with the proper threats, nuking an ICBM silo on a country's territory is something else entirely, and would be certain to draw a response. ICBMs make it less likely we'd be attacked. Furthermore, and people seem to forget this, it's a virtual certainty we could visually verify an attack is under way and launch before the warheads arrived. It's one thing for a computer to have a "glitch" and say, "you're under attack". It's quite another when you can SEE the missile in flight with sensors.
Going to ten or so aim points from 410 is pure folly. What if our entire at sea fleet goes missing? Even if you suspect the enemy you now know the SSBNs are vulnerable so do you keep the rest in port vulnerable to a first strike or disburse to sea knowing they might be sunk. If they were sunk conventionally are you going to start a nuclear war over 470 dead sailors?

Now as of today the above is implausible but when the next generation Triad is going to serve us to 2070-80 why take this risk for what it a very minimal cost to the nation.
 
Source:
https://www.ploughshares.org/letter-william-j-perry-and-james-e-cartwright-president-trump


October 31, 2017

President Donald J. Trump
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Trump:

As you know, the United States has begun a decades-long process to rebuild its arsenal of nuclear weapons, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile-carrying submarines, bombers, cruise missiles, and the nuclear warheads they carry. Today, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that maintaining and replacing the arsenal over 30 years would cost $1.2 trillion in constant dollars, and billions more with inflation.

This is a significant amount of money, especially at a time of tight defense budgets. A dollar spent on nuclear weapons is a dollar taken away from other priority military needs, such as sustaining conventional forces and countering terrorism and cyber attacks. The United States cannot afford to do it all.

Moreover, CBO’s new cost estimate is much higher than previous estimates and should be a wake up call that current plans to rebuild the nuclear arsenal are unsustainable and must be rethought. Now is the time to stop and ask ourselves: which weapons do we need to maintain deterrence in the future, and which can we do without?

We support a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons are held by other nations. But we do not support rebuilding every weapon in the arsenal just because we have that weapon now. The nuclear arsenal was designed to fight an adversary that disappeared 25 years ago. Current Russian belligerence, although worrisome, does not constitute a renewed Cold War.

We support building an appropriate number of new, nuclear-armed submarines as the most survivable leg of the deterrent. As an insurance policy in case submarine survivability becomes threatened in the future, we also support an appropriate number of new stealth bombers, which would be used primarily for conventional missions but could also be armed with nuclear gravity bombs now being rebuilt.

Beyond that, we think it is time to step back and take a fresh look. It is not clear that the United States needs to arm its bombers with a new generation of nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Similarly, the United States should review plans to replace its ground-based ICBMs. Forgoing a new generation of ICBMs and maintaining the current missiles instead would save $100 billion in production costs alone. Even more importantly, our ICBMs are in danger of being launched in the case of another false alarm (we have experienced three to date), thereby starting a civilization-ending nuclear war by accident. This is not a theoretical problem; we had three false alarms during the Cold War, and on one of those, we narrowly averted a nuclear catastrophe.

The rising cost of rebuilding the nuclear arsenal is a warning that these plans are unaffordable. We should consider all aspects of our nuclear posture, and our conventional forces’ needs, before rushing headlong into these expensive and contentious development programs. We believe too that taking a more prudent course in rebuilding our deterrent systems will help avoid a new arms race with Russia that neither side should want.

Sincerely,

William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense

General James E. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
 
Incredible a single seven paragraph letter can be so trite and at the same time deceptive and manipulative. Massive unilateral disarmament, no mention of China, N. Korea or Iran. Reference to the "Cold War" when we are 90% below deployed strategic warheads.

Including cost of both maintaining existing AND modernizing entire arsenal WITH NO comparison to total defense or government costs over same time frame around $30 trillion in total defense spending and $200 trillion in total government spending.

I was also right about another thing. I've said as soon as they stop the GBSD and LRSO they will target a reduction in the SSBN(X). What do you think "appropriate number" of SSBNs means, it means less than the 12 now proposed.
 
William J. Perry wrote an op-ed in September 30, 2016 issue of The New York Times titled "Why It's Safe to Scrap America's ICBMs"

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/opinion/why-its-safe-to-scrap-americas-icbms.html?_r=0
 
"Why It’s Safe to Scrap Bill Perry’s Advice"
By Adam Lowther & Matthew Costlow
October 16, 2016

Source:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/10/17/why_its_safe_to_scrap_bill_perrys_advice_110217.html

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry recently took to the pages of the New York Times to argue against President Obama’s plan to develop and field the ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD)—a replacement for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The problem with his arguments is that they are dead wrong. Let us explain.

Dr. Perry opens by arguing that ICBMs are Cold War relics that are some of the “most dangerous weapons in the world.” He goes on to argue that “They could even trigger an accidental nuclear war.” Dr. Perry then recounts an experience in which—nearly 40 years ago—the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received a false alert of incoming Soviet ICBMs and correctly verified that there was no Soviet launch.

By suggesting that this false alert could very well have been misinterpreted as an actual attack and led to an accidental nuclear war, Dr. Perry dismisses the perfect track record of nation’s space and land-based early warning systems. The reality of the nation’s nuclear command and control system is such that there are multiple and redundant space-based systems that exist to detect launches of ballistic missiles with much greater accuracy and speed than four decades ago.

Not only are today’s detection systems far better than those of the Carter administration, but any potential launch must be detected and verified by both a space-based detection system and a ground-based radar—specifically to prevent false returns and a subsequent accidental nuclear conflict.

Surprisingly, Dr. Perry blames the ICBMs themselves, rather than the true culprits of human and computer error, for the false alarm. Thus, his solution of scrapping U.S. ICBMs is an ineffective solution to a problem which was corrected long ago.

Thus, when critics of ICBMs suggest that the threat of accidental nuclear conflict is such that the nation cannot afford to have such weapons, they are completely ignoring a complex and redundant detection system that is designed specifically to prevent an accidental launch—which it has never failed to prevent. The United States’ detection systems, in particular, are better today than they have ever been, further reducing the probability of accidental nuclear war.

It is also common for critics of ICBMs to argue that modernizing the nation’s 1970s era ICBMs risks starting an arms race with Russia and China. However, if this is an arms race, then Russia and China have been running for 10 years with their extensive modernization programs while the United States is still tying its shoes at the starting block. Russia and China are both reportedly developing road and rail-mobile ICBMs that are more accurate and have greater ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses. For the first time in its nuclear history China is in the process of fielding an ICBM that will carry multiple nuclear warheads. The reality of the situation is that Russia and China set out on these modernization programs while the United States maintained its one ICBM system for decades beyond its planned life. Some race.

As one of the cheapest legs of the U.S. nuclear triad, ICBMs are a bargain for their deterrent effect. The U.S. will spend less than one percent of its defense budget each year on ICBMs for the foreseeable future while realizing cost savings because the new ICBMs will be cheaper to maintain than the old.

Dr. Perry and other critics also suggest that ICBMs, nuclear-capable bombers, and nuclear ballistic missile submarines are little more than redundant systems. This is like saying that a corvette, pick-up truck, and station wagon are all just cars. In reality, each has a very different and distinct purpose that is not equally performed by the others. The same is true of each leg of the nuclear triad.

ICBMs, for example, are the only leg of the triad that requires that an adversary launches a large-scale nuclear attack on the United States to destroy them. The submarine and bomber legs of the triad can be destroyed by conventional attack—lowering the stakes for attacking them. The strategic effect of requiring a massive attack on the American homeland is that it dramatically raises the bar for any adversary to contemplate such an attack. This is a good thing.

We want a nuclear war to remain unthinkable. Unilateral nuclear cuts do nothing to advance that cause and may, in fact, plant a dark seed of hope in an adversary’s mind.

In the final analysis, Dr. Perry and other critics of ICBMs make assertions that are simply inaccurate. We no longer live in the Cold War, but a much more complex and dangerous world and it is time critics of the ICBM join the rest of us in the present.

Adam Lowther is Director of the School for Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies. Matthew Costlow is a Policy Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed in this article are their own and do not represent the opinions of the U.S. government or any organization with which they are affiliated.
 
Most of CBO's cost estimates come from a very rigorous methodological approach of selecting a particular historical
program and scaling its development and production costs by 10% per decade since the selected program
entered EMD.

This results in absurdities like LRSO LRIP unit cost estimates that are ~5X LRASM LRIP unit costs.
 
"Time To Replace America's Land-Based ICBMs"
May 31, 2017 @ 10:35 PM

by Bruce Dorminey

Source:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2017/05/31/time-to-replace-americas-land-based-icbms/#3f27d16f12ad

For Americans who grew up under the long shadow of the Soviet threat --- during which thermonuclear war was a very real possibility --- our fascination with the Cold War has always been akin to a moth circling a flame.

Even today, the bedrock of American defense policy rests on the U.S.’ land-based ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) arsenal. That is, the 414 Minutemen III missiles which still lay in wait at three air force bases on the Northern tier of America’s western heartland.

“The ICBM force was relatively ignored for many years following the end of the Cold War,” Dana Struckman (Colonel, USAF, ret), an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, told me.

Despite completed major upgrades over the past 15-20 years, the Minuteman III is a 1960s-era weapon system that will continue to age-out and eventually become unsustainable, says Struckman, himself a former missileer and ICBM squadron commander.

Some argue that land-based ICBMs are outdated and altogether unnecessary --- particularly since the lion’s share of America’s nuclear deterrence capability can be achieved with submarines and strategic bombers.

But Struckman argues that having a dispersed ICBM force ensures that any potential enemy is confronted with a vast amount of "target coverage" which he says makes the Minuteman IIIs the most stabilizing piece of the U.S.’ nuclear triad.

ICBMs have long represented the ultimate existential threat in the sense that such thermonuclear fire power could erase Earth’s 7 billion souls held hostage by such technology in one horrific fell swoop. But to be effective, any land-based ICBM arsenal has to have the ability to absorb an enemy first or even second strike and retaliate. Although submarines and bombers have the advantage of mobility, as noted in a 2014 Rand Report for the U.S. Air Force, “Historically, the main threat to ICBMs has always been other ICBMs. Basing its ICBMs in hardened silos has always been the U.S. response to this class of threat.”

But a viable ICBM force requires more than hardened silos . Needed continual upgrades are a fact of life.

“Minuteman III spare parts are often hard to obtain and technology that was used 40 to 50 years ago --- considered cutting edge then --- is now obsolete,” said Struckman.

Recent modernization efforts have essentially rebuilt the missile from top to bottom, says Struckman. He says this included programs to replace the solid fuel in the rocket bodies; upgrade guidance systems; and modify the missile to carry one warhead instead of three. The aim, says Struckman, was to keep the Minuteman III operational through 2030 and perhaps beyond.

“The ground based strategic deterrent program's intent is to replace the Minuteman III and its associated command and control systems,” said Struckman.

The goal is to begin production on the new missile in the late 2020s, with fielding and full operational capability of the new system by the mid-2030s.

At present, Russia has the most deployed nuclear weapons in the world, says Struckman and could still wipe us out in 30 minutes or less. However, in terms of land-based ICBM capability, Struckman ranks the U.S. first; Russia, second; and China, third.

But Struckman emphasizes to maintain this capability will require a sustained investment. To that end, he notes that both Boeing and Northrup Grumman have submitted bids to be the prime contractor for the GBSD program which, in turn, would be run by the U.S. Air Force. The program’s cost estimates range from $63 to $85 billion.

Yet in the face of such high-stakes considerations, $85 billion, or even a $100 billion, should not be an impediment to making sure the U.S. continues to hold a global advantage when it comes to deterring longtime adversaries, such as Russia and China. Not to mention rogue nation states, like North Korea, which appears hell bent on developing their own ICBMs.

And although in mainstream America, globalization has often been a societal whipping boy, as Struckman points out, it may have kept the world out of conflict.

“Globalization has served to highlight the damaging effects that a nuclear war would have on the entire population, not just environmentally but also economically,” said Struckman.

Let’s hope this trend continues.
 
"Nuclear Triad: Pentagon Taking Steps to Modernize Global Strike Weapons"
11/3/2017
By Jon Harper

Source:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/11/3/nuclear-triad-pentagon-taking-steps-to-modernize-global-strike-weapons
 
Perry clearly doesn't understand strategy if he thinks he can unilaterally eliminate 400 aimpoints and free up probably 800 Russian warheads to be used against the remainder of the 'Dyad' and not drastically harm our deterrent against a first strike.
800 freed up warheads would mean US Bomber base escape routes, likely SSBN locations, and certainly SSBN counterbattery strikes after one SLBM is launched would be more at risk, and a strategic gift to the Russian nuclear strike planner.

What the hell is he thinking.
 
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/11/08/rising-nuclear-threats-require-a-modern-deterrent-commentary/
 
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/11/can-two-nuclear-powers-fight-conventional-war/142451/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
 
bobbymike said:
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/11/can-two-nuclear-powers-fight-conventional-war/142451/?oref=defenseone_today_nl

I think they can, to a degree. As long as neither attacks the others' homeland or strategic forces it could be possible. (That pretty much demands that any conflict occur at sea or in a 3rd-party country, which we've seen before. Russia and the US have been on opposite sides, if unofficially, in previous conflicts, and it never went nuclear.) Of course if the US sank a Chinese carrier, or vice versa, that might be pushing the limits. This will almost inevitably turn to politics (this whole scenario is decided by political will) so we might want to steer clear.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/11/can-two-nuclear-powers-fight-conventional-war/142451/?oref=defenseone_today_nl

I think they can, to a degree. As long as neither attacks the others' homeland or strategic forces it could be possible. (That pretty much demands that any conflict occur at sea or in a 3rd-party country, which we've seen before. Russia and the US have been on opposite sides, if unofficially, in previous conflicts, and it never went nuclear.) Of course if the US sank a Chinese carrier, or vice versa, that might be pushing the limits. This will almost inevitably turn to politics (this whole scenario is decided by political will) so we might want to steer clear.
I agree it could turn to politics as inevitably they would be making decisions of escalation. However it can be an interesting discussion as it relates to the South China Sea and areas where clashes might occur. No question carriers are a step too far but a submarine or a few fighters or a destroyer?
 
http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2017/November%202017/To-Give-Trump-Options-Air-Force-Speeds-Up-Nuke-Modernization-.aspx
 
https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/the-new-u-s-nuclear-triad-will-be-a-bargain/
 
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